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Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy- Book Review

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In Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann create both a thorough qualitative and meticulous quantitative analytical study on the practicality and effectiveness of using nuclear weapons for coercive diplomacy. Sechser and Fuhrmann believe that there exists a growing consensus between nuclear scholars, or, as the authors have dubbed them, members of the Nuclear Coercionist school, who are under the impression that “countries armed with large nuclear arsenals can bully other states into submission by raising the prospect of large nuclear punishment.” However, Sechser and Fuhrmann, self-proclaimed members of the Nuclear Scepticism school, advance the hypothesis that nuclear-armed states are in fact not better at coercion than their non-nuclear counterparts. They argue that in the vast majority of cases conventional weapons have sufficient capabilities, that the political and economic costs of deploying nuclear weapons are incredibly severe, and that the stakes are rarely high enough to justify nuclear weapons. Thus, the threat of deploying nuclear weapons simply becomes not credible. To test this hypothesis the authors break it down into manageable subproblems by asking more specific questions such as, but not limited to, “do nuclear weapons make coercive threats more effective?”Do nuclear arsenals give states advantage in wringing territorial concessions?”“Do nuclear arsenals influence military escalation?”and finally, “are nuclear states more engaged in nuclear risk taking during crises than their non-nuclear counterparts?”. To address these sub-hypotheses the authors use a two-pronged approach by conducting “statistical analysis to identify broad trends in nuclear coercion” and by discussing “history’s most serious coercive nuclear crises”. 

The strengths of the book lie in its historical unprecedentedness, its rigorous analytical approach, and its transparency. First, it is historically unprecedented because there had yet to be a book that discusses the issue of nuclear coercion at its core and in such depth. Nuclear diplomacy theory is mainly focused on the deterrence aspect and its coercive potential is not as thoroughly debated. There have been prominent nuclear authors, such as Robert Pape and Thomas Schelling, that have written on the utility of nuclear coercion. But this book is the first work that relies on large data sets and a large amount of qualitative case studies, rather than in-depth research of merely a handful nuclear crises case studies, to make cohesive arguments. Consequently, the book is a solid addition to nuclear coercion theory.

 Second, debates regarding geopolitical topics often revolve around intellectuals using case studies to refute or corroborate existing theories, rather than letting the (large amounts of) data decide and create theories, rules, or observations out of the emerging trends. Sechser and Fuhrmann don’t take such an approach, and using different datasets create a dispassionate, empirically grounded argument to test their hypothesis, which is retrospectively strengthened by qualitative case studies. The studies  used, such as the Militarized Compellent Threats dataset, are exhaustive and carefully picked so that the multivariate regressions are statistically sound and provide grounds to draw solid conclusions from. 

Third, the strongest quality of the book is the complete transparency the authors demonstrate throughout their thought and decision-making processes. For example, in the chapter Roadmap for Part II Sechser and Fuhrmann give a very comprehensive set of arguments against and in favor of statistical analysis so that the reader can evaluate for themselves whether they think such an analysis is a useful tool to tackle the hypothesis. Later, the authors provide their own thought process and arguments as to why they have chosen to use this type of analysis despite the existing counterarguments against such a method. This transparency of showing the reader the authors’ thought processes is incredibly consistent throughout the book and is used in every single chapter to explain the choices Sechser and Fuhrmann make. This is an extremely honest and clever way of supporting their claims without imposing themselves onto the reader because it leaves room for the reader to be critical with the authors’ methodology since they fully understand the academic choices made and the thought processes behind these choices. To illustrate this point further, in the chapter Roadmap for Part III, the authors explain how the qualitative side of the book, namely chapters 5 and 6, addresses the quantitative side’s deficiencies. The quantitative chapters of the book show that nuclear powers are indeed not more effective at coercive diplomacy compared to non-nuclear states. Chapters 5 and 6 add to the quantitative analysis by explaining that the weak performance of nuclear states in coercive diplomacy has to do with either the nuclear skepticism theory or possible exogenous factors; and qualitative analysis can test for this. Furthermore, the case studies in these chapters can explain the outliers from the quantitative models, thus giving a more salient conclusion. As the authors explain, some nuclear crises are given more importance than others by academics and this way the authors can test how nuclear skepticism theory fares in these cases.

Aside from its plentiful merits, the book has several weaknesses: it focuses solely on past and present geopolitical realities as opposed to thinking about potential future crises, its nuclear brinkmanship argument is weak, and the book is sometimes guilty of confusing correlation with causation. The book builds its case on past and present geopolitical realities that nuclear weapons are rarely a probable solution for the coercer because the resolve of the coercing actors is never high enough. This is the case because coercion usually revolves around a policy change or territorial dispute, often something the coercer can still live without. Hence, nuclear coercion does not work. However, the book does not address possible future scenarios that can seriously impact the stakes for the coercer. For example, vital primary resources could make nuclear coercion a possible effective form of diplomacy. Imagine a future scenario where China, after  constructing a string of dams, has exclusive control over the Tibetan Plateau, “the source of the largest collection of international rivers, including the Mekong, the Brahmaputra, the Yangtse and the Yellow river.” India, likely already to become water scarce in the near future, is dependent on much of the water from the Himalayas who’s rivers are the tool to allocate water among its citizens. In the event of a conflict between the two nations, and China severely slowing down the stream of these rivers, India’s people will be suffering extreme water shortages. The need for water, the most important resource for sustaining human life, could make way for very credible nuclear coercion in the future. Such a reality seems more plausible with climate change causing increased droughts and water scarcity issues. The authors are limited by their reliance on precedent and fail to conceive of future situations that could lead nations to employing strategies of nuclear coercion.

Second, the authors argue that nuclear brinkmanship does not work because there are examples of leaders, namely Nixon and Khrushchev, following “the brinkmanship script” without achieving their goals. The leaders’ policies of nuclear signalling were never picked up by their adversarial counterparts rendering the nuclear brinkmanship ineffective, according to Sechser and Fuhrmann. The writers’ prime example of this is Khrushchev moving nuclear missiles north of Berlin during the 1958-1958 Berlin Crisis. They explain that Khrushchev moved the missiles covertly and failed to alert his American counterpart resulting in no reactions from the United States and hence a failed attempt at nuclear brinkmanship. This is a weak argument at best, because it does not undermine the theory of nuclear brinkmanship, instead it explains that signalling is difficult. Although the latter is indeed true, as the authors have shown in several examples in the book, it does not equate to nuclear brinkmanship not being feasible. Furthermore, the fog of war regarding troop movements, resource extraction, and infrastructure building is decreasing because of expanding and improving surveillance technology and exponentially new available signal intelligence. Consequently, nuclear signalling will become much easier over time and can make nuclear brinkmanship a much more viable policy strategy. 

Third, as social science is an amazingly complex interwoven set of variables giving altering sets of outcomes, it is incredibly difficult to establish causation between variables and effects. The book tries to do this but either leaves out or glosses over certain key aspects of international relations and nuclear diplomacy, which should have been addressed. For example, the authors show that nuclear states are not more successful, on average, in making compellent threats than their non-nuclear counterparts and use this to strengthen their argument. However, the quality of cases is not taken into account. Nuclear states could gain much more favorable outcomes during regular diplomacy because of their nuclear arsenal, which would mean more of their core interests are accounted for. As a result, nuclear states might throw their weight around for interests that are either harder to obtain or less important. This is not reflected in the data and shows how quantitative analysis in social sciences can be misleading.

Overall, the book makes some strong arguments against the effectiveness of nuclear coercion and brings up  hard-hitting questions for staunch nuclear coercionists. The combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses complement each other well and build a strong case for nuclear skepticism. However, when looking below the surface the authors can’t seem to refute the underlying logic of nuclear coercion and remain stuck in explaining the ineffectiveness of nuclear coercion in specific situational contexts. The research, scope, and nicheness of the book make it an attribution to nuclear diplomacy theory but its, at times, feeble logic does not make it a future mainstay.

Bibliography 

Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy.

Snyder, “Water In Crisis – Spotlight India.”

Vidal, “China and India ‘water Grab’ Dams Put Ecology of Himalayas in Danger.”

Moos Hulsebosch is currently pursuing a MPhil degree in Latin American Studies and has previously obtained a MA in international Security at Sciences Po Paris focusing in Diplomacy and Intelligence. He has knowledge on geopolitics, Latin American politics, China’s foreign affairs, grand strategies, and United States’ politics and foreign affairs.

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Can diplomats be proactive online without becoming “wolf-warrior”?

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Photo: camilo jimenez/Unsplash

With the increasingly important digital world, traditional, offline tools and approaches are becoming less and less sufficient and effective in shaping the public conversation, influencing the global or national public opinion, and obtaining trust.

As a part of reform that veers towards revolution in a domain well known for its adherence to norms, today’s diplomacy is also experiencing functional changes in terms of what strategic communications means in the digital environment. As we are witnessing lately, the emerging diplomatic virtual presence has become a significant part of public diplomacy and policy.

Today, the undeniable power of social media lies in its fundamental role of linking the public and political sphere as part of a worldwide conversation. It is notable that the general reason behind its effectiveness and the steep rise of adoption lie in the power of this environment of building strong brands and credibility. This certainly is today’s Zeitgeist and involves the systematic cultivation of the attempt to influence the public opinion with every single action and to boost social legitimacy, in a more and more interconnected world that seeks to turn individual gestures and actions into symbols.

However, does this fully explain why social media is becoming an emerging playground for sarcasm and open battlefield for a digital war of accusations and threats? 

One of founders of today’s Twiplomacy phenomenon is the former US president, Donald Trump, who proved to be, for better or worse, one of the most vigorous and captivating presences on social media among world leaders.  What is striking in this is the gradual increase in the adoption of the new diplomatic style, known as the Wolf-warrior approach, which gained prominence in the context of the COVID-19 crisis and Chinese presence in the social media. This approach, which originated from a Chinese patriotic movie, in which the main mission of the warrior is fighting back foreigners, is characterized by a more aggressive and assertive style of conducting foreign policy.

It is argued by some that this approach is not being adopted in order to display authoritarian tendencies and to project but rather it is more often adopted by Chinese diplomats as a defense response to the repeated attacks and accusations. It seemed to be the straw that broke the camel’s back. Drastic times call for drastic measures?

Either way, the US-China digital war leads to questioning the adequate behavioral approaches to addressing the continuous global power competition and diplomatic tensions. Assertive and offensive or proactive? What makes a wolf-warrior and where do we draw the line?

When credibility and national identity are under threat, assertive approaches seem to come in handy when defending one’s stance and strengthening confidence. We know it very well from the Chinese ancient wisdom: project strength when you are weak. This general principle applies to political stances and authority in advancing agendas, as well as preserving independence in hegemonic environments. However, when increased assertiveness is taken down the wrong road, the world ends up being divided into conflicting blocs. While proactiveness is certainly the adequate modus operandi to overcome such blockages and prevent escalating disputes from bouncing back, the line is certainly crossed when it reaches bullying and propaganda levels.

What is the smart and well-balanced dose of actions when interests and sovereignty come first? Assertiveness or smart power? 

Proactiveness and high reliance on social media can also be channeled into advancing one’s objectives and consolidating strategic gains through smart use of power or through soft power. One of the best examples of this strategy is India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who’s presence on Twitter proves that, most of the time, the tone defines the effectiveness of the message and that balance is to be preferred to unhinged assertiveness. In the end, the art of persuasion is not limited to the right choice of words and actions here and now but also includes the challenging task of building trust in the long run. 

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China-India Vaccine Diplomacy – Will Pakistan Learn From Neighbors?

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Modern infectious diseases and viruses have stimulated anew war and conflict along with poverty, counterurbanization (deurbanization), and climate change that need freshassessment in international relation arena. International cooperation for objective of infectiousdisease control goes back to atleast the 14th century, and to the later date of 1851, when Europe held its first International Sanitary Conference for multilateral cooperation to prevent the spread of cholera and yellow fever. Beginning in 2000, vaccine became cohesive as key tools in helping developing countries to achieve MDGs. In 2007, foreign ministers from seven countries issued the landmark “Oslo Ministerial Declaration” that formally linked health to foreign policy. Yet,in the past, there have been very few moments, as CoVID19, that assimilated such a huge number and variety of the world’s state actors at diplomatic front. The coronavirus vaccine – one of the world’s most in-demand commodities – has become a new currency for “Vaccine Diplomacy”. Vaccine diplomacy is not only the use of vaccine to increase diplomatic relationship and influence other countries but also, from a strategic perspective, vaccine access opens the door to expand long-term health security provisions.

China, one of the first countries to make a diplomatic vaccine push, promised to help developed and developing countries.Since the start of the pandemic, China used medical supplies to pursue foreign policy gains, sent masks and protective equipment to hard-hit territories,at present distributing vaccine.The vaccine diplomacy is a expansion of China’s endeavors to frame itself as the solution to the pandemic. Since the early days of the CoVID19 outbreak, China’s President Xi Jinping has focused on publicizing Chinese efforts  to supply medical aid worldwide. China’s planeloads of CoVID19 donations including hospital gowns, nasal swabs, and surgical masks etc. – were regardedoptimistically, especially in developing countries. In addition, Chinese government sent experts to support medical personnel across the continent.Correspondingly, the Serum Institute of India, one of the world’s largest vaccine producers,produced Covishield, developed by Oxford-AstraZeneca. India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar said it plans to supply CoVID19 vaccine to 49 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. So far, the country has been distributed 22.9 million doses under its “Vaccine Maitri” (Vaccine Friendship)initiative. Mr. Jaishankar also announced a gift of 2 lakh vaccine doses for about 90,000 U.N. peacekeepers serving in numerous hotspots around the world.

The vaccine race has become a new domain for China-India strategic competition. China’s whole state apparatus is behind the drive and Beijing sprang into action “Health Silk Road” through the cooperation channels of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moritz Rudolf (German Institute for International and Security Affairs) says, “Health was one of the many subtopics of the BRI. With the pandemic, it has become the main focus”. On the other hand, C. Raja Mohan, (Director, Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore) said, “There is no way India can match China on a lot of issues, but in this particular case, because of India’s pharmaceutical infrastructure, India is in a good position”.In reality, both countries arecontemplating vaccine diplomacy as a matter of national pride and soft-power projection.

In Pakistan, the power of vaccine diplomacy has been underexplored despite the successful facts that included promoting peace between the Cold War powers of the 1950s and 1960s.The historical and modern-day track records of vaccine diplomacy are impressive. But, it has not yet led to an overarching framework for its expanded role in foreign policy of Pakistan. At the moment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Health Services, Regulations and Coordination, and National Command and Operation Center should establish vaccine diplomacy framework and play an imperative role in promoting international health agreements between Pakistan and governments throughout the world. Vaccine diplomacy will not only enhance Pakistan’s reputation in international arena but also blunt the propaganda of anti-Pakistan forces within boarder and abroad. Consequently, vaccine diplomacy activities should integrated into the foreign policy of Pakistan.

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Sail Away Tomorrow: Where Should We Sail?

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On January 1, 2021, we all met both the new year and the new, third decade of the 20th century. This is a good reason to think not only about possible events in world politics over the next twelve months, but also about the likely trends in the development of the international system over the next ten years.

First, let’s get ourselves oriented and learn the terrain. Humanity today is going through a painful period of deglobalisation that affects all of us together and each one of us individually. This is not just about the immediate social or economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Alarming failures in the usual mechanisms for the growth of interconnectedness and interdependence of countries and peoples did not begin yesterday, and they will not end tomorrow.

One can argue for a long time about how inevitable deglobalisation was and, if not, who exactly is responsible for its arrival. In any case, the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 and the post-crisis period of 2010–2013 showed that for the time being, it is possible to forget about the linear and especially about the exponential development of globalisation. After this crisis, some parameters of human connectivity (international trade, the volume of foreign direct investment) barely recovered until the middle of the last decade, and then collapsed again. In today’s world, centrifugal processes have already accumulated tremendous inertia, and it would be naive to expect that any single event, even a very important one such as the Joe Biden administration coming to power in the United States or the creation of the Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership in Asia, are able to stop them, much less to reverse them. It’s time to come to terms with the fact, that the on-going deglobalisation is serious and will last a long time.

Serious and for a long time, but not forever, right? Antiglobalists everywhere in the world have convincingly won their last battle, but in the common war against globalisation they will not win, in any event. The Hegelian “mole of history” continues its tireless work; albeit slowly and stumbling, albeit with stops and even retreats, but humanity is moving forward along the thorny path to future unity.

The world is being pushed in this direction by two powerful factors, which have become stronger over the years, no matter what the current anti-globalisation crusaders may assert. First, the pressure of common problems increasingly faces everyone in the world—from climate change to the threat of new pandemics, which urgently require the unification of global society in the interest of common survival. The self-preservation instinct of the human population must somehow manifest itself—at least, we would very much like to hope so. Second, technological progress is accelerating, creating new opportunities for remote communications of all kinds from year to year. The physical space and resource potential of the planet are shrinking, the opportunities for geographically distributed models of work, study and socialisation are expanding, and Napoleon’s old aphorism about geography as a destiny is increasingly losing its former axiomaticity.

Sooner or later, the world will somehow return to globalisation. Or rather, sooner or later, the world will create a new model of globalisation, which will be as different from the old model at the beginning of the century, as the modern Formula 1 car is incomparable to the first Ford Model T.

But all the same—sooner or later? When exactly will Globalisation 2.0 start? This is not an idle question, because the fate of entire generations depends on the answer to it. And not only generations of politicians, but hundreds of millions or even billions of people entering adulthood today, in five, ten or twenty years from now. What prospects are looming before these people? What professional and personal trajectories can they expect? In what value systems will they have to exist?

If we start from the experience of the already distant crisis of 2008-2009, assuming that we are on the way towards the lowest point of a new “de-globalisation stage” of the globalisation cycle, then we can relatively confidently predict another change of world development by the middle of this decade. If an additional adjustment is made for the more complex nature of the global cataclysms of 2020 -2021, then the moment the vector changes will have to be shifted at least another two to three years into the future—closer to the end of third decade of the 21st century, which has only just begun.

Let’s try to start from this rather conventional chronology. According to it, humanity has five to eight years in reserve to prepare a new historical cycle of globalisation. Over these years, it is necessary not only to minimise the negative consequences of the (temporary) de-globalisation which is unfolding today, but also to formulate and agree on a global strategy for a new globalisation cycle. Well, and in some details—to radically update the political elites in most countries of the world, to learn how to successfully resist the right and left-wing populists, to work out modern algorithms of multilateral approaches to international problems and prevent a world war, a global ecological catastrophe, a new catastrophic pandemic or other annoying delays during the transition to these algorithms.

The tasks are serious, but within the framework of ten years of world history, they are quite manageable. The problem of smoothing out the inevitable negative effects of de-globalisation could already be tackled by such world leaders as Joseph Biden, Josep Borrell and Antonio Guterres. None of them mentally belong entirely to the 21st century; they all grew up and began their ascent to political heights in the Cold War era. None of them looks like a revolutionary, a prophet, or even a visionary. But, as they say, “the old horse will not spoil the furrow.”

Will even the most powerful representatives of the outgoing generation of politicians be able to successfully resist the challenges of populism, protectionism and regionalism? Are they capable of channelling the colossal energy of the collapse of the old international system in a peaceful way? The positive answers to these questions are far from obvious, but there are chances of success. If the numerous Bidens and Borrels, who still have considerable opportunities, turn out to be at the height of the tasks set before them by history, then they will somehow save humanity from some of the unpleasant surprises in the next few years. If they fail, the international system will face new difficult challenges.

But the preparation of a new globalisation mega-project is clearly beyond the power of the outgoing generation of political leaders, whether it’s Biden or Borrell. There are generals created for defensive action, and there are generals born for offensive operations. There are managers who manage companies from their offices, and there are entrepreneurs who create the companies of the future in their garages. Already in the second half of this decade, when the vector of development changes, the world will need fresh ideas, which it will be useless to search for in the political experience of the last century.

In a slightly different set of circumstances, the natural world leaders of a new generation could be French President Emmanuel Macron or, say, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. But they still are no leaders of the global revolution. Perhaps they were just unlucky, or they entered politics at the wrong time. Certain hopes for the beginning of the renewal can be associated with the upcoming parliamentary elections in Germany this fall. But, most likely, the time for a new global agenda has not yet come—the world is still at the end of an old era, and not at the start of a new one.

Let’s not forget that the main issues of the new agenda will be fundamentally different not only from the current issues, but also from the Globalisation 1.0 era. Which ones—we can only guess so far. For example, if the victorious march of globalisation at the beginning of the century was marked by the strengthening of the conditional East, the weakening of the conditional West, then the fundamental issue of Globalisation 2.0 will most likely be the issue of a large-scale redistribution of resources between North and South in favour of the latter.

If the “old” globalisation was associated with accelerated economic growth and with an increase in personal and public consumption, then in the course of the “new” globalisation, most likely, the main criterion for success will be to ensure the transition to sustainable development models, both at the national and global levels.

If the global processes at the beginning of the century reflected a universal public demand for freedom, then in the second quarter of the century we will most likely see a more articulated and more insistent demand for justice.

In all likelihood, many familiar algorithms of foreign policy will also change. Major international organisations, hopefully, will still remain by the end of the 20s. In any event, a significant part of international activity will not boil around or within rigid bureaucratised institutions, but around specific problems: political, social, environmental and so on. To solve these specific problems, mobile situational coalitions of participants will be formed—and not only by nation-states, but also with the involvement of the private sector, civil society institutions, and other participants in international affairs. Old hierarchies will gradually lose their meaning, the terms “superpower” and even “great power” will increasingly be perceived as archaic, with no sense in modern life.

What does all this mean for Russia? In a sense, Moscow was very lucky: the crisis of the globalisation model at the beginning of the century actually nullified numerous Russian failures on the path towards integrating the country into the global economic and political system. Yes, Russian foreign policy over the past thirty years has made some mistakes and miscalculations, but what can we say about it now, if there is practically nowhere to integrate?

But it is unlikely that Russian politicians should rejoice in the epoch of deglobalisation that has come and stand in solidarity with the triumphant antiglobalists. Yes, Russian foreign policy feels comfortable amid the conditions of de-globalisation; properly in these conditions, the comparative advantages of Russia’s foreign policy style are most clearly manifested and its disadvantages are least noticeable. But if the assumption about the probable timing of the next change in the vector of world development is in principle correct, and if globalisation in its new embodiment returns to the world on the horizon of five to eight years, then even today Russia needs to actively prepare for this change.

The country must be able to demonstrate results that exceed those in its attempts to integrate into Globalisation 1.0 at the beginning of the century, especially considering that Globalisation 2.0 will inevitably turn out to be a more complex, more contradictory, and in some ways even more competitive environment than its previous incarnation.

Russia, like the other countries of the world, has several years to rebuild its system of foreign policy institutions, master the new rules of multilateral diplomacy, get rid of “bad assets” and find

its place in the coming world order. As the current Russian president likes to repeat on other occasions, “there is no time for reflection”.

From our partner RIAC

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