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The Prospects of Nuclear Disarmament in the New Nuclear Architecture



The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the foundation for the nuclear arms control and disarmament initiatives. Since coming into effect in 1970, the P5 have failed to act upon Article-VI of the NPT which states:

“… Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race… and complete disarmament …..”[1]

Thus, the failure of implementation by major powers have impacted the credibility of the non-proliferation initiatives. Moreover, the non-compliance have instilled discord and mistrust among the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). The latter states considers that the NWS have not fulfilled their commitments to various arms control initiatives from the Cold War era to Post Global Zero which are enlisted in the table below.[2]During 2019 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) which was held at UN headquarters in New York from 29 April to May 10, United States (US) proposed a new initiative for nuclear disarmament termed as “Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament” (CEND)aiming to implement NPT Article (VI) modify security environment to achieve cooperation and trust and enhance confidence in nuclear disarmament. Sweden put forward its working paper “Stockholm Initiatives or Stepping Stone Approach” exploring paths to rebuild ‘habits of cooperation, reducing uncertainty and identifying measures to reduce the risk of nuclear use. Further, US proposed trilateral arms control initiative calling upon Russia and China to participate. This issue brief tries to implore the causes, international impact and prospects behind proposition of new non-proliferation frameworks and whether are these in line with the existing norms based upon NPT or do they form new nuclear architecture.

Exploring The Age of Uncertainty

The emerging multipolarity between US, China and Russia has resulted into deteriorating international security environment. The contestation among major powers in political, economic and technological arena has ensued a new Cold War instigating arms race which are destabilizing norms for arms control and disarmament. The withdrawal of US and Russia from various initiatives including Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) along with the uncertain and fading future of New START by February 2021 has placed the future of arms control initiatives in a disarray. The US in its recent policy papers including National Security Strategy 2017 and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 2018[3] has categorically stated the rise of China and re-emergence of Russia as a threat to its national security, marking a major shift from its previous policy narratives. Thus, the withdrawal from arms control commitments, shift in policy statements of US and deployment of missile defense systems and intermediate range missiles in Eastern Europe and Asia Pacific have consequently raised the security concerns for Russia and China respectively.[4]

The Shaking of Nuclear Disarmament Architecture

The nuclear architecture is facing a shakedown in the contemporary era as major arms control initiatives are being abandoned. US announced withdrawal from INF in February 2019 based upon the pretext of treaty violation by Russia citing development of non-complaint 9M729 ballistic missile, allegations which are denied by Moscow.[5] The cessation of the INF came into effect on August 2, 2019. The future of New START has been jeopardized as Trump administration considers not to further extend the treaty after it expires in February 2021. US considers it to be flawed as it did not covered the modern Russian weapon systems including nuclear powered cruise missiles, and torpedoes.

During the 2019 NPTPrepCom the major powers including US, Russia, China and Sweden pitched for initiating new nuclear non-proliferation initiatives in their working papers. CEND, the working paper proposed by US aimed to address the emerging security challenges which cause further increase in arms race and uncertainty. The paper further pressed upon employing institutional processes, creating incentives for states to reduce their dependence on nuclear weapons and abrogation them as a tool of national security policy. Thus, creating a conducive environment for disarmament based on Article-VI of NPT.[6]The Sweden similarly proposed the working paper titled as “Stepping Stones Approach” or “Stockholm Initiative” aiming to resolve outstanding arms control processes by breaking them into small manageable steps. The paper aimed to increase cooperation and trust among NWS and NNWS, checks on fissile material and emphasize upon negative security assurances.[7] China produced the joint statement of the P5 states which pledged on working together for observing complete disarmament while delivering upon the existing commitments including NPT, CD, CTBT and International Partnership For Nuclear Disarmament Verification(IPNDV) in good faith. While, Russia raised concerns on the non-ratification of CTBT by the US as indicated during NPR 2018, thus, highlighting US intentions for carrying nuclear tests in future.[8]

The Trump administration has displayed contradictory stance on the future of New START. On July 17, 2019 between US and Russian delegation headed by US Under Secretary of State and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister in Geneva. During the strategic talks the two sides reportedly thoroughly talked about the extension of the New START.[9] While, on the sidelines of the G20 Summit at Osaka the US hinted to initiate a three-way treaty that will include US, Russia and also bring China in the ambit of arms control treaties. While, Beijing has categorically stated that it will not become a party to any such initiative as it is not involved in numerical dominance. The major purpose for this measure is to restrict the Chinese intermediated range strategic forces which threaten the US interests in the region, have thrived due to the absence of any arms control agreements.

A New Cycle of Arms Race

In contemporary era the phenomenon of new arms race is being observed between major powers US, Russia and China at conventional, strategic and tactical level, space and cyber domain. The trend is being established by doctrinal shifts and massive force modernizations. The extent of increase in defense spending can be analyzed from the SIPRI estimates for 2018 which mount up to USD 1.8 trillion showcasing 2.6% rise from 2017. The US being the largest military spender has embarked upon a major force modernization with China tailing behind with USD 250 billion and Russia with USD 61.4 billion.[10]The withdrawal from INF also indicates the development of a new range of medium and intermediate range tactical, hypersonic and ballistic missiles, further lowering the nuclear threshold. Moreover, US have devised the budget of USD 1.2 trillion for 2017-2046 nuclear force modernization.[11]

The cyber domain in this context is also crucial with rapid dependency of critical infrastructure related to national security based upon cyber technology, while US is also initiating space forces. Russia on the other hand has surpassed US in the field of hypersonic and glide vehicles including ICBMs, nuclear powered cruise missiles and torpedoes showcased during Putin’s State of Union speech in March 2018 which can out-smart existing western missile defense systems along with robust cyber and space commands.[12] China, an emerging power and second largest military spender is also undergoing force modernization, developing ambitious cyber and space programs, which areduly emphasized in 2019 Defense White Paper.[13]This emerging cycle of arms race will have deteriorating impact on international security environment and further ensuing arms race at regional levels.

The Prospects of New Nuclear Disarmament  and Nonproliferation initiatives

US, being on the helm of international affairs is wielding the arms control norms for its own interests, disregarding the international and regional repercussions of its decisions.. US proposals for trilateral initiatives including Russia and China are solely for putting caps on the strategic forces capabilities of these states, especially that of China. The international community would be cautious of any future initiatives as they lack credibility after withdrawal of US from JCPOA and INF. The inception of new framework for non-proliferation while capitalizing upon NPT holds bleak prospects for implementation. Russia has withdrawn itself from the observer status at IPNDV while China is not willing to be part of the new trilateral initiatives for arms control. These initiatives outcast non NPT nuclear weapon states and are aimed to curtail threats imminent to US and West rather than to international community at large. Subsequently, the emergence of new arms race have impact on international and regional balance of power as aspiring states will compete for dominance. The hegemonic ambitions of India in South Asian region is an evident example of this destabilizing phenomenon. India is gearing to compete China and has undergone massive conventional and nuclear force modernization including developments in cyber and space domain. Thus, compelling Pakistan to follow suite catering for its security needs to maintain balance of power in the wake of destabilizing security environment.


The debate for arms control and nuclear disarmament has been unfortunately for long has been played as self-serving and hollow pledges by the major NWS which have failed to deliver upon them. The withdrawal from the INF would lead to further lowering of the nuclear threshold as the US would actively develop and deploy tactical nuclear weapons in regions of interest including Asia Pacific and Eastern Europe. The new nuclear architecture developed by the actions of major powers further weaken and deteriorate the efficacy of institutional norms. The efficacy and credibility of new initiatives such as CEND among other remains questionable as the P5 have failed to deliver measurable progress upon the existing arms control and disarmament initiatives. The emerging nuclear architecture blur the legitimacy of the arms control initiatives and further encourage NNWS to pursue for alternative measures including nuclear weapons program to secure their interests. Thus, resulting in proliferation of nuclear weapons which threaten world peace and security. The major powers should for once initiate a robust implementation upon their aforementioned commitments in good faith rather than devising frameworks for achieving their limited interests.

Nuclear Disarmament Initiatives Post Global Zero[14]

Name of  InitiativeObjectives/ MandateMember StatesOriginFocal MemberStatus
Global ZeroComplete dismantlement of Nuclear Warheads by 2030 under 4 Phase plan.Over 300 world leaders, academicians, diplomats.Paris December 09, 2008Initiated on the pretext of Obama’s Prague Speech on Nuclear Free World in April 1, 2009.Phase 1 (2010-13) reduce warheads to 1000 Phase 2(2014-18) Multilateral framework for reduce war heads to 500. Phase 3 (2019-23) Negotiate Global Zero Accord Phase 4 (2024-30) Reduction of all Warheads to Zero and continue Verification and enforcement system.
International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND)To reinvigorate international NPD efforts and develop consensus for 2010 NPT RevCon.Japan/ Australia2008Japan/ Australia 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI)Aimed to facilitate the implementation of the measures of the 2010 NPT Review ConferenceAustralia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey, UAE.September 2010Japan/ AustraliaHiroshima Declaration (2014) proposals for both disarmament and nonproliferation, including calls to negotiate the FMCT, increase nuclear safety and safeguards, encourage the entry into force of the CTBT, and transparency in disarmament reporting.
Austrian Pledge/ Humanitarian InitiativeHumanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and negotiating a prohibition against nuclear weapons under the framework of the NPT.159 states8-9 December 2014Austrian Deputy Foreign Minister Michael LinhartThe nuclear weapon states did not participate in the first two conferences, but the United States and United Kingdom sent representatives to attend the third conference in Vienna.
P-5 StepContinue to seek progress on the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament5 NPT recognized NWS P5 StatesP-5 states have held seven conferences to increase dialogue and transparency in disarmament progress. At the 2015/19 Review Conference each of the P5 states submitted its national report
Nuclear Weapons Ban TreatyNNWS recommended UNGA to Negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading toward their total elimination.Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) of NNWS2016UNGAOn 27 October 2016, UNGA adopted voted to adopt the resolution to convene the nuclear ban conference, followed suit on 23 December 2016 by UNGA.
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear WeaponsStrengthen norms against nuclear weapons.25 party, 70 signatory states.7 July 2017UNGANWS have been sharply critical of the treaty process  asserting that the treaty deepens the division between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states
International Partnership For Nuclear Disarmament VerificationEngage diverse group of countries to develop innovative monitoring and verification solutions for disarmament.33 participatory statesDecember 2017U.S. State Department and Nuclear Threat InitiativeA major new international initiative, co-led by NTI and the U.S. Department of State and involving over 25 countries, focused on nuclear disarmament verification
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)Working to promote adherence to and full implementation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons468 partner organizations in 101 countries2007Melbourne, AustraliaAwarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for its “ground-breaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of nuclear weapons.”
Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament,To  rebuild trust among NWS and NNWS having differing approaches towards a NWFZ May 2017JapanSubmitted its recommendations to the second session of the Prep-Com for the 2020 NPT Review Conference
Stepping Stone Approach to Nuclear Disarmament/ Stockholm Initiative.Explore paths to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in state doctrines, rebuild ‘habits of cooperation,’ increase the transparency of fissile material stocks, and identify measures to reduce the risk of use. May 7, 2019SwedenProposed during 2019 NOT PrepCom.
Creating Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) Aims toimplement article VI of NPT and modify security environment to achieve cooperation and trust and enhance confidence in nuclear disarmament.Approximately 100 delegates representing 42 states attendedJuly 2, 2019US Department of StateFirst Session was held on June 11.

[1] “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” IAEA,

[2] “Nuclear Disarmament Resource Collection,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 7, 2018,

[3] US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington D.C: 2018.

[4]Liu Xuan, Wang Qingyun, “Possible missile deployment raising concerns in Asia-Pacific, Beijing says,” ,China Daily, August 7, 2019,

[5] Julian Borger, “Donald Trump confirms US withdrawal from INF nuclear treaty,” The Guardian, February 1, 2019,

[6]Paul Meyer, “Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament: Striding Forward or Stepping Back?,” Arms Control Association, April 2019,

[7]Sebastian Brixey Williams, “Foreign Minister of Sweden, Margot Wallström, launches ‘Stepping Stones’ Approach to Nuclear Disarmament,” Basicint, May 7, 2019,

[8]Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Reporting on the 2019 NPT PrepCom,” Arms Control Association, May 10, 2019,

[9]“ Trump Expects to Reach Arms Control Agreement with Russia,” Sputnik, July 31, 2019,—report/.

[10] “World military expenditure grows to $1.8 trillion in 2018,” SIPRI, April 29, 2019,

[11] “US Nuclear Modernization Programs,” Arms Control Association, August 2018,

[12] Joseph Trevithick, “Here’s The Six Super Weapons Putin Unveiled During Fiery Address,” The Warzone,  March 1, 2018,

[13]“China’s New 2019 Defense White Paper,” Center For Strategic and International Studies, July 24, 2019,

[14] “Nuclear Disarmament Resource Collection,” Nuclear Threat Initiative,

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Why the “Coronavirus Ceasefire” Never Happened




Six months ago, when COVID-19 had just moved beyond the borders of China and embarked upon its triumphant march across Europe and North America, politicians and foreign affairs experts started discussing what will happen after the virus is vanquished. The debate that ensued balanced the fears and concerns of pessimists with the hopes and expectations of optimists, with the latter believing that the pandemic and the global recession that followed would inevitably force humankind to put its differences aside and finally unite in the face of common challenges.

Six months later, we can say without any doubt that, unfortunately, the optimists were wrong. The pandemic did not bring about the changes in world politics they had been hoping for, even with the ensuing recession making things worse. And we are unlikely to see any such changes in the near future. Sadly, COVID-19 did not turn out to be a cure-all for regional conflicts, arms races, the geopolitical competition and the countless ailments of humankind today.

These persisting ailments are more than evident in relations between Russia and the West. No positive steps have been made in the past six months in any of the areas where the positions of the two sides differ significantly, be it the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the unrest in Syria, the political instability in Venezuela or the war in Libya. The fate of the New START and the nuclear nonproliferation regime remains unclear. Moscow continues to be the target of new economic and political sanctions. Russia and the West are locked in an intense information war. There are no signs of a “coronavirus ceasefire,” let alone a full-fledged peace agreement, on the horizon.

Of course, Moscow has placed the blame for the lack of progress squarely on the shoulders of its western partners. While this may indeed be true in many respects, we must admit that the Kremlin has hardly been overflowing with ideas and proposals over the past six months. Even if Moscow did want to reverse the current negative trends in global politics, it has not taken any steps on its own to do so. Nor has it proposed any large-scale international projects, or even tried to temper its usual foreign policy rhetoric and propaganda.

On the contrary, the various troubles that have befallen Russia in the “coronavirus era” – from the public unrest in Belarus to the unfortunate poisoning of Alexei Navalny – are explained away as the malicious intrigues of Russia’s geopolitical opponents. For all intents and purposes, the Kremlin is in the same position now, in September 2020, that it was in back in March. The chances of another “reset” or at least a “timeout” in relations have disappeared completely, if they ever existed in the first place.

So, why did the “coronavirus ceasefire” never happen? Without absolving the West of its share of responsibility, let us try to outline the obstacles that Russia has put in the way of progress.

First, in an environment of unprecedented shocks and cataclysms, there is always the hope that your opponent will eventually suffer more as a result than you will. Many in Russia see the 2020 crisis as the final damning indictment of the West and even an inglorious end to the market economy and political liberalism in general.

The recent statement by Aide to the President of the Russian Federation Maxim Oreshkin that Russia is poised to become one of the top five economies in the world this year is particularly noteworthy. Not because the country is experiencing rapid economic growth, but because the German economy is set to fall further than the Russian economy. If you are certain that time is on your side and that you will emerge from the crisis in better shape than your opponents, then the incentives to work towards some kind of agreement hic et nunc are, of course, reduced.

Second, the current Russian leadership is convinced that any unilateral steps on its part, any shifts in Moscow’s foreign policy, will be perceived in the West as a sign of weakness. And this will open the door for increased pressure on Moscow. Not that this logic is entirely unfounded, as history has shown. But it is precisely this logic that prevents Russian leaders from admitting their past foreign policy mistakes and miscalculations, no matter how obvious they may have been. This, in turn, makes it extremely difficult to change the current foreign policy and develop alternative routes for the future. In fact, what we are seeing is a game to preserve the status quo, in the hope that history will ultimately be on Moscow’s side, rather than that of its opponents (see the first point).

Third, six and a half years after the crisis in Ukraine broke out, we are essentially left with a frozen conflict. Turning the large and unwieldy state machine around, rewiring the somewhat heavy-handed state propaganda machine, and changing the policies that determine the everyday actions of the army of “deep state” officials is tantamount to changing the trajectory of a supertanker carrying a load of hundreds of thousands of tonnes. It is perhaps even more difficult, however, to change the opinion that has taken shape in Russian society in recent years about the modern world and Russia’s place in it. Just because the Russian people are tired of foreign politics, this does not mean that they will enthusiastically support an updated version of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking” of the second half of the 1980s or the ideological principles of Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev’s foreign policy of the early 1990s.

Fourth, the balance of power between the agencies involved in the development and practical implementation of Russia’s foreign policy has changed significantly in recent years. The role of the security forces has been growing in all its aspects since at least the beginning of 2014. Conversely, the role of diplomats, as well as that of the technocrats in the economic structures of the Russian government, has been dwindling with each passing year. It is the security forces that are the main “stakeholders” in Donbass, Syria, Libya and even Belarus today. It would be fair to say that they have had a controlling interest in Russia’s foreign policy. The oft-quoted words of Emperor Alexander III that Russia has only two allies, its army and its navy, perfectly reflect the shift that has taken place in the balance of powers between these agencies. We should add that this shift was largely welcomed and even supported by a significant part of Russian society (see the third point). Of course, the siloviki are, due to the specifics of their work, less inclined to compromise, concessions and basic human empathy than diplomats, economists and technocrats.

All these factors preventing the conceptual renewal of Russia’s foreign policy can equally be applied to its geopolitical opponents. Politicians in the West are also hoping that time is on their side, that Moscow will emerge from the crisis weaker and more vulnerable, and thus more malleable than it was before. They also believe that any unilateral steps, any demonstration of flexibility in relations with the Kremlin, will be met with an even tougher and more aggressive policy. Negative ideas about Russia have also taken root in the minds of people in the West, and foreign policy is being “militarized” there just as much as it is in Russia.

Thus, neither the coronavirus nor the economic recession will automatically lead to a détente, let alone a reset in relations between Russia and the West. We are, in fact, moving in the opposite direction, once again running the risk of an uncontrolled confrontation. However, this unfortunate situation is no reason to give up on the possibility of signing new agreements, even if COVID-19 will no longer be in our corner moving forward.

From our partner RIAC

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India’s strategies short of war against a hostile China



Since India’s independence several peace and border cooperation agreements were signed between the India and China. Prominent among them was the Panchsheel Agreement signed in 1954. A majority of the agreements were signed between 1993 and 2013. Recently genuine efforts were made by PM Narendra Modi by engaging Xi Jinping at the Wuhan and Chennai summits. But China is nowhere near to settling the border dispute despite various agreements and talks at the military and civilian levels.

After the 1962 war peace was largely maintained on the Indo China border. During the Mao and Deng era consensus building was the norm in the communist party. XiJinping appointed himself as chairman of the communist party for life. Today power is centralized with XiJinping and his cabal. Through Doklam and Galwan incidents Xi Jinpinghas disowned the peaceful principles laid down by his predecessors. China’s strategy is to keep India engaged in South Asia as it doesn’t want India to emerge as a super power. After solving a crisis on the border China will create another crisis. Beijing has declining interest in the niceties of diplomacy. Under Xi Jinping China has become more hostile.

China has been infringing on India’s sovereignty through salami tactics by changing the status quo and attempting to own the border territory. At Galwan on Xi Jinping’s birthday the PLA demonstrated hooliganism by assaulting Indian border positions. China violated the 1996 and 2005 bilateral agreements which states that both armies should not carry weapons within 1.24 miles on either side of the border. India’s Foreign Minister S Jaishankar mentioned that the standoff situation with China in Galwan Valley of eastern Ladakh is “surely the most serious situation after 1962.”China is constructing infrastructure, increasing forces and deploying weapon systems on the border.

Options for India

India led by PM Narendra Modi has implemented a realist foreign policy and a muscular military policy.India ended the age of strategic restraint by launching special operations and air strikes in Pakistan. Since the Galwan incident India has increased the military, diplomatic and economic deterrence against China. India is constructing military infrastructure and deploying weapon systems like SU 30 MKI and T 90 tanks in Ladakh. India banned a total of 224 Chinese apps, barred Chinese companies from government contracts and is on the verge of banning Huawei. Other measures include excluding Chinese companies from private Indian telecommunications networks. Chinese mobile manufacturers can be banned from selling goods in India.

India should offer a grand strategy to China. India has a plethora of options short of war. Future talks should involve an integrated strategy to solve all the bilateral issues and not just an isolated resolution of a localized border incident. All instruments of military and economic power and coercive diplomacy should be on the table.

Foreign Policy

China expects other nations to follow bilateral agreements and international treaties while it conveniently violates them. India should abrogate the Panscheel agreement given China’s intransigence and hostility. China claims 35,000 square miles of territory in India’s northeast, including the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. China occupies 15,000 square miles of India’s territory in the Aksai Chin Plateau in the Himalayas. India’s primary objective is to take back territories like Aksai Chin. While the secondary issue is the resolution of the border issue and China’s support to Pakistan. India can leverage the contemporary geopolitical climate to settle all issues. India can target China’s soft underbelly characterized by issues like Taiwan, Xinjiang and the economy. China raises the Kashmir issue at international organizations. As a countervailing measure India can raise Xinjiang at international organizations and conferences.

China has been militarily and diplomatically supporting Pakistan against India. Pakistan is a rentier and a broken state that sponsors terrorism. India can establish bilateral relations with Taiwan thus superseding China’s reunification sensitivities. China has territorial disputes with 18 countries including Taiwan and Japan. India can hedge against China by establishing strategic partnerships with US, Australia, Japanand Vietnam.

Military policy

An overwhelming military is a deterrence for China’s belligerent foreign and military policy. The 1990Gulf War demonstrated the capabilities of high technology weapon systems. As compared to China’s rudimentary weapons systems India has inducted 4th and 5th generation weapons like the SU 30 MKI, AH 64 Apache and T 90 tanks. The deterrence capacity of fighter aircrafts is reduced as they cannot target China’s coastlines due to their restricted range. Full deterrence can be achieved by ICBMs and nuclear powered submarines. With these weapons India can target centers of gravity like Shanghai and Shenzhen.

China is not a signatory to arms limitations treaties like Start I and Start II. China continues to expand its nuclear weapons stockpile and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) like DF 21 and DF-26B which are banned by the INF Treaty. India is a law abiding stable democracy in an unstable region with two hostile nations on its flanks. US and Russia can relax the arms control mechanism considering India’s’ impeccable record on peace and non proliferation. This will allow India to buy Russian weapon systems like Zircon and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, Topol and Bulava ICBMs and Yasen and Borey class SSBN submarines. While US can sell SSBN submarines and C4ISR gathering platforms like RC 135 and RQ 4 Global Hawk.

China remains a security threat for Asia. As China foments instability the APAC region from South Asia to South China Sea remains volatile. The Quad can be expanded to include Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea and Indonesia and multinational naval exercises can conducted in the South China Sea.

The enemy of my enemy is my friend. China fought small wars with India, Vietnam and Soviet Union. Vietnam defeated the PLA at Lang Son in 1979 with advanced weapon systems and guerilla warfare. India can increase militarily cooperation with Vietnam. China attacked the Soviet Union on the Ussuri river leading to heavy PLA casualties. Historically relations between Russia and India have been close. As a result of the Indo Soviet Friendship Treaty China did not support Pakistan during the 1971 war. India can enhance its military and diplomatic ties with Russia to the next level.

Strategic partnership with US

Its time for a partnership between the world’s largest and the world’s biggest democracies. India and the US have a common objective to preserve peace, maintain stability and enhance security in Asia. India’s reiteration at leaders’ level and international forums that both countries see each other as allies for stability in the APAC region is not enough. India has to go beyond the clichés of the need for closer ties.

Due to the China threat the US is shifting its military from Europe and Middle East to the APAC region.US and India can establish an Asian equivalent of NATO as China’s destructive policy frameworks and threatening postures remain a strategic threat. India should enhance and deepen cooperation with the US intelligence community in the fields of MASINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, TECHINT and CYBINT. Both countries can form an alliance of democracies. If China militarily or economically targets one of the member country then the alliance can retaliate under a framework similar to Article 5 of NATO. Thus power will be distributed in the APAC region instead of being concentrated with China. A scorpion strategy will ensure that China does not harass its neighbors. The strategy involves a military pincer movement by India from the west and US from the East against a hostile China. India can conduct joint military exercises with the US in Ladakh. China cannot challenge Japan and Taiwan due to the US security agreements with these countries.


The world has entered the age of instability and uncertainty. The 21st century is characterized by hybrid warfare through military and coercive diplomacy. South Asia is not a friendly neighborhood where peaceful overtures lead to harmonious relations. China is a threat to India even in the context of a friendly relationship. Diplomatic niceties have no place in India’s relations with China. India can impose costs on China which can be more than the benefits offered by normalizing relations. The application of measures short of war without engaging the PLA will reap benefits. India can fulfill its national security requirements and global responsibilities through a grand strategy.

A policy of engagement and deterrence is crucial against an antagonistic China. While India attempts to develop cooperative ties with China it will need to continue to enhance and implement its military and coercive diplomatic strategies. China does not represent a direct military threat to India but at the same time one cannot deny that challenges remain.

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COVID-19 and Challenges to the Indian Defence Establishment



The COVID-19 pandemic has created an uncertain situation all over the world. It is defined as the greatest challenge faced by the world since World War II. At a certain point, the pandemic had forced world governments to announce lockdowns in their respective countries that led to more than half of the human population being home quarantined. Since then, social distancing, travel bans, and cancellation of international summits have become a routine exercise. Most sectors such as agriculture, health, education, economy, manufacturing have been severely hit across the globe. One such sector which is vital to national security that has been impacted due to the pandemic is defence.

The effect of influenza and pneumonia during WWI on the US military was huge. The necessity to mobilise troops across the Atlantic made it even ideal for the diseases to spread rapidly among the defence personnel and civilians. Between mid-1917 and 1919, the fatalities were more so due to the disease than getting killed in action. Due to COVID-19, there have been many implications within the defence sector. Amid the ongoing transgressions in Ladakh, it becomes imperative to analyse the preparedness of the Indian defence establishment to tackle the challenges at hand.

Disrupting the Status Quo

Many personnel in the Indian armed forces have been tested positive for COVID-19. This puts the operational capabilities at risk. In one isolated incident, 26 personnel of the Navy had been placed in quarantine after being tested positive for COVID-19. The French and the Americans had a great challenge ahead of them as hundreds of soldiers were getting infected onboard their Naval vessels. Furthermore, the Army saw some cases being tested positive as well. In one such incident, the headquarters of the Indian Army had to be temporarily shut down because of a soldier contracting the virus. These uncalled disruptions are very dangerous for our armed forces. These disruptions challenge the recruitment process and training exercises.

Since the Indian Army has been involved in quarantining tasks, this exposes the personnel to the virus. As a result of this, the first soldier was tested positive on March 20 in Leh. Among them, those who work as medical personnel are even more exposed to the virus. In order to enforce damage control to the operational capabilities, the Army made sure that the non-essential training, travel, and attending conferences remained cancelled. They called off any foreign assignments and postings for the time being. The Army also made it a point to extend leaves for that personnel who were already on absence. This was a major preventive measure adopted to prevent further infection.

As a result of the lockdown that had been imposed nationwide, the defence services were forced to temporarily stall all the activities that relate to soldiering during peacetime. These activities include training, pursuing professional qualification, fitness tests and regimes, equipment maintenance such as unit assets and stores, up-gradation of the cadres among others. Since the Indian Army boasts of a force that has signed up voluntarily to guard the borders, most of the troops are away from their families, which makes it even more difficult during the times of crises. The mega biennial naval exercises scheduled to be held in Vizag were cancelled due to COVID-19. A total of 41 navies were planned to be a part of the joint exercises called MILAN. The Service Selection Board (SSB) training and the recruitment process have been put to a halt as well. This will severely impact the intake process for this year.

Handling Biohazards

The Army’s capable of operating in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) environment and has sufficient equipment like infantry vehicles, helicopters and tanks which can operate without any hassles. Since instances of chemical warfare have been witnessed in West Asia and other regions in the last two decades, the focus of the Army has been on that and not on biological warfare. Most Armies believe that bio-weaponry is still fictional and won’t come into play any time soon. Naturally, due to this mindset, most Armies are not capable of handling biohazards. This is a major setback in the time of COVID-19 and has to be addressed.

Riding Down the Slope

Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the Indian economy has been nose-diving day by day. This is some bad news for the defence sector since the military spending will possibly be reduced as a result of the slowdown. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), India’s GDP will grow at 1.9 per cent. This is one of the lowest in the history of post-independent India. Allocations and spendings will naturally take a hit and will take a long time to revive again. Defence manufacturing will also face a setback and discourage indigenous players who are looking at getting involved in the manufacturing and innovation sector. MoD has already received the Ministry of Finance’s circular that called for the defence spending to be limited to 15-20 per cent of the total amount allocated. This will ensure that the defence budget is not the priority for the finance ministry. A gap of Rs. 1,03,000 crore has been highlighted between the requirement and the allocated money. More than 60 per cent of this allocated amount anyway goes towards paying salaries and pensions. This means that the modernisation efforts will face a major slowdown in the next two years. Defence procurement is already difficult due to the bureaucratic hurdles, now the monetary crunch only adds more woes.

Moreover, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had announced earlier that more than 9,000 posts belonging to the Military Engineering Services (MES) will be abolished in the said industrial division. The reason cited was that this would bring about a balance to the expenditure. Due to the lockdown, the military development has taken a hit and has seen a decline in the production of freights. As of now, there is no manufacturing that is ongoing as far as fighter planes or aircraft, in general, is concerned. Some of the signed defence deals and contracts are said to be reviewed due to the financial crunch. India’s defence budget is expected to see some cuts due to the economy slowing down. The pandemic has worsened this even further. There is already an existing order to cap the spending for the first quarter of this fiscal year. Most of the payments that are being disbursed is largely that of paying for the existing contracts. This will diminish any scope for procurement of newer defence equipment that helps in modernising the armed forces in the long run. According to a report, it says that the Ministry of Defence is looking at a savings of anywhere between Rs. 400 and 800 billion in the 2020-21 financial year. To quote Yuval Noah Harari from his recent article in the Financial Times would seem relevant in this case, “Many short-term emergency measures will become a fixture of life. That is the nature of emergencies. They fast-forward historical processes. Decisions that in normal times could take years of deliberation are passed in a matter of hours.”  India has displayed the significant political will to make impactful decisions during the pandemic. The question is, how far and how soon can we push ourselves to be prepared on all fronts?

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