Connect with us
modi xi jinping modi xi jinping

South Asia

The Dragon Elephant Tango: Indo-China relations under Modi

Published

on

India and China have a demonstrated history of border tension since Independence, once even leading to war. Yet, a simultaneous effort to establish “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai” has persisted parallelly. Every subsequent government that has come to power has had a strategy of establishing ‘mutual trust’ and a ‘shared vision’ with their Chinese counterpart. The diplomatic efforts almost turned into a blossoming ‘friendship’ under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

Both countries have been carving out their space in the international arena and have commanded global attention. In their mission to establish a global footing, the neighbours have recognised each other’s importance. In 2010, after a bilateral talk, they even released a joint statement saying “there is enough space in the world for both China and India to grow”. China started displaying an interest in India since the beginning of the 21st century. India too, recognised China as a potential strategic partner, owing to its economy and geographical proximity.

Efforts from both sides since 2004 led to a chain of favourable events that helped cultivate the strategic relationship. The BRICS conference held at New Delhi in 2012, saw the two countries unite to condemn US action in Libya and Syria and asserting the importance of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. By the next BRICS meeting in Durban in 2013, the countries had grown significantly closer, and border disputes were pretty much put on the back burner.

However, since the shift in leadership to the NDA alliance there has been a visible deterioration in the trajectory of the relationship. Gradually leading to the current heightened tension in the Galwan Valley region.

The retraction of evolving relations under the Modi regime can be attributed to three primary changes in India’s foreign and domestic policy:

1. India’s shift towards joining the US camp

The UPA government had set the stage for a grand visit by Xi Jinping in September 2014 to be carried forward by a newly anointed Prime Minister Modi. However, the Modi government treated the visit “more as a bilateral mending of fences… rather than as the culmination of a long and patiently sought rapprochement.”. Additionally, Xi Jinping’s visit was preceded by a visit to Washington by Modi and followed by a surprise visit by President Obama as the chief guest for Republic day celebrations in 2015.

The Obama visit culminated in the signing of the ‘U.S.–India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region’. This demonstrated move to the US camp sent a clear signal to China against any kind of strategic relationship with India.

In 2016, under intense tension between USA-China in the South China sea, the Modi government sent four warships with the US-Japan task force that were docked in Vietnam and Philippines ports for over two months. This was clearly seen as “a blatant assertion of India’s freedom of navigation (under American protection of course) in the South China Sea.”

Furthermore, China is concerned about India’s participation in the Quad, trilateral, and military exercises such as the Malabar naval drills which China considers a quasi alliance.

More recently, Trump’s visit to India in February’20 and the Indo-US ‘Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership’ in the support of free navigation in the Indo-Pacific, all contributed towards a retaliation from China.

2. India’s refusal to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

India has expressed concern against joining the BRI, as it breaches its territorial integrity. A portion of the BRI passes through POK- which India considers an illegal occupation by Pakistan -directly threatening India’s sovereignty. Additionally, India is wary of China’s debt-trap diplomacy that offers favourable loans, indebting the member states to China.

The primary concern, however, is that the BRI expands China’s unilateral power, threatening India’s position as an alternate power in the Indo-Pacific region.

This has invited retaliation from China through repeated vetoing of India’s membership into the Nuclear Suppliers Group and obstruction of permanent membership into the UN security council.

The 2018 Doklam standoff was a push back from India against China’s construction of a road in the disputed region with Bhutan, whose claim India supports.

3. India’s reforms in Ladakh

Another significant transgression by India, in the eyes of China, are its reforms in Ladakh and Jammu Kashmir. Part of the new territory of Ladakh contains land that Pakistan gave to China in the agreement in 1963. China made their objection to the revocation of Article 370 and 35A clear, in August last year by issuing a statement that asked India to ‘exercise restraint’ and calling out their ‘unilateral’ attempt to change the status quo in Ladakh. India dismissed these accusations by calling them ‘misplaced’ and having no bearing on the LAC or the external boundaries of India. However, soon in September, PLA troops started blocking Indian patrol in the region.

In the Chennai Connect informal summit in October, President Xi Jinping suggested an India-China-Pakistan trilateral dialogue “free from the influence of third parties”, but Modi ignored the suggestion.

Recent Obstacles

Indo-Chinese border clashes have occurred before, but the difference this time has been the changed context in domestic as well as international circumstances.

China has turned more assertive in the face of international backlash for its handling of the virus. They have implemented stricter security laws in Hong Kong despite international condemnation, cautioned Taiwan against their independence and have made assertions in the South China Sea. China has been subjected to a supply chain reshuffling due to US tariffs on Chinese products and an unofficial China-boycott leading to overproduction and fall in demand.

India on the other hand has been dealing with a deteriorating coronavirus outbreak as well as a severe economic downfall. India’s relations with its neighbours are also at a decline, Bangladesh has not been pleased with the NRC policy implementation, Bhutan is not eager to join the BBIN, ties with Nepal have hit a rough patch since the blockade in 2016 and “with Rajapaksha in power, Sri Lanka will have no love lost for India”.

An anti-climax?

The ‘Dragon Elephant Tango’ has reached a heightened climax with the growing hostilities in the Galwan Valley. The rising US-China tension has led China to diversify its trade away from the US. In this regard, India serves as a perfect market. However, the growing Indo-US ties have triggered China against India. India is stuck in a bind regarding the Huawei 5G investment, as it keeps prices down but also does not want to enter into US-China trade tensions. China’s assertions in the Galwan Valley could be China’s attempt to pull India away from playing a central role in US-Japan ties. Whatever the case, it is clear that both countries have more to lose than gain from an escalation of hostilities. Instead, there is ample scope for a quid pro quo from either side.

I am a third-year undergraduate student of political science at Jadavpur University, India. My interest areas include foreign policy, international relations and public policy. I am currently working on a compendium with the Centre for Civil Society, a public policy think tank, on the effects of COVID-19 on professional education.

Continue Reading
Comments

South Asia

Bhashan Char Relocation: Bangladesh’s Effort Appreciated by UN

Published

on

Bhashan Char. Image source: dhakatribune.com

Bhashan Char, situated in the district of Noakhali, is one of the 75 islands of Bangladesh. To ease the pressure on the digested camps in Cox’s Bazar and to maintain law and order, Bangladesh has relocated about 18,500 Rohingya refugees from the overcrowded camps to the island since December last year. The Rohingya relocation plan to Bhashan Char aligns with the Bangladesh government’s all-encompassing efforts towards repatriation. The initial plan was to relocate 100,000 of the more than a million refugees from the clogged camps to the island. From the onset of the relocation process, the UN and some other human rights organizations criticized the decision pointing to remoteness and sustainability. UNHCR showed their concern over the island’s susceptibility to seasonal storm and flood. They proposed for a “technical assessment” of the Bhashan Char facilities.

An 18-member UN delegation visited Bhashan Char Island on March 17 this year to have a first-hand assessment of the housing facility for the Rohingya forcibly displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs). Shortly after the UN’s visit, a team with 10 diplomats including heads of missions of embassies and delegations from Turkey, the EU, US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Australia, Canada and the Netherlands also went to the island on April 3 to appraise the facilities. All the members of the technical team opined that they are ‘satisfied’ with the facilities in Bhashan Char. The experts of the UN told, they will hand over a 10-page report of their annotations and they have already submitted a two-page abridgment. On April 16, they released the two-page synopsis after a month of the visit.  After the three-day study of Bhashan Char by the UN delegates, they recommended the Bangladesh government to continue the relocation process to the island in a ‘phased manner’. The team twigged three points – education for Rohingya children, increasing heights of the embankments and better communication system. The Foreign Minister of Bangladesh A. K. Abdul Momen concerted to take the necessary measures to create a safe and secure environment for the Rohingya refugees until the repatriation takes place. The relocation is not the solution of the Rohingya crisis rather the over emphasis of the relocation and facilities inside Bangladesh is protracting the crisis and distracting the attention from the broader emphasis on the repatriation to Myanmar.

The UNHCR and other concerned parties should plan for a long run repatriation process. Repatriation is the only durable solution, not the relocation of the Rohingya refugees. For the time being, resettlement under the Asrayan-3 project is an ease for the FDMNs but in the long run the Rohingya crisis is going to turn as a tremendous threat for regional peace and stability. Besides, resentment in the host community in Bangladesh due to the scarce resources may emerge as a critical security and socio-economic concern for Bangladesh.  It is not new that the Rohingyas are repatriated in Myanmar during the Military rule. Around 20,000 Rohingya refugees were repatriated to Myanmar in the 2000s. The focus of the world community should be creating favourable conditions for the Rohingyas to return safely regardless who is in the power seat of Myanmar-civilian or military government. The UN should largely focus on repatriating the Rohingya refugees in a “phased manner”, let alone deciding their concern in the camps and the Bhashan Char. After the praiseworthy relocation plan, they should now concentrate on implementing speedy and durable repatriation. Proactive initiatives are essential from all walks for a safe and dignified return of the FDMNs. To be specific, the relocation is a part of the repatriation, not the solution of the problem. 

Continue Reading

South Asia

Afghan peace options

Published

on

President Biden’s decision to withdraw unconditionally all foreign forces from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021 will leave behind an uncertain and genuine security concerns that ramifications will be born by Afghanistan as well as the region.

The Taliban seems least interested in peace talks with the Afghan government and appear determined to take control of the entire afghan government territory by force during post-withdrawal of American forces. Short of the total surrender, Afghan government has no possible influence to force the Taliban to prefer talks over violence. Resultantly, the apprehensions that Afghanistan could plunge into another civil war runs very high.

The consequences of yet another civil war will be deadly for Afghanistan and the whole region as well. Among the neighboring countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan will bear the severe burnt of an escalation of violence in particular. A civil war or possible Taliban takeover will surely upsurge and reinvigorate the Islamic militancy in Pakistan, thus threatening to lose the hard won gains made against militancy over the past decade.

The afghan and Pakistani Taliban, nevertheless, are the two sides of the same coin. Coming back to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan is surely emboldened and revives Pakistani Taliban and other militant outfits. Moreover, spread of violence not only reduce all chances of repatriation of refugees but possibly increase the inflow of refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan.

Furthermore, worsening of the security situation in Afghanistan will jeopardize the prospects of  trade, foreign investment and economic development initiatives such as china-Pakistan economic corridor. The chances of Gawadar and Karachi port to become a transit trade route for the region and link the energy rich region of central asia will become bleak until a sustainable peace and stability is achieved in Afghanistan.

It is against this background that the successful end of the intra-afghan talk is highly required for Pakistan, for its own sake.  Officially, Islamabad stated policy is to ensure the afghan-led and afghan-owned peace solution of the afghan conflict. It helped in bringing the Taliban on the negotiation table, which finally resulted in the signing of the Doha deal between US and Taliban. Further, Pakistan has time and again pressurized the Taliban to resume the dialogue. Moreover, Islamabad holds that, unlike in the past when it wanted a friendly regime in Kabul, it aims to develop a friendly and diplomatic relation whoever is on the power in Kabul.

Notwithstanding the stated policy and position of the Islamabad, the afghan government and the many in the US remains dubious of Pakistan’s commitment. Against these concerns, Islamabad categorically stated that it does not have complete control over the Taliban.

The success of the peace process will require coordination and cooperation among the all regional actors and the US and afghan government. Pakistan’s role is of an immense significance because of its past relation with the Taliban. There is no denying of the fact that Pakistan has not complete control over the Taliban. Despite, it has more leverage than the other actors in the region.

The Islamabad’s willingness to use its influence over the Taliban is her real test in the achievement of peace process. However, Pakistan has successfully used its leverage and brought the Taliban on negotiations table. Although, history is the testimony of the fact that mere cajoling won’t dissuade the Taliban from unleashing violence.

The prospects of intra-afghan talks will develop in success when the cajoling strategy is backed up by with credible threats of crackdown which may involve denial of safe heaven to militant leaders and their families, stopping medical treatment, and disruption of finance etc. on the other hand, strong arm tactics fail to bring the Taliban to the table, then Pakistan should make sure that its territory is not used to carry out attacks in Afghanistan.

The afghan peace process has an opportunity for Pakistan to bury its hatchets with Afghanistan and start its diplomatic journey with a new vigor. While Kabul every time attach its failure with the Pakistan and shun away from its responsibility of providing peace to people of Afghanistan, it has a fair point about our pro Taliban afghan policy. Now that the US is leaving Afghanistan, it is high time that Pakistan bring forth a shift in its Afghanistan policy. Sustainable peace in Pakistan, especially Balochistan and ex-fata region is unlikely to achieve without Pakistan contributing to peace in Afghanistan.    

Continue Reading

South Asia

Pakistani Fanatics and their Foreign Policy Overtures

Published

on

A prudent leader ought to have regard not only for present troubles but also for future ones. They must prepare with every energy because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time. Through not having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that everyone can see them, there is no longer a remedy. These words are famously attributed to 16th-century Italian Philosopher Machiavelli, advising the ruler about statecraft, in his Magnus Opus, The Prince.

A similar kind of ignorance and obliviousness against which Machiavelli was warning to the ruler of the state was reflected by the government of Imran Khan when protests by a radical religious organization (TLP) shook the country from 11-20 April. Previous to this latest episode, TLP has also staged various sit-in and violent protests by which they effectively froze all life in twin cities as well as in various cities of Punjab.

2017 Faizabad interchange protest was the zenith of its anarchical behavior. In that protest, TLP demanded the resignation of the law minister altering the oath declaration in the election bill 2017. Preceding, the court heard a plea on the stated matter. Justice Qazi Faiz Essa while hearing a plea on the case, remarked; “The ambitious leadership of a fledgling political party [TLP] projected itself as the defender of the Muslim faith. They provoked religious sentiment, stoked the flames of hatred, abused, resorted to violence, and destroyed property worth Rs.163 million.”  Another takeaway from the ruling of the Supreme Court goes like, “Protestors who obstruct people’s right to use roads and damage or destroy property must be proceeded against by the law and held accountable.”

Qazi Faiz Essa’s observation is enough to make a viewpoint on the organization. It is recommended that steps must be taken to curtail the reach of TLP. But allowing its leaders to further myth-spin bogus and inflammatory narratives, catch the attention of masses, effect normalcy in the country, and take hostage federal and provincial capitals many times after that shows sheer incapability on behalf of the state.

Moreover, the recent episode is also another criticism of religiosity interwoven within Pakistani society that has been exploited by opportunists to gain the support of the masses since its birth. TLP, an amalgamation of religio-political narrative, first appeared on the scene when it demanded the release of Mumtaz Qadri, the person who assassinated Governor Punjab Salman Taseer for criticizing blasphemy laws. After the execution of Qadri, Rizvi laid the foundation of Tehreek-E-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYR) for the purpose to protect the Blasphemy laws of Pakistan under the banner of protecting Honor for Prophet (PBUH). TLP is the political wing of TLYR which emerged as the 5th most popular political group in the electoral race of 2018. These numbers are a barometer to show that the party has gained considerable support among the masses for its narrative

Though the rise of TLP is attributed to fault lines within the domestic political culture of Pakistan and cultural cleavages that exist in the society. The recent protests were the result of its activeness in international affairs relevant to its narrative. The group tried to dictate the foreign relations of Pakistan. In the latest episode, TLP took on the streets again and demanded severing diplomatic ties with France. In the short aftermaths of TLP protests, European Parliament has adopted a resolution calling the review of the GSP+ status of Pakistan for abuse of blasphemy laws and expressed deep concerns over prevailing anti-French sentiments.

To add insult to injury, all of this is happening at a time when Pakistan is looking to create a soft image for herself, seeking an effective role in regional and international organizations for political and economic benefits, lobbying to move out of FATF grey list, and initiating an international campaign to unmask Indian state-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir, etcetera. Unfortunately, this has seriously jeopardized our pursuit of national interests and can nullify progress.

Disrespect for the Holy Prophet (PBUH) is an issue sensitive to all Muslims but there is always a better way of doing things. The goal should be to stop disrespect and blasphemy and not forging further cause of hatred. On the other hand, the French president defended the acts as Freedom of Expression – a value so dear to the west – so even if Pakistan sends the French Ambassador back and suffers all the losses, is there any assurance for improvement in a situation regarding blasphemous content? What will be the next step of TLP if this continues? What will be the alternatives for Pakistan after that? Surely, this calls for some reflection on self-proclaimed defenders of religion. Government, on its part, must opt for softer and diplomatic ways in reaching out to France and making them realize the severity of the issue for Muslims.

To sum up, State ought not to be bogged down by religious pressure groups and fanatics like TLP for the reason being that they have not understood long-term national interests. Pledging to Khadim Rizvi on moving the parliament about French ambassador was never a wise act. One should have been vigilant enough to access the Omens. Furthermore, the government must impart this to such groups that they must not test the nerves of the state. It is in the interest of the state as well as government to not let things slip out of hand and go this further hereafter where one more episode similar to this makes international isolation inevitable.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Economy2 hours ago

Covid-19 and Liberal World Order

The liberal international order (sometimes referred to as the rules-based international order or the US-led liberal international order) involves international...

Human Rights5 hours ago

Myanmar coup: ‘No sign’ of end to brutal crackdown on all fronts

One hundred days since the Myanmar military seized power, the “brutal” repression of protesters has continued, despite all international efforts...

Development6 hours ago

Vaccine inequity posing ‘significant risk’ to global economic recovery

Although the outlook for global growth has improved, the ongoing impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as inadequate progress on vaccination in...

Middle East10 hours ago

Attack On Jerusalem – Where Is The International System?

Since mid-20th century the conflict has been referred to as the ‘most intractable conflict’ in the world with the ongoing...

Intelligence12 hours ago

Boko Haram: Religious Based Violence and Portrayal of Radical Islam

Modern-day global and domestic politics have set forth the trend that has legitimized and rationalized the use of religion as...

Europe14 hours ago

Cyprus conflict: How could be Resolved and Reunified?

Cyprus conflict has been regarded as one of the conflicts that are so far difficult to find a resolution for...

South Asia16 hours ago

Bhashan Char Relocation: Bangladesh’s Effort Appreciated by UN

Bhashan Char, situated in the district of Noakhali, is one of the 75 islands of Bangladesh. To ease the pressure...

Trending