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Economy in Libya

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Strange to say, but the Libyan economy which, as is well-known – depends much, if not almost exclusively, on oil extraction and sale, performed very well in 2017 even at a time of falling prices – currently made more complex by the Covid-19 pandemic which has led to crisis in consumer countries.

It should be recalled that the 2017 good performance of the Libyan economy came six years after the silly elimination of Colonel Gaddafi, with a +67% extraction peak compared to 2016.

 In 2018 it went much worse, with a 17.9% increase, but in 2019 GDP grew by 9.9% and currently, at the end of 2020, a 58.7% vertical drop in GDP is expected.

 Obviously there is an inextricable combination of severe internal political and military instability, pandemic-related crisis in consumer countries, as well as a different configuration of the struggle for world oil power, especially with the arrival of the U.S. shale oil.

 Basically, oil extraction and refining in Libya have almost stopped, except in the last few weeks, when some oil wells (such as El Sharara or El Feel, among the largest ones  Libya) are supposed to reopen “as soon as possible”, as the Minister said.

 The two oil wells, however, are still controlled, by Khalifa Haftar’s LNA forces. Here is the clear link between political-military destabilization and the Libyan economic crisis.

 Oil production fell by 0.1 million barrels per day as from April 2019, i.e. at the beginning of the clash between the GNA and the LNA, with a public deficit that reached 28.9% of GDP in 2019, but with inflation rate falling by 4.6% in 2019 alone, although expected to reach 22.3% by the end of 2020.

 The oil barrel global cost is supposed to keep on falling also in 2021, but production in Libya continued to grow, at least until March 2020, which was the expiry date of the moratorium granted to Libya by OPEC.

Nevertheless, the specifically political level of negotiations between Libya and OPEC – which is what matters – will be mediated mainly by Saudi Arabia, notoriously pro-Haftar, and the United States, often uncritical supporter of the Tripoli regime. A complex mediation.

However, both General Haftar’s LNA and, in many ways, the various katibe linked to Tripoli’s regime – often rather loosely – are business groups – mostly illegal – and, as always happens in these cases, constitute illegal monopolies guaranteed by the monocratic exercise of power and force.

Therefore the “mafiazation” of the economy is the obvious result of a central State which is absent, substantially unlawful or perceived as such.

General Haftar has imposed his monopoly mainly on the export of scrap metal and the sale of refined oil products.

 Many monopolies, ranging from food to the sale of technological materials, have been guaranteed more or less legally to Haftar’s LNA by the Tobruk House of Representatives.

 The activities for controlling and managing the routes of transit and sending of sub-Saharan migrants to Italy are mostly connected to the parallel networks of Haftar’s LNA, but also to Tripoli’s networks of Zawiya and the “Al Nasr Martyrs” group, always operating in that city. But there are entire sectors of the Defence Ministry, the Libyan Coast Guard, the Police and the Interior Ministry cooperating and contributing, directly or indirectly, to the big bipolar system of illegal migrant trafficking and smuggling.

This is the second source of illegal income, after the smuggling of oil products. This is what happens when you destabilize an African coastal State, without any other project than the chatter of some French pseudo-intellectual on “human rights”.

 It is the classic anti-Machiavellian paradox of modern politics. The heterogenesis of ends, as Giovanni Gentile put it.

 But Haftar’s LNA, in particular, also funds itself directly with banks: Libya’s Central Bank in the East has, in fact, backed the wages and material of Haftar’s troops for three years, with the local equivalent of at least 6.7 billion U.S. dollars.

Furthermore, with a view to funding the State and its armies, both Tripoli and Benghazi used the credits granted by merchant banks – often manu militari or through corruption or political-military connections.

In 2018 alone, the government of Cyrenaica raised 7.9 billion U.S. dollars in loans, while the Tripoli area reached a budget of over 8.1 billion U.S. dollars only with loans from credit banks.

As mentioned above, this share includes the role of corruption, which is huge and even affects the officials of the anti-corruption structure in Tripoli – to the tune of millions of dollars. Obviously this applies also to the East.

With about 70,000 soldiers, Haftar’s LNA currently controls a larger territory than France, but the core of its financial operations is still the creation, on June 5, 2017, of the “Committee for Military Investment and Public Works”, led by Air Force Colonel al-Madani al-Fakhri, whose leaders immediately began to extort money from Cyrenaica’s businessmen. In the West, the various military katibe of “martyrs” shared control over all trade and productive activities, sector by sector.

Based on what can be inferred from “open” local sources, the GNA has extorted at least 5-6 billion dollars from businessmen and traders in 2020 alone.

 Although Western propaganda always tends to see Haftar’s LNA as the den of all evils, the two forces are similar, as far as the illegal economy is concerned.

Furthermore, nobody knows how many counterfeit dinars were printed in Russia – possibly 4 billion, at least – with Gaddafi’s effigy, which passed through Malta, greasing many wheels.

In May 2017, during the Ramadan, the banknotes printed in Russia were distributed particularly to banks in the South and in the East.

The idea, after all, was not bad. Libyans do not trust banks, under any circumstances, even when they make withdrawals.

Hence, when it comes to paying wages and salaries, the rulers in both East and West hurry to print new money, which is easily exchanged with the banknotes probably printed in Russia.

 So much so that if everyone accepts it at a lower value than the normal dinars, it becomes only a devalued currency, no longer counterfeit money. 

This is fine, even better than the official dinar, for the “grey” and “black” economy.

 Moreover, the financial-oil system does not directly support Haftar’s LNA, nor can it do so.

 Only the state-owned National Oil Company (NOC) – which is largely answerable to the West – has the possibility to sell Libyan oil, and only the Central Bank of Tripoli can accept the related payments.

 The fact is that all the military groups operating in Libya, in the East and in the West, are linked to the war economy and inextricably tied to the parallel para- or totally illegal economy.

 The economic crisis, connected with the non-existence of a strong and credible central State, perpetuates the positive incentives for all those who take advantage of the State dysfunctions.

 Dysfunctional and para-criminal economies are always based on three pillars: smuggling, extortion, theft of public resources and external patronage.

 The latter can be of a Libyan potentate or, more often, of an “external player”: Turkey, Egypt, the Russian Federation, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar. Obviously Italy has disappeared from the Libya, since currently its foreign policy is little less than a joke.

 The operations of all these countries’ Intelligence Services are largely rewarded by the business that becomes possible for the companies linked to all external Services, if they operate in Libya. The operations of the various intelligence agencies fund themselves on their own in Libya.

I have been told that, regardless of the external player, the operations of the various Intelligence Services generate 20-25% gains, which are guaranteed by the extortion ability of the various local katibe to which the external States refer.

 There is no return from a criminal economy which generates a failed state and, above all, eliminates any alternative legal option.

 In Cyrenaica, there is now a monopoly of the illegal use of force by Haftar and his LNA. It shows signs of overstretching and some old allies are showing signs of disillusionment. But soldiers from Darfur, Chad and even Mauritania could soon strengthen Haftar and allow a new offensive towards Tripoli, also considering the presence of Syrian jihadists in the GNA, sent by the Turkish Intelligence Service.

 In the West, there is Tripoli and hence Fajez al-Sarraj’s government, often comically praised and hailed by Westerners.

In this case, however, there is another factor of structural weakness other than the LNA: the factionalism of the various katibe and their often completely interested and always partial relationship with the government in Tripoli.

 Therefore, the analytical pair with which to study the connections between Tripoli and Benghazi is Factionalism/Ovestretch. Here is the fundamental dialectic.

Again using the very useful terms of the Mafia jargon, Tripoli’s militias are a “cartel”, while in the East there is a monopoly of unlawful and illegitimate force which, however, struggles to make itself credible.

Moreover, factionalism is inherent in the Arab and, above all, Bedouin soul: “my brother and I against our cousin, my cousin, my brother and I against the stranger”.

 Thinking about the Middle East with the typically Western and European idea of the Nation-State is a mistake that will lead us to far greater disasters than those caused by the Sykes-Picot agreement, narrated in an old book with the now famous title, A Peace to end all Peaces.

Distribution of local gangs and oil wells, updated to May 2020, source

Then there is the powerful “stone guest” of the Libyan economy that we must never neglect, namely China.

It should be recalled that China abstained in the UN Security Council voting authorising military intervention in Libya against Gaddafi and also criticized NATO’s decision to create a no-fly zone. It even underlined the illegality of air strikes on the legitimate forces of Gaddafi’s regime. China was right.

 Even when Gaddafi was in power, China was very active in Libyan infrastructure, as Libya paid very well.

 At the time of Gaddafi’s fall, China had as many as 75 companies operating in Libya, with a turnover of 18.8 billion U.S. dollars.

 The workers concerned were mainly the 36,000 Chinese, but also the about 28,000 Libyan ones or even many immigrants (Egyptians, Tunisians and Algerians).

Until 2011 there were 50 Chinese projects in Libya and it should be noted that Libya alone produced 3% of all Chinese oil imports, equivalent to 150,000 barrels a day.

  At the time of West’s maximum manipulation against Gaddafi, China always tried to maintain all its business connections, obviously rejecting the NATO military mission in its entirety.

 Moreover, like the Russian Federation, China also rejected the theory – typically Western-style in its naivety and arrogance- of Responsibility to Protect, i.e. the universal rule – stuff for boy scouts or elegant socialites-whereby States can intervene directly and militarily in other States when the protection of “human rights” is needed.

However, who establishes and ascertains the violation of human rights? A French pseudo-philosopher, a former follower of Pol Pot, two articles in the New York Times or possibly the statements of an NGO invented at the moment (in this respect, the story of NGOs working for migrants from Libya to Syria would be very interesting) or the lamentation of some “intellectuals” who do not even know where Tripoli is on the map?

Obviously, with a view not to being relegated to play the role of the only protector of the vilain Gaddafi, China finally abstained in voting on the UN Security Council Resolution on Libya, but immediately recognized the National Transitional Council (NTC), as the only semblance of unitary Libyan government left.

 ENI also recognized it, well before others, exactly two days after the start of the insurgency against the Colonel, staged only by the East and by French submarines.

As early as the beginning of June 2011, China held its first meeting with Mohammed Jibril, the Head of the NTC. A few days later, the Head of the Department for West-Asian and Middle East Affairs of the Chinese government, Chen Xiaodong, visited Benghazi very carefully.

 Obviously China pursues a policy of careful neutrality between the two factions, namely the GNA and Haftar’s LNA.

 Officially China supports the GNA, which – in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in June 2018 -even accepted that Libya would be part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, albeit with some obvious twists in the map.

China, however, has also excellent relations with Haftar and, above all, with the Tobruk House of Representatives.

 As to the Covid-19 pandemic, which – for those who know how to use it-is an opportunity for hegemonic penetration into the so-called “third” countries, China has rapidly included Libya in its humanitarian and health aid programmes, which are currently envisaged for as many as 82 countries.

However, what is the profound logic of Libya’s political and hence economic system? Unfortunately, we always see and interpret the non-Western world through the eyes of our often idiotic, fashionable ideologies. It is the biggest mistake we can currently make.

As seen above, the fact is that Libyan institutions have always been sectarian and biased in Libya, but not less powerful for this reason.

 The British Military Administration (1942-1951) built up a great deal of political-tribal mediations in Libya even equal, if not greater, than Gaddafi’s. They largely remained in place, even after the 1969 coup of the “Free Officers”, organised by the Italian intelligence services in a meeting at Abano Terme.

 Then there is the Senussi monarchy, originating from an Islamic esoteric sect, not from a specific family lineage of the monarch.

 The last King Idriss was ousted by the coup of the Nasserian and Third- World Socialist “Free Officers”, led at the time by Gaddafi, who had been selected for that purpose by the Italian intelligence Services, during a comfortable meeting – I still remember – at an excellent hotel in Abano Terme.

 The Senussi monarchy originated from a strange esoteric organization that started from a wide Islamic heterodoxy and finally shifted to a sort of quasi-Wahabi Koranic normativism, which is not at all contradictory, as it would appear in the poor minds of Westerners, who see only the servile adaptation to Western pluralism or simple “fanaticism”, old theme of the worst and naivest18thcentury Enlightenment.

As we all know, Gaddafi’s regime began in 1969, amidst counter-coup, attacks and adverse operations by the British intelligence services, which only thanks to Italy were wrecked. Revolutionary governments, however, choose only the faithful tribes, which are such because they are paid to be so.

In the case of the Senussi, the Cyrenaica Defence Forces operated – and King Idriss boasted he had never been to Tripoli – made up of agents and employees of the British Intelligence Services. Also the People’s Social Committee of Executives had military roles. Gaddafi had no mercy, of course.

 The Warfalla tribe made several unsuccessful attempts on Colonel’s life. Therefore, after the attempted coup against the Colonel in 1991 it accepted a negotiation with Gaddafi.

Nevertheless, it was precisely because of the Gaddafian Jamahiriya (1973-1979) that the Libyan economic networks became ever more informal and sometimes tribal, but paradoxically ever less controlled by the Colonel’s regime.

Exactly those networks killed him and hence ousted him from power, although the poor informal military economic networks believed in the Western promises of an economy integrated in the world market and in an opening of Libya to foreign investment.

 They wanted globalisation, without too many disasters, but the West gave them a useless failed state, even for Italy.

Hence within the Great Socialist Jamahiriya of the Libyan Arab People there still were popular committees that dealt with economy and business, often very seriously – but without any coordination and control by Gaddafi’s leadership, except for the NOC.

 There were GECOL (General Electricity Company of Libya), a separate committee, as well as LISCO (Libyan Iron and Steel Company), ESDEF (Economic and Social Development Fund) and ODAC (Office of Development of Administrative Complexes).

A great role was played by the free zone of the port of Misrata, and by an endless number of autonomous committees, even in the Security Services, which, however, were linked to the abstract and even scarcely “informative” structure of Jamahiriya.

 Generally speaking, the network of “people’s” Committees that managed the economy reported to the General People’s Congress, but everything was obviously in the hands of Gaddafi and his most trusted aides and collaborators – who, however, did not succeed in getting the news in time or let some operations slip away, given the level of informality of the Libyan economy, already pathological at the time.

 The only two organizations with some degree of autonomy were the Central Bank of Libya, established in 1956, well before Gaddafi’s coup – which, however, originated from a UN-established institution, namely the Libyan Currency Committee – and obviously the National Oil Corporation (NOC), created in 1970, immediately after Gaddafi’s coup.

 There is also the Libyan Investment Fund (LIA), the Libyan Sovereign Fund that supports 15 other apparently autonomous funds or financial initiatives.

 It was established in 2006. At the beginning, in the good years of oil revenues, LIA had an endowment of as many as 60 billion U.S. dollars.

 Gaddafi’s son, Saif-al Islam, was actually its leader. But, after the anti-Gaddafi “revolution”, between 2005 and 2010, also the experts who seemed capable of privatizing anything arrived. Called by France, the United States, the Libyan elite itself, but not by Italy, of course.

 At that juncture, given the solidity of the old informal Gaddafian economies and of those following the destruction of the Libyan State, the new Agencies of Libyan liberals arrived. Hence the Economic Development Board and the Privatization and Investment Board were established, in addition to the Public Projects Authority.

You privatize when there is capital available, otherwise to whom do you sell in a failed state where those who have money are already out of Libya?

 As early as the phase in which the war between Eastern and Western Libya was starting to emerge, the local governments had to “enlist” technicians, experts, economists and business jurists to understand the intricacies of post-Gaddafi economic structures which, in any case, had developed – in their baroque and elaborate complexity – since the last years of Gaddafi’s life.

We could define Libya between Gaddafi and the two current governments as an overlap between the oil rentier States, the Socialist autocracies typical of the Third International and the chaotic and incoherent liberalization attempts that the Americans made in the old Socialist economies of the East after 1989.

This adds to the unpreparedness and factionalism of the new economic and political ruling classes that came to power after Gaddafis’ elimination.

 The Colonel’s technocracy was often better than the current ones.

 No economic unifying criteria were visible among the various factions that fought and then managed the 2011 insurgency, but all this remained even in the years 2013-2015, when the high oil barrel prices gave hope that fresh capital would right the wrongs of an authoritarian planning that added to the factionalism of the economy and the Stock Exchange short-sighted naivety of post-Soviet liberalisations.

 Meanwhile, the mass of wages and salaries, in addition to subsidies, increases every year regardless of the amount of oil revenues.

 There are therefore no quick fixes or effective solutions for a mechanism that is now so structured.

The World Bank predicts that oil rents will be 47% of GDP by the end of 2021, but wages and salaries will increase by up to 49%.

 Public subsidies for oil or food will be equally high, to the tune of 10.6% of GDP, but then how will debt be refinanced?

 In Tripoli – but the situation in Benghazi seems similar – the solution will be the cash advance from the Central Bank of Libya, in addition to the sale of Treasury Bonds, especially in Cyrenaica.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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The suffocating economy of Iran

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Iran’s economy is on a roller coaster. The past year saw a dramatic rise in inflation rates and a historic fall in the value of the rial. The protests which followed the death of a 22-yar old Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini have magnified the creaks in the country’s economy.

On  January 22, The Iranian rial was selling at an exchange rate of 450,000 against the greenback, an all-time low. The rial has lost 29% of its value since the time the protest started. Iran’s statistical agency reported an inflation rate of 48.5% in December 2022, the highest level since 1995. November data recorded food inflation of above 70% in 12 provinces of the country.

Reports from the country suggest that more than half of the population is living below the poverty line due to spiraling prices. As per the latest forecast, the World Bank predicts a GDP growth of 2.9% for Iran in 2022 which will slow down to 2.2% in 2023 and 1.9% in 2024 owing to “slower growth in key trading partners and new export competition from discounted Russian oil”. However, the government’s response to the bleak economic indicators so far had been subtle and unperturbed.

Causes

The unilateral withdrawal of the US from the nuclear deal in 2018 and the sanctions that followed on oil exports and international banking has put heavy stress on the country’s economy.

 The country’s government debt-to-GDP ratio rose to 45% in 2020. According to World Bank, Iran’s unemployment rate reached 12.2% in 2020 before narrowly dipping to 11.5% in 2021. Iranian daily Etemad had reported that at least 23 workers have committed suicide since March 2022 in the country due to reasons like dismissal, punishment, or threats.

The government lifted import subsidies for essential goods in April 2022, to ease the pressure off the strained government budget, which subsequently triggered rapid spikes in food prices during May-June.

The Federal Reserve in November tightened its control over Iraqi commercial banks to restrict the illegal siphoning of dollars to Iran and other Middle-East countries. The new regulations blocked a huge chunk of daily dollar wire transfers to Iran. The Taliban takeover in 2021 had previously blocked access to hard currency to Iran via the Afghan route.

Amid the uprising, European Parliament approved a resolution designating the Iranian militia, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a ‘terrorist’ organization. It also called for sanctions on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Ebrahim Raisi, and others. The US and UK too imposed fresh sanctions on Iran.

Response

Iran retaliated on January 25th by imposing sanctions on 34 British and European individuals and entities.

Former Central Bank of Iran governor Ali Salehabai had been sacked in December due to failure to control the rapid depreciation of the rial. According to analysts in the region, the Central Bank is injecting dollars into the market to thwart further depreciation.

In late January, the Central Bank decided to raise the maximum amount of currency that can be sold to individuals annually from 2000 euros to 5000 euros, to instill confidence and ward off fears about the availability of currency. The cap was initially introduced to stabilize the currency after the US pull-out of the nuclear deal in 2018.

Iran has not resorted to austerity to tide over the crisis. Instead, President Ebrahim Raisi presented a noticeably enlarged national budget in January to boost growth. Valuing 21,640 trillion rials, the budget is 40% larger than the previous one. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) was allocated $3 billion registering a 28% rise over the last year, in a taunting message to the west.

Recently, Iran introduced gold coin certificates in the stock market to raise cash and mitigate inflation. The government is desperate to raise cash as the government budget is posting a deficit of $9.75 billion. Critics point out unrealistic revenue estimates riding on oil sales and over-optimistic tax collection figures.

To raise revenue, Iran has increased its oil exports to China to more than 1.2 million barrels per day over the past three months. The sanctions have in effect caused Iran to warm up to western rivals like China and Russia. Iran and Russia are reportedly in talks over the introduction of a stablecoin, backed by gold, to bypass western sanctions in cross-border transactions.

Iran’s response to the looming economic crisis was devoid of any extreme desperation. The government took all necessary steps to keep the dread within bounds. The present security situation in the country could go haywire if the economy collapses.

It remains to be seen how fast the government can ensure reliable alternate arrangements in place to sustain the economy. If not immediately, chances are high that the country may drift to panic mode.

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Prospects of Vietnam’s Economic Growth in 2023

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The ongoing  war in Ukraine and increasing commodity prices across the world have impacted the developing countries. Countries in Asia which were recovering from the COVID-19 impact on their economies have to rework their recovery process by looking for alternate supply chains and reducing their financial responsibilities towards social sector through budgetary management. Among the developing economies in Asia , Vietnam showed an economic growth of nearly 3 per cent  even when many of the countries were witnessing  recession and reduced production because of adverse impact of COVID-19 .The stimulus packages that the governments across the world have to give to the manufacturing sector to accelerate production and meet the demands of the people. In a report released by World Bank in August last year it was stated that the Vietnamese economy is likely to grow by nearly 7.2 per cent in 2023 and it is going to sustain itself in 2024 with a likely growth projection of 6.7 per cent. These are encouraging signs .Few of the sectors which might be accelerating the growth process would be in the field of footwear and electronics. Vietnam itself has been undertaking strong anti corruption measures so as to facilitate stronger economic fundamentals and recovery from the COVID-19 impact.

The economic growth of Vietnam has been accelerating and the agricultural sector has been productive in ensuring food security for Vietnamese citizens. As per one of the estimates this sector contributed more than 14 per cent in national gross domestic product and has engaged more than 35 per cent of youth in the year 2020. This sector also earned valuable foreign exchange of more than U.S. dollar 48 billion. One of the interesting achievements of Vietnam has been increasing life expectancy, and its universal health coverage which covers more than 87 per cent of the population.

As per the plan of action which has been envisaged  for Vietnamese economy by its leadership it aspires to become a high income country by the year 2045. It is expected that with the sound economic fundamentals and more than 5.5 annual average per capita growth for the next 2 and a half decades it can reach that milestone. Vietnamese population is also young and is adapting itself for digital economy and building core fundamentals for its membership in different regional economic organisations such as RCEP and CPTPP.The bilateral free trade agreement with EU is also facilitating its growth in several sectors.

There have been significant structural improvements ushered through policy documents in terms of improving financial architecture, accepting global norms related to climate and environment, comprehensive security for population against poverty , and extensive investment in infrastructure development both in rural and urban areas.

In one of the articles written  in Bloomberg it has acknowledged that Vietnam is  now is one of the Asia’s  fastest growing economies which has grown to 8.02% last year and it even surpassed  government assessment of 6 to 6.5 per cent growth. The article also acknowledged the fact that manufacturing has been growing to near 10 per cent mark in comparison to last year and there is strong development in the services sector as well. Among the economies Vietnam’s  inward foreign direct investment has also been doing quite well and it has received nearly US  $27.72 billion last year .Asian Development Bank has forecasted that Vietnam is going to grow at the rate of 6.3% in the year 2023. Also the unemployment rate has reduced and with inflation clearly under 5 per cent , showcases that the long term decisions which we have taken with the initiation of Doi Moi(economic liberalisation process )  in 1986 has been bearing fruits.

In terms of sectoral assessment, the real estate as well as construction  sector ,the growth was about 7.78 per cent last year and the services sector growth was closer to 10 per cent. There have  been increase in exports last year as well and an increase of 10.6% was noticed. One of the core arguments which have been given with regard to Vietnam’s impressive growth has been related to trade liberalization, increased deregulation and improvement in the ease of doing business, investment in human resources and stable government were seen as critical attributes for this impressive growth in Vietnamese economy.

Major companies in footwear, electronics, and mobile production have invested in Vietnamese economy and few of the companies have shifted base from China to Vietnam. Improved  congenial economic environment has been appreciated by companies such as Adidas, Nike and Samsung to list few.

Owing to the development of new kind of digital technologies and better consumer awareness Vietnam is preparing itself for a major impetus in the E- commerce sector and therefore has been making extensive changes in digital based economy and more stress on science and technology development. Vietnam has acknowledged the fact that with the changes in sectoral composition of the economy, it is pertinent to develop necessary skill power and human resources which can seamlessly integrate Vietnam into global value chains and also help the services sector in exploring new markets.

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The Crippled Economy

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Lack of money is the root of all evils. Facts do not seize to exist because they’re ignored.

Lack of money is what Pakistan is experiencing and dealing with every now and then for the major part, since it came into existence either due to incompetence of our political leaders, their corruption, fighting wars of someone else or due to lack of long-term vision. Pakistan is currently in the middle of a turmoil trying to recover from devastating floods of 2022, facing the after effects of the withdrawal of USA from Afghanistan in the form of resurgence of terrorism, dealing with the political chaos created by the politicians who claim to be leaders of the state. Another yet most important, severe and devastating challenge that Pakistan is facing is its economic downfall. In one sense the lack of money is the root cause of all the problems mentioned above except the political chaos.

The economy of Pakistan, like a battle-hardened warrior has built resilience battling several challenges over the course of seventy years and is trained to survive but the recent political turmoil and the difficulty caused by nature (Floods), the burden of debts repayment, the threat of resurgence of terrorism and international indicators pointing towards an economic recession in 2023 has almost crushed the backbone of Pakistan’s economy.  

World bank has recently released its latest report forecasting Pakistan’s Gross domestic product (GDP) to grow at only 1.7% for the fiscal year (FY) 2023 that is less than the half of what it predicted to during last June (4%). It has also predicted a near to recession economic situation of the world economy characterized with high inflation, increasing interest rates and the circumstances caused by the Russian Invasion of Ukraine.

Pakistan must reportedly payback 73$ Billion in the next three years till the end of FY2025 and central bank of the country also known as State Bank of Pakistan currently has Foreign exchange reserves of about only 5.6$ billion. This debt repayment is the key challenge for Pakistan’s economic survival and other challenges such as ever-increasing inflation, high interest rate, the growing unemployment, the decrease in imports are all byproducts of the main challenge. The threat of a possible default is becoming evident and is looming over fiscal horizon.

Monsoon on Steroids, a phenomenon directly linked with climate change played havoc with Pakistan. These floods added a profound risk to the country’s economic outlook. The country lost infrastructure worth of billions of dollars and floods effected 33$ million people and 1700 people lost their lives. According to Ministry of Planning and development of Pakistan, Pakistan has faed the loses of more than an estimation of 10$ billion. The catastrophe of floods also played with agroeconomics as crops were destroyed causing destruction of agriculture sector which makes up to 24% of country’s GDP. A comprehensive recovery policy is needed and with the helped promised by international community at Geneva, government has passed one hurdle but to make the sustainable recovery abundance of resources, capacity and transparency is needed.

The policy uncertainty has been a major cause in creating a mistrust among investors and has almost ceased foreign direct investment in Pakistan. This policy uncertainty is due to lack of will of national leaders to take tough decisions. For Example, former prime minister of Pakistan rolled out of International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) program fearing his ousting and to gain public support he reduced prices of commodities such as Petrol & Gas and took country almost on the verge of default.

The policy uncertainty is caused by Political uncertainty which in turn lead towards economic uncertainty. Economic stability can only be achieved by political stability and there’s no other way around. Political stability can be achieved through free and fair elections and elimination of the role of establishment in political process of Pakistan. And if a government takes long-term policy goals into account while formulating a policy rather than short-term goals to gain public support and trying to keep hold on the reins of Government. The selfish politicians have to play selfless and put Pakistan’s benefit before their own benefit to get Pakistan out of this political and economic turmoil.

The only solution in sight for Pakistan is to carry on with the 6$ billion IMF program and to try for rescheduling of depts repayment as it owes more than 70$ billion to be paid by the end of 2025 that is currently not possible. Another step from international community can also help Pakistan that is if a country makes an investment of 10-20$ billion directly rather than in the form of loans as happened in CPEC. Moreover, help from rich friendly Muslim countries can also provide an array of hope for Pakistan.

But these steps won’t address the clear underlying malaise of the economy and the fact that something fundamentally will need to change, in terms of how much the economy produces versus how much it spends, to avoid default down the road. But none of Pakistan’s political parties seem to have the political will or ability to bring about such change. Priorities needs to be shifted from personal interest of political elite to national interest. They must be ready to sacrifice their political image and interest for the greater good and to save the country from default down the road.

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