Ladakh: A geopolitical hotspot

Anew perturbing phase of Chinese intrusion in Ladakh is attaining impetus. Unlike the 2013 intrusion, it is alarming because People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has penetrated beyond Line of Actual Control (LAC) from multiple points. This analysis tries to understand the causes behind the latest standoff and introspect as why India has adopted a muted approach against Chinese penetration.

However, PLA’s actions this time seem permanent rather than temporary along LAC. Chinese troops reportedly have erected more than 100 tents and also brought heavy machinery for construction of bunkers along LAC in the Galwan Valley. According to Indian media reports, Chinese troops entered into areas claimed by India at four locations including Patrol Point 14 (PP14) and Gogra post. Moreover in Pangong Tso, it has been reported that Chinese troops are establishing bunkers around disputed area of finger 3 to halt Indian patrols. Similarly, they also have brought additional boats to patrol Pangongriver and pressurize Indian troops. Chinese have reportedly excavated a trench like structure and also blocked the Indian patrols by placing two bulldozers. Amidst this border dispute, New Delhi need to come up with balancing measures to prevent any further escalation or else China will permanently alter the status quo of LAC for future.

From early May, PLA personnel have intruded beyond LAC at multiple points. According to Indian officials, the areas which Chinese have intruded are those which were not disputed. Indian Defence Minister has also acknowledged about presence of a large number of Chinese troops in areas about which India claims ownership.

The latest military standoff is seen as a response to Indian construction activities along LAC. It includes a road construction stretching from Dharchuk to Daulat Beg Oldie that is an overhaul advance landing ground (ALG), literally the highest airstrip in the world where Indian forces are able to land C-130. This acquisition of enhanced airborne operation capability will enable India to move its troops and apparatus more frequently to ‘vulnerable areas’. Moreover, this road can grant access to Karakoram Highway, in future, that is a bone of contention for Beijing’s strategic interests, since this region is linked to the resource rich Xinjiang in east while Gilgit Baltistan in the west. Furthermore, Gilgit Baltistan’s geographical contiguity with India, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Xinjiang make itself a political, logistical and strategic asset. Indian access to KKH will also have a negative implication on China Pakistan Economic Corridor.  PLA is reportedly intensifying its presence by making penetrations into Southern Ladakh.  Since Indian army has not shown any challenging retort rather it is mounting a defensive strategy as a ‘second mover’.

Meanwhile, New Delhi is determined not to stop its border progress activities, hence bolstering its positions by men and material that reflects that India is also prepared for an elongated standoff in all dimensions. In past four years, India had geared to establish roads and runways along LAC that had enabled it to mobilize its troops more frequently. Furthermore, it can recurrently encounter Chinese patrol aggressions. The main source of dispute on this front is that there is no clear demarcation of LAC, rather it depends upon the ‘local understanding’ of both troops. Similarly, there is no exchange of maps among both armies about actual demarcation of LAC.

For China, these scuffles have been considered as a tangible effort to divert attention from a series of missteps, that includes severe criticism on Chinese government regarding detention camps in Xinjiang, Hong Kong demonstrations and a rapid slowdown in Chinese economy. Secondly, these skirmishes are seen as an artifact of local PLA commanders. Local commanders undertake aggressive patrolling along LAC to pursue tactical advantages without realizing political or strategic repercussions of their actions. It has been said that in past PLA conducted aggressive moves without approval of Chinese government, most notably in 1967 skirmishes along Sikkim that resulted into several hundred casualties. Thirdly, these scuffles are seen as a response to Indian road constructions to encounter Chinese patrol intrusions. It has to be noted that Chinese patrol is ‘vehicle based’ while Indians are relying on ‘foot’. Consequently these upgradations will no longer ensure Chinese ‘free run’ in this area. Abrogation of article 370 and 35-A is used by China as a tool to proceed with its own stakes in Ladakh. Beijing views this alteration as a stake for its own interests due to various reasons. It views the change of J&K’s status as a threat to CPEC, Moreover Indian claim on eastern fringe of Aksai Chin occupied by China in 1962’s war, as seen in rhetoric of Home minister Amit Singh is seen as a serious concern in Chinese circles. Similarly China claims on various parts of Ladakh and it sights this alteration as unification of Ladakh into Indian territory. In the light of these few reasons, any attempt to alter demography of Ladakh will ultimately problematic for China.

Up till, New Delhi had adopted a muted approach towards Chinese intrusion. India had adopted a muted approach regarding Chinese intrusion since Modi’s government and military had lost its credibility in the current crisis. Amidst all these tensions New Delhi is relying on diplomatic channels to settle the dispute without enmity. Recently Indian and Chinese military commanders met in Ladakh. After the meeting both sides moved back to nearly 2.5 kilometers. However sources reflect a far austere picture by claiming that Chinese even refused to confer its intrusions into Galwan valley, instead they sued complete proprietorship of entire area. Moreover PLA alleged, one kilometer long track built along the Shyok-Galwan river junction as an infringement in Chinese territory. PLA also rejected the Indian charges of intrusion in Pangong Tso and termed is a ‘rightful’ act of constructing a metaled road and organizing defensive positions in these areas. It’s apprehended that Chinese troops have gained a strategic advantage in Galwan valley where their positions can oversee the strategic Darbuk-Shyok-Daulet Beg Oldie road to Despang. Chinese have successfully secluded Despang area by dominating DSDBO road. Moreover PLA activities at Sikkim and Uttarakhand are aimed to tie down Indian troops rather than to serve any large strategic advantage.

Hence Modi’s government came under strong criticism by opposition leader Rahul Gandhi. He accused PM Modi of being silent at Chinese occupation of Indian Territory. BJP leader Ravi Shankar Prasad replied to Gandhi’s accusation that BJP government want to settle the dispute peacefully. It seems that Chinese gain of strategic advantage over DSDBO road and Despang area is compelling Modi’s government to adopt a muted approach towards China, Hence China is occupying a upper ground in this crisis. Delhi government is inclined towards muted approach yet it haven’t utilized its top guns like Ajit Doval and Subrahmanyam Jaishankar to negotiate

In a nutshell, this military standoff between two ‘Asian Giants’ will have an adverse effect on bilateral relations and most notably on South Asian region. It will affect the regional connectivity and increase hostility on Jammu and Kashmir status and Ladakh status, as any alteration is perceived by China as a threat to its interests. There is an immediate necessity to demarcate LAC to prevent any further escalation in future. Likewise both countries must pursue confidence building measures to solve the contentious issues without enmity. Diplomatic channels are crucial to be consulted to settle the boundary clashes. Both regional powers have to adopt ‘responsible’ attitude to ensure stability in South Asian region.

Shaheer Ahmad
Shaheer Ahmad
Shaheer Ahmad currently pursuing bachelors in International relations from National Defense University Islamabad.