With a view to understanding how Erdogan’s Turkey thinks strategically, we need to analyse the recent evolution of Turkey’s political system, together with its historical geopolitical determinants, which are always defined.
As Napoleon used to say, you only need to look at a country’s map to define its foreign policy.
The first government of the AKP – an Islamist party that was reorganized and refounded after some of its members were not considered regular by the Constitutional Court – lasted from 2002 to 2010- and later, as we all know.
In 1970, however, the first truly Islamist party was established in Turkey, the “National Order Party” (MNP) led by Necmettin Erbakan.
As mentioned above, the MNP was disbanded by the Constitutional Court, but it re-emerged a year later under the name of “National Salvation Party”, which won as many as 48 Parliamentary seats in the 1973 election.
In 1981 it was again dissolved by the National Security Council, along with all the other political groups, none excluded, due to the military’s “constitutional” coup.
In 1983, when it was again allowed to form the various political parties, the “Welfare Party”, always led – behind the scenes – by Erbakan, was born from the ashes of the MNP and the “National Salvation Party”.
It was always Erdogan’s explicit and revered model.
Not even this party, however, had the military’s consent to participate in the 1983 election.
Throughout the 1980s, the “Welfare Party” did not exceed the 10% threshold and hence was not represented in Parliament. Nevertheless, it began to grow considerably and unexpectedly in the 1990s, until its victory in the 1997 election and the subsequent and then inevitable intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces.
In 1998 the Constitutional Court “disbanded” the Welfare Party again, which then re-emerged in 1999 as the “Virtue Party”, but it reached little consensus in the 1999 election and was anyway banned again as unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.
Later the “Happiness Party” emerged from a traditionalist split of the “modernist” wing – so to say – that would be found later in the AKP. It did not go much far.
The ideology was the Milli Gõruş, i.e. the “national perspective”, which saw a very clear separation between the Western materialist, colonialist and repressive civilization vis-à-vis “third” countries, all destined to a quick death, and the Islamic civilisation, based on an essential and typical factor, namely justice. That was an important feature.
Therefore, based on that ideology, not even the modernising reforms which, starting from Ataturk, had secularised Turkish society and politics, were good at all.
But the nationalism which also characterised the Turkish “secular” tradition in the early 20th century was fine.
No accession to the EU, of course, nor any relations with Israel, if not aggressive, at least in words.
However, the mainstay of the AKP’s new ideology we could generically define as “Islamism” was that only Turkey should lead the new united Islamic world.
Secularism was in fact accepted only because it allowed freedom of religion, but it was rejected in the name of Islam which was the only truth.
Another aspect of Islamist ideology, which was later encompassed almost entirely in the AKP, was the “just order” (adildűzen), a “third way” model superior to capitalism and Socialism.
No interest in trade, although the financial mechanism is often currently organised according to the Islamic banking system, modelled on the policy lines of Al Qaradawi, Al Jazeera’s major preacher and one of the most important personalities of the Muslim Brotherhood.
A figure that currently both Saudi Arabia and al-Sisi strongly question.
In January 2020, Moody’s verified that the Islamic banking transactions in Turkey now account for approximately 15% of total transactions.
Much more than in many Middle East countries, but less than in Saudi Arabia or even Malaysia.
Hence, again, massive hatred for the International Monetary Fund, the EU, even NATO, but we will talk about this later on.
The Turkish Islamic parties, however, are the only mass parties left today, after the post-modern political era has also infected the Middle East or even the Eastern countries.
“The AKP is the conservative democracy” Erdogan said when he won the 2002 election. But he also made explicit reference to free market, privatisation and foreign investment in Turkey and to the strong relationship between Turkey and the United States, and even with NATO and the central Asian Republics, sometimes of Turanian origin.
Democracy is mainly regarded as a shield against the secular State’s interference.
On the geopolitical level, Erdogan reaffirms – by mixing them – the pieces of the traditional Turkish global strategy: firstly, careful control of Mediterranean ports to avoid the sensitive areas of Ankara’s territory being the target of easy enemy operations; secondly- and this is the core of the issue – Cyprus.
It was Bulent Ecevit, the secular and centre-left Turkish Prime Minister, who ordered the invasion of Cyprus in 1974.
It is true that, shortly before, Greece had overthrown Archbishop Makarios and declared enosis, i.e. the union with Greece.
Now there is Turkey’s clear refusal to anyway accept an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Greek Cyprus, and then the agreement with Muslim Brotherhood’s Libya,i.e. that of Tripoli, for a Turkish EEZ stretching from the Libyan coast of Tripoli to the (Greek) island of Kastellorizo and the whole Cypriot sea, with parts of the possible future new Greek EEZ.
As is well-know, EEZs are areas spreading up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline of a coastal State and, from a legal viewpoint, they are the “territorialisation of the sea”, as they allow to exploit the seabed natural resources.
Italy and Greece have recently ratified an agreement, which is still to be signed by the Italian President of the Republic, although Italy already has a “quasi-EEZ” in the Tyrrhenian Sea, stretching from the Ligurian Sea to the above-mentioned Tyrrhenian Sea, especially for the protection of marine fauna.
Considering the great fear that Italy has of Turkey and the obsession – already certified by Cavour – for favouring anyone on a diplomatic level just to “be present and have a say in the matter”, Greece and Italy, however, have already established that in the future the Italian-Turkish EEZ will most probably be the one defined by the 1977 Treaty.
The agreement on the Greek side to allow 68 Italian fishing boats to have access to Greek territorial waters, pursuant to EU Regulation 1380/2013, is also valid for the future.
Italian politicians think only about fishing – which is certainly important – but they never think about Internet cables, remote defence positions of relevant areas of the Italian territory, commercial lines, first or second response channels to adverse operations. They are cabin boys, in essence. Or fish freezers.
Certainly Greece has silenced Italy, which deals only with mullets, mussels and tuna fish, with a favourable agreement, but it is looking above all at the proclamation of its “great EEZ”, which will spread as far as Egypt and most of Cyprus, as is well-known by Turkey.
Greece’s next move will be an arrangement with its neighbours, again for its “big” EEZ, particularly with Albania.
But also Egypt, which has the great gas field of Zohr, which was discovered the ENI but which I would not be surprised if it were “shifted” to Greece, for the typical generosity of the poor wretched people, since for the time being Italy has no effective EEZ negotiations in place with Egypt.
I would not want Italy to end up in the mire, as was the case with the Treaty of Caen in 2015.
With the “wrong maps” coincidentally spread by France, which were then declared false. I wonder why.
Certainly the Treaty of Caen is still a secret with seven seals. As far as we can read, the “median line” of waters and all the other UNCLOS’ legal nonsense are safe, but doubts remain about the effective protection of our economic, military, commercial, political and tax borders.
When it comes to EEZs and borders, there is always a backside available, namely Italy’s.
Hence this is the primary scenario: at the beginning of August – after Turkey conducted naval exercises throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, with the extension of its seismic analyses of the seabed and Greece considered these “observations” and military exercises totally illegal – clashes between Turkey, Greece, France and even Italy began, initially diplomatic ones and later also maritime military confrontation.
There have also been Italian and French ships operationally supporting the Greek ones, but Turkey has already placed all its pawns in the Eastern Mediterranean.
It should be noted that the 2019 agreement between Turkey and Tripoli’s Government of National Accord (GNA) mainly concerns military cooperation and maritime jurisdiction.
Between the two countries, namely Tripoli’s GNA and Turkey, the EEZ already defined bilaterally overlaps with the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone both in the south and in the north and Turkey can make explorations – on an exclusive basis –in the sea in front of the very weak State of GNA and al-Sarraj.
As stated by the Turkish Defence Minister, the Turkish Mediterranean strategy, known as Mavi Vatan (the “Blue Homeland Doctrine”), is based on the fact that the great spreading of Greece’s Peloponnese islands” cannot have the effect of excluding Turkey from the rest of the Mediterranean, and with the agreement with GNA’s Libya we have shown that we cannot accept any fait accompli“.
Defending Turkey’s autonomy and “hands free” in the Eastern Mediterranean is an absolute strategic priority for Turkish strategists.
Let us see, however, how Turkey reacts to the U.S. and Russian gas policies, which is the real plot to understand what is currently happening.
On June 15, 2020, the U.S. Department of State developed a restrictive policy for companies operating in Nord Stream 2, the Russian pipeline, and also for Turk Stream 2.
The sanctions on Turk Stream 1 and 2 are essential to currently understand Turkey’s maritime reactions.
As already noted, TurkStream sends gas from Russia to Turkey, with minor sections to Bulgaria, Greece and North Macedonia. It is a pipeline that started operating in January 2020.
Gazprom, the well-known Russian company and BOTAŞ, the Turkish state-owned company, are still completing the final phase of TurkStream2.
The Turkish interests in the TurkStream 2 network, however, are currently marginal.
They are only rights-of-way, which do not solve the Turkish economic crisis and the sometimes colossal projects of Erdogan’s regime.
Turkey, however, has three real goals in the gas sector: firstly, the quick development of the gas field in Sakarya, Black Sea, accounting for 320 billion cubic metres. Secondly, Turkey also wants to stop gas competition from Russia and the Mediterranean and finally favour the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, which brings Azerbaijani gas through Turkey to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline towards Greece, a line that could be expanded also with gas from Israel, the Iraqi Kurdish country and Turkmenistan.
Turkey also favours the passage of ships containing LPG through the Istanbul Canal, a project consisting of the construction of an artificial canal connecting the Black Sea to the Marmara Sea for 28 miles towards Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine.
It is supposed to be completed in 2025, or maybe sooner.
The ships’ rights-of-way should be much more than those of the pipelines, and could even slowly change the Turkish State’s financial equilibria.
Therefore, Turkey has little interest in the U.S. sanctions against TurkStream2 – or probably it even likes them.
Coincidentally, it was precisely when the United States began to become a major exporter of liquefied gas everywhere that the legislation against Russian pipelines to Europe was developed.
NordStream2was hit by the United States in July 2018, but TurkStream was not sanctioned until June 2019.
The gas industry is now undergoing a very complex phase.
From January to May 2020 the EU demand for gas fell by 8%, also for the well-known pandemic reasons, but there is a real possibility that natural gas can fully participate in the next hydrogen race, considering that the methane extracted from natural gas can produce hydrogen, which can also be easily transported in the old pipelines.
Therefore, given the world market’s volatility, no more new gas explorations are made. This keeps the future of Mediterranean gas and, above all, of the Eastern Mediterranean on hold.
Turkey, however, has been reducing its dependence on Russian gas since 2018.
Turkey imports gas also from Qatar, the United States, Algeria and it is currently the third largest importer of U.S. natural gas in Europe after Spain and France.
Turkey has recently discovered a new underwater natural gas field in the Black Sea, namely the Tuna-1.
Hence Turkey is no longer dependent on gas from the old pipelines, but Israel has now won its geoeconomic battle with the agreements with Egypt and Jordan as stable importers of its new natural gas.
Only if Cyprus remains far from Turkish influence in the newly-prospected gas area, it will remain a reserve that cannot be banned – except in special cases – by Turkey’s hegemonism, even vis-à-vis Egypt or the Lebanon.
Iceland’s Historic(al) Elections
The morning of September, 26 was a good one for Lenya Run Karim of the Pirate Party. Once the preliminary results were announced, things were clear: the 21-year-old law student of the University of Iceland, originating from a Kurdish immigrant family, had become the youngest MP in the country’s history.
In historical significance, however, this event was second to another. Iceland, the world champion in terms of gender equality, became the first country in Europe to have more women MPs than men, 33 versus 30. The news immediately made world headlines: only five countries in the world have achieved such impressive results. Remarkably, all are non-European: Rwanda, Nicaragua and Cuba have a majority of women in parliament, while Mexico and the UAE have an equal number of male and female MPs.
Nine hours later, news agencies around the world had to edit their headlines. The recount in the Northwest constituency affected the outcome across the country to delay the ‘triumph for women’ for another four years.
Small numbers, big changes
The Icelandic electoral system is designed so that 54 out of the 63 seats in the Althingi, the national parliament, are primary or constituency seats, while another nine are equalization seats. Only parties passing the 5 per cent threshold are allowed to distribute equalisation seats that go to the candidates who failed to win constituency mandates and received the most votes in their constituency. However, the number of equalisation mandates in each of the 6 constituencies is legislated. In theory, this could lead to a situation in which the leading party candidate in one constituency may simply lack an equalisation mandate, so the leading candidate of the same party—but in another constituency—receives it.
This is what happened this year. Because of a difference of only ten votes between the Reform Party and the Pirate Party, both vying for the only equalisation mandate in the Northwest, the constituency’s electoral commission announced a recount on its own initiative. There were also questions concerning the counting procedure as such: the ballots were not sealed but simply locked in a Borgarnes hotel room. The updated results hardly affected the distribution of seats between the parties, bringing in five new MPs, none of whom were women, with the 21-year-old Lenya Run Karim replaced by her 52-year-old party colleague.
In the afternoon of September, 27, at the request of the Left-Green Movement, supported by the Independence Party, the Pirates and the Reform Party, the commission in the South announced a recount of their own—the difference between the Left-Greens and the Centrists was only seven votes. There was no ‘domino effect’, as in the case of the Northwest, as the five-hour recount showed the same result. Recounts in other districts are unlikely, nor is it likely that Althingi—vested with the power to declare the elections valid—would invalidate the results in the Northwest. Nevertheless, the ‘replaced’ candidates have already announced their intention to appeal against the results, citing violations of ballot storage procedures. Under the Icelandic law, this is quite enough to invalidate the results and call a re-election in the Northwest, as the Supreme Court of Iceland invalidated the Constitutional Council elections due to a breach of procedure 10 years ago. Be that as it may, the current score remains 33:30, in favor of men.
Progressives’ progress and threshold for socialists
On the whole, there were no surprises: the provisional allocation of mandates resembles, if with minor changes, the opinion polls on the eve of the election.
The ruling three-party coalition has rejuvenated its position, winning 37 out of the 63 Althingi seats. The centrist Progressive Party saw a real electoral triumph, improving its 2017 result by five seats. Prime-minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir’s Left-Green Movement, albeit with a slight loss, won eight seats, surpassing all pre-election expectations. Although the centre-right Independence Party outperformed everyone again to win almost a quarter of all votes, 16 seats are one of the worst results of the Icelandic ‘Grand Old Party’ ever.
The results of the Social-Democrats, almost 10% versus 12.1% in 2017, and of the Pirates, 8.6% versus 9.2%, have deteriorated. Support for the Centre Party of Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, former prime-minister and victim of the Panama Papers, has halved from 10.9% to 5.4%. The centrists have seen a steady decline in recent years, largely due to a sexist scandal involving party MPs. The populist People’s Party and the pro-European Reform Party have seen gains of 8.8% and 8.3%, as compared to 6.9% and 6.7% in the previous elections.
Of the leading Icelandic parties, only the Socialist Party failed to pass the 5 per cent threshold: despite a rating above 7% in August, the Socialists received only 4.1% of the vote.
Coronavirus, climate & economy
Healthcare and the fight against COVID-19 was, expectedly, on top of the agenda of the elections: 72% of voters ranked it as the defining issue, according to a Fréttablaðið poll. Thanks to swift and stringent measures, the Icelandic government brought the coronavirus under control from day one, and the country has enjoyed one of the lowest infection rates in the world for most of the time. At the same time, the pandemic exposed a number of problems in the national healthcare system: staff shortages, low salaries and long waiting lists for emergency surgery.
Climate change, which Icelanders are already experiencing, was an equally important topic. This summer, the temperature has not dropped below 20°C for 59 days, an anomaly for a North-Atlantic island. However, Icelanders’ concerns never converted into increased support for the four left-leaning parties advocating greater reductions in CO2 emission than the country has committed to under the Paris Agreement: their combined result fell by 0.5%.
The economy and employment were also among the main issues in this election. The pandemic has severely damaged the island nation’s economy, which is heavily tourism-reliant—perhaps, unsurprisingly, many Icelanders are in favor of reviving the tourism sector as well as diversifying the economy further.
The EU membership, by far a ‘traditional’ issue in Icelandic politics, is unlikely to be featured on the agenda of the newly-elected parliament as the combined result of the Eurosceptics, despite a loss of 4%, still exceeds half of the overall votes. The new Althingi will probably face the issue of constitutional reform once again, which is only becoming more topical in the light of the pandemic and the equalization mandates story.
New (old) government?
The parties are to negotiate coalition formation. The most likely scenario now is that the ruling coalition of the Independence Party, the Left-Greens and the Progressives continues. It has been the most ideologically diverse and the first three-party coalition in Iceland’s history to last a full term. A successful fight against the pandemic has only strengthened its positions and helped it secure additional votes. Independence Party leader and finance minister Bjarni Benediktsson has earlier said he would be prepared to keep the ruling coalition if it holds the majority. President Guðni Jóhannesson announced immediately after the elections that he would confirm the mandate of the ruling coalition to form a new government if the three parties could strike a deal.
Other developments are possible but unlikely. Should the Left-Greens decide to leave the coalition, they could be replaced by the Reform Party or the People’s Party, while any coalition without the Independence Party can only be a four-party or larger coalition.
Who will become the new prime-minister still remains to be seen—but if the ruling coalition remains in place, the current prime-minister and leader of the Left-Greens, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, stands a good chance of keeping her post: she is still the most popular politician in Iceland with a 40 per cent approval rate.
The 2021 Althingi election, with one of the lowest turnouts in history at 80.1%, has not produced a clear winner. The election results reflect a Europe-wide trend in which traditional “major” parties are losing support. The electorate is fragmenting and their votes are pulled by smaller new parties. The coronavirus pandemic has only reinforced this trend.
The 2021 campaign did not foreshadow a sensation. Although Iceland has not become the first European country with a women’s majority in parliament, these elections will certainly go down in history as a test of Icelanders’ trust to their own democracy.
From our partner RIAC
EU-Balkan Summit: No Set Timeframe for Western Balkans Accession
On October 6, Slovenia hosted a summit between the EU and the Western Balkans states. The EU-27 met with their counterparts (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Kosovo) in the sumptuous Renaissance setting of Brdo Castle, 30 kilometers north of the capital, Ljubljana. Despite calls from a minority of heads of state and government, there were no sign of a breakthrough on the sensitive issue of enlargement. The accession of these countries to the European Union is still not unanimous among the 27 EU member states.
During her final tour of the Balkans three weeks ago, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the peninsula’s integration was of “geostrategic” importance. On the eve of the summit, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz backed Slovenia’s goal of integrating this zone’s countries into the EU by 2030.
However, the unanimity required to begin the hard negotiations is still a long way off, even for the most advanced countries in the accession process, Albania and North Macedonia. Bulgaria, which is already a member of the EU, is opposing North Macedonia’s admission due to linguistic and cultural differences. Since Yugoslavia’s demise, Sofia has rejected the concept of Macedonian language, insisting that it is a Bulgarian dialect, and has condemned the artificial construction of a distinct national identity.
Other countries’ reluctance to join quickly is of a different nature. France and the Netherlands believe that previous enlargements (Bulgaria and Romania in 2007) have resulted in changes that must first be digested before the next round of enlargement. The EU-27 also demand that all necessary prior guarantees be provided regarding the independence of the judiciary and the fight against corruption in these countries. Despite the fact that press freedom is a requirement for membership, the NGO Reporters Without Borders (RSF) urged the EU to make “support for investigative and professional journalism” a key issue at the summit.”
While the EU-27 have not met since June, the topic of Western Balkans integration is competing with other top priorities in the run-up to France’s presidency of the EU in the first half of 2022. On the eve of the summit, a working dinner will be held, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called for “a strategic discussion on the role of the Union on the international scene” in his letter of invitation to the EU-Balkans Summit, citing “recent developments in Afghanistan,” the announcement of the AUKUS pact between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, which has enraged Paris.
The Western Balkans remain the focal point of an international game of influence in which the Europeans seek to maintain their dominance. As a result, the importance of reaffirming a “European perspective” at the summit was not an overstatement. Faced with the more frequent incursion of China, Russia, and Turkey in that European region, the EU has pledged a 30 billion euro Economic and Investment Plan for 2021-2027, as well as increased cooperation, particularly to deal with the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Opening the borders, however, is out of the question. In the absence of progress on this issue, Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia have decided to establish their own zone of free movement (The Balkans are Open”) beginning January 1, 2023. “We are starting today to do in the region what we will do tomorrow in the EU,” said Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama when the agreement was signed last July.
This initiative, launched in 2019 under the name “Mini-Schengen” and based on a 1990s idea, does not have the support of the entire peninsular region, which remains deeply divided over this project. While Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are not refusing to be a part of it and are open to discussions, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, who took office in 2020, for his part accuses Serbia of relying on this project to recreate “a fourth Yugoslavia”
Tensions between Balkan countries continue to be an impediment to European integration. The issue of movement between Kosovo and Serbia has been a source of concern since the end of September. Two weeks of escalation followed Kosovo’s decision to prohibit cars with Serbian license plates from entering its territory, in response to Serbia’s long-standing prohibition on allowing vehicles to pass in the opposite direction.
In response to the mobilization of Kosovar police to block the road, Serbs in Kosovo blocked roads to their towns and villages, and Serbia deployed tanks and the air force near the border. On Sunday, October 3, the conflict seemed to be over, and the roads were reopened. However, the tone had been set three days before the EU-Balkans summit.
German Election: Ramifications for the US Foreign Policy
In the recent German election, foreign policy was scarcely an issue. But Germany is an important element in the US foreign policy. There is a number of cases where Germany and the US can cooperate, but all of these dynamics are going to change very soon.
The Germans’ strategic culture makes it hard to be aligned perfectly with the US and disagreements can easily damage the relations. After the tension between the two countries over the Iraq war, in 2003, Henry Kissinger said that he could not imagine the relations between Germany and the US could be aggravated so quickly, so easily, which might end up being the “permanent temptation of German politics”. For a long time, the US used to provide security for Germany during the Cold War and beyond, so, several generations are used to take peace for granted. But recently, there is a growing demand on them to carry more burden, not just for their own security, but for international peace and stability. This demand was not well-received in Berlin.
Then, the environment around Germany changed and new threats loomed up in front of them. The great powers’ competition became the main theme in international relations. Still, Germany was not and is not ready for shouldering more responsibility. Politicians know this very well. Ursula von der Leyen, who was German defense minister, asked terms like “nuclear weapons” and “deterrence” be removed from her speeches.
Although on paper, all major parties appreciate the importance of Germany’s relations with the US, the Greens and SPD ask for a reset in the relations. The Greens insist on the European way in transatlantic relations and SPD seeks more multilateralism. Therefore, alignment may be harder to maintain in the future. However, If the tensions between the US and China heat up to melting degrees, then external pressure can overrule the internal pressure and Germany may accede to its transatlantic partners, just like when Helmut Schmid let NATO install medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe after the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan and the Cold War heated up.
According to the election results, now three coalitions are possible: grand coalition with CDU/CSU and SPD, traffic lights coalition with SPD, FDP, and Greens, Jamaica coalition with CDU/CSU, FDP, and Greens. Jamaica coalition will more likely form the most favorable government for the US because it has both CDU and FDP, and traffic lights will be the least favorite as it has SPD. The grand coalition can maintain the status quo at best, because contrary to the current government, SPD will dominate CDU.
To understand nuances, we need to go over security issues to see how these coalitions will react to them. As far as Russia is concerned, none of them will recognize the annexation of Crimea and they all support related sanctions. However, if tensions heat up, any coalition government with SPD will be less likely assertive. On the other hand, as the Greens stress the importance of European values like democracy and human rights, they tend to be more assertive if the US formulates its foreign policy by these common values and describe US-China rivalry as a clash between democracy and authoritarianism. Moreover, the Greens disapprove of the Nordstream project, of course not for its geopolitics. FDP has also sided against it for a different reason. So, the US must follow closely the negotiations which have already started between anti-Russian smaller parties versus major parties.
For relations with China, pro-business FDP is less assertive. They are seeking for developing EU-China relations and deepening economic ties and civil society relations. While CDU/CSU and Greens see China as a competitor, partner, and systemic rival, SPD and FDP have still hopes that they can bring change through the exchange. Thus, the US might have bigger problems with the traffic lights coalition than the Jamaica coalition in this regard.
As for NATO and its 2 percent of GDP, the division is wider. CDU/CSU and FDP are the only parties who support it. So, in the next government, it might be harder to persuade them to pay more. Finally, for nuclear participation, the situation is the same. CDU/CSU is the only party that argues for it. This makes it an alarming situation because the next government has to decide on replacing Germany’s tornados until 2024, otherwise Germany will drop out of the NATO nuclear participation.
The below table gives a brief review of these three coalitions. 1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism and 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism. As it shows, the most anti-Russia coalition is Jamaica, while the most anti-China coalition is Trafic light. Meanwhile, Grand Coalition is the most pro-NATO coalition. If the US adopts a more normative foreign policy against China and Russia, then the Greens and FDP will be more assertive in their anti-Russian and anti-Chinese policies and Germany will align more firmly with the US if traffic light or Jamaica coalition rise to power.
|Issues Coalitions||Trafic Light||Grand Coalition||Jamaica|
1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism. 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism.
In conclusion, this election should not make Americans any happier. The US has already been frustrated with the current government led by Angela Merkel who gave Germany’s trade with China the first priority, and now that the left-wing will have more say in any imaginable coalition in the future, the Americans should become less pleased. But, still, there are hopes that Germany can be a partner for the US in great power competition if the US could articulate its foreign policy with common values, like democracy and human rights. More normative foreign policy can make a reliable partner out of Germany. Foreign policy rarely became a topic in this election, but observers should expect many ramifications for it.
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