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Myanmar’s Development needs both ASEAN & China

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Authors: Thet Thu Thu Aye and Jamal Ait Laadam

Although Myanmar is one of the least developed countries in the world, it does have a couple of advantages to become an economically middle-level income and politically stable country in Asia. Geographically surrounded by China, India and Indochina, Myanmar is rich in terms of natural resources and has strategic importance as well. In addition, Myanmar won independence even earlier than its neighbors. Yet, during the Cold War, the leadership of Myanmar (then Burma) declared that it did not want to join ASEAN, which was seen as an imperialist pawn given its policy of neutrality. Officially speaking, Myanmar was admitted into ASEAN in 1997, yet the two sides saw each other with suspicion and uncertainties. One of the main reasons is that Myanmar could receive all kinds of its needs including security from China. However, politically since the 1990s, the pro-democracy leader of the country Aung San Suu Kyi wrote an open letter to the leaders of the ASEAN calling on the regional grouping to “nudge Burma towards democracy”. Yet, the reply was cautious as it said that since the ASEAN had advocated a policy of “constructive engagement” with Myanmar, it would do little good now to take a more confrontational approach. Due to this, it is pragmatic not to pursue a policy of exclusion, including economic sanctions simply because it was not likely to achieve the desired end.

But the last three decades of the 20th century witnessed the sea-changes all over the world: China’s start of economic reform, then the end of the Soviet Union as an ideological beacon, and meanwhile increased globalization of trade and FDI. In light of this, many ASEAN member states re-evaluated their interests and oriented the policy tools to meet the new situation. One aspect of this approach was the rekindling of ASEAN’s interest in Burma as a means to fortify its security, economic and political position. With the perception among ASEAN members evolved that China posed more of a threat at a time when the US security presence in East Asia obviously diminishing, this spurred interest in a security arrangement that would come to include China and Myanmar. Equally, by the end of the 1980s, Southeast Asia emerged as one of the most vibrant economic areas in the world. From 1981–90, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the region grew at a steady average of 6.1% per annum, and some countries grew at an even higher rate of 7–10% per annum. Fueling this growth was trade and investment from East Asia, such as Japan, South Korea and later China. Accordingly, ASEAN began to take measures to deepen its integration and engage new markets as its leaders became aware of growing economic competition from other regional trade blocs like North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU. One aspect of ASEAN’s action to remain competitive has been its enlargement to include all of Southeast Asia, such as Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar included. That means the ASEAN-10 offered a population of about 500 million, an area of 4.5 million square kms and a combined gross national product of US$ 685 billion, a total trade of US$ 720 billion and an ample supply of cheap natural resources. In the long term, Myanmar held the potential of 50 million new consumers for Southeast Asian goods as well as natural resources.

It is true that Myanmar has an abundance of inexpensive natural resources coveted by ASEAN, including lumber, natural gas and minerals. Politically, what had happened in the country also prompted ASEAN’s interest in constructive engagement. Since 1988, Myanmar began to implement far-reaching reforms of its economic system and foreign relations since the military government realized that it would have to seek external assistance to maintain control. As scholar Donald Seekins argued, the open economic policy in Myanmar after 1988 must be understood primarily in power political terms – a device for generating revenues for the military and building a stronger state. One crucial result was the flow of Chinese assistance in terms of military hardware, trade and investment blossomed overnight. In the span of 10 years, trade between Burma and China grew from $15 million to US$ 800 million. One influential aspect of the assistance was increased military training and hardware. From 1991 to 1995, about US$ 740 million of approximately US$ 1 billion in arms purchased by Burma came from China, including quite advanced weapon such as jet-fighter aircrafts, tanks, armored personnel carriers, radar, 3 frigates with missile capability, patrol boats, rocket carriers and small arms. Along with the Chinese hardware came other types of assistance: infrastructure development projects supported by the Chinese including the construction of a road and railways intended to link China’s landlocked hinterland – Yunnan province – with a deep water port on the Andaman. The infrastructure projects also provided easier access for China to the Indian Ocean. Other policy reforms inspired by the political uprising in 1988 included the liberalizing of foreign investment regulations in Burma, so that the regime could earn hard currency to support the country’s ailing economy. FDI flowed in from ASEAN, now that the terms were conducive to investment. One chief interest was the extraction of natural resources such as timber, gems, and offshore oil exploration. Key foreign investors included Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia, along with Big Three from outside ASEAN.

As the region’s largest investor in Myanmar, Singapore’s support for the country’s admission into ASEAN was based upon a different set of concerns. Singapore had little if not nothing interest in human rights issues and no real objections to the Myanmar regime’s treatment of its political opponents, but was concerned about its handling of the country’s economy and particularly its policies towards foreign investment. Through their support of the Myanmar’s status in ASEAN, Singapore hoped to gain influence over the economic thinking of the military leaders and gain greater access to the country’s natural resources and huge market for weapons. Singapore has also long been a major supplier of arms to Burma. Equally, Indonesia’s support had historical roots, given the active role in the 1955 Bandung Conference of Asia-African solidarity. But ultimately it has been geopolitical considerations that tipped the balance of opinion in favor of granting membership to Myanmar. Besides the fear that excluding Myanmar from ASEAN could be viewed as an invitation to China to take a more prominent role in the country, Western condemnation of the regime, culminating in sanctions imposed by the United States, was perceived by some as an attempt to impose alien values on the region. At a time when the supposed superiority of “Asian values” was still a favorite theme of Asian leaders eager to argue that the region’s increasing prosperity was deeply rooted in their countries’ cultures, any attempt by the West to take the moral high ground was met with resentment and derision. For some Asian leaders, particularly Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, but to a lesser extent even others with more liberal views, admitting Myanmar was a way for ASEAN to indicate their rejection of Western condescension. The coincidence of these two events – the admission of Burma into ASEAN and the Asian economic crisis – immediately ignited speculation about a possible Western conspiracy. Meanwhile, after 2000 the EU began to adopt a softer approach towards Myanmar in the hope that some fresh overtures between the government and the opposition groups would emerge. Although some EU member states such as the U.K., Sweden and Denmark have continued to maintain their hardline position, they still want to see political openness and are ready to give in to the argument that sanctions against Burma have not worked; therefore it has become necessary to seek a compromise to end the current political deadlock. They urged Myanmar to solve political conflict through dialogue because only through dialogue will there be a national reconciliation that will bring about a stable and prosperous Myanmar.

In sum, the essence of Myanmar’s foreign policy is to develop friendly relations with all the countries of the world, particularly with its neighbors. Therefore it joined ASEAN with a view to promote regional peace, stability and prosperity through cooperation and integration with the other nations of Southeast Asia. While Southeast Asian leaders continue to hope that ASEAN’s constructive engagement policy serves to mitigate Chinese leverage on Myanmar, some are not at all sanguine about the country’s prospects. For example, Singapore’s senior minister Lee Kuan Yew expressed his view that “ASEAN cannot rescue Myanmar even if it wants to, and I have the awful feeling rescuing Burma is beyond the capability of even the USA. The Myanmar’s government may resent its growing dependency on China, but it is likely to remain necessary as long as it finds itself isolated from most of the rest of the international community. Particularly, China is not only a great neighbor but also the most vital economic and security partner, followed by Japan and India. As Myanmar’s leader expects China to act as a defender of its interests and image in the world affairs. In light of this, it is reasonable for Myanmar to work together with both ASEAN and China for mutual benefit in the peace and progress.

PhD candidate in International Relations, School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Jilin University, China.

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Southeast Asia

Impunity for desertion of the Constitution

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A collection of scratches depicting the nuances of “totalitarianism” (repressive actions of state stakeholders tend to be authoritarian) and “radicalism” (civil society groups that rebel against the authoritarian system through deep understanding and hard actions) are still etched in the minds of the nation’s children.

In 1955, September was the holding of voting in selecting members of the DPR in the first general election in Indonesia, which was attended by 29 political parties and individuals. Where the election left a sad one, the general election committee was kidnapped and killed. The tragedy of the massacre in 1965-1966, the Tanjung Priok incident in 1984, the Semanggi II incident in 1999, the murder of Munir in 2004, to the brutality of the apparatus in the “Corruption Reformasi” action in 2019 yesterday caused one of my friends in the struggle who was a student at Halu Oleo University to be shot dead by the police. in action.

All of the above events took place in September, which the author calls “September Mourning”. The historical record has shown that from time to time the civilization of the Indonesian State has not yet ended with problems that pose a great risk, especially regarding the loss of life. This collection of tragedies in September demonstrates an understanding that what happened was an act of desertion.

Desertion, usually used in the military world with the aim of describing the conditions for the defection of soldiers from unitary discipline. But in this article, the author contextualizes desertion to express defection to the constitution. This means that any conscious action intended to straddle the constitution is defiance. Both the perpetrators from civil society, the military, and even the president, must be brought to justice!

In Indonesia, constitutional deserters often occur, ranging from murder, kidnapping, corruption, selling state assets, and other actions that are detrimental to the state. However, in this discussion, the constitutional desertion that the author wants to discuss is the constitutional position for deserters between civil society and the government which can control the civil apparatus.

Many civil society groups were declared by the government as deserters to the constitution until they were disbanded. For example, HTI organizations, FPI, and others. And there are even civil society groups declared as deserters of the constitution which were then massacred to the max. For example, civilians who were victims of the struggle between the military and the PKI during the Old Order had claimed millions of lives.

Civil society who deserted the constitution in the midst of conflicting elite interests was faced with a dilemma. Although they may have strong complaints about the survival and sustainability of their generation, they face the problem of the government’s incompetence in managing the country, so they choose to fight ideas and ideas against the resistance movement.

This dilemma arises because of the extreme risks associated with the desertion process on the one hand and the fact that the relationship between deserters is dominated by mistrust on the other. The first problem makes the potential cost of desertion very high because civil society is certain to face a credible threat of punishment. Second, the potential rewards of desertion are uncertain because deserters have reason to believe that rebellion is the last resort for their ideas to be accepted by the State even though lives are at stake. The second problem implies that the perpetrators of desertion from the regime’s instructions will be very difficult to be punished fairly by the constitution.

But what is clear is that the constitutional position for deserters from civil society has always been made firm. It is even permissible to carry out massacres by simply using the term “in order to maintain the integrity and sovereignty of the State” as happened in 1965-1966. The death toll against innocent civilians and civil servants is not treated fairly by the State. The State should apologize for the incident, but not apologize to the PKI or to the military.

However, the regime’s uncompromising attitude and violent strategy of arrogance have led to further escalation of the conflict and caused increased anxiety at the level of civil society. A repressive ruling elite, a regime that often relies on military forces creates harsh and deteriorating conditions. Such as the kidnapping and murder of the election committee in 1955, the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident, and the 1999 Semanggi II incident.

Likewise with the murder of Munir in 2004, in fact it is a form of victimindividual desertion which later grew into a phenomenon of anger as well as mass fear. This is due to the unfair positioning of the constitution to punish deserters from the regime.

It is as if the regime’s position is higher than the constitution and interprets it at will. In almost every regime in this country, the constitution is weak and fails to bring the deserters entrusted by the regime to be punished fairly. This means that the impunity of desertion to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is sweeping freely. This issue is a serious homework that must be realized as soon as possible by all elements of the State to make improvements.

We must position the constitution as forming a harmonious life order for the nation and state. By him forming all elements of the State as nationalists who forbid massacre, become humanists with basic principles, socialists without restraining society, and capitalists who prioritize the welfare of the people.

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Southeast Asia

The Race of Supremacy in the Indo-Pacific Region

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Joe Biden
Official White House Photo by Adam Schultz

Amid the growing US-China rivalry for the supremacy, the geopolitics has been altered to gain favour for oneself and outsmart rival. This time the battlefield is Indo-Pacific region. Since US has forged AUKUS, the regional countries are concerned over this move. AUKUS is a defence agreement- comprising Australia, UK, and US- which is aimed to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific with nuclear-powered submarines potential on patrol and the deal enables Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines.

               China retorted it and termed it “Cold War Mentally” and claimed such partnership is anti-china clique. They do not have any definite purpose behind this agreement but to contain China’s rise. Signing such deals will destablise the peace and trigger an arm race in the region. She claimed that they, in order to contain China’s growth, are throwing military net around it in waterway like the South China Sea and attempting to halt China’s economic development.

                Also, Malaysia and Indonesia fuss with this move and are of the view that this will speed up arm race and aggression in the region; North Korea chastised this maneuver claiming it as undesirable and dangerous and stated that it will underscore North Korea to continue developing its arsenals of atomic weapons; Some Russian Diplomatic officials dubbed it an step to accelerate arm race and undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Besides regional countries, France was also ticked off with AUKUS, due to cancellation of previously signed deal of $66 billion between France and Australia for conventional submarines, which will cost France jobs and revenue.

               On the contrary, India and Japan, the antagonists of China and member of an anti-china pact namely Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as QUAD), have warmly welcomed this measure. But in reality, the AUKUS is nothing more than a potential hazard for the region, in which Washington is adopting Asian versus Asian strategy to pit them fight to contain China’s rise and sell its weaponry. However, the results of this gathering storm can be far beyond the thoughts of political scientists and eagerly participating Australia.

               The first unanticipated loss of this pact is the deteriorating ties of Australia with France. Reportedly, this in consequence has kept Australia away to finalise a free trade agreement with the European Union. Apart from this, Scott Morison’s, Australian Prime Minister, planned visit to Indonesia has been cancelled, because Indonesian President Joko Widodo is no longer available. Australia has been victimised in the US-China rivalry which has its first consequence in the loss of robust ties with France and Indonesia.

               Apart, Since the Australia had close economic relation with China, Australian Trade Union has opposed this maneuver; It has shamed AUKUS deal and insisted they do not want war with China and warned of dangers to country on multiple fronts. Also, the Maritime Union of Australia has opposed this deal and verbalised that Prime Minister should not engineer such secret deals instead supply vaccines and help lockdown affected.

               Moreover, a China state-owned newspaper, Global Times, warned arm race and grimly stated that Australian soldiers were likely to be first to die if China counterattacks.

               To sum this deal, without having any challenge to Australia, buying nuclear-powered submarines is a potential step toward endangering and victimising itself for nothing but US gain.

               Apart from this alliance, US have Quad and Five Eyes to focus the China and keep China’s power from spreading. Quad is consisting of US, Japan, India and Australia. The main purposes of this alliance were economic and security interests that span the Pacific and Indian oceans. Quad was actually tailored for tsunami relief efforts, which lay dormant until 2017. Later, it was revived by Trump to challenge China from every front. And, Five Eyes is pertaining to US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

               All the Quad members have poor diplomatic relations or even face-off with China, which strengthens US position in the region and collectively they are sparing no effort to undermine China’s rise.

               On September 24, Quad had an in-person summit, in which they had discussed vaccine export, trade, and technology. They also said, “We stand for the rule of law freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity of states.” besides this the main purpose behind the meeting was to opt strategy to counter China.

               In addition to this, Biden administration had made clear that it desires to forge a united front of democracies to deal with China across the board- on security, trade, technology, and human rights. Actually, the desire is to make alliance of democracies to defeat China. All the maneuvers US is taking are not to safeguard any human right but to contain China’s economic influence and military power.

               However, Chinese spokesman, Mr. Lijian said: “Faced with the common challenge of fighting the epidemic and economic recovery, the people of the Asia-Pacific region need growth and employment not submarines and gunpowder.” He further vocalized, “Individual powers have repeatedly dispatched military aircrafts and warships to South China Sea that spark trouble and deliberately provoke conflicts on maritime issues. And, Chinese determination to safeguard national and territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interest is unwavering, and all will continue to properly handle differences with the countries connected through consultation and negotiations.” This statement clarifies that China does not want war rather prefers consultations, but it is not necessary that it is the reality; China has already focused military power. If both rivals escalate military power, then danger will loom and exacerbate already worsened diplomatic ties.

               Furthermore, Japan is another active member of Quad, who is ardently participating in the US-China rivalry. However, the participation can be equally annihilatory for Japan.

               Li haidong, a professor at the Institute of International relations of China Foreign Affairs University, viewed that Japan has been leaving no stone unturned to use the anti-China clique to gain an upper hand in its territorial conflicts with China, Russia and on the Korean peninsula issue.

               Further, Chinese analysts also warned Japan, India and Australia that if they went too far in following the US strategy of containing China, they will become cannon fodder as China will steadily safeguard its interests.

               Additionally, China’s rocketing influence and military power deters America. If China finds any danger from US, China’s missile arsenal could annihilate American bases in Asia during opening hours. Equally gruesome for US is China’s rapidly growing economic reach, which has expanded state-owned companies buy up strategic assets such as ports around the globe that could be harnessed in times of war.

               To encapsulate, this ebbing situation can destablise peace in the region. Both the powers should repair their completely dysfunctional relationship and evade forging blocs in the region. If the region divides in the blocs, the regional as well as global peace will be at risk.

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Southeast Asia

The Indo-Pacific Conundrum: Why U.S. Plans Are Destined to Fail

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Official White House Photo by Lawrence Jackson

That U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris paid an official visit to Singapore and Vietnam in late August 2021 signifies clear intention of Joe Biden’s democratic administration to forge ahead with the course taken by his predecessor to build A Free and Open Indo-Pacific. According to the statement made by the second-highest political office-holder in the U.S., fostering partnership with the countries of the Indo-Pacific, including those in Southeast Asia, is Washington’s priority in foreign policy. Kamala Harris reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the international rules-based order, ensuring freedom on the seas, unimpeded commerce and advancing human rights. Although the U.S. Vice President noted that China continues to coerce and intimidate, Washington’s engagement in Southeast Asia, she argued, is not against any country, nor is it designed to make ASEAN member states choose between countries. At the same time, almost all Indo-Pacific states, either known as the so-called Quad—the United States, Japan, India and Australia—or those willing to join the initiative on a less binding basis, have already failed to escape the adverse effects of the rapidly deteriorating U.S.-China relations.

Top Secret (or maybe not)

Previously classified as secret and unintended to be publicly released before 2042, the U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific was made available in May 2021. Experts believe this to be a guarantor of continuity in the Asian dimension of Washington’s foreign policy, regardless of the party affiliation of the country’s leadership. The document provides for a tougher confrontation with China in the military and economic spheres, which may negatively be perceived by some Indo-Pacific states and complicate their relations with the United States.

The policy outlined in the document seems inconsistent, which may cause misunderstanding on the part of allies and partners, resulting in a discussion about the real priorities and intentions of the United States. For example, it is difficult to explain the differing interpretations of India’s role. In the declassified NSC document, the nation is equated with Washington’s leading partners in the region, which implies an allocation of significant assistance from the U.S. Department of State, the military and the secret services in order to enhance “India’s capacity to address continental challenges.” Meanwhile, the 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report of the U.S. Department of Defense ranked India among small and medium-sized states of Asia, which are not considered U.S. allies and are, therefore, not eligible for considerable assistance.

The ASEAN Way

Australian experts note that the deliberately declassified document reveals the need to consolidate the leading role of ASEAN in the security architecture of the region. At the same time, there is no consensus among the union’s member states regarding the essence and degree of priority of such important for the United States categories as freedom of navigation, trade and investment, respect for human rights and the rule of law. The so-called universal liberal values are of less importance to them as compared to the practical benefits coming from bilateral relations with China. According to Indonesian experts, such a divergence of views signifies apparently little sense of the specifics of Southeast Asia and regional processes on the part of analysts in Washington. They believe that the United States has not yet been able to convince the ASEAN nations of the need to create a counterbalance to Beijing as the U.S. cannot guarantee their security. As a result, the region has to face invidious choices since they find themselves at the intersection of the U.S.-China confrontation. Some countries seek to develop ties with Beijing within the Belt and Road Initiative (Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar), while others opt for equidistance (Vietnam, Singapore) or adopt a wait-and-see approach (Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia). At the same time, the latter increasingly tend to re-establish ties with the U.S. in order to benefit from American partners and put pressure on the Chinese leadership.

Re-Rebalancing

Among the measures on claiming superiority over China, the architects of the U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific envisage to deny the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) air and sea dominance within the first island chain in a conflict (Japan, Taiwan, northern Philippines). However, this merely is a further extension of the “rebalancing” policy carried out without much success by the Obama administration. A restoration of this course is predetermined by the fact that the plans of the former U.S. President Donald Trump for the massive rearmament and more American troops to be stationed in the Indo-Pacific never received proper financial support. The doldrums seem to be rooted in the Biden administration officials being skeptical about these grand in scale military goals in the Indo-Pacific, which they believe are neither affordable nor necessary to balance China and protect U.S. interests in Asia.

The underlying theme of the National Security Council report is “the U.S. remaining the region’s dominant actor.” However, analysts believe that Washington’s fundamental interest is effectively about ensuring access of national manufacturers to the markets and resources of the region rather than maintaining U.S. hegemony there. To this end, the American authorities are invited to clearly define how they could help the states of South and Southeast Asia in resisting pressure from China. At the same time, experts rely on the Cold War experience, when the U.S. could justify its military and economic presence by the menacing spread of communism. Consequently, the notion of an authoritarian the Chinese Communist Party and the need to sever ties with communist China are gaining popularity in the American establishment.

First Match

The Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance provide for a change in the U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific, taking into account its reorientation to ensure an effective response following the loss of unconditional dominance over the PLA.

The key pillars of the revised strategy to deter China were presented by Navy Adm. Philip S. Davidson in March 2021, at that time the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). He believes that China’s military capabilities will enable it to upset the status quo in most of East Asia, especially in the Taiwan Strait, the East China and the South China Seas, over the next six years. In order to prevent a further erosion of the rules-based order, he suggested putting a premium on “exercises, experimentation, and innovation” within the U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific as “critical enablers to deter day-to-day, in crisis, and key to our ability to fight and win.”

The Pentagon plans to provide for the allocation of USD 4.68 billion for the force design and stronger military capabilities in 2022, with another USD 22.69 billion spanning from FY 2023 through FY 2027. One of the focus areas is the creation of forward-based joint rotational forces under the auspices of INDOPACOM that would be capable of responding to challenges that require immediate and joint solutions.

Earlier on, one of the authors of this initiative, former U.S. Navy Secretary Kenneth Braithwaite, argued that the U.S. Navy should create a new First Fleet [1] that would take some load off the U.S. Third and Seventh Fleet (respectively based in San Diego and Yokosuka). According to American experts, the Seventh Fleet, overloaded with combat and training under the present conditions, is experiencing difficulties in supplies and staffing, since it is actually forced to operate in a vast area of the western Pacific and eastern Indian Oceans (from the dateline to India–Pakistan border). At the same time, the strength of the Third Fleet, whose AOR is the east and north of the Pacific, is excessive to fulfill the tasks facing it now[2].

Spare the Triarii

The U.S. military envisage the allies and partners of the United States to become the basis of the security system of “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” In the meantime, close attention will be paid to the compatibility of branches of the armed forces, interaction of units and formations, improving the exchange of information as well as leveling the technology of the region’s nations in the field of defense to be similar to the U.S.

The U.S. Department of Defense considers it justified to maintain an emphasis on forward deployment at foreign bases and the rotation of operational formations (mainly aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups), based on the specific situation. In this regard, Washington relies on India’s and Singapore’s assistance in the deployment of American units and formations as well as their logistic support. Promoting cooperation with the Maldives in this area is not ruled out either, with a defense agreement being signed in 2020. The prospects for a partial renewal of the substantive provisions of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, which provided for the deployment of the U.S. armed forces on its territory, look rather realistic. Earlier in February 2020, Rodrigo Duterte, President of the Philippines, announced the suspension of the Visiting Force Agreement, but his position towards the U.S. softened, given the complications in relations between the Philippines and China.

First Chain Bound

Based on the rhetoric of the U.S. military leadership representatives and the published reports, Washington must constantly demonstrate its ability to deter China, denying China actions in critical regions and deploying sufficient U.S. forces in these regions to defeat the PLA. In alignment with the situation, the Pentagon finds this possible through creating local superiority zones within the so-called first island chain, using Fleet Forces, Air Force, mobile air missile defense systems as well as high-precision short- and medium-range missiles. In addition, an integrated Indo-Pacific anti-missile and air missile defense system is designed to ensure stability for the second island chain (from the Bonin Islands through the Mariana Islands to New Guinea). The U.S. Department of Defense is planning to allocate funds to improve space detection and tracking systems for a timely response to the PLA’s unwanted activities. These actions are designed to fulfill the Pentagon’s mission to increase the lethality of the Integrated Joint Force to prevent any enemy from dominance in land, sea, air, space and cyberspace conflicts.

Hidden Catch

The plans presented by Washington are built around the futility of military operations against it within the Indo-Pacific and are coupled with high losses for any potential adversary. At the same time, the presented strategy does not provide for inevitable retaliatory measures from China. Relying on allies and partners seems controversial as well, including when it comes to the deployment of additional U.S. Armed Forces. Most Asian states would prefer to retain the benefit from furthering cooperation with Beijing and are afraid of being abandoned by Washington in the event of a serious threat to their security, with the situation in Afghanistan already serving as an illustration.

Apparently, the Biden administration, even in the face of the declared defense budget austerity, will still increase the costs to strengthen U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific. On the one hand, this approach reflects the intention to reach a compromise with the Republicans. On the other hand, it is aimed at putting pressure on China and persuading it to negotiate such important areas of bilateral cooperation as trade, arms control and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. This policy has already shown itself at the meeting of the U.S. and China representatives in Anchorage in March 2021 as well as at the meeting of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman with China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in July 2021.

Most likely, the United States will not give up on its attempts to establish a multilateral Quad-based security system in the Indo-Pacific in the foreseeable future. It is also planned to gradually involve other participants in this format, as evidenced by the increased contacts with Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia. Taipei has a critical role to play in the U.S. strategic plans in the Indo-Pacific, while the development of military and technical, trade and economic cooperation, and the exchange of intelligence information with it deserves particular attention.

Today, Beijing is no longer going to hide its capabilities and bide its time, rather pursuing policies to advance its own security and development interests. China’s activities, not being directed against anyone, are perceived by the United States and its allies as an expansion and an attempt to crash the liberal world order, which is habitually defended by the liberal military force.

  1. An operational formation with AOR in the Northwest Pacific and the same name already existed from 1946 to 1973.
  2. The total number of warships (aircraft carrier, landing ship, cruiser, destroyer, frigate, multi-role nuclear submarine) is almost five times greater.

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