Ever since China has rolled out its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), policymakers have questioned the durability and positive economic benefits of this enormous set of strategic investments in infrastructure around the world. Nevertheless, the BRI has achieved concrete results in China’s strategic political goals. For example, multiple members of the BRI, El Salvador among others, have switched their recognition of the Republic of China in Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China. The same countries have also started to support China’s aggressive efforts to increase its influence over the South China Sea where it is building artificial islands and promoting the nine-dash line. The nine-dash line is China’s territorial claims over the sea, which would de facto give the West-Asian country entire control over the sea through which a third of the global maritime trade passes, an estimated 3.4 trillion dollar per annum, and which shelters rich hydrocarbon resources underneath its surface. The nine-dash line creates conflict with regional powers such as Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia who have their own territorial claims (albeit not nearly as extensive as China) over the sea.
The BRI is problematic for the European Union as it extends to sixteen countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEEE) of which eleven are EU member states and the other five are West-Balkan states. Therefore, the EU, as a bloc, cannot denounce China’s efforts in the Sea because of shifted loyalties of the CEEE members. This could affect the bloc’s security of in several ways. First, China’s aggressive amoebic nature in the South China Sea might ignite conflict between the sea’s bordering nations. China and countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are the EU’s second and third largest trading partners. Hence, it is of paramount importance for the EU that the ASEAN region remains stable and peaceful. In addition, the EU should protect an equal division of the sea so that the ASEAN countries, trusted allies in security cooperation as well as in the promotion of the rules based order and international institutions, can benefit from its resources rather than China alone.
The European Union is mostly comprised of pocket-sized middle powers and, individually speaking, each nation cannot go toe to toe with a behemoth like China. Rather, they can only instrumentally protect their interests, that of trading nations, in the region through the EU as institution but more importantly as geopolitical player. The countries can exert this influence because the EU has hard and soft diplomatic clout by means of its unity. United the EU is the world’s largest trading bloc and economy and has the second largest defence expenditure in the world. To leverage this power the EU needs to be a united block. As a block these middle powers, in accordance with the United States, can engage in effective (coercive) diplomacy to stabilize the region. Second, losing global diplomatic support in the EU’s quest to divide the South China sea equally among the bordering countries according to The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) weakens the EU’s resolve and undermines the legitimacy of the international institutions that the EU champions. Weakened international institutions will decrease global stability, which invites conflict between and within countries. Increased tensions in other regions of the world negatively affect security issues in European countries through, for example, the increase of terrorism in and from these parts of the world.
To address this issue, the EU released a report in which it criticized the BRI of being unsustainable to the members’ economy, environment, finances, and social welfare. The report also lambasted China for discriminating against EU businesses and for its lack of transparent bidding processes. Additionally, the EU has released an EU-Asia connectivity strategy in order to counter the BRI. This Joint Communication promotes the principles of the international rules based order and sustainable connectivity, and specifically addresses an equal level playing field regarding foreign investments between Asia and Europe. In order to promote these principles, the EU combines financial resources from the private sector and the EU’s External Investment Plan. With respect to the South China Sea, the EU has been relatively passive in this document and in its wider approach as it sees itself as a party that wants to deploy peaceful diplomatic resources to address the dispute. Although this might be the least confrontational option, it does not prevent the aforementioned security threats that might arise from a passive approach.
So what more can be done? Most of the Central and Eastern European countries that are part of the 16+1 format, countries approached by China to establish stronger economic ties, align themselves with China not out of want but rather out of necessity. Therefore, the EU must be willing (to some extent) to match Chinese investments and as such countries should urge the European Investment Bank to finance big infrastructure projects in these countries. For example, despite having a signed memorandum with a Chinese firm, there is still an outstanding public tender for Romania’s Tarnita-Lapustesti hydroelectric powerplant. This invites opportunity for the EU to reclaim its member’s alignment and trust especially as Romania itself states that “We have signed a memorandum withe a Chinese partner for its construction, but we respect the European transparency principle and this is why we tender the project.” The EU should proactively demonstrate inclination to help other members of the 16+1 format in order to reduce Chinese influence. Furthermore, the EU should not limit its efforts in the South China Sea to merely possible diplomatic involvement. Rather it should persistently promote UNCLOS in joint public statements and open investigations to all parties’ claims under UNCLOS. Additionally, the EU should engage in coercive diplomacy through deployment of their naval vessels in the South China Sea to demonstrate their resolve for international maritime law in all parts of the world. Lastly, the EU can cease military cooperation, block Chinese vessels from European ports and increase cooperation with ASEAN countries in order to strengthen their claims in the sea.
