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From Prince to Duce: An in depth study about Machiavellianism in the Fascist Doctrine

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Although both philosophies of Machiavellianism and Fascism are almost 400 years apart, there is no doubt that the theories of Machiavelli regarding realism and power can be found in the theories of Giovanni Gentile. How much of an influence was Niccoló Machiavelli for the father of fascism, Giovanni Gentile and was Mussolini the actual prince that Machiavelli was dreaming of? Why does Machiavelli have a special place at the pantheon of fascism and how relative are those theories in the 21st century?

Political profiles of Machiavelli and Gentile

Nicolló Machiavelli was born in 1469, in Florence of Italy. He was the son of a wealthy lawyer and he studied at the University of Florence. He was mostly known after 1498 where he first served as a government official in the government of the Republic of Florence.

Apart from a government official, Machiavelli was a well-known diplomat, philosopher, and writer. Some of his key works are The Discourses on Livy (1517), The Art of War (1519-1521) but the most notable of them is The Prince (1513). Based on Machiavelli’s works and theories, the modern term Machiavellian was born which is mostly connected with acts of political deceit.

On the other hand, Giovanni Gentile was born in Castelvetrano, Sicily in 1875. At a young age after finishing high school, he studied philosophy focusing on the idealist tradition in Italy and Neo-Hegelian idealism. His works such as The Doctrine of Fascism (1932) and The Philosophy of Fascism (1928), were essential foundations for what would be known as the Fascist movement.

In that respect, Giovanni Gentile is considered to be the father of fascism, who gave birth to the iconic figure of the Duce, Benito Mussolini. He served under Mussolini’s regime as the Minister of Education and later as the president of the Academy of Italy. In 1944 he was captured and executed by Italian partisans.

Understanding the realist approach in Machiavelli’s works

To completely understand how Machiavelli influenced one of the most successful ideologies of the 20th century, there has to be in-depth research regarding the theories of Machiavelli. One of his most remarkable works was with no doubt The Prince.

Written in 1513, his work is focused and addressed to young princes that are willing to become successful rulers. Machiavelli is trying to imply the concept of realism by directly implying the truth rather than imagining it. Unlike other political thinkers, he does not see the state as a mechanism to nurture the morality of its citizens but as an ensuring concept that will protect their wellbeing. To have a strong state, you need to have a strong leader that will be able to ensure the wellbeing of his subjects by using any means possible, even deception or intrigue.

“In judging policies, we should consider the results that have been achieved through them rather than the means by which they have been executed”

Machiavelli considered the idea of the end justifies the means as the only way to ensure stability and prosperity for the state. The success of a prince should be judged by the consequences of his actions and never by his morality or ideology. This idea is perfectly described in The Prince.

“ In the actions of all men, especially princes, where there is no resource to justice, the end is all that counts. A prince should only be concerned with conquering or maintaining a state, for the means will always be judged to be honorable and praiseworthy by each and every person because the masses always follow appearances and the outcomes of affairs, and the world is nothing other than the masses”

Regarding his views about religion and the state, although he was a devoted catholic, he did oppose the interference of church to political life. According to one of his books, the Discourses on Livy, the vision that he has for the perfect form of government is modeled on the Roman Republic, with a mixed constitution and participation by its citizens. However, he stresses out that for such a republic to exist, it needs a strong leader that will allow specific laws about the social organization that will allow this ideal republic to be born.

Gentile’s idea of the fascist state

Similar to Machiavelli’s ideas about the ideal leader and republic were the theories of Giovanni Gentile. As the father of fascism, Gentile was essential to establish the foundations and the pillars to promote Benito Mussolini and the Duce of the people that will lead them to the resurrection of the Roman Republic.

Gentile’s ideas are perfectly described in one of his early works, The Philosophy of Fascism which was written in 1928. Based on his book, we can get a clear understanding of his constructive ideas. To get the support of the masses, Gentile focused on more nationalistic elements combined with a more radical form of social organization that will be based around the fascist state.

The philosophy that he wanted to impose was one of unity through collectivism. In this idea, he promotes the fascist conception of the state as an attitude towards life in which individuals are bound together by a higher law and will, the law and will of the nation. However, to fully understand the principles behind fascism, one has to follow the guidelines that he mentions in The Doctrine of Fascism which he co-wrote with Benito Mussolini.

Written in 1932, The Doctrine of Fascism, focuses on the ideas that can be promoted to achieve the goal of the fascist state. Gentile rejected the idea of individualism and thought that the answer to the needs of people for security and prosperity was in the idea of collectivism.

Although it might sound very familiar with what Karl Marx was advocating, Gentile did not agree with him on the idea of a divided society into social classes and a historical struggle between classes. He also was against any form of democracy that indicated the majority rule, which sees the will of the nation underneath the will of the majority.

Above all, the idea of fascism sets in three major ideas. That the law and will of the nation must take precedence over the individual will and that all human values lie within the state. Moreover, all individual actions serve to preserve and expand the state.

In addition to his philosophy, it needs to be mentioned his ideas regarding other forms of political theory or even the aspect of peace. For Gentile, any form of economic or political liberalism would only result in an unstable political system that is bound to fail.

His views about the failure of liberalism came right after the end of WWI, where Italy ended up in a state of social and political unrest.

Politicians that were promoting these ideas were not able to provide sustainable answers to Italy’s increasing unemployment rate and social unrest.

Gentile also believed that the aspiration of permanent peace could not be implemented because of the conflicting interests of all the nations that in the end made conflict completely inevitable.

A comparative study of both philosophies

After carefully reviewing both theories, it is safe to say that there are quite a few similarities that can be found. Firstly,  there is a clear sense of contempt for the idea of moral progress.

In terms of politics, both Machiavelli and Gentile’s ideal leader, Benito Mussolini always considered themselves realists that were willing to sacrifice anything for their nation.

Mussolini himself even claimed that Niccoló Machiavelli and his realist approach were an inspiration to him and that his book The Prince had an influence on him since he aspired of being the great leader for Italy that would restore the glory of the Roman Empire.

Secondly the idea of the state’s wellbeing being above any form of individualism. In that sense, the famous quote of Machiavelli “the end justifies the means”, can be found in the fascist doctrine.

The belief that the end justifies the means, as a pure struggle for power is the defining characteristics of fascism.

Finally, both of the theories can be traced down to the single concept of the sheepdog and the sheep.

An effective leader can and will harness the weaker traits of humanity in his people to great effect, in the same way, a sheepdog can manipulate to his will a herd of sheep. Not to mention that both Machiavelli and Mussolini thought that the idea of ensuring the wellbeing of a state and its citizens can be effectively achieved by using deceit, treachery, and secrecy whenever it is necessary.

Was Benito Mussolini a real Machiavellian Prince?

With all these similarities, wouldn’t all the scholars agree that through Gentile’s intellectual foundations to the fascist movement, Benito Mussolini can be considered the ideal prince according to Machiavelli?

However, he might be far from being the ideal leader. Machiavelli himself would have found the idea of Mussolini being a prince obscure.

Firstly, the radical ideas that Mussolini had and the way he imposed them on the people through a dictatorship did not comply with the concept of virtues that Machiavelli suggested.

Secondly, Machiavelli specifically said and made it very clear that this is only a matter of expediency and not a model for social behavior, something that Mussolini tried to impose through his blackshirts movement. The aspect of totalitarian regimes was not what Machiavelli had in his mind.

Mussolini also failed to protect and ensure the wellbeing of his citizens and the state. His radical views and clear lack of understanding of what was happening around him made him more of a joker rather than a prince.

An excellent example is his will to enter WWII with the Axis, something that completely crippled the Italian people.

Machiavelli was not an advocate of war and he believed that being ruthless should only last until peace and prosperity are achieved, not to mention that his ideal ruler will establish the ideal republic where there will be a mixed constitution and participation by the citizens.

In that sense, Mussolini was not willing to let his people have any sort of power. In the end for many historians and political thinkers. Mussolini was not in power for the benefit of his people but for the benefit of his ego and his idea that he was the chosen one to restore the glory of ancient Rome.

Implementing the political philosophies in the 21st century

In conclusion, can these two theories be implemented in today’s society? Certainly, fascism has left a bitter taste in Europe and around the world and no government in the world wants to hold the title of a fascist state.

However, fascism has not disappeared rather it has silently moved towards right-wing groups that promote the idea of nationalism.

On the other hand, the theories of Machiavelli regarding realism can be found around the world and some may argue that leaders like Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping are the modern princes that put the interests of the state above individualism. With that being said, it would be impossible to compare any world leader to the ideal prince of Machiavelli, simply because it is hard to understand the notion of a paternalistic society that Machiavelli wanted to be created through the perfect leader. Instead in this day and age authoritarian regimes have replaced this notion and most of the time they leave a negative global opinion.

Today it is important for everyone to remember our world’s history in order not to allow ourselves to fall for the same mistakes of our past. The mistakes that brought misery for the whole world with catastrophic wars and misleading ideologies that pretend to be closer to the citizens but in reality they serve their own authoritarian goals. All in all, when we approach such theories we have to remember the words of the revolutionary Leon Trotsky:

“If the end justifies the means, what justifies the end?”

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The 30th Anniversary of the Visegrád Group: The Voice of Central Europe

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The Visegrád group or V4 is a cultural and political union created in 1991, during a conference in the city of Visegrád in Hungary. V4 has been a symbol of Central Europe’s international activity and a new way of coordinating regional cooperation. Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia’s location in the Central European region provides shared cultural and intellectual roots, which they wish to, preserve and further strengthen.

The aim has been clear since the beginning of the cooperation: to eliminate the remnants of the Communist bloc in Central Europe and to accomplish the necessary transformation to further European integration. V4 accessed the EU membership together on May the 1st 2004. Once the goal – EU and NATO membership – had been reached, the Visegrád group did not disappear, as it was and still is also a way for those 4 countries to have a bigger voice by cumulating their strengths. However, some uneasiness and gloom can now be felt in this axis connecting the Baltic, the Adriatic, and the Black Sea.

Relationship with the EU

The construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which is being opposed by several central and eastern Europeans as well as the United States, is a contentious subject for the V4. Its completion would bypass the V4 region, causing economic and geopolitical harm. It’s not only about falling income from gas transit fees to Western Europe; it’s also about the overall “geopolitical rent” for the Central European area, which would dwindle correspondingly as the present gas pipelines’ relevance decreases.

In Brussels, “Europe” usually means Western Europe. Yet V4countries are, in terms of national progress, becoming the equals of, and even superior to, France and Germany—two EU founders and its two largest, wealthiest members. Recent statistical measures of economic growth, employment, and terrorism all show that four ex-Soviet satellites on the EU’s eastern frontier demonstrate better performance than France or Germany in almost every benchmark metric.


The gross domestic product (GDP) of the V4 grew an average of 4.3 percent in 2018, compared to 1.6 for France and Germany. In both Hungary and Poland, the growth of GDP was 5.1 percent, more than three times the average rate for France and Germany. The worst growth rate among the V4—Czechia’s 3.0 percent—was still double Germany’s growth rate. Given Germany’s stellar reputation as Europe’s economic powerhouse, this is significant. Yet inflation remained mild across all four Visegrád countries, ranging from 1.7 percent in Poland to 2.9 percent in Hungary.


Western Europe still sports larger economies, higher incomes, and longer life expectancies, but these represent a fading legacy of decades of prosperity and peace that was denied to the EU’s eastern members. The indicators, in which some CEE states still lag, like corruption or pollution, are similarly an inheritance of ex-communist rule. Pre-pandemic economic and social progress looked very good for Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, and troubling for Germany and France. If these trends resume—and there is no reason to think they won’t—the East will soon outshine the West.

Despite the fact that Germany is the largest net contributor of EU funds, its economy has benefited the most under the euro, gaining €1.9 trillion from 1999 and 2007, or about €23,000 per German. Berlin’s economy benefits from the EU’s euro zone in many ways, according to Bertelsmann Stiftung, a respected German think-tank. By 2025, the benefits could amount to €170 billion more for Germany. Observers often refer to the V4 as “two plus two,” because of their differing attitudes to European integration. Czechia and Slovakia are more Europe-friendly than Poland and Hungary, which are far more eurosceptic.

Conclusion

The V4 do not share the post-World War II view of the EU embraced by dominant decision-makers in Western Europe, such as France, and Germany. Hungary and Poland’s authorities have generated front-page headlines in recent months for disregarding EU regulations. Their vision for Europe is for a robust and strong nation-state. The V4 has emerged as a non-institutional organization but is increasingly present as a separate agent in European and global politics. The upcoming year, with all its challenges, will certainly reveal more about this partnership. Central Europe needs to be strong within the European Union, and this requires a functioning Visegrád, and the willingness to find common results.

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EU: The stalemate in negotiations brings Serbia ever closer to Russia and China

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Serbia has been waiting since 2012 for the European Union to respond to its application to become a full member of the EU.

In spite of exhausting negotiations, this response is slow in coming and the main cause of the stalemate has a clear name: Kosovo. Before accepting Serbia’s application for membership, the EU requires a definitive solution to the relations between Serbia and that region that broke away from it after the 1999 conflict – when NATO came to the aid of the Kosovo Albanians – and proclaimed its independence in February 2008.

Serbia has never recognised the birth of the Kosovo Republic, just as many other important countries have not: out of 193 UN members, only 110 have formally accepted the birth of the new republic, while the rest, including Russia, China, Spain, Greece and Romania – to name just the most important ones – refuse to recognise the independence of the Albanians of what was once a region of Serbia.

The European Union cannot accept that one of its members is in fact unable to guarantee control over its borders, as would be the case for Serbia if its membership were accepted.

In fact, since the end of the war between Kosovo and Serbia, there is no clear and controlled border between the two countries. In order to avoid continuous clashes, Kosovo and Serbia have actually left the border open, turning a blind eye to the ‘smuggling economy’ that thrives on both sides of the border.

In this situation, if Serbia were to become a full member of the European Union, it would create a gap in the borders of the entire Schengen area, as anyone passing through Kosovo could then move into all EU countries.This is not the only obstacle to Serbia’s accession to the European

Union: many European chancelleries are wary of Serbian foreign policy which, since the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation, has maintained a privileged relationship with Russia, refusing to adhere to the sanctions decided by Europe against Russia after the annexation of Crimea to the detriment of Ukraine.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, Serbia even agreed to produce the Russian vaccine ‘Sputnik V’ directly in its own laboratories, blatantly snubbing EU’s vaccine offer.

For the United States and some important European countries, Serbia’s formal accession to the European Union could shift the centre of gravity of Europe’s geopolitics towards the East, opening a preferential channel for dialogue between Russia and the European Union through Serbia.

This possibility, however, is not viewed unfavourably by Germany which, in the intentions of the CDU President, Armin Laschet, the next candidate to succeed Angela Merkel as Chancellor, has recently declared he is in favour of a foreign policy that “develops in multiple directions”, warning his Western partners of the danger resulting from “the interruption of the dialogue with Russia and China”. In this regard, Laschet has publicly stated that ‘foreign policy must always focus on finding ways to interact, including cooperation with countries that have different social models from ours, such as Russia, China and the nations of the Arab world’.

Today we do not know whether in autumn Laschet will take over the leadership of the most powerful country in the European Union, but what is certain is that Serbia’s possible formal membership of the European Union could force Europe to revise some of its foreign policy stances, under the pressure of a new Serbian-German axis.

Currently, however, Serbia’s membership of the European Union still seems a long way off, precisely because of the stalemate in the Serbia-Kosovo negotiations.

In 2013 Kosovo and Serbia signed the so-called ‘Brussels Pact’, an agreement optimistically considered by European diplomats to be capable of rapidly normalising relations between Serbia and Kosovo, in view of mutual political and diplomatic recognition.

An integral part of the agreement was, on the one hand, the commitment of Kosovo’s authorities to recognise a high degree of administrative autonomy to the Kosovo municipalities inhabited by a Serb majority and, on the other hand, the collaboration of the Serbs in the search for the remains of the thousands of Kosovar Albanians presumably eliminated by Milosevic’s troops during the repression that preceded the 1999 war.

Neither of the two commitments has so far been fulfilled and, during the meeting held in Brussels on July 21 between Serbian President Alexander Vucic and Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti, harsh words and reciprocal accusations were reportedly exchanged concerning the failure to implement the ‘Pact’, to the extent that the Head of European foreign policy, Josep Borrel, publicly asked the two parties to ‘close the chapter of a painful past through a legally binding agreement on the normalisation of mutual relations, with a view to building a European future for its citizens’. This future seems nebulous, to say the least, if we consider that Serbia, in fact, refuses to recognise the legal value of degrees and diplomas awarded by the Kosovo academic authorities also to members of the Kosovo Serb minority.

Currently, however, both contenders are securing support and alliances in Europe and overseas.

Serbia is viewed favourably by the current President of the European Union, Slovenian Janez Jansa, who is a supporter of its membership because “this would definitively mark the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation”. The vast majority of European right-wing parties, ranging from the French ‘Rassemblement National’ to the Hungarian ‘Fydesz’, also approve of Serbia’s membership application and openly court the Serbian minorities living in their respective countries while, after the years of US disengagement from the Balkans under Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump, the Biden administration has decided to put the region back on the list of priority foreign policy commitments, entrusting the ‘Serbia dossier’ to the undersecretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Matthew Palmer, an authoritative and experienced diplomat.

With a view to supporting its application for European membership, Serbia has also deployed official lobbyists.

Last June, Natasha Dragojilovic Ciric’s lobbying firm ND Consulting officially registered in the so-called EU ‘transparency register’ to promote support for Serbia’s membership. ND is financed by a group of international donors and is advised by Igor Bandovic, former researcher at the American Gallup and Head of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, by lawyer Katarina Golubovic of the ‘Committee of Human Rights Lawyers’ and Jovana Spremo, former OSCE consultant.

These are the legal experts deployed by Serbia in Brussels to support its application for formal European integration, but in the meantime Serbia is not neglecting its “eastern” alliances.

Earlier this month, the Head of the SVR, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergey Naryshkin, paid an official visit to Belgrade, a few weeks after the conclusion of a joint military exercise between Russian special forces (the “Spetznaz”) and Serbian special forces.

In the Serbian capital, Naryshkin not only met his Serbian counterpart Bratislav Gasic, Head of the ‘Bezbednosno Informativna Agencija’, the small but powerful Serbian secret service, but was also received by the President of the Republic Alexander Vucic with the aim of publicising the closeness between Serbia and Russia.

The timing of the visit coincides with the resumption of talks in Brussels on Serbia’s accession to the European Union and can clearly be considered as instrumental in exerting subtle diplomatic pressure aimed at convincing the European Union of the possibility that, in the event of a refusal, Serbia may decide to definitely turn its back on the West and ally with an East that is evidently more willing to treat the Serbs with the dignity and attention that a proud and tenacious people believes it deserves.

A piece of news confirming that Serbia is ready to turn its back on the West, should Europe continue to postpone the decision on its accession to the European Union is the fact that China has recently signed a partnership agreement with Serbia in the field of pharmaceutical research, an agreement that makes Serbia one of China’s current largest commercial partners on the European continent.

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NATO’s Cypriot Trick

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UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Warsaw Pact died, there was much speculation that NATO would consider itself redundant and either disappear or at least transmogrify into a less aggressive body.

Failing that, Moscow at least felt assured that NATO would not include Germany, let alone expand eastwards. Even the NATO Review, NATO’s PR organ, wrote self-apologetically twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin wall: “Thus, the debate about the enlargement of NATO evolved solely in the context of German reunification. In these negotiations Bonn and Washington managed to allay Soviet reservations about a reunited Germany remaining in NATO. This was achieved by generous financial aid, and by the ‘2+4 Treaty’ ruling out the stationing of foreign NATO forces on the territory of the former East Germany. However, it was also achieved through countless personal conversations in which Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders were assured that the West would not take advantage of the Soviet Union’s weakness and willingness to withdraw militarily from Central and Eastern Europe.”

Whatever the polemics about Russia’s claim that NATO broke its promises, the facts of what happened following the fall of the Berlin wall and the negotiations about German re-unification strongly demonstrate that Moscow felt cheated and that the NATO business and military machine, driven by a jingoistic Cold War Britain, a selfish U.S. military-industrial-congressional complex and an atavistic Russia-hating Poland, saw an opportunity to become a world policeman.

This helps to explain why, in contrast to Berlin, NATO decided to keep Nicosia as the world’s last divided city. For Cyprus is in fact NATO’s southernmost point, de facto. And to have resolved Cyprus’ problem by heeding UN resolutions and getting rid of all foreign forces and re-unifying the country would have meant that NATO would have ‘lost’ Cyprus: hardly helpful to the idea of making NATO the world policeman. Let us look a little more closely at the history behind this.

Following the Suez debacle in 1956, Britain had already moved its Middle East Headquarters from Aden to Cyprus, while the U.S. was taking over from the UK and France in the Middle East. Although, to some extent under U.S. pressure, Britain was forced to bring Makarios out of exile and begin negotiating with Greece and Turkey to give up its colony, the U.S. opted for a NATO solution. It would not do to have a truly sovereign Cyprus, but only one which accepted the existence of the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) as part and parcel of any settlement; and so it has remained, whatever the sophistic semantics about a bizonal settlement and a double-headed government. The set of twisted and oft-contradictory treaties that have bedevilled the island since 1960 are still afflicting the part-occupied island which has been a de facto NATO base since 1949. Let us look at some more history.

When Cyprus obtained its qualified independence in 1960, Greece and Turkey had already signed, on 11 February 1959, a so called ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’, agreeing that they would support Cyprus’ entry into NATO.1 This was, however, mere posture diplomacy, since Britain—and the U.S. for that matter—did not trust Cyprus, given the strength of the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) and the latter’s links to Moscow. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) wrote: ‘Membership of NATO might make it easier for the Republic of Cyprus and possibly for the Greeks and Turks to cause political embarrassment should the United Kingdom wish to use the bases […] for national ends outside Cyprus […] The access of the Cypriot Government to NATO plans and documents would present a serious security risk, particularly in view of the strength of the Cypriot Communist Party. […] The Chiefs of Staff, therefore, feel most strongly that, from the military point of view, it would be a grave disadvantage to admit Cyprus to NATO.’2 In short, Cyprus was considered unreliable.

As is well known, the unworkable constitution (described as such by the Foreign Office and even by David Hannay, the Annan reunification plan’s PR man), resulted in chaos and civil strife: in January 1964, during the chaos caused by the Foreign Office’s help and encouragement to President Makarios to introduce a ‘thirteen point plan’ to solve Cyprus’ problems, British Prime Minister Douglas-Home told the Cabinet: ‘If the Turks invade or if we are seriously prevented from fulfilling our political role, we have made it quite clear that we will retire into base.’3 Put more simply, Britain had never had any intention of upholding the Treaty of Guarantee.

In July of the same year, the Foreign Office wrote: ‘The Americans have made it quite clear that there would be no question of using the 6th Fleet to prevent any possible Turkish invasion […] We have all along made it clear to the United Nations that we could not agree to UNFICYP’s being used for the purpose of repelling external intervention, and the standing orders to our troops outside UNFYCYP are to withdraw to the sovereign base areas immediately any such intervention takes place.’4

It was mainly thanks to Moscow and President Makarios that in 1964 a Turkish invasion and/or the island being divided between Greece and Turkey was prevented. Such a solution would have strengthened NATO, since Cyprus would no longer exist other than as a part of NATO members Greece and Turkey. Moscow had issued the following statement: ‘The Soviet Government hereby states that if there is an armed foreign invasion of Cypriot territory, the Soviet Union will help the Republic of Cyprus to defend its freedom and independence against foreign intervention.’5

Privately, Britain, realising the unworkability of the 1960 treaties, was embarrassed, and wished to relieve itself of the whole problem. The following gives us the backstage truth: ‘The bases and retained sites, and their usefulness to us, depend in large measure on Greek Cypriot co-operation and at least acquiescence. A ‘Guantanamo’6 position is out of the question. Their future therefore must depend on the extent to which we can retain Greek and/or Cypriot goodwill and counter USSR and UAR pressures. There seems little doubt, however, that in the long term, our sovereign rights in the SBA’s will be considered increasingly irksome by the Greek Cypriots and will be regarded as increasingly anachronistic by world public opinion.7

Following the Turkish invasion ten years later, Britain tried to give up its bases: ‘British strategic interests in Cyprus are now minimal. Cyprus has never figured in NATO strategy and our bases there have no direct NATO role. The strategic value of Cyprus to us has declined sharply since our virtual withdrawal from east of Suez. This will remain the case when the Suez Canal has reopened.8

A Cabinet paper concluded: ‘Our policy should continue to be one of complete withdrawal of our military presence on Cyprus as soon as feasible. […] In the circumstances I think that we should make the Americans aware of our growing difficulty in continuing to provide a military presence in Cyprus while sustaining our main contribution to NATO. […]9

Britain kept trying to give up the bases, but the enabler of the Turkish invasion, Henry Kissinger, did not allow Britain to give up its bases and listening posts, since that would have weakened NATO, and since Kissinger needed the bases because of the Arab-Israel dispute.10

Thus, by the end of 1980, in a private about-turn, Britain had completely succumbed to American pressure: ‘The benefits which we derive from the SBAs are of major significance and virtually irreplaceable. They are an essential contribution to the Anglo-American relationship. The Department have regularly considered with those concerned which circumstances in Cyprus are most conducive to our retaining unfettered use of our SBA facilities. On balance, the conclusion is that an early ‘solution’ might not help (since pressures against the SBAs might then build up), just as breakdown and return to strife would not, and that our interests are best served by continuing movement towards a solution – without the early prospect of arrival [author’s italics]11.

And so it is today: Cyprus is a de facto NATO territory. A truly independent, sovereign and united Cyprus is an anathema to the U.S. and Britain, since such a scenario would afford Russia the hypothetical opportunity to increase its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

From our partner RIAC

[1] Ministry of Defence paper JP (59) 163, I January 1960, BNA DEFE 13/99/MO/5/1/5, in Mallinson, William, Cyprus, a Modern History, I.B. Tauris (now Bloomsbury), London and New York, 2005, 2009, 2012, p.49.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Memorandum by Prime Minister, 2 January 1964, BNA CAB/129/116, in ibid, Mallinson, William, p.37.

[4] British Embassy, Washington, to Foreign Office, 7 July 1964, telegram 8541, BNA FO 371/174766, file C1205/2/G, in ibid.’, Mallinson, William, p. 37.

[5] Joseph, Joseph S., Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, St Martin’s Press, London and New York, 1997, p. 66.

[6] In 1964, Cuba cut off supplies to the American base at Guantanamo Bay, since the US refused to return it to Cuba, as a result of which the US took measures to make it self-sufficient.

[7] Briefing paper, 18 June 1964, BNA-DO/220/170, file MED 193/105/2, part A. Mallinson,William, Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus, p. 127.

[8] ‘British Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean’, draft paper, 11 April 1975, BNA-FCO 46/1248, file DPI/515/1.

[9] Cabinet paper, 29 September 1976, in op. cit. Mallinson, William, Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus, p.134.

[10] Mallinson, William, Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2011, and Bloomsbury, London and New York, 2020, pp. 87-121.

[11] Fergusson to Foreign Minister’s Private Secretary, minute, 8 December 1980, BNA-FCO 9/2949, file WSC/023/1, part C.

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