With the emergence of regional and global powers, the call for increasing the permanent seats of the United Nation’s Security Council is becoming louder. On real grounds the UNSC is the only body of the United Nations which can take decisive actions and give out rulings on certain issues, especially the executive permanent members (Russia, China, United States, Britain and France). The permanent members have the power to Veto, which the permanent members have been known to use from time to time to stop the council’s decisions that are against their will. This veto power and the structure of UNSC is considered as discriminatory and controversial as the UN gives the status of equality to all the member states and UNSC is a question mark on that status.
Many feel that there is a need of reforms in the UNSC and that new permanent members should be added to the UNSC as they deserve to become the permanent members. According to the proponents of expansion and reforms of UNSC the current permanent members do not fairly represent the world order. Due to this, many states are seeking permanent membership of UNSC which will have a huge impact of the effectiveness of the UNSC in responding to threats to international security.
The UNSC is considered as the most powerful and influential body of the United Nations. It is mainly responsible for maintaining international peace and security according to the UN charter. It has the ability to make decisions that all UN members are bound to obey. This makes the UNSC an important body of the United Nations and gives it a powerful position in the world.
The UNSC is made up of 15 states; five permanent and ten non-permanent states. The permanent members remain unchanged as appointed in 1945 as chief custodians of World Order. The non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly of the United Nation for a two years term. Before 1965 there were only six non-permanent members of the UNSC but after restructuring the numbers increased from six to ten.
The UNSC has ideally a noteworthy scope of power and duties. To examine issues such as Armed Conflicts or Disputes which are a threat to international peace and security, the council meets throughout the year. It is authorized to take Military actions, order mandatory sanctions and call for cease fire, on behalf of the United Nations. Other roles and responsibilities of the UNSC include the appointment of Secretary General of the UN, the addition or removal of the members of the UN and electing the judges of the International Court of Justice.
Permanent Members and the “Power of Veto”
The UNSC “Power of Veto” means a negative vote by a permanent member on “substantive” draft resolution. Only the permanent members have the right to veto. The main purpose of establishing this system of Veto was to prevent and prohibit UN from taking actions against the founding members in the future.
The P5 have been accused many times for misusing the Veto power. The single negative vote of P5 carries the power to reject a resolution. The non-permanent members have a less important role in the UNSC as they do not have the power to veto. To pass a resolution nine votes are needed but if one of the P5 state votes against the resolution the other votes do not matter and the resolution is not passed.
The P5 states have used the veto power hundreds of times in order to serve their personal interests. From 1946-2016 the veto power has been used more than three hundred times. Russia tops the list by using veto 133 times. Most of the negative votes used by Russia were to serve the interests of its allies. For example, recently in the case of Syrian civil war Russian being a Syrian ally used the veto power 12 times to reject the resolutions related to sanctions and investigation of chemical weapons and referring Syria to International Criminal Court. The US comes second on the list by using veto 83 times from 1946-2016. Most of the negative votes by the US were on the resolutions related to Israel/Palestine conflict. China with 40 negative votes comes third on the list. Most of the negatives votes were against the resolution related to Taiwan issue, support of Russia, and on Burma Myanmar issue. The UK and France used 32 and 18 negative votes on the resolutions mostly related to Suez Canal and Rhodesian Crisis.
The Veto power system is unjust and un-democratic. It only serves the interests of the P5. The developing countries who are non-permanent members and non-veto holders have been longing for restructuring of UNSC and some of the new rising powers want permanent membership because they believe that they deserve to become a permanent member of UNSC.
Quest for Permanent membership of UNSC
The number of states has increased since the formation of the United Nations. The number of states increased from 51 to 118 until 1965. In this year the non-permanent seats of the UNSC were increased from six to ten; the permanent seats remained unchanged. Now as the number of states has increased to 192 the proponents of the restructuring of UNSC are demanding reforms in the UNSC and demands the enlargement of the permanent seats of the council.
The non-permanent seats are distributed on the basis of geography and the contributions made by the states or international peace and security. The representation of the permanent members of the UNSC is not proportional. The current structure of the UNSC is opposed by many states and they are asking for reforms.
Former Secretary General Annan proposed two models for the reforms in UNSC. The model A suggests to expand the number of UNSC seats to 24, including 3 new non-permanent seats and 6 new non-permanent seats with veto power. The new permanent members should be from Europe (1 seat), Americas (1 seats), Africa (2 seats), and Asia Pacific (2 seats). The model B also suggests the expansion of seats from 15 to 24 but does not include new permanent seats. It suggests the 4 year terms for 8 members. Africa, Asia pacific, Europe and Americas will each get 2 non-permanent seats with a 4 year term. Another additional non-permanent seat will also be created.
Another group asking for reforms is G4 (Group of four) which includes Japan, Germany, India and Brazil. The G4 states are aspiring for permanent seats in the UNSC. These 4 states are economically and politically very strong. If more seats are created in the UNSC these countries are most likely to become permanent members.
Japan contributes the second largest sum to the UN’s regular budget. Germany is the third largest contributor. India is the World’s largest democracy and 2nd largest population. It is also the world’s largest economy and third largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping missions. Brazil is the largest country in the Latin America with the largest population and economy. Russia UK and France support the G4 aspirations.
There is another group called “Uniting the Consensus”. This group includes Pakistan, Italy, Colombia and Canada. This group opposes the expansion of the permanent members of the organization. There are also other models suggested by other states and groups such as Regional model (Italian proposal), Panama proposal etc. the most discussed are the G4 states who are putting a lot of effort to get permanent membership.
How effective is the current UNSC:
The UNSC was formed in order to ensure international peace and security. It has been successful in achieving some of its goals but failed to achieve others. One of the Success of the United Nations Security Council is that after its formation the world has not seen another world War like the first and second World Wars. The credit for this success goes to all the member states that have contributed politically and economically to improve the organization. The peace keeping missions of the UNSC in Angola, Liberia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti and several other states were successful. The efforts by Secretary General U Thant during the Cuban missile Crisis are also appreciated. He was responsible for the negotiations between US and USSR during Cuban missile crisis in 1962. His efforts helped to save the world from nuclear holocaust.
The success of the Security Council is on one side but there are some failures of the council which are criticized. The council was not able to avert interstate conflicts. It failed to stop the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Cambodian genocide of 1975-79, Somalian civil war of 1993, the Srebrenica massacre of 1995 and Sri Lankan Civil war. The council was powerless during the Cold war period and several substantive resolutions were rejected at that time. It has been almost three decades since the cold war ended but the power politics between the states specially the P5 states is still going on. The misuse of the Veto power by P5 to serve their own interests is a huge failure of the Council. Due to this Veto power the Security Council was and is unable to respond to several threats to the international security.
The debate on increasing the permanent members of the UNSC has been going on for quite some time and states like India, Japan, Germany, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia have had tried to become permanent members in the past. Although the current system of the UNSC is quiet objectionable on democratic grounds because states like Japan, Germany etc. who have grown out to be strong regional and global powers have been long bereaved of the luxury of sitting at the elders table (the Permanent members) in the UNSC. The UNSC’s current structure lacks proportionality as the P5 chose themselves. The restructuring of UNSC and increasing the number of permanent members can undoubtedly help bring about a balance of power in the region but unfortunately it can have some serious negative impacts in the effectiveness of UNSC in responding to threats to the international security. The widening of permanent membership of UNSC would definitely weaken its potential to respond to the threats to international security. First of all it is already very hard to get a unanimous decision from 5 members with different interests hence further increasing the number of permanent members with the power to veto will result in new members too abusing the power just like the current 5 permanent members for their benefit. In a system like this, with such diversified conflicts of interests any practical decision making will become almost impossible. Another issue is that the regional powers like Pakistan and Canada cannot afford to see their rivals handed a bigger gun. Especially inclusion of the G4 countries like India will face heavy resistance because of the fear of them abusing the power for their personal gains instead of working towards international peace and security. Strong resistance against this can lead to further instability in the already unbalanced international system.
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Ahmad, Abdullahi A., and A. S. Haroon. “(PDF) United Nations Security Council Permanent Seats and Oic Requests.” Research Gate. Last modified January 2015. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316545136_United_nations_security_council_permanent_seats_and_oic_requests.
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Guzzardi, Jose E., and Mark J. Mullenbach. “The Politics of Seeking a Permanent Seat on the United Nations Security Council: An Analysis of the Case of Japan.” University of Central Arkansas — UCA. Accessed April 23, 2019. https://uca.edu/politicalscience/files/2011/05/3_Guzzardi_and_Mullenbach.pdf.
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“The Problem With the UN Veto Power | NowThis World.” YouTube. Last modified September 30, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HPAONq36HKg.
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Why International Institutions Survive: An Afterword to the G20 Summit
We, of course, are extremely critical of the very idea of global institutions and the prospects for their survival amid the emergence of a qualitatively new international order. Basic ideas about how such organisations appear and why they work, as well as the practical experience of the past decades, constantly demonstrate how unprepared such forms of interaction between states turn out to be to solve their most important hypothetical task — limiting selfish manifestations in the behaviour of their own creators. However, the institutions persist and, moreover, their number is increasing due to the formation of new specific regional platforms and global gatherings of powers, which is happening both formally and informally.
Just a few days ago, another G20 summit took place in Indonesia — a meeting of the 20 supposedly most developed powers. These economies first convened 13 years ago to discuss the fight against the global consequences of the financial crisis in Western countries. This association is not a formal international organisation, unlike the UN or the World Trade Organization, and does not have its own secretariat or specialised agencies. However, in its composition, the G20 has turned out to be one of the most promising institutional undertakings of the entire post-Cold War period.
The reason is that the G20, first, is quite objective in terms of participation criteria and, second, is completely non-democratic in terms of the formation of its membership. In the simplest terms, it was created by the leading powers of the West — the G7 countries — at a historical moment when they felt the need to make their decisions more legitimate, to gain a new way to influence growing economies, and, finally, share some of their own economic difficulties with the rest of the world not only in fact, but also organisationally.
Other countries of the world included in the G20 list compiled by the USA and Britain were glad to accept this invitation. First of all, because they saw an opportunity to limit the West’s monopoly on making the most important decisions, or, at least, to get new chances to reflect some of their interests there. Thus, both groups of participants made a very pragmatic choice amid circumstances where the West was still strong enough that no one could expect to survive without its consent.
The G20, as we can see, was created for special purposes in special circumstances, which, by the way, also applies to any international institution set up during the second half of the 20th and early 21st century. Even the United Nations (UN) was an intellectual creation of the United States and Britain, aimed to preserve and strengthen their influence on international affairs after the World War II. Another thing is that the UN still tried to live its own life, and now the presence of Russia and China in its “Areopagus”, i.e. among the permanent members of the Security Council, creates the appearance that the hypothetical pinnacle of world governance relatively adequately reflects the distribution of aggregate power capabilities. However, during the Cold War, as now, we see that all really important issues regarding war and peace are decided by the great powers among themselves.
As for the impact on the main processes in the world that emerged after the end of the Cold War, here it was the G20 that was considered a suitable palliative solution juxtaposed between the omnipotence of the West and the desire of the rest to get at least a part of the “pie” of the global distribution of goods. Moreover, 14 years ago, when the G20 began to meet, none of the major countries of the modern World Majority imagined a direct confrontation with the West and all sought to integrate into the globalisation led by it, even without a special revision of the rules and norms that existed there before. This fully applies to Russia, which quite sensibly assessed its strength. There were still five years left before the ambitious Xi Jingping came to power in China, when most observers considered the strengthening of Beijing’s economic and political proximity to be the most plausible scenario for Sino-American relations.
However, it was the financial crisis of 2008-2013 that turned out to be a turning point, from which everyone seemed to have realised that it is not necessary to count on the existing model of globalisation to solve the basic problems of development and economic growth. The cyclicality of economic development and the accumulated imbalances in trade, global finance and everything else made it clear that a return to sustainable growth in the US and Europe was unrealistic, and saving what had already been created would require a much tougher policy in relation to the distribution of benefits on a global scale. The emerging economies, of which China quickly took the lead, could expect a more sustainable position, but also doubted the West’s ability to act as a benevolent engine of the global economy. In other words, it was at the very moment when the G20 emerged as an institution that the leading states realised that it was no longer possible to save globalisation in its previous form, and economic shocks would very likely lead to violent geopolitical clashes.
Therefore, the extremely informal and, at the same time, representative G20 arose precisely as a mechanism for a “civilised divorce” of countries actively involved in globalisation on the eve of its inevitable crisis.
In this respect, it was indeed the pinnacle of the institutional approach to problem-solving that marked the entire 20th century. What follows should be either the formation of a new balance of power and the adaptation of institutions to it, or their complete disintegration with an unclear prospect for states going beyond bilateral agreements or relatively narrow regional associations and forums.
We see that the most successful multilateral projects of our time are either a continuation of those that have already taken place, like ASEAN or NATO, or completely new regional groupings with uncertain prospects and internal structures. The promising Shanghai Cooperation Organisation should be included among the latter. The latest SCO summit in Uzbekistan revealed that its participants were highly able to single out from the whole set of international problems of Eurasia and their own development issues those that make sense to discuss at the multilateral level. In addition, Sino-Russian leadership in the SCO leaves hope that other participating countries will be able to build their interests into the priorities and integrity limits of the two Eurasian giants. India only adds pluralism, allowing alternatives to the increasingly solidarity positions of Moscow and Beijing to be put forward.
However, the fact that the G20 is, in reality, a tool for the civilised dismantling of the existing order rather than their renewal does not mean its immediate death. After all, we already know examples where organisations created to “divorce” participants retain their vitality beyond solving the most important problems associated with this unpleasant process. The latest G20 summit was overshadowed by the desire of the Western countries, which, together with their satraps from the European Union institutions, make up the majority, to turn the political part of the meeting into a fight against Russia. However, at the same time, we saw that the Indonesian presidency used such intentions to increase its independence in world affairs and rejected all Western claims regarding Russian participation. In addition, an important personal meeting between the leaders of the United States and China took place on the sidelines of the summit, which allowed them to temporarily dispel the expectation of an inevitable clash, which seemed likely only three months ago.
Of course, we are far from thinking that China, India or other developing countries, not to mention Russia, see the G20 as a way to take global leadership away from the West. In Moscow, Beijing, New Delhi and other capitals, they know that those institutions that do not fully meet American interests are easily sacrificed to the current circumstances. However, first, such a radical US approach still has a chance to change under increasing pressure from outside and inside. Second, the G20 is still a platform that can survive as at least a club filled with contradictions, precisely amid the complete decline of formal global international institutions. And it looks like we won’t have to wait very long.
From our partner RIAC
Cooperation in a Changing World: A Discussion on New Regionalism and Globalisation
The two main trends that have shaped the World Economic Order are 1) multilateralism, which sets global rules for international trade without favouritism, and 2) new regionalism, which sets up several zones of regional free trade and cooperation that can apply development and economic growth more quickly and flexibly but have a limited geographic scope.
Hettne (1995) says that “new regionalism” is not a single policy but a set of policies that focus on economics or other factors. “Regionalism” refers to a complex change process involving state and non-state actors at the global, regional, and national levels. Since actors and processes interact at many different levels and their relative importance changes over time and space, it is impossible to say which level is the most important (Soderbaun, 2001).
This article highlights the discussions between the experts on regional cooperation and integration and the supporters of multilateralism and globalisation. The objective is not to extend arguments that can be endless due to rich literature, however, it is to show the major points of contention that can lead to more research and discussions.
Gilson (2002) and other scholars argue that regionalism divides the international system into different and separated competitive blocks, despite arguments to the contrary from authors and analysts like Hettne (1998, 2005), Beeson (2009), and Dent (2004). Regionalism, especially forms of closed regionalism, acts as an obstacle on the path to globalisation (Dent, 2008).
Authors in the first category argue that globalisation and regionalism are not mutually exclusive concepts. Their reasoning rests on the GATT-WTO conception of regionalism and regionalisation as integral to and predating globalisation. As of 2022, the WTO had informed about 356 Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) in force (and its predecessor, the GATT), while several others are thought to be in effect but have yet to be reported (see: WTO, 2022 database).
Regional trade liberalisation and cooperation arrangements have been considered important intermediate measures, enabling nations to cope with the risks and opportunities of the global market and embrace new multilateral regulations (Katzenstein, 1997). The developing tensions between economic regionalism and economic multilateralism directly result from the mutually reinforcing nature of regionalism and globalisation. As seen with the end of the Uruguay Round, when integration into the EU prompted some member states to adopt the GATT deal, and with NAFTA’s significant impact on the liberalisation of investments, regional cooperation can be a good stepping stone to an accessible international economy. According to Summers (1991), regionalism affects the multilateral international trade system and will increasingly serve as a driving factor towards liberalisation. Summers contends that regional liberalisation is the best approach towards liberalisation and globalisation.
In contrast, the second category of experts’ places greater emphasis on the notion that discriminatory regional and sub-regional accords are a response to globalisation. As an example, Bhagwati (1993) argues that protectionism, mercantilism and other regionalism delay global liberalisation and threaten the multilateral trading system. Bergsten (1997) says that the European Monetary Union (EMU) shows how it sets priorities that differ from those of the world. Furthermore, regional blocs can contribute to geo-economics conflicts, which may have political implications.
Three key issues are raised by those who want complete dependence on the multilateral approach (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996):
- Trade is diverted by regional cooperation.
- The distraction of attention.
- The geopolitical consequences of regionalism.
First, they point out that trade is diverted by regional cooperation that provides members favourable treatment over non-members. Members may also profit from favourable policies and regulations for restricted content in addition to differential tariffs. According to opponents, the disadvantage of regional liberalisation can be more than overcome by the impact of preferences, resulting in a diversion of the trade balance.
Also, they are worried that transferring tariff revenues under a preferential arrangement could hurt the way one member’s income is split. The distraction of attention is the second point raised by critics. They say that if countries get involved in regional projects, they might lose interest in the multilateral system, which could stop its growth and possibly make it less effective.
The United States’ rapid change in trade policy since the early 1980s has drawn particular attention. The international system had previously received top attention from the United States. It declined to take part in regional economic integration. The main reasons the U.S. agreed to the creation and growth of European integration were political and security issues. The U.S. wanted to keep Europe safe and out of war.
The geopolitical consequences of regionalism are the third issue. Regional trade agreements (and economic groupings more generally) may have caused political and even military conflicts between governments in former times. While modern regionalist critics do not expect such severe results, analysts are concerned that close and intense regional links may cause aggravations and even conflicts that extend beyond economics to more generalised domains of global affairs.
Regionalism proponents hold opposing viewpoints on each of these topics (Bergsten, 1996). First, they contend that regional agreements advance free trade and multilateralism in at least two ways: first, that trade expansion has typically surpassed trade contraction, and second, that regional agreements support both domestic and global dynamics that increase rather than diminish the likelihood of global liberalisation. For developing nations, the internal dynamic is particularly crucial since regional agreements, which can be negotiated considerably more quickly than global accords, lock in domestic reforms against the possibility that succeeding governments will attempt to reverse them. Internationally, regional agreements frequently set the stage for liberalisation concepts that can then be broadly applied in the multilateral system.
Second, regionalism critics pointed out that it frequently has considerable, verifiable impacts. Regional integration will likely lead to further multilateral initiatives when officials, governments, and nations adapt to the liberalisation process.
Third, proponents of regionalism argue that it has had more positive than negative political consequences. Because of trade and closer economic cooperation, a new war between Germany and France was almost unthinkable in the European Union. Argentina and Brazil have used it to end their long-running rivalry, which has recently taken on nuclear implications.
APEC’s primary objectives include establishing the United States as a stabilising power in Asia and creating institutional ties between nations that were once adversaries, like Japan, China, and the rest of East Asia. Therefore, the potential of carrying up peace through cooperation is greater than the likelihood of generating conflicts.
Defenders of regionalism point out that regional agreements are permitted explicitly by Article 24 of the GATT and, more recently, the WTO, recognising their consistency with the global trading system. Three requirements must be met for these agreements to be effective:
- They must substantially encompass all trade between member nations;
- They must not erect new barriers for outsiders;
- They must accomplish free trade among members by a specific date (usually to be at most ten years from the starting date).
Although it is generally acknowledged that the most significant regional agreements (the EU and NAFTA) have fully or largely met these criteria, the GATT and WTO have been largely ineffective in certifying and overseeing their implementation. Because of this, the important regions have had many reasons to say that they work well with the multilateral system.
In conclusion, regionalism and globalism are linked, but only if the major countries involved in the process manage it well. History shows they can succeed if they try to improve things for both sides. The outcome in former eras shows that this is also reasonably achievable if they desire to pursue one at the expense of the other. The process’s inherent dynamics are sufficiently balanced for the participants’ policy choices to be decisive.
As the human civilization is evolving, the institutions that were once very relevant and inevitable have been becoming archaic and irrelevant and alarmingly becoming deleterious if remain enacted and rigid. Standing mass armies is one of such institutions, which is losing its relevance that it once earned through conscription of human resource and extraction natural resources. With the emergence of democracy coupled with the dilution of borders by globalization, the armies have lost their stage and much eulogized roles as the defender, protector and invaders. The yardstick to measure the strength of any nation was their military’s might which has now been replaced with other well established indicators.
To shed light upon how and why the role of armies has been dwindled, we have to dive into the modern historical account of the events and reasons that once made the army inevitable and much desirable. As the raison d’etat for establishing the armies and galvanizing their influence was to acquire the large swaths of land and the quantifiable amount of people to propel the engine of their state machine. Resultantly, the expanded territories were in dire need to be regulated and protected with the iron fist rule, which could not be done without strengthening armies.
Now the hitherto said aspirations have become obsolete and less desirable due to changing dimensions of a society as a whole thereby the military too. To give credence to these assertions it is adequate to allude towards the decline in the tendency of ragging the territorial acquisition wars specifically in the post peace era. Now there is no incentive to acquire the large latifundia or the large amount of people to be slave them as farm workers or to conscript them into armies.
As per the report of the freedom house, there were scant sixty-nine electoral democracies in 1990; today there are more than one hundred and fifteen electrical democracies, which are more than sixty percent. In recently emerged democracies, resultantly, the transition from the centrally planned economies to the economic liberalization spawned the era of entrepreneurship and innovation. Now these budding democracies have recently embarked on the journey towards more opportunities and rising incomes that remained chimera twenty years ago. To bolster this claim, the human security report is enough as it claims that state-based arm conflict has ebbed by 40 percent and which is waning the propensity of countries to wage a full-scale war.
Furthermore, well-established democratic peace theory hits the last nail in the coffin of the aspirations to reinvigorate the military might. The increasing number of democracies are less likely to wage a war with another democratic country, which in result declines the chances of war.
As initially claimed, the ab initio reasons of having standing armies have squarely been replaced; it comes naturally in mind what have replaced them. In a complex and entangled world woven with the fabric of trade, ideas, and innovations, the war-philic countries are the least fit for survival in the Darwinian sense. The countries who are doing wonders in the spheres of economy ideas, innovations inter alia services are less prone to war and aggression.
Many but naming few as the innovation, ideas, trade, and entrepreneurial tendencies have substituted the reasons, which once made the armies relevant and inevitable. Sweden, Norway, UK at the top of global innovation index 2021 and the countries deprived of bloated, mighty, and behemoth militaries, which are also circumscribed in the limited territories, are at the peak of ideas, prosperity, and innovation as compared to those who are bestowed upon with unassailable armies.
Ostensibly, after taking into account the recent shift in the reason of having large standing armies, it is now necessary to discuss about the nature of the future warfare which poses the threats, but here too while dealing with them make everyone wary of the institution of armies and militaries which are too rigid to abreast with the current dynamic nature of warfare, resultantly, they have to bear the brunt of their rigidity everywhere.
Therefore, the Character of the future warfare is dramatically changing which incorporates the novel means to materialize the desired and often mischievous aspirations. In this regard, hybrid warfare is one emerging character, which includes a diverse variety of activities and instruments to destabilize the society, which surely would be desirable for its user. These instruments are like interfering in the electoral processes in which the adversaries can influence the outcome of the electoral processes in the direction, which benefit the adversaries’ political aspirations – Putin’s interference in Trump’s election campaign and Cambridge analytica.
Other instruments are disinformation and false news, Cyber-attacks, and financial influence. Which all of them have already been employing in different dimensions and scales. In this domain, Russia is employing all of these instruments with great dexterity. To better deal with such recent emerging means and tools, it has become a need of hour to introduce the more integrated and sophisticated ways to deal with hybrid warfare and to replace the rigid, archaic and obsolete militarily solutions. In doing so, fostering democracy, inclusion of civil society investment in media literacy are few but viable solutions.
Succinctly, the justifications for raising the large armies, which were to expand the territories, to slave the people or to protect the volatile boundaries, have recently been replaced or become obsolete and irrelevant. Therefore, this institution should be abreast its pace with the dynamic and changing character of the threats posing the great dangers. Moreover, the gauge to quantify the power of any country has resultantly been changed from the strength of armies to the innovation, ideas, entrepreneurial spirit, trade, and socio economic and socio political stability. Contemporarily, it has become futile to strengthen and increase the sizes of armies, which have already lost their relevance, conversely, the changing Character of warfare or better known as hybrid warfare, demands more.
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A review of popular unrest in China in light of the ongoing anti-lockdown protests
Americas4 days ago
The Silicon Valley’s ‘Code Peasants’ and ‘Code Overlords’
Terrorism3 days ago
Terrorist Upsurge in Taliban’s Afghanistan: Regimes, Attacks and the Concerns of Neighbors
Energy2 days ago
Massive Lying About the War in Ukraine