Intelligence

The future of strategic intelligence

Published

2 years ago

October 2, 2020

Giancarlo Elia Valori

There are currently three types of intelligence transformations, namely conceptual, technological and operational.

In the first case, we are dealing with a new and original intelligence paradigm.

From a mechanism based on the identification of the need for information-research-processing and analysis-dissemination-feedback, we are shifting to what some people already call “position intelligence”.

In other words, we are coming to an information mechanism that continuously perceives data and processes it, and then spreads it permanently and continuously to those who have to use it.

While the old intelligence model was “positivist”, i.e it concerned single objective and empirical data to be included in a decision-making process that is not determined by intelligence, currently it is instead a matter of building acontinuous follow-up not of data, but of political behaviours, perceptions of reality by the enemy-opponent, as well as complex phenomena that constantly reach the intelligence matrix from different parts and areas.

While in the past intelligence was rhapsodic and temporary, à la carte of politicians, and sometimes even unsolicited and not requested, it currently becomes the stable core of political, strategic, economic and industrial decisions.

This obviously results in a new relationship between politicians and Intelligence Services.

While, in an era we have already defined as “positivist”, facts, news and the unknown novelties of the enemy-opponent counted, what currently matters is the ever more evident integration between the intelligence system and politicians.

There is obviously a danger not to be overlooked, i.e. the danger that – without even realizing it – the Intelligence Services take on responsibilities which must be typical of elective bodies only.

But certainly intelligence currently plays a much greater role than in the past.

Another key element of the conceptual transformation of intelligence is the use not only of highly advanced and powerful information technologies, but also of scientific paradigms which were unknown to us only a few years ago.

Just think about Artificial Intelligence, but also cloud computing, algorithm theory and Markov chains – and here we confine ourselves to the mathematics that sustains current IT and computing.

But there is also human ethology, an extraordinary evolution of Konrad Lorenz’s animal ethology, as well as social psychology, sociological analysis and scientific depth psychology.

A whole universe of theories that, in Kant’s words, have recently shifted from metaphysics to science.

It must certainly be used to analyse, for example, mass behaviours that seem unpredictable, as well as the psychological reactions of both the ruling classes and the crowds, and the interactions between the various group behaviours of a country.

Nothing to do with the old Habsburg Evidenzbureau, which informed the General Staff of enemy troops’ movements or of the various generals’ lovers.

We here witness a substantial union between intelligence and political decision-making or, rather, between the thought produced by intelligence and the foundations of political decision-making.

CIA has often tried to poison Fidel Castro’s beard.

Today, apart from the doubtful rationality of that operation, it would be a matter of using – for example – advertising, TV series, Hollywood movies, the sugar, tourist or tobacco market cycles, not to poison late Fidel’s beard, but to put the Cuban economy and decision-making system into structural crisis.

The typical idea of Anglo-Saxon political culture –whereby, once the “tyrant” is eliminated, everything can be fine and back in place – has been largely denied by facts.

All this obviously without being noticed, as far as the operations for disrupting a country are concerned.

Another factor of the conceptual transformation of intelligence is speed: currently the IT networks are such as to allow data collection in real time with respect to facts and hence favour wide-ranging decisions.

As far as technology is concerned, it is well known that both the AI networks, the new calculation structures, and the networks for listening and manipulating the enemy-opponent data are such as to allow operations which were previously not even imaginable.

At this juncture, however, there are two problems: everybody has all the same tools available and hence the danger of not “successfully completing” the operation is great, unlike when the Intelligence Services’ operations were based on the skills, role and dissimulation abilities of some operatives – or on confidential and restricted technologies.

The other problem is intelligence manipulation: a country that thinks to be a target can spread – in ad hoc networks – manipulated news, malware, data and information which are completely false, but plausible, and can modify the whole information system of the country under attack.

Another problem of current intelligence technologies is their distance from the “traditional” political decision-making centres.

A politician, a Minister, a Premier must know what comes out of the intelligence system. Nevertheless, it is so specialised and sectorial that the distance between technical data processing and the “natural language” of politics is likely to make data ambiguous or unclear and of little use.

Moreover, there is a purely conceptual factor to be noted: if we put together the analysis of financial cycles, of technology change, of public finance and of political and military systems, we must connect systems that operate relatively autonomously from each other.

In other words, there is no “science of the whole” that can significantly connect such different sectors.

Therefore, there is the danger of projecting the effects of one sector onto another that is only slightly influenced by it, or of believing that, possibly, if the economy goes well, also the public debt – for example -will go well.

The room for political decision-making is therefore much wider than modern intelligence analysts believe.

Political decision-making is still made up of history, political-cultural traditions and of perceptions of reality which are shaped by many years of psychological and conceptual training.

With specific reference to operativity, once again we are dealing with radical changes.

Years ago, there was the single “operative” who had to decide alone – or with very little support from the “Centre” – what to do on the spot and with whom to deal.

Today, obviously, there is still the individual operative, but he/she is connected to the “Centre” in a different way and, in any case, imagines his/her role differently.

On the level of political decision-making, intelligence is always operative, because reality is so complex and technically subtle that it no longer enables even the most experienced statesman to “follow their nose”.

The primary paradox of the issue, however, is that intelligence cannot take on political roles that imply a choice between equivalent options.

This is inevitably the sphere of politics.

Another factor of the operational transformation is the inevitable presence of intelligence operatives in finance, in the scientific world, in high-level business consulting, in advertising, communication and media.

Intelligence has therefore progressively demilitarised itself and is increasingly operating in sectors that we would have previously thought to be completely alien to Intelligence Services. Instead, they are currently the central ones.

Moreover, we are currently witnessing a particular mix of strategic intelligence, geopolitics and financial analysis.

Why finance? Because it is the most mobile and widespread economic function.

We are witnessing the birth of a new profession, namely currency geopolitics.

Hence we are also witnessing the evolution of two new types of intelligence, namely market intelligence (MARKINT) and financial intelligence (FININT).

An old and new problem is secrecy. The greater the extent to which old and new intelligence is used, the less it can keep secrecy, which is essential now as it was in the past.

What has always been the aim of strategic intelligence? To predict phenomena starting from a given context.

Contexts, however, change quickly and the interaction between sectors is such as to change the effect of forecasts.

The formalised techniques for analysis-decision making are manifold: intelligence data mining, “grid technologies”, knowledge creation and sharing, semantic analysis, key intelligence needs (KINS) and many others.

All operations which are often necessary, but currently we need to highlight two factors typical of the North American intelligence culture which, unfortunately, also negatively affects the models used by U.S. allies.

The first aspect is that, strangely enough, the same formal models are proposed for both companies and States.

A State does not have to maximize profits, while a corporation does, at least on a level playing field with its competitors.

A State is not a “competitor” of the others and ultimately a State has no specific “comparative advantage” but, on the contrary, some of its companies have, if this happens.

Therefore, the overlap between business intelligence, which is currently necessary, and States’ intelligence is a conceptual bias, typical of those who believe that a State is, as Von Mises said, “the joint stock company of those who pay taxes to it”.

For companies, it is obvious that all specific and original intelligence operations must be known to the State apparata, which may coordinate them or not, considering that they inevitably have additional data.

On the other hand, some business operations can become very useful for intelligence.

Hence a structure would be needed to put the two “lines” of operations together, and above all, a new intelligence concept is needed.

In the past, the Intelligence Services’ operations were largely defensive: to know something just before it happened, to avoid the adverse operations of a State hitting its own resources, but all with often minimal time limits.

Now we need expressly offensive intelligence which can hit the opponents’ (commercial, economic and strategic) networks before they move and in good time.

Intelligence

High-Altitude Espionage (Spy Balloon) and India’s National Security

Published

6 days ago

March 17, 2023

Radhika Shaw

Throughout the nineteenth century, balloons were a vital tool for obtaining intelligence. Since then, their value has drastically decreased. In order to spy on the Soviet Union in the 1950s, the United States utilised high-altitude balloons (that the Soviets complained about and subsequently shot them down). The U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance plane, (which was also shot down) and the Corona reconnaissance satellites, (the first of many generations of spy satellites) that many nations utilise today, succeeded in replacing balloons. Now that a Chinese balloon has flown above the United States, serious worries are being expressed.

During the first two weeks of February, the Chinese spy balloon saga that concerned the United States, Canada, and rest of the world seemed to have come to an end. The four balloons, or “high-altitude objects,” as they were officially referred to, were shot down by American fighter aircraft.

Similar to airships, surveillance balloons are equipped with sensors, cameras, or communication equipment to track and gather information. The spy balloons can either be anchored to the ground or can float at a great height, giving them the ability to take extensive pictures of their surroundings. Safety and monitoring, process sensing, climatology, and disaster response are all possible uses for the collected data.

Among the many uses of balloon surveillance equipment by spies are the following: ‍

SIGINT: The intelligence community can use communication signals, such as voice and data transmissions, to intercept and analyse signals intelligence (SIGINT), which enables the collection of information on foreign governments, military forces, and other organisations. SIGINT is typically collected using balloons fitted with specialised sensors and equipment.

GEOINT: Spy Balloons collect geospatial information (GEOINT) in order to create detailed maps and photographs of the ground and track changes over time.

HUMINT: Balloons can be used to acquire human intelligence (HUMINT) to keep an eye on people, groups, and activities on the ground.

ELINT: Balloons enable the intelligence community to intercept and analyse signals from foreign military and other electronic equipment to learn more about their capabilities and intentions. This is known as electronic intelligence (ELINT).

Balloons were employed during the Cold War for psychological operations, or PSYOP, to drop pamphlets or books. In the 1950s, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) deployed millions of hot air balloons off West Germany’s coast to drift through the Iron Wall with their prized cargo, George Orwell’s book Animal Farm (1945).

The usage of balloons for espionage operations and surveillance is not hidden from the world. Today, China adopted the earlier existing technology of balloons in its advanced version to fulfil its own intelligence needs. According to sources, US intelligence authorities think the recently discovered Chinese spy balloon is part of a vast surveillance operation managed by the Chinese military.

Such practices of China and the balloon system leaves an important question on India’s national security. A similar balloon like the one in America was sighted in January 2022 over the Andaman Nicobar tri-service command by the Indian forces last year. “But soon it flew off. These advances sparked conversations about some rethinking of the tactics to counter emerging dangers like spy balloons, ” said by former DG of DRDO. Even if such a balloon isn’t armed, it can gather private information about vital infrastructure, such as the activities of the armed troops near the border, in the islands, or anywhere else on the mainland, and test India’s capacity to recognise aerial surveillance gadgets.

China’s stance on the balloons were that it was a weather balloons, however the high resolution cameras could serve for the purpose of stationary Surveillance. Spy balloons, however, are difficult to shoot down. Elevated targets are inaccessible to anti-aircraft guns that are mounted on the ground. The fired bullets from the ground may cause casualties or injuries. Only a small number of fighter jets have the ability to launch an air-to-air missile from a height of 20 km which could quite expensive. Spy Balloons might make it easier for China’s military to collect electromagnetic emissions that reveal a weapon system’s capabilities when compared to using sophisticated satellite systems positioned at higher altitudes.

India has to improve its intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities in light of the latest incident. Sino-Indian ties are already fraught with uncertainty, so failing to recognise and address new dangers, especially those in the grey area, would have serious consequences. New Delhi needs to improve its technological proficiency and work with nations that share its interests.

Data collection today has become a very important part of a state’s strategies. Being unaware of such actions in its own backyard would have negative effects on India, given the tensions between the two countries. Although, advancement of the technology has led to blurring of the geographical border lines India needs to be rigorously vigilant to such espionage attempts especially near its borders and critical infrastructure.

Intelligence

Maritime Cybersecurity: A Potential Threat to India’s National Security

Published

3 weeks ago

March 5, 2023

Sravani P

India has a huge coastline of 7516.6km comprising 13 major ports (including one private port) and more than 200 minor ports across the coastline. It is a very known fact that the maritime sector is very crucial for India’s security, stability, economy, and sustainable development. India conducts around 70 percent of its total trade by value through the sea. India is strategically placed in the Indian Ocean, which gives it greater access to trade with the world’s major shipping routes. India’s seaborne trade has grown at a rate that is twice the 3.3% rate experienced globally. India is now focusing on strengthening its maritime sector through the upgradation of safety and security standards at the ports, enhancing port capacity and operations, and automation. It is placing emphasis on automation and technology upgradation through projects like SAGAR and Sagarmala. With digitalization in place in almost all the port operations and in the surveillance of the maritime waters, as shown in figure 1, the maritime domain is vulnerable to cyber threats ashore and afloat.

Figure.1 Technology in the Maritime Sector

With Information and Communication Technology (ICT) coming into use, increasing reliance on seaways, and the growing importance of the data as a weapon in the hands of the state, all these pave the need for better cybersecurity management systems in the maritime sector.

The maritime business, its ships, and its cyber environment are all protected by a variety of tools, policies, security concepts, safeguards, guidelines, risk management techniques, actions, training, best practices, assurance, and technologies.

Maritime cyber risk can be referred to as the extent to which the technology in use could be attacked, that could result in the loss or compromise of information.

Pirates and opposing nations have been a menace to the maritime transportation business for thousands of years, but as the sector has developed and technology has been more thoroughly integrated for enhanced efficiency, so too has the magnitude of possible cyber threats. Now, even using something as simple as a USB flash drive, or even an unsecured Wi-Fi, the hacker can get access to the critical systems of the vessel, thereby obstructing the entire port operations. For example, a suspected ransomware attack on the Management Information System (MIS) crippled the operations of the Jawaharlal Nehru Port, Mumbai, in 2017 and again in 2022.

Though the primary motive behind cyber threats is profiteering, there are several aspects that motivate a cybercriminal to conduct a cyberattack on the port or vessel operations. This includes espionage, activism, terrorism, warfare, and others.

The various kinds of cyberattacks on the maritime sector involves malware, trojans, botnets, advanced persistent threats, ghost shipping attack, cryptocurrency hijacking, and other. In addition to these cyber threats, the maritime domain is vulnerable to cyber terrorism as well. The awareness in the maritime sector over cyber terrorism is very minimal or negligible, with very little emphasis given to it. Chinese cyber activity is a major security threat to India. China is also using cyber technology in its South China Sea Anti –Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy . The A2/AD strategy denies freedom of movement and navigation to rival powers by increasing defense systems that threaten their ships/submarines.

The technologies like the Automatic Identification System (AIS), ECDIS, GPS, information systems, Industrial Control Systems, and other operational technologies have played a crucial role in enhancing the efficiency of port and vessel operations. Nevertheless, these technologies are of no exemption to cyberattacks as every technology comes up with its own loopholes. For example, the adoption of AIS is compulsory for any vessel to ensure its safe navigation, but as it is unencrypted and unauthenticated, the maritime sector is vulnerable to spoofing, water holing, social engineering, and other cyberattacks. It is also important to identify the human role in operating such technologies, as it is noted that human error and equipment flaws are primary reasons behind the success of these cyberattacks.

Maintaining the integrity of supporting systems, protecting ship systems from physical assault, and making the maritime sector resilient to both internal and external threats are all critical. Protection from various cyberattacks is necessary to prevent a breach of the network and its systems. Proper countermeasures and in-depth defense strategies must be deployed for each attack to prevent an attack from taking advantage of a flaw or vulnerability in the technology.

Primarily, it is important to promote awareness among the staff or the crew to identify cyber threats and on responding to such threats and, for example, alerting the officials if any malicious or unusual mail or notification is identified in the system.

Block chain technology can be an efficient solution as it allows for a continuous monitoring system and provides real-time status on the ship’s security. It also enables secure communication and storage of data in the control centers. It helps in avoiding loss of data and data modifications by unauthorized users.

The AIS and GNSS systems must adopt encryption and authentication measures which are given zero attention to this date.

With the vast coastline, it is not possible for India to secure the coastline through manpower. Israel based startups, in order to effortlessly secure the maritime IoT ecosystem, Cydome Security offers a cyber solution to handle this precise problem. The company’s solution is intended for systems with links to coastal infrastructure as well as guidance, sensors, control, and command.

Fighting fire with fire is one way that organizations can aid in stopping such intrusions: AI-driven security systems can successfully foresee and thwart AI-driven threats in real-time with appropriate data.

It is crucial to note right away that there is no magic solution for marine cybersecurity. An interconnected era has been retrofitted with a history of outdated shipboard equipment, leading to a shattered and vulnerable maritime environment.

It is in India’s interest to take a leading role in negotiations and developments with global countries, given its crucial position in the Indian Ocean Region and the need to protect itself against China’s growing threat in that region. In order to take shipping on to the next level of connectedness, strong cybersecurity is imperative.

Intelligence

CIA’s Supremacy in Global Spy Ring and Hammering Russian Intelligence Since Cold War

Published

3 weeks ago

February 28, 2023

Srijan Sharma

I Doubt Therefore I Survive”- Michael Richard Daniell Foot, British Intelligence Historian.

Since world war US always had upper hand in conducting sub/ unconventional warfare especially Covert Psyops, Americans have always heavily invested in sinister designs- the famous MKultra progaramme of using high psychotic drugs- LSD to psychologically weaken Human’s mental state and force confessions out of them. Also, Its aim was to develop mind-controlling drugs for use against the Soviet bloc. The project attempted to produce a perfect truth drug for interrogating suspected Soviet spies during the Cold War, and to explore other possibilities of mind control. CIA’s Subversion techniques and plans into the Soviet’s camp and other communist camps are also one of the greatest security headache for Soviets. The problem was that Soviets espionage/ Intelligence temperament was not that ruthless, hard and developed as CIA’s. Eventually, this became a reason of how and why US’s psychological operations substantially harmed Russian/Soviets’ influence too much. If we leave Vietnam, the scores of US in espionage circles, activities of de-installing regimes and squeezing Soviets sphere of influence and even now squeezing Russia’s sphere of influence are much higher than of Russia. Further, this also becomes a strong reason why Russians were not able to swiftly retort to these activities in a fashion in which US does or the tit for tat temperament was not proactively seen from the Russian or Soviet’s side. In other words, they struggled to match and register covert successes in countering US’s influence in substantial sense. A story of one of the greatest female speies and phenomenal covert operations led by US and west which set the stage rolling for “espionage” in global politics.

We mostly idealize male as spies, because of their endurance and the tradition or culture of talking only about male spies, the amount of glorification/popularization which a male spy gets is somewhere reduced to less when the story of female spy comes in. Though the mindset is now changing and people are now equally focusing on both the cases, However, it has been observed that stories of female spies are still struggling to get glorified or talked about in some parts of the world. The tides changed their directions when a female spy- Virginia Hall, regarded as one of the greatest female spy whose contribution led to Allied Forces Victory in World War-II. In America she is regarded as one of America’s greatest heroes.

The Past

She was born on 6th April 1906 in Maryland, attended Roland Park country school, later for her higher studies she went to Barnard College(Columbia University) where she learned French, Italian and German and later moved to Geroge Washington University to peruse Economics. Virginia Hall’s life was filled with roller coaster rides with dramatic twists and turns. She had a dream to become the first female Ambassador of the United States. She even started to work towards her dream by taking up the job of a clerk at the consular office in Warsaw Poland and later in Turkey. She didn’t know that a major setback is still waiting for her. In an accident she lost her left leg, However, this accident didn’t slow down Hall’s dream, She was firm and determined to achieve her dreams and serve for her country.

Making of A Spy

Later, She applied for Foreign Services and her application in the foreign services was turned down because of disability and her gender(Females were rarely hired at that time). Repeatedly her applications were turned down over and over. However as usual her determination and refusal to comprise with her dreams were fueling/ not letting her dreams die. Later she moved to France for employment, where During World War-II in February 1940 (the early period of war) she become an ambulance driver for France Army, after the defeat of French she again moved to Spain for employment where she accidentally met British Intelligence Official name Geroge Bellows. Bellows got amazed by her communication and thinking skills and gave her the number of a “friend” who was working in Special Operations Executive(SOE), United Kingdom secret operations unit in World War-II. After getting in touch with “friend” she joined the SOE in April 1941.

The First Job

She gets the training in SOE and sent to France by France Section of SOE. She was given a cover of a reporter/ journalist for New York Post which enabled her to interview people, gather information from surroundings which can be useful for intelligence/ military officials of Allied Forces. Gradually she became an expert and learned how to arrange contacts, logistics, and who to bribe to get information and get the required work done. She also learned how to distribute and supervise wireless sets among agents and the network of SOE. Despite the French occupation by the Germans, she managed a long tenure as a spy-transmitting information to London about German which highlights her operational brilliance and. She also sensed danger and refused to attend a meeting of SOE Agents and later French Police raided the meeting place and SOE agents got arrested.

The Journey with Americas

After successfully planning an escape of the SOE agents from jail, when Hall returned, she was declined to serve in France because she and SOE networks were almost compromised, and sending her again would be too much risk. After this, Hall got in the contact with OSS(predecessor of CIA) and joined American Intelligence at the low rank. She was sent to France again by OSS. This time she was given a cover of poor peasant women, she used to roam around the various places and often changed her disguise to a milkmaid and prepared Cheese and sold cheese to German Soldiers. Hall was tasked to prepare resistance force known as Maquis and set up Anti- Nazi The environment in France, which would help Allied Forces during Invasion. Hall continued to gather information about German Soldier’ locations and finance Maquis and help to set up resistance force which later helped Allied Forces in planning effective Invasions- Operation Jedburgh. No doubt with an artificial leg, she ruled the helm of Spy Networks, and in those times when females were rarely hired for jobs. German described her as “Most Dangerous Allied Spy” She successfully established Anti Nazi resistance which eventually led to the collapse of the Nazi and victory of Allied Forces, It was Hall with whom help Allied Forces were victories over the Axis Powers effectively. Hall broke all the stereotypes in the spying network who believe that Females are not that smart witted to survive in the Intelligence Word. She was awarded Distinguished Service Cross in 1945 and earlier she was also awarded prestigious British Medal. Later She becomes the first female to work in CIA, she was given desk jobs in CIA and due to her age she couldn’t perform well in the tests which were mandatory in CIA and after a brief period of time she resigned and took retirement at the age of 60. She lived with her husband Paul Barnesville, Maryland, until her death in 1982. She always refused to talk/write about her World War-II or in-field experience which led to the curiosity of many. The way she believed in her instincts, intuition, and with the brilliant skill set despite one leg has made her one of the greatest spies of all time.