Connect with us

East Asia

Resisting China’s Expansionist Designs

Published

on

The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting”.- Sun Tzu, the Art of war

Twenty Indian soldiers had lost their lives in a violent military confrontation with the troops of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China in the Eastern Ladakh region. Even though PLA faced at least twice the number of causalities as compared to their Indian counterparts, the territorial integrity of India came under question. This skirmish between both the forces threw open the Pandora’s Box of China’s expansionist tendencies. China has been trying a new version of colonisation by capturing smaller nations with their ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy. Being a responsible stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific region, it is high time for India to act against the Chinese aggression and use its diplomatic cum financial clout to resist the economic magnification of China using all available means.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S had been enjoying a unipolar status in the global geopolitics. Since the beginning of 21st century China had been trying to become a viable alternative to the U.S. Due to the availability of cheap labour and ruthless control over its citizens, China emerged as an international manufacturing hub. With its expanding economy the red nation started a strange desire to occupy areas from its neighbourhood. China’s land greed can be better understood by the fact that the nation has boundary disputes with 18 nations while they share land boundaries with just 14 countries. Their territorial ambitions can be traced back to the very beginning of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Within a year of its formation Tibet was annexed to China through a military operation and eastern Turkestan (present-day Xinjiang) was forced to join PRC. China started constructing a highway connecting both Xinjiang and Tibet passing through Aksai- Chin territory in the Indian side. Pandit Nehru’s government took years to diagnose the Chinese intrusion and it was too late when India responded militarily. Following the Indian defeat in the 1962 war, China occupied 38,000 sq.km of land in the Aksai-Chin region. Intelligence outputs also suggest that the Chinese forces had occupied more land in the region through multiple intrusions in the past six decades.

India holds a major place in the Chinese economic ecosystem. China’s exports to India range from crackers to pharmaceutical raw materials. India has a trade deficit of $48.6 billion with China. Chinese phone manufacturers have a 71% share in the Indian smartphone market. Cheap cost, high-end technology and easy availability are the few reasons for customers’ preference for Chinese products. Following the military conflict, there were clarion calls for boycotting Chinese products. Even though a blanket ban on Chinese goods cannot be imposed due to international trading laws, step by step initiatives can slowly take us to that goal

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping promoted the term ‘China dream’ which emphasised on national rejuvenation. This motto has been closely knit with their ongoing ‘Belt-Road Initiative’ (BRI) project of connecting over 70 counties through rail, road and air, and also improving their healthcare, infrastructure and communication sectors. A controversial periphery of BRI is China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in which China will invest over $46 billion. The proposed road passes through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and is thoroughly opposed by India. The corridor ends at Gwadar port which is of high strategic importance in the Chinese doctrine of ‘String of Pearls’. This doctrine aims at encircling India in the Indian Ocean Region by building ports or earning access to ports of other nations sharing maritime borders with India. China operating Hambanthota port in South Sri Lanka through their debt-trapping method shows how strategically advanced the Chinese are.

Contrary to the popular perception, China should be seen as the principal opponent of India and not Pakistan. Pakistan, with its non-state actors, had been trying to destabilise India on the behest of China. The nexus between Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and China is well known in the international arena. On multiple occasions, China blocked India’s attempt to list Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azar as a global terrorist by the UN. Following the United States- Taliban peace treaty Afghanistan is staring at a massive political uncertainty. With the withdrawal of U.S troops Taliban could come back to power. The strategic location of Afghanistan is important for India as a passage to central Asia. Hence, China can block India’s access to Afghan using Pakistan which is an ally of the Taliban. India had to cut short its oil imports from Iran following the sanctions imposed by the U.S. The Chabahar port in Iran is of immense importance to India. Recently, there was news of a possible ousting of India from the Chabahar port project, if that happens it could be a big blow to our strategic efforts.  China has a significant role to play in turning Nepal against India. Nepal had released a new map showing Indian territories of Lipulekh, Kalapani and Limpiyadhura as theirs. In Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar, China is developing submarine berthing and operating facility. China had also given loans worth millions of dollars to India’s friendly nations including Maldives, Myanmar and Iran. China with its surplus revenue is trying to create vassal states across the BRI route.

China’s much aggressive ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ can be better understood only by keeping their history in mind. After annexing territories they ran a ‘cultural revolution’ which was barbaric in nature. Critics of Mao were publically executed or sent to Laogai prison camps by branding them as counter-revolutionaries. Citizens were indoctrinated with party lessons and are still monitored through a strict surveillance system. People residing in China sees what their government wants them to see. Internet is censored with ‘the great firewall’. Facebook, Twitter and Google are all banned in China. In their Xinjiang province, Uighur Muslims are oppressed and they fall prey to the government’s ‘organ harvesting’. Dissidents of Chinese Communist Party, even while being in exile are physically targeted through operation ‘Fox Hunt’. Chinese government has recently passed several laws to curb freedom of people in Hong Kong which is China’s special administrative unit. Taiwan is also under the radar of Xi. Here India has to deal with a party or government which have created a utopia for its 1.4 billion people; hence strategy to checkmate China needs to be multifaceted.

India has to flex its muscle while dealing with China. China’s $14 Trillion economy makes it a major force to reckon with. China also controls much of the world’s supply chain; hence any disruption to it can create tremors in the global economy. Relocating the supply chain to trusted countries or democracies can reduce the transnational dependence on China for finished products. The recently formed informal alliance called the QUAD comprising of United States-Japan-Australia-India has put the onus on China in the Indo-Pacific region. With the QUAD extending its influence over smaller countries in the South China Sea with whom China has border disputes, the anti-China block can stand as a barrier against the Chinese aggression. China’s global dominance in 5G technology needs to be challenged and met with alternative options. For that cooperation among free democracies is essential.

 Recently, a small town in Gujarat ‘Morbi’ was in news for emerging as a toy manufacturing hub in response to the Prime Minister’s call for “Atmanirbhar Bharat’ (Self sufficient India). Similarly, manufacturing hubs for various products needs to be established in various parts of India, hence reducing and later eliminating our reliance on China. Millions of new employment opportunities can be generated in the manufacturing sector in India and thereby solving our unemployment crisis. Over a hundred companies have decided to shift their manufacturing bases outside China. Since India had been improving its position in the Ease of Doing Business index, many of them would be investing in India. Taiwanese electronics manufacturer Foxconn has announced investment of $1 billion to expand their iphone assembling unit in Chennai. Government of India’s infrastructural development and simplification of business approval process have helped India to emerge as a viable alternative manufacturing hub to China.

Following the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan and PLA’s muscle flexing, many nations have come forward to resist China’s belligerence. China is the second largest economy after U.S and has a strong military. Experts may differ on the accuracy of their war machines. But in the era of globalisation and mutual cooperation, any physical conflict needs to be avoided. Economics is a sharp weapon that nations including India can use to inflict heavy loss on China. Even though India of today has multiplied many folds from its position in 1962, but still we are a developing economy with a GDP of $3 Trillion. China’s expansionist mindset is not going to fade away. They have always claimed that even Arunachal Pradesh (Indian state) is a part of Tibet, which is a part of China. India should prevent the flow of capital through trade to China. By forming a strategic cum economic alliance as an anti-China block, India has high chance of improving its own economy and to safeguard its boundaries in case of any eventuality.

The writer is currently pursuing masters degree in History from the Department of History, University of Hyderabad, India. Publishes articles on topics pertaining to International affairs, History and Indian politics.

Continue Reading
Comments

East Asia

Nanjing tragedy – massacre or “incident”?

Published

on

On December 15, China was marking the 80th anniversary of the Nanjing massacre by Japanese troops.

In Japan, they avoid using the term “massacre,” however, so when covering the tragic event the local media referred to it as the “Nanjing incident.”

In December 1937, at the height of the second Sino-Japanese war, Japanese forces entered the city of Nanjing, then the capital of Nationalist China, which had been used by the Kuomintang government as its headquarters since 1927. The Chiang Kai-shek government had earlier decided to move the bulk of its forces out of the city, leaving behind just a small garrison. All that time, the citizens were kept in the dark about those plans. Moreover, they were prevented from escaping, even though there still was plenty of time to evacuate the civilian population. As to the Japanese, in Nanjing they didn’t encounter the serious resistance they had faced in the battle for Shanghai.  And still, in addition to mass-scale looting and torching of houses, they staged a real bloodbath killing thousands of unarmed city residents and POWs. Judging by numerous accounts of that massacre, including by a handful of Europeans who remained in the city and were spared by the Japanese, who agreed to place them in a special “safety zone,” it seems that the city was being overrun not by soldiers but a giant crowd of characters from American movies about sadistic serial killers. The elaborate torture and murder of pregnant Chinese women was especially shocking.

The reasons for such behavior by the Japanese military still defy a clear explanation. One thing is clear, though: Japanese militarism as a phenomenon is characterized by the complete loss by politicians of control over the military and of officials closely associated with it. That being said, senior officers, unlike the “field generals,” were often unable to prevent the atrocities committed by the lower ranks that quickly became widespread. Unlike in the Navy, the system of personnel training in the Imperial Army allowed uneducated conscripts from peasant families to rise to the rank of officers. A chance to feel oneself as part of the “military caste” and traditions of the samurai, which their ancestors could not even dream of, might be a reason why many of those new officers began to “revel” in their own power. At the same time, medieval customs, like testing the sword’s sharpness on unarmed people, and ritual cannibalism were coming back. Japanese newspapers of that period wrote about two officers in Nanjing who competed who of them would chop off more heads, thus executing hundreds of people.

It was not until the close of World War II that the events in Nanjing attracted international attention, as even the Kuomintang propaganda had been keeping mum about it. The Japanese militarists committed countless other crimes, but for them the Nanjing massacre carried a special meaning, not because of the number of victims, but because of the reputational risks it posed for the imperial family, since one of their members (Prince Yasuhiko of the Asaka clan) was the one who personally supervised the capture of Nanjing. After the war he was not put on trial and enjoyed immunity granted to members of the imperial family, with the full consent by the US occupation authorities.

In 1948, the case of the Nanjing massacre was considered by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which handed down two death sentences. The tribunal determined that more than 200,000 people were killed in Nanjing. A year before that a series of “smaller courts” held in China, including in Nanjing, put the death toll at 300,000.

In post-war Japan, the “Nanjing Incident” remains a much-disputed issue giving rise to all sorts of conspiracy theories concerning not only the historical past, but also present-day relations between Japan and China.

These include attempts by the so-called “revisionists” to question both the methods of counting the victims (with just 40,000 mentioned as the lower limit) and the very fact of the Nanjing killings.

Meanwhile, a movement that emerged in Japan during the Cold War period, led by representatives of the country’s academic community, people of the arts and members of the teachers union, challenged the way historical facts, including the Nanjing massacre, were presented in school textbooks.  However, their activities started to die out during the 1990s, when the  nationalists, opposed to the “masochistic view” of history, began to play a bigger role in Japanese politics.

The famous Japanese writer Haruki Murakami took a lot of angry flak from the extreme right-wingers when in one of his books, published in 2017, he had one of the characters reflecting on the question about “the difference between 100,000 and 400,000” of people killed.

Getting back to the present, there is one question that is begging for an answer. Tokyo’s policy towards China was one of the biggest achievements of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who stepped down in September 2020. Amid a  deep crisis that Japanese-Chinese relations found themselves in in 2012, due to the inability of the Democratic Party, which was in power before him, to stand up to the nationalists’ populist actions, during his eight-year premiership Shinzo Abe managed if not to make them friendly, then at least to restore “normality.” Moreover, in solving this difficult task, he neither made any concessions on key issues for Tokyo, nor irritated Washington, which had its own plans for Beijing. At the same time, Shinzo Abe continues to be viewed in East Asia and also in the West as a “hawk,” whose statements and even some symbolic gestures clearly smack of revisionism. On one occasion, for example, he was photographed at the controls of a Japanese-designed fighter with “731” painted on its fuselage, evoking clear associations with the Japanese Unit 731, which was testing bacteriological weapons on humans in Manchuria. In 2013, Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, drawing negative reaction not only from Japan’s regional neighbors, but also from Washington. How come a politician with such views was able to “make friends” with China?

There is a circumstance here that has not been lost on the Japanese media.  Since 2018, [Chinese President] Xi Jinping has not attended events marking the anniversaries of the Nanjing tragedy, although it was he who in 2014 proposed to mark the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre. This time round he did not show up either for the December 15 event (due to the pandemic, as was officially explained). On December 13, Japan’s state broadcaster NHK reported that amid a further deepening of its confrontation with the United States, China intends to demonstrate its interest in strengthening ties, primarily economic ones, with Japan. Therefore, the mourning ceremony was organized so as not to harm the current status of Sino-Japanese relations.

However, the gradual “unfreezing” of relations between the two countries began long before Donald Trump declared a sanctions war on China. It was Shinzo Abe who, speaking in parliament back in 2014, invited Beijing to resume the dialogue between the two countries’ leaders. In that same year, a group of prominent Japanese politicians, among them the former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, paid a visit to China. When Fukuda’s father, Takeo, was prime minister during the late 1970s, Japan signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China, and his surname has since been a symbol of a “reset” in bilateral relations. This time the elderly politician was once again used as a “fire engine.” In the same year, Shinzo Abe and Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Beijing, and their meeting in Hangzhou, China, during the September 2016 G20 summit is now seen as the beginning of the active phase of mending fences between the two nations.

During the Trump presidency, this process only accelerated, much to the benefit of both Beijing and Tokyo, each of which had serious problems in relations with Washington. Notably, as the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed in 1978, each year ending with “8” could bring new headways in bilateral ties. This tradition is especially important for China, where ceremony plays such a big role in politics. During Shinzo Abe’s first visit to Beijing in October 2018, the sides agreed to launch over 50 infrastructure cooperation projects, which experts were quick to hail as the dawn of a new era in Japanese-Chinese relations. In fact, many of these joint projects later turned out to be just for show, and were subsequently shelved. Still, when Shinzo Abe met his Chinese counterpart at the 2019 G20 summit in Osaka, they agreed that Xi Jinping would pay an official visit to Japan in the spring of 2020, but the visit was postponed due to the pandemic. The epidemic could also have been the reason why Xi Jinping refrained from attending this year’s memorial event in Nanjing.

As for Shinzo Abe’s revisionist views, they are probably seen in Beijing as mainly intended for domestic consumption, in contrast to the pro-American nationalism of another charismatic Japanese politician, former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Unlike Koizumi, Shinzo Abe was more of a “nationalist-pragmatist,” focused on solving problems pertaining to the national interests of Japan.

During his first news conference after taking office, Japan’s new Prime Minister, Yoshihide Suga, said that he would like to build stable relations with neighboring countries, including China and Russia.  Still, chances are high that the subject of the Nanjing massacre may return to the bilateral agenda since the age-old traditions of historical memory will not let the onetime foes forget this tragic event.

From our partner International Affairs

Continue Reading

East Asia

South Korea’s Potential for Global Influence is Weakened by its Mistreatment of Women

Published

on

In recent years, the Republic of Korea has become a pop culture juggernaut.

Eight years after “Gangnam Style” went global, K-Pop still reigns supreme with boy band BTS topping charts and issuing IPOs. Bong Joon-ho’s film “Parasite” swept last year’s Oscars, kimchi now has UNESCO cultural heritage status, while Samsung smartphones are used all over the world, second only to the mighty Apple.

The global appeal of the Korean Wave, known as “Hallyu,” recently attracted the attention of a report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which argued that this rising soft power could in turn boost South Korea’s global influence and drive diplomatic leadership on a broad range of transnational issues, from climate change to public health to democracy promotion.

This all sounds great, but there remains a nagging problem. Despite its flourishing culture, there have also been a string of scandals highlighting the plight of women in the country, who facing everything from inequality to workplace discrimination and rampant sexual harassment.

By any measure, the problem is significant and costly to the country’s interests. According to a 2019 report by the World Economic Forum, South Korea ranks 124 out of 149 countries in the world in terms of economic opportunity for women, while another report cites the highest gender pay gap among OECD nations at 35%. This low level of female participation in the economy is not only a drag on future GDP growth, but also coincides with a parallel mental health crisis: suicides among Korean women in their 20s have jumped by more than 40 percent in the last year, at the same time that male deaths are in decline.

Mistreatment of women in Korea may be a feature, not a bug, of the system. A recent string of sexual abuse scandals has reached the highest levels of the country’s political elites.

This past July, the country was shocked to wake up to the news that the popular Mayor of Seoul Park Won-soon had committed suicide when accusations of sexual assault against his secretary were made public. Mayor Park had built his image as stalwart champion of women’s rights, and yet, the secretary, who has been threatened and blamed following the suicide, says that she “felt defenseless and weak before the immense power” of the Mayor.

Months later, we are discovering the very people meant to protect the victims instead act to protect the alleged perpetrators. Congresswoman Nam In-soon, one of South Korea’s highest profile women’s rights activists, is being called on to resign after it was revealed that she leaked news of the sexual harassment investigation into Mayor Park. Another member of congress, Yoon Mee-hyang, was forced out of the ruling Democratic Party after facing criminal charges of embezzlement from the “comfort women” charity she used to direct, which raised money for survivors of World War II military brothels.

Before Mayor Park’s suicide and the comfort women scandal, there were many others. Last year, South Chungcheong Province Governor Ahn Hee-jung was convicted on nine counts of rape and sentenced to three and half years in prison. Mayor of Busan Oh Keo-Don was forced to resign following the assault accusation. Ahn Tae-geun, a former senior prosecutor whose case had become symbolic for the #MeToo movement, had his conviction overturned earlier this year.

These patterns stand in stark contrast to the image the government seeks to project.

In public speeches, President Moon Jae-in frequently advocates in defense of women’s rights in speeches and interviews. Speaking at the last UN General Assembly, he declared a commitment to inclusiveness and reducing inequalities. The ruling DPK has long associated itself with rights activists, and has made gestures toward combating misconduct and mistreatment of women – but critics say they aren’t doing enough. A headline on CNN last summer went so far as to call out the hypocrisy: “South Korea’s President says he’s a feminist. Three of his allies have been accused of sex crimes.”

Despite numerous protest movements and well supported marches, Korea has not yet experienced a breakthrough #MeToo moment. According to media testimonials, many women continue to face significant obstacles to advance in their careers. Even after 70,000 women marched last year to protest the prolific abuse of spy cams set up in bathrooms and changing rooms, patriarchal attitudes continue. This month, guidelines published on an official government website advising pregnant women to cook, clean, and to lose weight for their husbands after childbirth caused a social media uproar.

This is a deeply concerning problem. As highlighted by the Carnegie report, Korea’s role as a “middle power” in a such a volatile region would be highly welcome, and not just on things like climate and coronavirus vaccine distribution, but also their crucial role in containing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and holding firm in the shadow of China’s expanding authoritarian reach.

Some Korean groups have advocated internationally against gender-based violence, which is undoubtedly a very worthy cause. But until the Moon government can get serious about tackling these inequalities and abuses at home, its efforts to project influence abroad will fail to meet potential.

Continue Reading

East Asia

Considering the Continental Dimension of the Indo-Pacific: The Mongolian Precedent

Published

on

The Indo-Pacific is now the site of global great-power competition and contestation. And, as a reflection of its growing importance in international discourse, a number of extra-regional actors adopted the concept last year. Among those adoptees, Mongolia set a unique precedent for the regional security discourse to actively consider the continental dimension of the Indo-Pacific by highlighting geopolitical convergences with other regional actors, and the strategic threat posed by Beijing’s “Silk Road Economic Belt”.

Mongolia in the Indo-Pacific

Actors who have adopted the Indo-Pacific concept vaguely define it as beginning in the Arabian Sea and ending in the Western Pacific Ocean. Much of the discourse is also driven by the US-China strategic competition in Southeast Asia, and the US’ attempt to counter Chinese influence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, along with its regional partners and allies, e.g the India-Australia-Japan-US ‘Quad’. As a result, actors in the Indo-Pacific have generally focused on the development of maritime military and economic measures.

In early October, during a Japan-Mongolia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, both sides agreed to continue consolidating their efforts in pursuing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, in line with the promises of the 2018 Japan-Mongolia Summit.

Mongolia’s participation as a continental, extra-regional actor with limited maritime significance, shifts the geopolitical locus of the theatre, ever so slightly, north of Southeast Asia (the current focus). Ulaanbaatar’s adoption of the geostrategic theatre appears to be driven by continued Chinese antagonism, and a result of its “third neighbour” policy.

China continues to threaten Mongolia’s territorial sovereignty by claiming Inner Mongolia,clamp down on its cultural identity, and impose costs on Mongolia’s export-oriented economy. The last issue is critical, since Mongolia’s largest export partner, approximately92.78 percent of overall exports, is China. Enclosed between two large countries, Russia and China, Mongolia has traditionally maintained a “third neighbour” policy approach: building political and economic relationships with actors other than the aforementioned.

Given the continued animosity with Beijing, Ulaanbaatar has increasingly emphasised these other relations over the years. e.g. with the UK, the US, Japan, etc. In 2019 President Khaltmaagiin Battulga visited New Delhi to develop deeper ties with another “third neighbour” state. Mongolia also shares the “like-minded” characteristics – a liberal democracy – to maintain and preserve a “free, fair, open and rules-based” order in the US-Japan Indo-Pacific strategy.

And so, actors looking to potentially partner with Mongolia or others with similar economic and connectivity deficits in Central and West Asia, will have to include, within their Indo-Pacific approaches, measures that involve non-littoral actors.

The BRI and Continental Asia

China’s rise as an expansionist Asian military and global economic power is at the core of the  Indo-Pacific security discourse. Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea (SCS), China’s growing naval power, and the colossal Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) form the major strategic threats to regional multilateralism and collective security.

The most long standing threat among them, the BRI, is divided into the transcontinental “silk route” and the maritime “silk road”. However, much of the Indo-Pacific discourse is dominated by the silk road, especially those projects directed towards the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). BRI projects in the IOR are crucial to Beijing’s expanding influence in South Asia and control on international energy and trade supply routes. Also hidden among the maritime/trans-continental connectivity and infrastructure projects, is China’s growing security presence in the region.

However, Mongolia’s entry directs attention to a dimension unique to the current maritime Indo-Pacific discourse –the silk route, that cuts across Central Asia, towards Europe and South Asia, with a similar number of projects in Southeast Asia.

Among the six ‘silk route’ projects, Mongolia’s concern is the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC) that cuts through Eastern Mongolia, beginning in Ulanqab (or “Jining”) in Inner Mongolia, and ending at Ulan-Ude, in BurYatia, Russia. Similar projects include the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC).

Connecting the continental to the maritime is the main goal of the BRI. In fact, the project was first announced during a Chinese state visit to Central Asia in 2013. President Xi Jinping proposed the “Silk Road Economic Belt” with a vision to connect the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea. Beijing’s vision of comprehensive global economic and military power requires a built path to various regions of the world, i.e infrastructure to facilitate dual-use logistics. Given the recent spate of BRI loans going bad, this vision continues to remain unfulfilled.

The continental dimension, Asia, is what makes the Indo-Pacific a theatre of global concern. Trans-continental connectivity, between and within Europe and Asia, narrows the distance between actors, and the shared interest in maintaining regional multilateralism and collective security ensures their continued participation in the Indo-Pacific. As more actors like Mongolia adopt the Indo-Pacific concept, connecting the continental to the maritime and vice versa, sans BRI, will become a strategic concern.

Mongolia’s entry into the theatre offers a unique precedent for those involved in maintaining and preserving a “free, fair, open and rules-based” Indo-Pacific to evaluate and initiate relationships between non-littoral actors and the maritime dimension.

The On-Ground Reality

However, there are a number of obstacles to actively consider continental Asia in the Indo-Pacific discourse. The two most important are geography and geopolitics.

Mongolia for example, is completely enclosed by two actors – Russia and China – who are averse and hostile to the idea of the Indo-Pacific. And, any “counter-BRI” connectivity project envisioned by other regional actors will have to go through their territories. The case of Afghanistan is similar. Divergences in geopolitical interests and ties with actors in the Arabian Sea, particularly with regard to Iran and Pakistan, stays the idea of trans-regional connectivity between Kabul and the world.

The geopolitical obstacle here is the dependent economic relationships that non-littorals in Asia have with Beijing. Mongolia is just one among many Central and West Asian states that have local economies indelibly tied to the political whims of Beijing. During the coronavirus pandemic, a period that saw considerable anti-China sentiment in the international community, Beijing has managed to maintain a level of trust and shared security with many Indo-Pacific states. National vaccination plans are based on the delivery of Chinese vaccines.

There is another reason why the security discourse on the Indo-Pacific is focused on maritime measures – maintaining and preserving the integrity of international Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and the respect for territorial sovereignty. In that endeavour, multilateral platforms like the Quad allows members to share historic and strategic advantages in the IOR and Pacific Ocean to counter Chinese expansionism in the Indo-Pacific’s various sub-regions.  On land however, in Central and South Asia, for example the clash in the Galwan river valley last year, Chinese incursions provoke bilateral responses giving it leeway to act with relative impunity.

Conclusion

While there are a number of real obstacles to consider the continental dimension of the Indo-Pacific, Mongolia sets a geopolitical precedent for a comprehensive geographic definition, one that includes both the maritime and continental. From this year on, states participating in the Indo-Pacific now have a reason to approach and include non-littoral actors in the Indo-Pacific.

This precedent also highlights the need to include the continental ‘silk route’ in the Indo-Pacific security discourse. Devising such a definition will be a similar exercise as to the amalgamation of the terms “Indo-Pacific” and “Asia-Pacific” to form the “Indo-Asia-Pacific”; now used at times in geostrategic discourse.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Trending