Connect with us

Europe

Russia–Germany: Crisis of Political Confidence as a Factor in Asymmetrical Relations

Published

on

In 2020, Germany and Russia celebrate several important anniversaries in their bilateral relations, marking events that did much to lay the foundations of the two states’ current cooperation: 65 years since diplomatic relations were established between the Federative Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 50 years since the Treaty of Moscow was signed, 30 years since the reunification of Germany and the signing of the founding agreements related to this, including Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany and Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Good-Neighbourliness, Partnership and Cooperation. They were signed in August–November. In these months of the anniversary year, the bilateral relations are facing major tests.

Officially, the stages in Russia–Germany relations are measured not in anniversaries but in legislative periods of Germany’s governmental coalitions that formulate their own four-year foreign political agenda. Traditionally, Russia is part of this agenda and Germany’s programme in relation to Russia is determined by the factional makeup of the German Government, the current international situation and the domestic political processes in Russia. The latest coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU bloc and the SPD was concluded for the period between March 2018 and September 2021. It contains statements about Russia violating the European world order (“annexation” of Crimea, intervention in the east of Ukraine), about there being great potential for civil and public dialogue and economic cooperation, about Germany’s commitment to the idea of a common space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. The coalition members believe that “Germany is sincerely interested in good relations with Russia and in close cooperation with a view to ensuring peace and resolving important international problems” though “Russia’s current politics compel us to be particularly careful and flexibly stable. … The goal of our Russian policy remains: a return to relations based on mutual confidence and a peaceful balance of interests allowing the parties to once again achieve close cooperation.”

Moscow’s relations with Germany are determined by Russia’s foreign policy concepts, the latest of which was adopted on November 30, 2016. Among the EU states, Germany has traditionally been assigned the place of the leading partner and a revitalization of mutually advantageous bilateral relations with that partner is viewed as an important resource for “promoting Russia’s national interests in European and global affairs.”

The first two and a half years of the current German coalition government’s legislative period were marked by a series of events that had a major effect on the political backdrop for the bilateral cooperation. The Salisbury incident of March 4, 2018 (“the Skripal affair”) resulted in the “collective West” states, including Germany, expelling Russian diplomats, adopting new sanctions, with Berlin, particularly the Aussenamt, and developing negative sentiments toward Moscow. This all coincided with the new governmental coalition starting its work on March 14 and Russia’s “new old” president being elected on March 18. Under such difficult circumstances, Russian and German leaders continued their constructive communication largely based in a mostly closed-door meeting held in Sochi in early May 2017. Details of another meeting between Vladimir Putin and Angela Merkel held in the same city in May 2018, as well as the working discussion of topical questions in Meseberg, were also not revealed to the public, yet they shaped generally positive sentiments that contributed significantly to smoothing out the influence the March events had had on shaping the anti-Russian sentiments in Germany’s political community and media. Regular meetings held in 2018 between heads of various agencies (primarily foreign ministries) were also conducive to positivity.

On August 23, 2019, Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, a Georgian citizen of Chechen origin, was killed in Berlin. This also engendered negativity as it resulted in further exacerbation of diplomatic relations and in the expulsion of two Russian diplomats in December 2019. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reciprocated.

On January 11, 2020, Angela Merkel made an unexpected visit to Moscow and discussed topical problems in international relations with Vladimir Putin. At the same time, the two states’ foreign ministers also held a meeting. The German politicians’ visit confirmed that Berlin was ready to continue the constructive dialogue. The coronavirus pandemic that broke out in March pushed most bilateral issues into the background somewhat.

In mid-May, Angela Merkel expressed her highly negative personal opinion concerning the cyberattack on the Bundestag in the spring of 2015, which German special services believed to have been organized by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Even though the experts at the Federal Criminal Police Office confined themselves to stating that “this fact is highly likely,” without providing incontrovertible proof, Berlin adopted this version as “final and incontrovertible.”

On July 1, 2020, Germany assumed the presidency of the Council of the European Union. Its Presidency Programme has only one paragraph on Russia, stating that relations with Russia need to be actively formed on the basis of the EU’s five principles (the 2016 Mogherini principles) and that their implementation needs to be analyzed. On May 27, 2020, the Federal Chancellor delivered a speech at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Berlin focusing a lot on Russia. While emphasizing the objective importance their bilateral relations have for both states, the Chancellor reminded her audience that she had, from the outset, had a critical constructive attitude to the bilateral dialogue and to the importance of respecting the values and recognized international rules that, in her opinion, Russia “has repeatedly violated.” Consequently, Berlin will “speak out” against subsequent breaches of these by Moscow. Simultaneously, within the framework of its value-based approach, Germany sees opportunities for new impetus in the development of bilateral relations, including such areas as climate protection and global healthcare.

The August 20 incident with Alexei Navalny was a litmus test for the true level of anti-Russian sentiments in some parts of Germany’s political community. This time, the paper turned dark purple. “The Salisbury spirit” made a comeback to the public discourse with active support from some EU capitals. There were insistent voices calling for “punishing the Kremlin” by imposing sanctions on, among other things, Nord Stream II, up to and including shutting the project down. Moscow has no success in its attempts to transform those unfounded and harshly formulated demands and accusations into a constructive discussion: Berlin saw a clear violation of its values and legal rules that, in her May speech, the Chancellor referred to as being possible. At the same time, in his message of greetings to Angela Merkel and Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the 30th anniversary of Germany’s reunification, Vladimir Putin confirmed “Russia’s invariable commitment to dialogue and interaction with German partners on the pressing issues on the bilateral and international agenda.”

Against the backdrop of clearly dubious proof of “the Russian authorities once again using chemical weapons” to eliminate undesirable persons, the ”collective West” continued to apply unprecedented pressure; in October 2013, it prompted Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to make several harsh statements to the effect that Russia could stop communicating with the European Union. Let us note that, officially, the EU put a freeze on the top-level dialogue from the spring of 2014. The same applies to Russia–EU summits and intergovernmental consultations with EU states. Yet, Russia’s working consultations with individual states, primarily Germany and France, continue. The inter-parliamentary dialogue has never stopped. Moreover, the Russian-German High-level Working Group on strategic economic and financial cooperation resumed its meetings in June 2016, while the inter-agency High-Level Working Group on Security Policy resumed its meetings in November 2018. Clearly, neither party is interested in having their communications come to a halt.

Both Brussels and Berlin heard Sergey Lavrov, but it did not prevent them, on October 15, 2020, from imposing EU sanctions on six high-ranking Russian officials and on a research institution. These sanctions had been proposed by the France–Germany tandem. On October 15 2018, the Council of the EU adopted a mechanism for imposing restrictions as part of combating use and proliferation of chemical weapons. This mechanism served as the legal grounds for the sanctions: the EU celebrated the second anniversary of this mechanism in style. On October 22, Brussels imposed sanctions on two Russian citizens for having allegedly participated in organizing a cyberattack on the Bundestag.

On October 17, Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas noted that the EU had adopted appropriate sanctions, that Brussels was ready to respond henceforth to “Russia’s unacceptable actions,” while also admitting that no one was interested in cutting off the dialogue with Moscow as this dialogue is required for resolving conflicts, including those in Libya, Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh and elsewhere. Nonetheless, on October 26, Andrea Sasse, a German Foreign Ministry spokesperson, responded negatively to Vladimir Putin’s suggestion that a moratorium be imposed on deploying land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in Europe. Agreeing with NATO’s Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, she believed this initiative did not inspire confidence. On October 27, in an interview with the Croatian newspaper Vecernji List, Sergey Lavrov confirmed his previous statements, saying, “I hope our European colleagues will have the wisdom, vision and pure common sense, so that our dialogue with the European Union and its member states is fully restored on the basis of the principles of neighbourly relations, good faith, predictability and openness.” On October 28, Russia’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs commented on Andrea Sasse’s remarks, pointing out, in particular, that this was “a typical example of a biased and, in fact, knee-jerk reaction, no effort being made to understand what the Russian proposal is about.”

In the year that marks the 75th anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War, the European Union and its member states have begun distorting history, including the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over Nazism. For instance, the resolution the Bundestag adopted on October 9 on bolstering the memory of war victims stipulates creating a new historical and memorial centre about Nazi crimes. The text of the resolution suggests the likelihood of distorting the historical memory and using the centre to instrumentalize insinuations “equating the Soviet Union with the Third Reich when it comes to unleashing the war,” which, from Russia’s point of view, is absolutely impermissible.

As of early November 2020, relations between Russia, Germany and the EU are still based on the “selective engagement” principle, with the European participants having no clearly defined strategic approach to the development of these relations. Germany apparently has no conceptual framework for working in this area and, in its presidency of the Council of the EU, Germany has essentially abandoned its opportunity to spearhead a discussion of the contents of future interaction to which there are no alternatives.

Clearly, Moscow and Berlin will continue their working contacts on political matters, although these contacts will have as their backdrop a profound crisis of confidence crisis and a minimal level of understanding on a series of controversial issues (cyberattacks, Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, Alexei Navalny). Yet, that circumstance will not significantly affect the Normandy format or the cooperation on the Syrian, Libyan, Iranian and other tracks.

The paradox of today’s crisis of relations is that it is taking place against the background of decent (despite the effect of the coronavirus pandemic) relations in other areas, such as the economy, culture, science and education. In recent years, these have received an additional impetus to development.

Back in 2014, Russia and Germany’s foreign ministries launched a new format, a Russian-German Cross Year, which was intended to boost bilateral cooperation in specific areas. The first years were dedicated to language and literature, youth exchanges, and regional and municipal cooperation.

The Russian-German Year of Scientific and Educational Partnerships was held in 2018–2020. The events that year bolstered cooperation in inter-university interactions, cutting-edge research and support for young scientists and innovations. Currently, about 1,000 joint university partnerships are functioning, involving 203 German and 233 Russian universities, as well as 33 organizations with other status, and their numbers are constantly rising. Russia is Germany’s ninth-largest partner in this area.

Since July 2017, the German Government has been protecting the principles of European energy security and sovereignty and attempting, for that purpose, to counter the consistent steps taken by the US Administration (and their EU supporters) against Nord Stream II. Yet, that opposition has thus far not been particularly effective. In early 2020, Washington first succeeded in having the construction of the gas pipelines suspended; subsequently, threatening extra-territorial sanctions against the current and future project partners, the US put a question mark over the project being completed/ the pipeline being put into operation. In early August 2020, EU Ambassador to Russia Markus Ederer said that the EU was designing a mechanism that would “also ensure that the EU becomes more resilient to exterritorial sanctions by third countries,” including Washington’s possible economic restrictions against Nord Stream II. The “Communication on Strengthening the EU’s Financial and Economic Sovereignty” is to be ready by the end of 2020.

In June 2019, the economic ministers of both states signed a Memorandum on Partnership for Efficiency based on provisions from the position paper of the Eastern Committee of the German Economy (January 2019) intended for developing cooperation in principal economic areas such as energy, climate protection, nuclear security, outer space, healthcare, support for small- and medium-sized enterprises, further professional training, digitization, agriculture, visa liberalization, etc. In February 2020, in Berlin, Germany’s Minister for Economic Affairs Peter Altmaier and Russia’s Minister for Industry and Trade Denis Manturov agreed to form a joint energy group.

In December 2019, the EU adopted the European Green Deal mandating a transition to a climate-neutral economy for EU member states by 2050; this deal became a challenge for Russia–Germany cooperation. Interaction with Germany on hydrogen energy could be a promising area for cooperation. Even though Germany and the EU’s hydrogen strategies do not mention Russia, there is every objective reason for Russia to find a niche in that sphere. The Eastern Committee of the German Economy and the German-Russian Chamber of Commerce (GRCC) deserve credit for bringing this matter up in their reports in early July 2020. On September 17, the GRCC formed a Hydrogen Initiative Group with a view to determining and promoting Russian and German companies’ pilot projects. On October 12, the Russian Government approved a “roadmap” for developing Russian hydrogen energy, which envisages active involvement by Russia in international cooperation.

The obvious challenges entailed by the Green Deal include introducing carbon tariffs intended to bar imported goods manufacture of which produces considerable СО2 emissions. Many Russian businesses had prepared in advance for this contingency by investing heavily in reducing their emissions, in waste treatment facilities and in circular technologies. Even so, they face an uphill battle as they attempt to convince EU officials that their products meet the European requirements. Today, Brussels mostly believes that all Russia-made goods leave a large carbon footprint.

Actually, Russia is arriving at comprehending, at all levels, that there are no alternatives to environmental thinking and conduct. For several years running, there have been successful Russian-German projects for introducing the most accessible technologies, primarily in the sectors that produce the biggest amounts of СО2. Despite certain difficulties, cooperation has been launched in environmentally friendly waste disposal and processing. Individual regions are becoming increasingly interested in environmental protection measures, building sustainable energy sources, in particular wind farms. Energy-saving technologies are being used in constructing new buildings and facilities. German companies have good opportunities for participating in Russia’s “green” modernization, though this has only just been launched.

Falling global energy prices and the rigid restrictions Germany and Russia have imposed on the movement of capital, services, and manpower have resulted in a decline in mutual trade estimated at up to 25% at the end of 2020. Drops in Russian exports to Germany are several times greater than drops in German exports to Russia since the two states’ economic cooperation is still largely tied to the energy sector, whose economic agents determine a significant part of foreign trade flows and mutual investment flows. Foreign trade is being restructured at a very slow rate owing, among other things, to the inadequate pace of Russian economic reforms and creation of a critical mass of competitive small- and medium-sized businesses. The state is taking steps to support the economic agents’ exports performance and incentive mechanisms are becoming more effective, but this is clearly not enough to achieve a qualitative breakthrough.

Even though the number of German businesses in Russia has fallen by about a third, the German business community remains the biggest and best organized among all foreign communities as it is continuing to invest and lobby its members’ interests. They name bureaucracy and protectionism on the part of the Russian authorities among the most prominent negative factors. In recent months, visa restrictions imposed in connection with the pandemic have become a significant obstacle. The GRCC obtains exceptions and charters special flights, but this does not solve the mobility problem for German top managers and for skilled professionals that assemble and service German-made equipment. The situation will clearly not improve during the second wave of the pandemic.

Russian companies in Germany have recently also faced frequent non-market problems but, unlike their German partners, they do not have such powerful support as that provided by the Eastern Committee and the German-Russian Chamber of Commerce, which can set up a direct dialogue between the country’s leaders and major entrepreneurs.

In conclusion, it is important to remind our readers that the year of Germany in Russia was officially inaugurated in late September. It will feature various events intended to introduce Russians to the culture and cutting-edge economic, educational and scientific achievements of Russia’s principal European partner. This year, Germany itself will experience difficult societal, economic and political developments that will shape electoral sentiment at the 2021 elections to the Bundestag, Landtags and local councils. The elections to the Bundestag will bring a new governmental coalition and a new chancellor and officially introduce a new period in Russia-Germany relations. On the one hand, Germany’s new leadership will assume a harder stance towards the Kremlin. On the other hand, following the initial interaction between the states’ leaders, there will be an opportunity for a joint search for a common denominator in both states’ interests and for ways of gradually emerging from the current crisis of confidence and achieving an understanding on the critical points on strategic issues and areas. Both sides already need to be preparing for this.

From our partner RIAC

Ph.D in Economics, Deputy Director of the RAS Institute for Europe, Head of the Country and Regional Researches Department, Head of the German Research Center

Continue Reading
Comments

Europe

The new Silk Road: The agreement between the EU and China opens up new geopolitics scenarios

Published

on

The year that has just started does not seem destined to be more peaceful than the one that has just ended.

While the world continues to be afflicted by the Covid-19 pandemic, the United States, which can boast to be “the oldest democracy” of the modern era, is not only helplessly suffering from the virus attack but is going through an unprecedented internal crisis that seriously calls into question its coveted role as world superpower.

On January 6 last, the Capitol Hill in Washington was assaulted by a crowd of “Trump supporters” who, inflamed by the subversive words of a President who does not seem to resign himself to electoral defeat, violently stormed the House in a bid to stop Congress from counting electoral votes to certify President-elect Joe Biden’s victory in last November election. The attack brought America back to the dark times of Abraham Lincoln’s first election when, in 1860, eleven Southern States refused to recognize the electoral result and started an attempt to disrupt the Republic that resulted in a bloody civil war.

Donald Trump’s reckless adventurism which, in the coming days, could lead to his ousting, is not only causing a deep crisis in the internal set-up of the American society and its institutions, but also risks seriously undermining America’s credibility globally and leading to a major downsizing of its geopolitical ambitions.

Throughout his four years in office, Donald Trump has attempted to “contain” China economically and politically, by imposing tariffs and duties on Chinese goods imported into the United States and supporting the “democracy movement” in Hong Kong that has been causing unrest in the former British colony for almost two years. By inciting his supporters to challenge and oppose the Presidential handover, he has handed a propaganda weapon on a silver platter to a country like China that, after being the first to be hit by the pandemic, was also the first to emerge successfully from it.

While recalling that when protesters stormed and ravaged Hong Kong’s Capitol Hill in 2019, both Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Democrat Nancy Pelosi, applauded the protesters’ violent behaviour, it was easy for the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, to accuse the Americans of “double standards” in the moral and political assessment of their own and others’ behaviours.

In a press conference convened to comment on the Washington attack on Capitol Hill, Hua Chunyingsaid: “I believe that this assault is a déjà vu … I see that in the United States there are different reactions to what happens at home compared to what happened in Hong Kong in 2019 …”.

Over and above propaganda skirmishes, in the year in which the centenary of the CPC’s is celebrated, China keeps on scoring points in its favour in the geopolitical and economic competition with the United States.

On December 30, 2020, the news of the historic investment agreement between China and the European Union was reported.

After seven years of negotiations, during a conference call between Chinese President Xi Jinping and the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von Der Leyen, with French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, the “Comprehensive Agreement on Investments” (CAI) was adopted.

It is a historic agreement that opens a new “Silk Road” between Europe and the huge Chinese market.

The CAI’s basic principles aim at a substantial rebalancing of trade between Europe and China, as the latter has so far shown little openness towards the former.

With this agreement, China is opening up to Europe in many significant sectors, with particular regard to manufacturing and services.

In these sectors China commits itself to removing rules that have so far strongly discriminated against European companies, by ensuring legal certainty for those who intend to produce in China, as well as aligning European and Chinese companies at regulatory level, and encouraging the establishment of joint ventures and the signing of trade and production agreements.

In the manufacturing field, the “automotive” sector will be boosted, with specific reference to the production of electric cars, but also to the production of chemical products, materials for telecommunications and new generation health devices.

As far as the servicesector is concerned, China will foster European investment in cloud services, financial services, private healthcare and the services related to air and maritime transport.

In all the sectors covered by CAI, European investors and producers will no longer suffer any discrimination with respect to Chinese competitors, including state-owned companies, nor will they be denied access to productive sectors so far forbidden to foreigners.

The agreement also provides for guarantees that will make easier for European companies to deal with the paperwork needed to fulfil all administrative procedures and obtain legal authorizations, thus removing the bureaucratic obstacles that have traditionally made the operation of European companies in China difficult.

It is the first time in its history that China opens up in this way to foreign companies and investment.

In view of attracting them, China is committed to lining up in terms of labour costs and environmental protection, thus progressively aligning its standards with European ones, in terms of fight against pollution and trade union rights.

With a view to making this commitment concrete and visible, China adheres to both the Paris Climate Agreements and the European Convention on Labour Organization.

While commenting on the signing of the agreement, President Von Der Leyen stressed that “this is a fundamental step in our relations with China. The agreement will provide European investors with unprecedented access to the Chinese market, thus enabling our business to grow and create jobs. It also commits China to adhering to the principles of transparency and non-discrimination and fundamentally rebalances our economic relations with China.

The China-Europe agreement is another piece in the mosaic of commercial and political relations on which China wants to build the geopolitical role of a nation which, according to growth estimates, is destined to reach the first place in the world ranking in terms of GDP by the end of the decade.

In fact, CAI follows by just a month the signing of the “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership” (RCEP), an agreement of strategic importance signed by China with the ten ASEAN countries and with Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

The RCEP has been described as “the world’s largest trade and investment bloc” and essentially creates an area of economic cooperation and free trade involving 2.2 billion people producing 28%of world trade and over 30% of global GDP.

The RCEP countries account for 50% of the world’s manufacturing output, 50% of automobile production and 70% of electronics. The RCEP eliminates 90% of tariffs on trade in the signatories’ region, thus creating a huge Asian free trade area that sees, on the one hand, India’s marginalization and, on the other, the growth of China’s role throughout East Asia.

The CAI agreements with Europe and the RCEP agreements with Asian partners undoubtedly mark a historic turning point in relations between China and the rest of the world. The United States remains excluded from these relations, as it is currently blocked in a process of transition that limits not only its democratic activity, but also its operativity and international credibility.

After the hallmark of U.S. foreign policy in Trump’s era was reduced to imposing tariffs on trade with China, the gradual loss of credibility of the U.S. administration has stultified Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s attempts to gather a broad international anti-Chinese coalition led by the United States.

The RCEP is there to demonstrate how fragile the U.S. attempts to counter China economically and politically have been, as two once strategic partners of the United States like South Korea and Australia have literally turned a deaf ear to American appeals and have struck a historic and strategic deal with China.

The CAI puts Europe in communication and in ever closer connection with what for centuries was “The Middle Kingdom”, i.e. a China that has chosen to lower its ideological barriers in order to open up new pathways of economic progress and hopefully democratic development.

French and German representatives were present at the CAI signing.

While Europe was opening the “new Silk Road”, the country that gave birth to De Gasperi, one of the founding fathers of the European Union, and to Marco Polo, protagonist of the opening of the first “Silk Road”, was conspicuously absent from the negotiation table.

Continue Reading

Europe

Has Germany Lost its NATO Compass?

Published

on

Authors: Dr. Zlatko Hadžidedić, Adnan Idrizbegović

By the end of 2020, a strange information appeared in Bosnian and German media: having made unilateral concessions to the long campaign of Russia to put an end to the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Germany now wants to overthrow the current High Representative, Valentin Inzko, and bring the OHR under control of its own man, Christian Schmidt. Does this bilateral initiative have any legal basis? And, is this petty manoeuvre in the Balkans going to open Pandora’s box on the global level, again?

The Office of the High Representative was established in 1995 by the Dayton Peace Accords, to exercise the remaining10% of the Bosnian state sovereignty, which has in 90% been ceded to the two ethnically defined sub-state units, the so-called entities. As such, High Representative has the authority to overpower blockades and vetoes introduced by the entities. High Representative is an inseparable part of Bosnia’s Dayton Constitution, no less than the entities and their veto power. In that sense, the Russian campaign to eliminate the Office of the High Representative while preserving the entities and their veto power is legally absurd: one cannot take one part of a contract out, while insisting on implementation of the rest; for, taking one part out nullifies a contract altogether. However, implementation of the Russian requests under the given conditions of the Dayton Constitution would destroy the last remnants of the Bosnian sovereignty and integrity, granting full sovereignty to the entities and resulting in Bosnia’s dissolution. Russia, acting for years as a self-proclaimed supporter of Serbia and its interests to dissolve Bosnia, does not introduce any novelty in its foreign policy in the Balkans. Yet, what is going on with Germany, a NATO member, an EU leader, and a self-promoted supporter of Bosnia’s sovereignty and integrity?

It should be noted that a High Representative can be replaced only by decision of the UN Security Council, under recommendation of the Peace Implementation Council, a body for implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords consisting of diplomatic representatives of the US, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference represented by Turkey. The UN Security Council decisions can be reached only by consensus of the permanent members with veto power. Decisions of the Peace Implementation Council can also be reached only by consensus of its original members (US, UK, France, Russia, Germany, Italy). It is, therefore, legally absurd, again, to replace a High Representative by a bilateral agreement between Russia and Germany, without any such consensus. It would mean a violation, if not elimination, of all legal procedures, not only those referring to the institution of High Representative, but also those related to the Security Council and the UN as a whole. Indeed, what happened to the German foreign policy, hitherto absolutely devoted to international legal procedures and international law?

An explanation for the German change of course, presented in both Bosnian and German media, was German increasing dependence on Russian gas supply, bearing in mind that Germany has given up all alternatives to the Nord Stream pipeline, which delivers Russian gas to Germany. Once upon a time, the former German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, strongly advocated an alternative pipeline, called Nabucco, which would bring Iranian gas to Germany and the rest of Europe. On the other side, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who eventually became Chairman of the Board of both Nord Stream AG and Rosneft, a Russian oil corporation, advocated the Nord Stream pipeline as the preferential one. Eventually, Schroeder had enough luck to have a comprehensive anti-Iranian coalition (ranging from Russia to the US) on his side, so that the Nabucco project was eventually abandoned and the Nord Stream remained the only option. At the time, Schroeder was criticised by German media for linking his private interests with strategic interests of Russia: for, the company Nord Stream AG, of which he was the Chairman, was in 51% owned by the Russian corporation Gazprom. In this way, Schroeder made Germany dependent not only on Russian gas supply, but also on Russian geostrategic interests, articulated by the Kremlin and Gazprom. Schroeder’s personal friendship with Russian President, Vladimir Putin, did not pass unnoticed, either. In this way, Germany not only gave up its own energetic sovereignty, but also abandoned the official EU energetic security strategy, which stipulates diversification of energy supply sources. Schroeder thus intentionally buried the traditional German Ostpolitik; but what was the reason for the next German government, led by Angela Merkel and controlled by the CDU/CSU coalition, to adopt the same course? What has happened to the German geostrategic orientation? Has Germany lost its NATO compass?  

After the disastrous consequences of the 1973 oil crisis, German government invested heavily in construction of gigantic oil and gas storages, with a strategic goal to control negative effects of permanent oil price fluctuations on the German economy and population. Yet, these storages have eventually ended up in ownership of the Russian oil and gas giant, Gazprom. Such a development has given Gazprom effective control of the German energy market. Consequently, it has given Gazprom and Russia strategic influence on the entire economy of the European Union. One can only wonder, why has Germany decided to deliver not only its own destiny, but also that of Europe, to Russia? And then, no wonder that Great Britain has opted for Brexit to simply run away – this time, not from the Brussels bureaucracy, but from the Kremlin’s oilgarchy and Russian energocracy.

This U-turn in geopolitical orientation, unilaterally performed by Germany but tacitly agreed upon by the rest of the EU countries, certainly generates shockwaves throughout the Euro-Atlantic structures, inevitably separating Europe from the Atlanticist part of its identity. In this context, the most loyal American allies among the NATO members, Turkey and Germany, have turned their backs on the US and started looking at Russia as a new strategic partner. Both of them utilised the crisis of leadership in the US, caused by President Trump, to reclaim their sovereignty and decide which side to turn to. Since Trump has managed to disable the entire global security architecture as constructed after the World War II, attacking all multilateral organisations and treaties and thus opening the gates of the West for the Russians and Chinese to enter, German and Turkish re-orientation can be justified as rational. Yet, a bitter taste of betrayal – by Germany, by Turkey, but no less by Trump – lingers on. Does it mean that America, under Donald Trump, has eventually lost the Cold War, as Russia had once lost it under Boris Yeltsin? Will American influence be reduced to the English-speaking world? Is Germany, together with Russia, establishing a new, Eurasian Union? Is China going to be a part of it, given its hasty trade deal with the EU? Has the worst Anglo-American nightmare, that of a united Eurasian “World Island”, finally come true? Or the current German-Russian pact is going to end up like the previous one, smashed under the weight of the Anglo-American axis?

Global Pandora’s box has obviously been opened and the world geopolitical order, as we knew it, has fallen apart. A new order, or perhaps a disorder, is approaching. Such a development can be detected at all levels, looking at the top or at the bottom, and is signalled even by the clumsy German attempt to court the Russians by abandoning fundamental legal principles and its own foreign policy postulates in a seemingly insignificant place like Bosnia. Strangely, both Germany and Russia have accepted to play the roles assigned to them in the 1990s by the then British propaganda, which labelled them as patrons of Croatia and Serbia in their efforts to carve up Bosnia along the lines of its multiple religious identities. Whereas Russia openly adopted its role as the protector of the Orthodox Serbs many years ago, Germany’s adoption of the parallel role, that of the protector of the Catholic Croats, is a relative novelty. While in the 1990s both Germany and Russia were reluctant to play the roles casted by others, now they have become eager to demonstrate their rising power through such a game. The attempted appointment of Christian Schmidt leaves no place for doubt that Germany has fallen into this trap with a surplus of enthusiasm. For, the former German Minister of Agriculture, and a member of the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU),was publicly decorated by Croatia with a medal of “Order of Ante Starčević” for his promotion of Croatian national interests. He proudly shares this medal with prominent Croatian ultra-nationalists and war criminals, such as Gojko Šušak, Mate Boban, Dario Kordić, Jadranko Prlić, and many others, who were inspired by the Croatian Ustash a regime from the World War II, as much as the Ustashas themselves had been inspired by the then German Nazi regime. In this context, it should be noted that Schmidt’s inclinations are not derived from some religious, pan-Catholic sentiments, but rather from his ideological, ultra-nationalist affinities, for which he was rewarded by his ideological brethren. If appointed a High Representative, Schmidt will probably follow the same path, so he will promote interests of Croatian ultra-nationalists, whose goal is to cede a part of the Bosnian territory and make it a part of Croatia, rather than interests of Catholics in Bosnia. Does it imply that he is going to work together with ultra-nationalists of all sorts – and there are enough of them in Bosnia – on the country’s final dissolution? Is that outcome in Germany’s best interest, and what kind of image does Germany project if it sends Schmidts as its representatives? Finally, what message does Germany leave to the world, if it takes the advantage of the uncertain power transition in America to prepare dissolution of a US-sponsored international treaty, the Dayton Peace Accords, thereby introducing, with a help of Russia, a new era of lawlessness?

There are so many questions to which German authorities should offer valid answers, before they pull the trigger to assassinate both Dayton and Bosnia, and destroy some of the last remnants of the international order. Do they think that they owe these answers to the rest of us?

Continue Reading

Europe

How does the UK-Spain Deal Saves Gibraltar from a Hard Brexit

Published

on

The new year’s eve brought Spain and Britain to reach a last minute deal making Gibraltar part of the Schengen zone even though it is a British overseas territory. Located at the southern tip of the Iberian Peninsula and bordered by Spain on the north, Madrid and London were engaged for months in diplomatic negotiations over the post-Brexit future of Gibraltar. Now this deal ensures that Gibraltar is not separated from Europe from a hard border.

Gibraltar

The name Gibraltar is derived from Arabic word Jabal Tariq translated as Mount of Tariq. In 1713, it came under the power of Britain after the kingdom of Spain ceded Gibraltar in the Treaty of Utrecht and has remained with Britain since then. Located at a strategic location, Gibraltar was used as a key base during the Napoleonic wars and its importance grew with the opening of Suez canal. Thereafter, Gibraltar was fortified and earned the title, ‘the Rock.’ During the second world war, it became one of the bases for the allies.

After the war, in the 1950s, Spain claimed sovereignty on Gibraltar following which the 1967 Gibraltar sovereignty referendum voted to remain with Britain. Even during the referendum of 2002, people of Gibraltar voted against shared sovereignty by Britain and Spain. Gibraltar has thus remained as a Britain overseas territory and the citizens have British citizenship.The governance of Gibraltar is managed by its own government through a parliament. Britain governs on matters of defence and foreign policy.

Britain (including Gibraltar) became part of the European Union in 1973. It was the only  British Overseas Territory included in the European Union. In the 2016 UK European Union membership, 96% of the Gibraltarians voted to remain, however since a total of  51.9% of the votes in the UK was cast in favour of leaving the EU, Brexit followed. Gibraltarians mainly voted ‘Remain’ because the territory’s economy depends on an open border with Spain, which sends over 15,000 workers and 200 trucks there daily. UK’s withdrawal from the European Union also implies Gibraltar’s exit from European Union.

The UK-Spain Deal

Brexit left Gibraltar with a hard border situation with the EU. With the UK-Spain Deal, Gibraltar is being placed in the Schengen area, with Spain acting as a guarantor and it will follow other EU rules. This will restore free movement of people across Gibraltar and EU, meaning citizens of EU and Gibraltar can move across without passport checks. The Gibraltar deal will mean the EU sending Frontex border guards to facilitate free movement to and from Gibraltar. Their role is planned to last four years.

The agreement between Madrid and London has been signed off on an agreement in principle. So it remains to see what the nitigrities of the deal would mean for all parties. British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has said that, “we reached agreement on a political framework to form the basis of a separate treaty between the UK and the EU regarding Gibraltar. We will now send this to the European Commission, in order to initiate negotiations on the formal treaty. In the meantime, all sides are committed to mitigating the effects of the end of the Transition Period on Gibraltar, and in particular ensure border fluidity, which is clearly in the best interests of the people living on both sides.”

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Trending