Today, the logistics centers play an important role in the development of various formats of international interaction at the beginning of the new Millennium. At the present stage, their role is particularly high in the context of integration processes at the regional and global levels. The trends of globalization and regionalization led to the formation of the concept of “global region” and the increasing competition of integration associations for sales markets.
The current fight in the transit transport market in the regions of the world is becoming more complicated, as in modern conditions, competition for transit cargo flows is moving from offering more rational routes and cost-effective services to meeting the geopolitical and geo-economic interests of the main participants.
In this regard, initiatives by individual States or mega-partnerships to build new systems and channels of economic interaction between individual countries and subregions are emerging in regions of the world. It should be understood that the implementation of such projects requires the creation of a new architecture of international transport corridors. Thus, in response to the new challenges of developing economic relations between Europe and Asia, EU leaders began to take steps towards the development of logistics routes on the continent.
The Concept of the pan-European corridor was one of the first to appear as part of the concept of pan-European transport infrastructure and was developed for more than 8 years at the so-called Prague (1991), Cretan (1994) and Helsinki (1997) conferences. Its main goal was to increase the EU’s connectivity with its (back then) potential members – the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). After the Helsinki conference, the content of the pan-European transport and infrastructure network was formulated, which consists of : 1. Trans – European transport network in the EU (TEN-T); 2. 10 pan-European corridors in CEE; 3. 4 pan-European transport zones; 4. TRACECA Eurasian routes.
The implementation of the 10 pan-European corridors program (in 1995 – 2005) was closely linked to integration processes in Europe and the desire to develop pan-European cooperation. Nevertheless, the large number of States in Europe and the borders separating them, and differences in the rules governing international transport, significantly slowed down the cross-border movement of goods.
After the EU enlargement in 2005, a Program was developed to expand the main transport routes (5 logistic roads) to neighboring countries and regions, which were considered as an infrastructure framework for pan-European economic cooperation, which was linked to the future prospects of the EU .
Deepening integration processes within the Union and building up mutual economic and social ties have revealed bottlenecks in European logistics in the form of disparate national projects for its development, lagging in the introduction of intermodal transport technologies, and insufficient coordination of the development of individual modes of transport and improving their environmental friendliness. In order to eliminate these bottlenecks, the EU adopted the Trans – European transport network development program (TEN-T), designed up to 2050.
TEN-T consists of two subsystems: a comprehensive one that provides integrated transport development in the EU countries and a high-speed connection of about a hundred European urban agglomerations, all major seaports, airports and border checkpoints, and a basic one in the form of Trans – European highways, where international traffic is concentrated. There are 9 main logistics hubs: North sea – Baltic; Mediterranean ; Rhine – Danube ; Baltic – Adriatic ; North sea – Mediterranean ; middle East ; Atlantic ; Scandinavia – Mediterranean; Rhine – Alps.
The implementation of the program allows ensuring the smooth functioning of the internal market, economic, social and territorial cohesion of the EU, and improving transport accessibility throughout the Union.
Another EU project to strengthen logistics routes along the EU – Asia line was the TRACECA project created in 1993. Over the past ten years, more than 50 technical assistance and investment projects have been implemented under the TRACECA program, in which 14 States participate, and private investment has exceeded $ 1 billion. In particular, over the past five years, $ 25 million has been invested in the development of the ports of Baku and Turkmenbashi, $ 70 million in Amirabad (Iran), and about $ 100 million in Aktau.
As a result, a significant part of the cargo traffic passing through the Caspian region already goes through TRACECA. However, difficulties in the implementation of the project are also present and the deadline for the corridor to reach full capacity has been pushed back to the 2020s. This project provides for the reconstruction of logistics between Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Geopolitical changes on the world map and the strengthening of the PRC as one of the main actors in international relations not only in the region, but also in the world, attracted the attention of European political and business circles to a new project put forward by the PRC in 2013 – Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
According to the Chinese side, the BRI concept should not be considered an integration structure, international or regional organization. This is an initiative of mutually beneficial cooperation and joint development of China and neighboring countries.
The main goal of the project is to redirect the flow of exports of goods and capital to those countries with which China has begun to develop cooperation in the last decade, primarily to countries in Africa and Central Asia and Western Europe. The project’s focus on solving China’s long-term Eurasian problems is clearly visible. After solving numerous political, organizational, financial and other issues, the communication basis of the project should be implemented in the current logistics.
According to the initiators of the project, the New Silk Road should include land and sea components. The land-based silk road, as it was a thousand years ago, will start in Xian (Shaanxi province), then pass through China to Lanzhou (Gansu province), Urumqi district, and cross Central Asia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Then, passing through the Bosphorus Strait, it will go to Moscow (Russia), continue to Rotterdam and end in Venice (Italy), where it will meet the sea component.
The Maritime Silk Road will start in Quanzhou (Fujiian province), pass through the major cities of southern China, Guangzhou (capital of Guangdong), Beihai (Guangxi) and Haikou (Hainan), reach the Strait of Malacca with a stop in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), cross the Indian ocean with calls in Kal-Kutta (India), Colombo (Sri Lanka) and the Maldives, and reach Nairobi in Kenya. Then it will pass through Djibouti, the Red sea and the Suez canal to Athens (Greece) and then to Venice (Italy), where it will connect with the land route.
Control over two Silk Road routes ensures China’s energy security and helps protect its investments in strategically important regions. In addition, the implementation of the project allows to reduce logistics costs. Thus, it is important for China to ensure the security of East, Central and South – East Asia, on which political and economic stability depends the well-being of a number of border regions of the PRC, as well as the stability of its trade.
The emergence of the Belt and Road Initiative has become the embodiment of a competition of development models that challenges the former role of the EU as a global model of regional integration. “Belt and road” partnerships of ASEAN with major international players (USA, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea), as well as the Trans – Pacific partnership are a set of new initiatives, “significantly different from classical integration schemes, which are formulated in the theory of international relations based on the experience of the EU, and “new regionalism” relying on non-state actors and transnational processes that occur “apart from” state” .
China’s ability to respond with interest to new plans for regional cooperation has become an advantage against the background of the EU’s wary attitude to the BRI, which has led to the involvement of the interests of Central Asian and Eastern European countries in the initiative. Thus, as a consequence of the involvement of the Eastern partnership countries in the Chinese investment zone of influence, the EU and China decided to combine their logistics routes.
Analyzing the Sino – European relations, it can be noted that the current relations between the EU and China are characterized by a comprehensive content of the bilateral agenda. In an effort to strengthen a common foreign policy line in relations with China, in 2015 The EU has developed a document“Elements of a new EU strategy towards China”. A new “Connecting Europe & Asia: The EU Strategy” was adopted in 2018, which specified the European policy towards Asian countries as part of the “connectivity” approach, providing a forum for coordinating EU and Chinese infrastructure investment relating to TEN-T and the BRI.
A key objective of the “Connectivity Platform” is to ensure that investment takes place within a framework of fair and undistorted competition based on regulatory convergence, while promoting cooperation in areas such as technology, engineering, construction and the development of standards.
An important initial area of work for the “Connectivity Platform” is the financing of investment on priority transport corridors. The Sino – EU summit 2016 in Riga (Latvia) provided further confirmation of an increasing focus on BRI – related projects and initiatives. At the closure of the summit, participants declared that they would make concerted efforts to develop synergies between the BRI and relevant EU initiatives such as the Trans – European Transport Network, more generally support the development of transport routes between Europe and Asia, and establish multimodal logistics centres throughout the area of the New Eurasian Land Bridge. They also committed to improving the international supply chain and border crossing rules on key transport corridors and the connection from the Port of Bar (Montenegro) to the railway network in Central and Eastern Europe.
Analysing the logistics along TEN-T, it should be mentioned that the EU has ports on the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea (including the Aegean, Adriatic, Tyrrhenian and Balearic Seas), North Atlantic Ocean, North Sea and Baltic Sea, providing a wide range of access points for shipping from outside the EU.
Also should be taking into the consideration the possible approaches to the EU by land and sea and the TEN-T core network corridors. Thus rail services between China and the EU currently operate mainly on the route through Russia, Belarus (where they transfer from the Russian, broad gauge (1,520mm) to the standard UIC gauge (1,435mm) at Brest) and Poland, using the North Sea – Baltic TEN-T Core Network Corridor (CNC) at least as far west as Warsaw. In the course of this research, various rail routes from the Far East to the EU were assessed to determine the most likely ones for carrying rail freight in the future. To that end, the attractiveness of the time of the shipment was considered. Based on the above assumption, it was found that, with shipping times to the North Sea up to one week longer than to the Mediterranean Sea, rail would be most attractive for transport to Europe north of the Alps, including to EU Member States bordering the North Sea and Baltic Sea.
Containers carried by rail, therefore, would primarily be those previously shipped to North Sea ports, and would travel along the route from Moscow (Russia) through Brest (Belarus) and Warsaw (Poland) to Berlin (Germany). Containers carried by sea would first pass or call at ports in Southeast Europe, such as Athens/Piraeus in Greece, where they could in principle be transferred to rail for travel further north. However, most freight of sufficiently high value to justify the additional costs of rail across the Balkans would already have switched to overland rail travel across Asia. It would therefore be more cost-effective for the remaining containers at Athens/Piraeus to continue by sea to ports in the north Adriatic Sea, such as Venice and Trieste in Italy, Koper in Slovenia and Rijeka in Croatia.
Assuming that sufficient end – to – end capacity is available between China and the EU, the focus of future rail freight flows, including those attributed to the BRI, is likely to be the North Sea – Baltic TEN-T CNC from Brest to Warsaw(Poland).
Some freight trains through or around Warsaw (Poland) currently continue to Berlin and Duisburg in Germany, but, by 2040, services may diverge to a range of destinations: south via Katowice in Poland to Hungary and Austria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and onwards to southern Germany, Switzerland and France; southwest via Łódź and Wrocław in Poland to Germany; west, as at present, via Poznań (Poland) to Germany, and onwards to the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Ireland, and via Hamburg to Denmark and Sweden; and northeast along Rail Baltica to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonian and Finland.
The routes to the west and to the northeast form part of the North Sea – Baltic Core Network Corridor of the TEN-T, which extends from Warsaw west to Berlin, Amsterdam and Rotterdam and north to Tallinn and Helsinki. The North Sea – Baltic Core Network Corridor Study includes estimates of rail freight tonnage crossing the border between Belarus and Poland in 2025. While it is difficult to compare estimates of tonnages and TEUs, the estimates in the Corridor Study appear to be small compared with the potential volume of BRI – related traffic by 2040.
Despite wide range of synegration of TEN-T and BRI, the analysis showed, that the geographical and project scope of the BRI are not clearly defined and that they continue to evolve.
The analysis of potential future traffic flows in this study suggests that the first study should focus on the New Eurasian Land Bridge Corridor connecting with the North Sea – Baltic Core Network Corridor of the TEN-T. This would require dialogue with other organisations already engaged in the development of rail transport routes in Eurasia, in particular CAREC. It would also require engagement with organisations such as UNIFE, representing manufacturers of rail equipment, with an interest in the promotion and application of EU standards beyond its borders.
The analysis of BRI – related traffic flows in the EU suggested that the BRI could generate additional rail freight of approximately 3 million TEU (equivalent to 50 – 60 trains per day or 2 – 3 trains per hour each way) between the Far East and the EU by 2040. Subsequently, it was concluded that the most likely TEN-T corridor to be required to accommodate this traffic would be the North Sea – Baltic Core Network Corridor.
It is not expected that the BRI changes patterns of shipping traffic materially other than to reduce slightly the volume of freight entering the EU via the North Sea Ports. Any effect might be offset by a growth in the shipment of BRI – generated freight across the North Sea to the UK. Nevertheless, it should be noted that maritime trade between China and the EU is already well-established, and that it is not possible to forecast possible changes in related trade patterns as a result of the BRI.
Given these results, and taking account of the uncertainties surrounding the definition and evolution of the BRI, recommendations to address particular constraints or bottlenecks on TEN-T beyond those already highlighted by the corridor studies would be premature. In the absence of greater clarity on the scope and priorities of the BRI, there is a risk that the development of specific investment projects designed to accommodate more traffic on the North Sea – Baltic Core Network Corridor, for example, would prove either inadequate or redundant.
It is also worth noting the issue of stabilization of subsidies for infrastructure and logistics projects of the PRC through the EU – Asia line.
At the same time, the TEN-T Corridor Studies should be reviewed and developed periodically as the work of the “Connectivity Platform” progresses and the BRI is defined more clearly. This would require TEN-T policy to become more outward-looking, with an explicit requirement to take account of major policy initiatives sponsored by countries outside the EU. It could also be facilitated by the development of periodic forecasts of BRI – related traffic, following the model of the European Commission’s Reference Scenario, with forecasts developed under the framework of the “Connectivity Platform” and jointly approved by participating countries.
Despite the presence of problem areas in the development of logistics ties between the EU and China, partners (especially the EU) note that the development of the logistics is greatly influenced by the geopolitical considerations of countries, in particular the desire to strengthen their foreign policy influence through modern infrastructure, reduce the geopolitical risks of entering major markets, and diversify options for communication with world markets. In other words, the dynamics of the developing of the EU – China logistics is a reflection of technological progress in transportation, the progress of globalization and regionalization of the world economy, geopolitical and geo-economic interests of participating countries in the development of international communications.
It should be understood that one of the key advantages of continental cooperation in the Eurasian space is the possibility of developing transport potential and related infrastructure. Work in this direction will lead to a number of positive effects, the main of which are the use of the transit potential of countries, localization of industry along the Trans – Eurasian transport corridors, export development and increased connectivity of inland States and regions.
Constructive interaction between the EU and China on the development of logistics routes in Eurasia shows that participation in the Eurasian cooperation can help the participants of the initiative “consolidate the strategic rear”, provide a basis for the rise of countries and influence the restructuring of the world structure, become a useful platform for global governance and international policy building.