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Chile’s plebiscite: Optimism, yet there remains a long road ahead to achieve social reform

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Image credit: Sandra Cuffe/Al Jazeera

In a groundbreaking plebiscite held on 25 October, Chileans went to the polls to vote whether to uphold or replace the Pinochet-era constitution. An overwhelming majority of 78% voted in favor to draft a new constitution and to hold a constituent assembly to draw up this new document. Elections for the candidates who will partake in the constituent assembly will take place in April. But, why did Chileans vote so massively in favor of a new constitution? And how will these events unfold?

The Pinochet-era Constitution

To understand the importance of this vote and specifically why most Chileans voted to draft a new constitution we have to go back to 1973, when Chile suffered a US-backed military coup at the hands of General Augusto Pinochet, who then ruled the country from 1973 to 1991. Pinochet made sweeping neoliberal economic reforms kowtowing to the United States’ ultraliberal economists from the University of Chicago under leadership of Nobel prize winner Milton Friedman, dubbed the Chicago Boys. The Chicago Boys used the Southern Cone country as their neoliberal playground and the country implemented radical neoliberal reforms by imposing minimalist state intervention policies, the privatization of public goods, market liberalization and fiscal and monetary austerity measures. This fueled the fires of growing inequality as prices for privatized services such as education, pensions and healthcare skyrocketed. Consequently, the cost of living in Chile rose and wealth was concentrated in the hands of the rich elites.

More importantly, these neoliberal policies were embedded into Chilean society since Pinochet drafted a new constitution in 1980 that enshrined these philosophies. Many Chileans, however, consider this constitution fraudulent and an abomination to their civil rights.They argue that the constitution was drafted by a dictator during a repressive regime which embodied torture, extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses. Moreover, they claim that the process in which the constitution got written and implemented was unjust. First, the full political spectrum was not consulted. Opponents, mainly leftist parties, were not included in the drafting process. Second, the plebiscite itself was rigged as the state had exclusive control over the media, which it used for intense propaganda campaigns. Additionally, the state were able to manipulate the voting process through double-voting and the disappearance of registers.

After Pinochet stepped down in 1991, Chile’s faith in democratic politics was not restored. The old established political parties and the elites decided to adhere to the dictator-era constitution. The feeling of apathy crystallized when the Rettig Report (officially called the National Committee for Truth and Reconciliation Report), designed to investigate the human rights abuses under Pinochet, proved disappointing as reparation programs for victims and investigations into perpetrators were limited or dismissed entirely. Roughly 75% of Chileans believe no reconciliation about the Pinochet-era has been achieved. This is significant considering that under Pinochet’s iron rule 3,000 died or went missing, 40,000 suffered human rights abuses, and 200,000 fled the country.

A Long Overdue Response

Despite several constitutional amendments, the last of which occurred in 2017, the constitution still did not represent the political ideals important to Chileans. An undercurrent of dissatisfaction and political aversion remained present, and when President Sebastián Piñera announced the increase of the nation’s underground fare last year, protests erupted. First, the students started marching the streets of Santiago in protest, but soon after, cross-section of Chileans of sectors and classes joined in outrage over low wages, the rise in living costs and one of the highest rates of inequality in Latin America. Calls for strikes and protests moved across country and within a matter of days, half a million protestors had taken to the streets in Santiago alone.

The persistent protests coalesced in the demand for a new constitution. Citizens collectively demanded a fundamental change in their way of life to recover their dignity, by expanding economic rights, such as redistribution of wealth from the few to the many; civil liberties, such as reproductive rights; and political rights, such as having women and indigenous quotas in politics. As protests did not lose momentum, Piñera made concessions to maintain order. The concessions included, among others, the suspension of the underground fare increase, raising pensions, and most notably, a national plebiscite to vote on whether to rewrite the national constitution.

The process for rewriting the constitution began on October 25, when Chileans went to the voting booth and were asked two questions. First, they had to vote on whether they approved or rejected the drafting of a new constitution. Second, they voted on who would be responsible for drafting the constitution: either a constituent assembly comprising specially elected representatives, or through a mixed convention, consisting half of current congressional members and half of newly elected representatives. Chileans voted with an overwhelming majority of 79% for a new constitution that would be drafted by a constituent assembly of newly elected representatives.

So what happens next?

On April 11 2021, Chileans will elect their constitutional convention consisting of 155 citizens: 75 men, 75 women and one extra man or woman. Interestingly, this will be the first constitution to have been written with gender parity as opposed to men writing the constitution. Congress is in the process of determining whether there will be a quota for indigenous people in this convention as well. Once this convention has been elected, the representatives will have nine months and a possible three-month extension to write the new constitution. After the drafting, the representatives must have a two-thirds majority approval to present the public the new constitution. If the new constitution is ready the Chilean public will vote once more by means of a mandatory plebiscite whether to ratify the new constitution or dismiss it. If a simple majority of the Chilean population votes in favor the Pinochet-era constitution will be replaced, but if they vote to reject it the old one will remain in place until a new course of action is set.

It will be interesting to see how these events unfold for several reasons. First, obtaining a two-thirds majority might be a high threshold to reach. If the representatives find themselves in an impasse, they will need to make comprises on sensitive topics to draft a constitution that has broad support. Second, the scope of the document might prove difficult to demarcate. Last year’s protests witnessed grievances over issues as wide as pensions and police brutality. People are concerned that the representatives might want to address all of these issues. This could result in a constitution that is inflexible and sets unpragmatic and unrealistic standards which will blur the line between what should be a written component of the constitution and what should be left for government to interpret and enforce. Third, the next general elections are set for November 2021. What will happen if the new constitution is not ready by then? What power will a new president have over the drafting process and how will his or her role change when the new constitution is set in place? This is supposed to be an apolitical process, but currently one of the highest polling candidates to win the next general elections is the right-wing candidate Joaquín Lavín of the Unión Democrática (Democratic Union). Despite voting in favor of a new constitution he represents a wealthy elitist district who overwhelmingly voted against the new constitution and approves of the status quo. Some politically dispirited Chileans are worried that the future president might interfere with the elections. In reality, however, this seems unlikely considering the overwhelming majority opting for a new constitution and the political backlash an interfering president will receive from the general public. Last, the scope of the constitution might have consequences for the country’s economy. For example, an increase in rights for the environment and indigenous people might put a dent in Chile’s extensive copper, lithium, and gold and silver mining projects. A decrease in mining output could seriously affect its export, trade in general, and subsequently its GDP. Will Chileans cope when subsidies shrink in the face of economic uncertainty?

These uncertain times also leave room questions about Chile’s foreign policy. What will happen with Chile’s trade alliances? Since signing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in 2018, Chile’s congress still has not ratified the agreement. This begs the question if new rights for the environment, indigenous people, and laborers contradict the CPTPP paving the way for a resignation from partnership? Similarly, existing and pending Free Trade Agreements might constitutionally violate the rights of Chileans. For example, in 2019, after years of protests, the Pascua-Lama gold-silver project could not get launched by Barrick Gold Corporation ruled a Chilean high court. With enshrined environmental rights and rights for indigenous people’s lands, such events might happen more frequently contradicting past trade deals. Is the new government up to the task to either renegotiate these agreements or circumvent the new constitution? Venezuela and Bolivia, both members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the peoples of Our America (ALBA), have witnessed similar but different power changes that cater to the social masses. Depending on specifics of the new constitution, Chile might align itself with this regional bloc rather than the Pacific Alliance group of which it is a current member. Moreover, Chile’s new social construct might set up the country to become a new ally for Venezuela on the regional and global stage. This could help to legitimize Maduro’s presidency and alleviate some of the immense pressures on Venezuela imposed by the western world and the regional powers.

A stunning result in the national plebiscite has provided Chileans with the opportunity to reclaim their dignity and their country. Nevertheless, the near future of Chile remains uncertain. Questions remain as to what degree the social reforms citizens so desperately seek can realistically be implemented. Furthermore, high levels of uncertainty and volatile circumstances that come with the outcome of the plebiscite compounded with the impact of coronavirus can negatively impact foreign investments, levels of trade, and consequently the entire economy of Chile. Questions about foreign alliances within Latin America are relevant too. Only time will tell how ambitious Chile’s new constitution will be, how it will operate de facto, and in which ways markets respond to the new constitution.

Moos Hulsebosch is currently pursuing a MPhil degree in Latin American Studies and has previously obtained a MA in international Security at Sciences Po Paris focusing in Diplomacy and Intelligence. He has knowledge on geopolitics, Latin American politics, China’s foreign affairs, grand strategies, and United States’ politics and foreign affairs.

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The liberal international order has not crumbled yet

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Since 2017 when Donald Trump took office, the “liberal international order” erected in 1991 has been under serious challenges raised by the United States’ relative decline, the Trump administration’s isolationist policy, and on top of that, the outbreak of COVID-19. Indeed, this order is greatly plagued, which is evidenced by its dysfunction. Against this backdrop, its endurance in the upcoming time is questionable. Nevertheless, the liberal international order has not collapsed yet. It will even revive, and endure in the post-pandemic era.

The victory of Biden 

Notwithstanding facing great threats, the liberal international order is far from crumbling. On the contrary, it is gradually reviving. In the Western world, countries are making effort to reform their order that is on the verge of collapse. This is true in the US – the world democracy’s leader. Joe Biden’s victory against Donald Trump may be a positive signal for the US and the global democracy. As a strong advocate for values including democracy, multilateralism and international trade, at no doubt, President Biden will be opposite to Trump in his policy, both domestic and foreign ones. Indeed, during his first 100 days, Mr.Biden has implemented some meaningful things. Regarding the pandemic, he has a stricter approach than his predecessor’s: Mandatory mask wearing, a $1.9-trillions bill, historical vaccination campaign, to name a few. All of Biden’s actions have been so far effective, when the new cases and deaths are steadily declining, and the number of vaccinated people is substantially high. This lays a foundation for Biden to reinvigorate his country’s ruined democracy and governance system, as his efficiency in countering COVID-19 may help him regain American people’s trust on the future of American democracy.

In terms of foreign policy, President Biden has some radical changes compared to that of Trump, which might be favorable to the Western world. At first glance, Biden embraces multilateralism much more than his predecessor, with the hope of saving the American global leadership. He supports Washington’s participation in international institutions, which is illustrated by the rejoining of WHO, Paris Agreement and several multilateral commitments. In tandem with this, Biden values the US’ alliances and strategic partnership as vital instruments for the US’ hegemony. Unlike Trump’s transactional approach, Biden prioritizes early and effective engagement with allies to tackle regional and global issues, especially major ones like NATO, G7. In Asia, he also seeks for further cooperation with traditional allies such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand and deepening partnership with Vietnam, Singapore, India and ASEAN countries.

More importantly, President Biden’s policies towards the US’ competitors and “rogue states” are far different from Trump’s. Granted, despite seeing China as the biggest threat to the American global leadership, Biden adopts a more flexible and multilateral policy. His administration looks to cooperate and compete with China, which implies a different trajectory of the US-China relationship in the upcoming time. Additionally, as noted above, instead of unilaterally escalating tensions with China as Trump did, Biden has been forging relations with traditional and potential Asian allies to contain China together, given China’s increasing assertiveness. With regard to Iran, Washington is now working on the Iran Nuclear Deal with other six parties, promising a potentially positive future on the relations of Iran with the US and the West. The bottom line is, a radical change in Biden’s foreign policy will be a clear message to the world that the US will still try to save the liberal international order and make this world safer for democracy.

The European Union is recovering 

Things are happening in the same pattern in Europe. European leaders are also closely cooperating, both inside and outside the bloc, to defeat COVID-19. That said, they are ardently supporting multilateralism. So far, the EU has spent billions of dollars in vaccine development as well as humanitarian support, demonstrating its solidarity in the battle against COVID-19. As such, if EU leaders can successfully lead their bloc out of the current crisis, they can reform this currently plagued institution in the post-pandemic era. Not only seeking further intra-bloc cooperation, but also European leaders are working with other major actors around the world to substantiate the global battlefront against COVID-19. Recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel urged her country and China to jointly develop COVID’s vaccine in an open, transparent way, and to a further extent, maintain good and stable bilateral partnership, regardless of two sides’ differences.

Similarly, the EU has been putting the Transatlantic relationship among the priorities of its foreign policy agenda. After Biden’s election, the European Commission has proposed refreshing the US-EU alliance and establishing a Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council, being seen as an informal tech alliance with the US to prevent China from dominating this critical sector. The Transatlantic relationship is perhaps one of the pillars for the liberal international order, given its long history and its contribution to maintain the global stability. In the last decades, this axis has been damaged by numerous issues, from economic to security, which is one of the main causes for the decline of liberal international order. Thus, a fresh Transatlantic relationship is conducive to the re-emergence of this order. In this respect, the EU’s effort to strengthen the Transatlantic alliance, despite being questionable in terms of feasibility and outcome, is still paving the way for reinvigorating of liberal international order. More notably, the most recent G7 Summit has illustrated the Western’s solidarity, when there is a convergence in most issues related to global governance and maintaining the Western-based order. This may be a harbinger of the liberal international order’s revival, at least in a foreseeable future.

Non-Western world is struggling 

The dynamics outside the Western world is also changing in a more favorable direction. Many non-Western countries, once were effective in combating against the pandemic, are now struggling with a greater threat. Taiwan, in spite of being praised as one of the most successful states in the battle against COVID-19, is currently facing another wave of pandemic when the new cases in this island are surging recently. Other successful stories, let us say Thailand, Japan or South Korea, are questionable of maintaining their momentum in preventing the virus, showcased by their relatively inefficiency during this new wave, in implementing strong measures and getting their people vaccinated. This raises question about these countries’ model of governance, which was used to be praised as a better alternative for a plagued, dysfunctional Western one, thanks to its merits in helping those above-mentioned states contain COVID-19.

Major non-Western blocs are in the midst of COVID-19 crisis as well. The clearest example is the BRICS. Except China, all other countries in this bloc have been tremendously suffering from the pandemic. Due to this, they are far from being recovered quickly. This failure in dealing with the virus undermines the bloc’s previous effort in establishing its position as a major, effective one, not to mention building a new, non-Western international order. This is also the case with ASEAN, as the organization was sharply divided by COVID-19. There are countries doing well with controlling the pandemic such as Vietnam, Singapore, but the Philippines and Indonesia are unable to do so, making this bloc suffering from institutional sclerosis without having any coherent COVID-19 policy. Therefore, non-Western blocs and countries are far from being more efficient than Western ones, implying they are unable to come up with any better international orders than the current liberal international one.

More importantly, Western values underpinning the liberal international order are universal. This is noteworthy when arguing for the long-lasting of Western order, as its existence and endurance mainly hinge on the universality of Western values. These values have been embraced by many countries for a very long time. Hence, despite being deteriorated in recent years, they cannot be easily changed. On the other hand, non-Western values are also not as highly embraced as Western ones. China, desiring to topple the US, is initiating numerous projects and agreements to spread its values around the world, making the world less Western and more Chinese/Asian. Nonetheless, Beijing has yet achieved any remarkable achievements in making their values more widespread and embraced by the rest of the world. Even worse, its image has been tarnished due to its rising assertiveness. Its projects in developing countries, especially BRI-related projects, have been notorious for a large number of problems related to environment or local corruption, and it is raising strategic uncertainty in the region by its increasing militarization, particularly on the South China Sea. These movements have turned China into a “malevolent” major power, hindering its process of disseminating and socializing its values to the world.

It is also worth noting that although Western values have declined, they have been proven to be benevolent for this world. Most recently, it is Western countries that have successfully developed good COVID-19 vaccines to save themselves and save the world from this unprecedented health crisis. Non-Western countries, for instance China and Russia, have their own vaccines, but they are not as welcome as other developed countries in the West in the vaccine race, because their vaccines are relatively less effective than Western-produced ones. Democracy, liberty, lassaiz faire are values that help Western countries or ones embrace such things able to produce massive amount of effective vaccines, and more broadly to develop a strong science and technology foundation. Producing and distributing vaccine for the rest of the world would make the West become a savior, which is good for saving the liberal international order.

Without doubt, the liberal international order has been in its worst time since 1991 when it reached its heyday. However, thanks to its merits, the liberal international order will not die. Instead, most countries will jointly save it, because they have been benefitting from this order for a long time, and will be so in the future. The order’s founding members are recovering, and cooperating closely to reform it, as well as there are no better international orders that can replace the existing one. Given these circumstances, the liberal international order would re-emerge as a dominant form of ordering this world after the pandemic, and would be perpetuated.

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Who benefits more from the Biden-Putin summit in Geneva?

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With the Putin-Biden summit in Geneva around the corner, the question is who actually benefits more from the meeting in the small Swiss town.

Mainstream media and right-wing foreign policy thinkers alike have argued that a joint press conference would “elevate” President Putin to the level of the American President.

Ivana Strander, the Jeane Kirkpatrick fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC, argued that the upcoming Geneva summit is actually “a gift” to Putin.

In a CNN story, Kaitlan Collins and Kevin Liptak mention that “officials who have been involved in arranging past US meetings with Putin say the Russian side often pushes for a joint press conference, hoping to elevate Putin’s stature by having him appear alongside the American leader”.

Whether as a subconscious bias or an actual reflection of attitudes, prevalent is the idea that coming close to the US President is a privilege that other leaders can only dream about. But who gains more from the upcoming summit?

In fact, it is the American President who is vying for other leaders’ approval and acceptance once again after a humiliating period – not the other way around. American is emerging from Trumpism, which revealed the other, ugly face of America. Trumpism is not gone and the other face of America is still there.

This week, US President Joe Biden is eager to show the world that America is “back”. In meetings with the G7, NATO countries’ top leaders, the NATO Secretary General, the Queen of England, and President Putin in the same week, Biden is asking the world to forget the last four years. And he is not doing this from the position of power or superiority. That’s why assuming that other heads of state, be it Putin or anyone else really, can only gain by coming close to the superiority of the American President is a misplaced and misguided. The US President is asking the international community to take America back – not the other way around.

President Putin doesn’t need the US President’s acceptance – Putin already got that. That happened back in 2018, in Helsinki, when President Trump sided with Putin over the US government’s own intelligence agencies, by rejecting the idea of Russia’s meddling in the US presidential elections. Trump slapped across the face and humiliated the US intelligence community in front of the whole world. Ever since, the US intelligence community has tried to figure out ways to prove Trump wrong and show him otherwise. And they have gone to incredible lengths, only so that they can get their pay pack of a sort, and prove Trump wrong. So, Putin already got what he wanted. He doesn’t need more “elevation”.

What’s also striking is that in Geneva, the UN is absolutely missing from the action. Geneva is the home of numerous UN agencies and international organizations, and not one is actually involved, which speaks volumes to questions of relevance. It is the Swiss government from Bern which is organizing the Summit. The UN is nowhere to be seen which is also indicative of the current Biden priorities.

If Trump was about “America First”, then Biden is about “America is still number one, right?”. But as the United Kingdom learned the hard way recently, it is sometimes best for a declining power to perhaps elegantly realize that the rest of the world no longer wants to dance to its tune, or at least not to its tune only. Discussions about how much Putin gains from coming close to the presence of the US President are misguided. In trying to climb back on the international stage on crotches and covered up in bruises, America is not in a position to look down on other big powers. And as regards who benefits more from the Summit, it seems like one side is there with a clear request asking for something. My understanding is that it is Biden who wants Putin to hand cyber criminals over to him. Putin still hasn’t said what he wants from Biden, in return.

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Trump’s legacy hangs over human rights talk at upcoming Biden-Putin Geneva summit

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Official White House Photo by Adam Schultz

Two days after the NATO Summit in Brussels on Monday, US President Joe Biden will be in Geneva to hold a much anticipated meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The two leaders are meeting at the shores of Lake Geneva at a villa in Parc la Grange – a place I know very well and actually called home for a long time. The park itself will be closed to the public for 10 days until Friday.

A big chunk of the lakeside part of the city will be closed off, too. Barb wire and beefed up security measures have already been put in place to secure the historic summit. The otherwise small city will be buzzing with media, delegations and curious onlookers.

I will be there too, keeping the readers of Modern Diplomacy updated with what’s taking place on the ground with photos, videos and regular dispatches from the Biden-Putin meeting.

The two Presidents will first and foremost touch on nuclear security. As an interlude to their meeting, the NATO Summit on Monday will tackle, among other things “Russian aggression”, in the words of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. Last week, Stoltenberg said that he “told President Biden that Allies welcome the US decision, together with Russia, to extend the New START Treaty, limiting strategic weapons, and long-range nuclear weapons”. To extend the treaty is an important first step for Stoltenberg. This will be the obvious link between the two summits.

But Biden also has to bring up human rights issues, such as the poisoning and imprisonment of Alexei Navalny and Putin’s support for the jailing of Belarusian activists by Lukashenko. Human rights have to be high on the agenda at the Geneva Summit. And indeed, Biden has confirmed officially that pressing Putin on human rights will be a priority for the American side.

Biden and Putin are not fans of each other, to say the least. Both have made that clear in unusually tough rhetoric in the past. Over the years, Biden has said on numerous occasions that he has told Putin to his face that he doesn’t “have a soul”. Putin’s retort was that the men “understand each other”.

Right at the beginning of his Presidency, earlier this year, Biden also dropped the bomb calling President Putin a “killer” for ordering the assassination of political opponents. The Russian president responded to the “killer” comment on Russian television by saying that “it takes one to know one”. Putin also wished Biden good health, alluding to the US President’s age and mental condition which becomes a subject of criticism from time to time.

Understandably, Putin and Biden are not expected to hold a joint press conference next week. But we weren’t expecting that, anyways.

For me, this Summit has a special meaning. In the context of repression against political opponents and critical media voices, President Biden needs to demonstrate that the US President and the US government are actually different from Putin – if they are any different from Putin.

This week, we were reminded of Trump’s legacy and the damage he left behind. One of Trump’s lasting imprints was revealed: Trump had the Department of Justice put under surveillance Trump’s political opponents. Among them House Democrats, including Congressman Adam Shiff, who was one of the key figures that led Trump’s first impeachment that showed that Trump exerted pressure on Ukrainian authorities to go after Joe Biden’s son, Hunter.

In the context of Trump’s impact, President Biden needs to show that there has to be zero tolerance towards the cover up by the US government of politically motivated attacks against voices critical of the US government. If President Biden wants to demonstrate that the US government is any different from Putin’s Russia, Secretary of State Blinken and FBI director Chris Wray have to go. Biden has to show that he won’t tolerate the cover up of attacks on political critics and the media, and won’t spare those that stand in the way of criminal justice in such instances.

Biden is stuck in the 2000s when it comes to Eastern Europe, as I argued last week but he needs to wake up. President Biden and the US government still haven’t dealt effectively with Trump’s harmful impact on things that the US really likes to toot its horn about, such as human rights and freedom. Whether the upcoming Geneva Summit will shed light on that remains to be seen.

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