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Southeast Asia

Myanmar’s Development needs both ASEAN & China

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Authors: Thet Thu Thu Aye and Jamal Ait Laadam

Although Myanmar is one of the least developed countries in the world, it does have a couple of advantages to become an economically middle-level income and politically stable country in Asia. Geographically surrounded by China, India and Indochina, Myanmar is rich in terms of natural resources and has strategic importance as well. In addition, Myanmar won independence even earlier than its neighbors. Yet, during the Cold War, the leadership of Myanmar (then Burma) declared that it did not want to join ASEAN, which was seen as an imperialist pawn given its policy of neutrality. Officially speaking, Myanmar was admitted into ASEAN in 1997, yet the two sides saw each other with suspicion and uncertainties. One of the main reasons is that Myanmar could receive all kinds of its needs including security from China. However, politically since the 1990s, the pro-democracy leader of the country Aung San Suu Kyi wrote an open letter to the leaders of the ASEAN calling on the regional grouping to “nudge Burma towards democracy”. Yet, the reply was cautious as it said that since the ASEAN had advocated a policy of “constructive engagement” with Myanmar, it would do little good now to take a more confrontational approach. Due to this, it is pragmatic not to pursue a policy of exclusion, including economic sanctions simply because it was not likely to achieve the desired end.

But the last three decades of the 20th century witnessed the sea-changes all over the world: China’s start of economic reform, then the end of the Soviet Union as an ideological beacon, and meanwhile increased globalization of trade and FDI. In light of this, many ASEAN member states re-evaluated their interests and oriented the policy tools to meet the new situation. One aspect of this approach was the rekindling of ASEAN’s interest in Burma as a means to fortify its security, economic and political position. With the perception among ASEAN members evolved that China posed more of a threat at a time when the US security presence in East Asia obviously diminishing, this spurred interest in a security arrangement that would come to include China and Myanmar. Equally, by the end of the 1980s, Southeast Asia emerged as one of the most vibrant economic areas in the world. From 1981–90, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the region grew at a steady average of 6.1% per annum, and some countries grew at an even higher rate of 7–10% per annum. Fueling this growth was trade and investment from East Asia, such as Japan, South Korea and later China. Accordingly, ASEAN began to take measures to deepen its integration and engage new markets as its leaders became aware of growing economic competition from other regional trade blocs like North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU. One aspect of ASEAN’s action to remain competitive has been its enlargement to include all of Southeast Asia, such as Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar included. That means the ASEAN-10 offered a population of about 500 million, an area of 4.5 million square kms and a combined gross national product of US$ 685 billion, a total trade of US$ 720 billion and an ample supply of cheap natural resources. In the long term, Myanmar held the potential of 50 million new consumers for Southeast Asian goods as well as natural resources.

It is true that Myanmar has an abundance of inexpensive natural resources coveted by ASEAN, including lumber, natural gas and minerals. Politically, what had happened in the country also prompted ASEAN’s interest in constructive engagement. Since 1988, Myanmar began to implement far-reaching reforms of its economic system and foreign relations since the military government realized that it would have to seek external assistance to maintain control. As scholar Donald Seekins argued, the open economic policy in Myanmar after 1988 must be understood primarily in power political terms – a device for generating revenues for the military and building a stronger state. One crucial result was the flow of Chinese assistance in terms of military hardware, trade and investment blossomed overnight. In the span of 10 years, trade between Burma and China grew from $15 million to US$ 800 million. One influential aspect of the assistance was increased military training and hardware. From 1991 to 1995, about US$ 740 million of approximately US$ 1 billion in arms purchased by Burma came from China, including quite advanced weapon such as jet-fighter aircrafts, tanks, armored personnel carriers, radar, 3 frigates with missile capability, patrol boats, rocket carriers and small arms. Along with the Chinese hardware came other types of assistance: infrastructure development projects supported by the Chinese including the construction of a road and railways intended to link China’s landlocked hinterland – Yunnan province – with a deep water port on the Andaman. The infrastructure projects also provided easier access for China to the Indian Ocean. Other policy reforms inspired by the political uprising in 1988 included the liberalizing of foreign investment regulations in Burma, so that the regime could earn hard currency to support the country’s ailing economy. FDI flowed in from ASEAN, now that the terms were conducive to investment. One chief interest was the extraction of natural resources such as timber, gems, and offshore oil exploration. Key foreign investors included Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia, along with Big Three from outside ASEAN.

As the region’s largest investor in Myanmar, Singapore’s support for the country’s admission into ASEAN was based upon a different set of concerns. Singapore had little if not nothing interest in human rights issues and no real objections to the Myanmar regime’s treatment of its political opponents, but was concerned about its handling of the country’s economy and particularly its policies towards foreign investment. Through their support of the Myanmar’s status in ASEAN, Singapore hoped to gain influence over the economic thinking of the military leaders and gain greater access to the country’s natural resources and huge market for weapons. Singapore has also long been a major supplier of arms to Burma. Equally, Indonesia’s support had historical roots, given the active role in the 1955 Bandung Conference of Asia-African solidarity. But ultimately it has been geopolitical considerations that tipped the balance of opinion in favor of granting membership to Myanmar. Besides the fear that excluding Myanmar from ASEAN could be viewed as an invitation to China to take a more prominent role in the country, Western condemnation of the regime, culminating in sanctions imposed by the United States, was perceived by some as an attempt to impose alien values on the region. At a time when the supposed superiority of “Asian values” was still a favorite theme of Asian leaders eager to argue that the region’s increasing prosperity was deeply rooted in their countries’ cultures, any attempt by the West to take the moral high ground was met with resentment and derision. For some Asian leaders, particularly Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, but to a lesser extent even others with more liberal views, admitting Myanmar was a way for ASEAN to indicate their rejection of Western condescension. The coincidence of these two events – the admission of Burma into ASEAN and the Asian economic crisis – immediately ignited speculation about a possible Western conspiracy. Meanwhile, after 2000 the EU began to adopt a softer approach towards Myanmar in the hope that some fresh overtures between the government and the opposition groups would emerge. Although some EU member states such as the U.K., Sweden and Denmark have continued to maintain their hardline position, they still want to see political openness and are ready to give in to the argument that sanctions against Burma have not worked; therefore it has become necessary to seek a compromise to end the current political deadlock. They urged Myanmar to solve political conflict through dialogue because only through dialogue will there be a national reconciliation that will bring about a stable and prosperous Myanmar.

In sum, the essence of Myanmar’s foreign policy is to develop friendly relations with all the countries of the world, particularly with its neighbors. Therefore it joined ASEAN with a view to promote regional peace, stability and prosperity through cooperation and integration with the other nations of Southeast Asia. While Southeast Asian leaders continue to hope that ASEAN’s constructive engagement policy serves to mitigate Chinese leverage on Myanmar, some are not at all sanguine about the country’s prospects. For example, Singapore’s senior minister Lee Kuan Yew expressed his view that “ASEAN cannot rescue Myanmar even if it wants to, and I have the awful feeling rescuing Burma is beyond the capability of even the USA. The Myanmar’s government may resent its growing dependency on China, but it is likely to remain necessary as long as it finds itself isolated from most of the rest of the international community. Particularly, China is not only a great neighbor but also the most vital economic and security partner, followed by Japan and India. As Myanmar’s leader expects China to act as a defender of its interests and image in the world affairs. In light of this, it is reasonable for Myanmar to work together with both ASEAN and China for mutual benefit in the peace and progress.

PhD candidate in International Relations, School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Jilin University, China.

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Southeast Asia

France, Germany and the UK note verbale to the UN on the SCS issue

Prof. Pankaj Jha

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Following the enlistment of Chinese companies under sanctions by the US for involvement in SCS for reclamation of islands, there has been increasing pressure on Chinese establishment for course correction. In total, about twenty-four Chinese companies, and their management individuals have been listed under the US sanctions. These 24 companies have been placed in the sanctions list, and the US companies are barred from entering into any trade or investment dealings until unless they have specific permission from the US government. This effectively means that any transfer of technology, software, and associated agreements will be presumed as denied from the US government.

One of the critical companies which will be majorly affected and has been engaged in infrastructure projects such as ports development and highway construction would be China Communications Construction Company(CCCC) which has been involved in more than 80 projects across the world. These sanctions have been complimented with visa denial and restrictions on Chinese individuals who are responsible and are directly involved in the large-scale reclamation, construction, or incremental militarization in the disputed seas. The visa restrictions have been comprehensive, and includes individuals and their immediate families.

Following this US response to the Chinese island reclamation activities, NATO countries such as France and Germany have already outlined their Indo Pacific strategy and have try to take cognizance of the fact that island reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea would be detrimental to their interests in the region. The US sanctions on the Chinese companies would have comprehensive impact as many other nations which would be doing business with this companies would be apprehensive of collateral impact from US, in case they engage these companies in the long term projects in their countries.

Closely following the NATO partner Germany, the UK and France have also made a representation to the UN in the form of a note verbale submitted to the UN on 16th September on the developments in South China Sea. This buttresses the Malaysian representation made to the UN in December 2019 related to the commission on the limits of the continental shelf. This note verbal also reposes faith in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) as the framework under which the activities related to the oceans and the seas must be addressed.

The provisions of UNCLOS resonated under the PCA ruling on the issue of Philippines and China dispute related to contested islands in South China Sea. The PCA ruling had adjudicated that the UNCLOS should be the reference for resolving disputes related to maritime zones, territorial seas, and defining the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)of the islands which are uninhabitable. Given the fact that France and the UK are the permanent members of the UN Security Council while Germany is a UNSCaspirant, this note verbalegains significance in the current context. This also reinforces the fact that Indo-pacific would be the epicenter of development in the region and in order to safeguard their interests the European countries cannot ignore intimidating tactics adopted by the China at the sea.

While it is understandable that France has a number of territories in the Indo-Pacific region which comprise more than 80 per cent of its total EEZ but Germany taking an anti-China stance shows shifting priorities. Germany foreign minister during press briefing has expressed that Germany would like to work together with the countries in the Indo Pacific region and would be a participant in the rules based order. The three countries -the UK, France, and Germany are critical in pressurizing China to adapt to the international regulations related to the law of the seas and must acknowledge that freedom of navigation, overflight, and the right of innocent passage are the legitimate rights of the littoral countries as well as extra regional powers which have trade and commercial interests in the region. The US has not acceded to the UNCLOS but the three countries have acceded to it. It is also seen as the fact that the US is trying to galvanize NATO countries in support of its initiatives and military deployments in the South China Sea. The three countries also have extensive business and trade interest in the region, and have trade relations with Korea, Japan and Taiwan. Therefore, increasing tensions in the South China Sea would increase their freight costs as well as insurance costs.  This would make their exports expensive and would affect the market dynamics.

The increasing resistance to Chinese assertive activities started in in December 2019 when Malaysia made a representation to the UN about the extended continental shelf. This has been supported by identical representations and statements made by littoral countries of South China Sea which included Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and even a public statement by Brunei. The US also made a strong rejoinder to the case and extended support on major issues that have been highlighted by the various countries include the issue of baselines, the low tide elevations of the rocks, islets and uninhabitable islands, and the issue of Chinese concocted history which is in contravention to the established international order.

In response to these submissions made by the three European countries, China has stated that it treats the UNCLOS as an established order but abhors its use as a political tool. Citing reservations to the UNCLOS, it has stated that it does not cover everything related to the maritime order. Citing paragraph 8 of the UNCLOS it has stated that “matters not regulated by this convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law”. This clearly means that China wants to derive new meaning which suits its own interests and reclamation activities in the South China Sea. The UNCLOS has made it very categorical that parties which have acceded to UNCLOS must comprehensively and correctly interpret the rule of the law of the seas. In its representation China has stressed that it has a long history, and the Chinese governments under different leaders have expressed their sovereign rights on the islands in the South China Sea. In the submission China has completely castigated the PCA ruling of July 2016, and stated that the sovereign rights of China on those disputed islands cannot be prejudiced by the illegal awards made under any arbitration or ruling .The biggest irony in the statement is the fact that it believes that UNCLOS  is not effective neither implementable in the context  of South China Sea but China claims that territorial baselines related to the islands and rocks are in conformity to the provisions of UNCLOS; clearly showing the dichotomy between  conditional acceptance and comprehensive selective utility.

The long response that China has made with regard to submission by the three European countries clearly highlights the fact that China is under pressure to accept legal provisions and maintain law and order at the sea. In the letter in response to these representations, China has made it very clear that it is making sincere efforts through friendly consultations with the ASEAN countries. The representation made by UK, Germany and France has brought about an international dimension to the whole issue. In total the number of countries which have raised objections to China’s reclamation activities have increased to more than 10 countries which have been seen as regional powers and have clout in the UN.

This also empowers Vietnam which is the current chair of ASEAN to undertake wide-ranging discussions on the topic during the summit meetings and in a way coerce China to undertake effective course correction measures. The hyperactivity which China has shown with regard to Taiwan, and military exercises in the South China Sea, have brought about international attention and raised serious concerns with regard to the developments in the region. The US exercises has been matched by China with undertaking surveillance sorties, scrambling of advanced fighter jets and infringing on EEZ of littoral countries. Therefore, it requires effective countermeasures as well as international condemnation of the Chinese activities. One can very well understand the fact that with China being at the receiving end of the international criticism in the wake of the coronavirus and subsequent domestic dissent shows that China would try to rake up hyper nationalism so as to protect President Xi from stigma. However, with majority of UNSC members expressing dissent the pathways for China are going to get tough in future.

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Southeast Asia

Uncreative Teachers: Online Learning Is Ineffective

Kevin Fallo

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Inevitably, Indonesia has to apply online learning (in the network) during the Covid-19 pandemic, this aims to anticipate the spread of the Covid-19 virus itself. However, there are still many problems in its implementation.

The problems found during online learning come from students, educators, and even the system itself. This causes the existing curriculum targets not to be achieved.

Curriculum

Based on the Decree of the Minister of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia Number 719 / P / 2020 concerning Guidelines for Implementing Curriculum in Education Units in Special Conditions which was signed on August 4, 2020, it has the objective of providing flexibility for educational units to determine the curriculum according to the needs of students. However, it was reported from news.detik.com that the Minister of Education did not oblige to follow this emergency curriculum and provided 3 options, namely:

  1. Keep referring to the national curriculum
  2. Using an emergency curriculum
  3. To simplify the curriculum independently

Judging from the current situation, it is very difficult to follow and pursue the curriculum targets that are commonly used, therefore the next option is a very good option to run in the current online learning period. A simplification that does not make students stressed and can still focus on taking online learning.

Home Atmosphere & Student Psychology

Each student has a situation that is not the same as each other at home, different when students are in the same class, uniting them in one room and many individuals so that some problems at home can be forgotten for a moment and focus on learning.

In the classroom the teacher can pay attention to the psychology of each student and can apply special attention when one of the students experiences “problems” in the learning process. However, it is not fair if in online learning students are given the same demands while the teacher does not know how the psychology of each student is at his home.

Limited Access

One other big problem is the limited internet access, this can be affected by the internet network, internet quota, smartphone or other hardware. As a teacher, of course this kind of thing has been considered and made a more flexible learning policy, of course.

In practice, there are still teachers who do not understand this problem. Demanding students to be able to work on assignments in a matter of hours, this certainly makes students get pressure to be able to catch up on time within limitations.

Within these limitations it can cause negative attitudes to students, for example, such as students asking their parents to force their parents to buy quotas without understanding the economic conditions of the family, or students who even experience pressure due to inability in several matters related to online learning.

In this case, the teacher should give a long enough period of time for an assignment, giving time for students to meet the needs of access to online learning so that they can take part in this online teaching and learning process.

Creativity

Not only students are required to be creative in online learning, but teachers should also be creative in online learning to create a fun learning atmosphere.

Many cases occur in online learning so that it seems that the teacher is only limited to giving assignments at each meeting. Not without reason, this opinion was born in the community during the online learning period because generally that is the reality that happened in learning during the pandemic.

Teachers can use and take advantage of technology without having qualified skills in the technology field. The most important thing is the willingness and awareness to learn, unless the teacher doesn’t want to learn anymore. The existing limitations can be communicated by fellow teachers to create a creative breakthrough that can support this online learning.

There are many examples of the use of technology that can be used by teachers, one of which is the podcast through this media, students can listen to the teacher’s explanation anytime and anywhere, and of course listening to audio through podcasts is more efficient in using internet data.

To find out the understanding of the material in students, students can also repeat the material in their own style and then upload it into podcast media again. This does not only train students ‘understanding but also learners’ skills. Or teachers can use other means and methods to be able to teach in online learning.

Another example could be using an animaker, a website that creates simple animations that can be created to support learning to be more interesting. With animation media, of course this is more interesting than the powerpoints that are commonly used, especially during this learning period, powerpoints are generally distributed to students without further explanation.

Furthermore, there are many small problems that we see in the implementation of this online learning, one of which is the teacher who asks students to use whatsapp profile photos using personal photos, because previously the profile photos of students used photos of Korean idols. This can be used by the teacher to get closer to students and support learning by connecting learning with Korean idols.For example: In learning Indonesian, the teacher can ask students to make stories by including Korean idols as the main character.

The widespread use of Youtube, Tiktok, Instagram and other social media as a means of entertainment should be used by teachers to create creative learning. It is unfortunate if during this online learning period the teacher cannot create creative things which are of course useful for achieving the learning target itself. Rigid learning methods combined with heavy learning demands are a time bomb for students to be able to damage the psychology of the students themselves.

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Rediscovering the Sea: Comparing New Maritime Orientations of Turkey and Indonesia

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Authors: Tufan Kutay Boran and Hadza Min Fadhli Robby*

Sea has once more become one of the most contested regions in the arena of international politics. One of the main reasons is that sea hold reserves to crucial energy and food resources. These resources are needed to sustain the basic needs to be used for supporting the industries and ensuring human developments. Sea also becomes a new area of influence that countries use to increase their leverage in the midst of geopolitical contestation. This condition eventually propels some countries to rediscover their once-forgotten maritime orientation again. This article would like to explore how Turkey and Indonesia are implementing their new maritime orientation in the second decade of the 21st century.

Turkey and Mavi Vatan Doctrine

In Turkey’s case, the geopolitical game is currently focused on two main areas: The Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea. Dominant players in international politics have recently turned their faces to the Eastern Mediterranean as a new energy source. Especially after 2010, at the time when Egypt and Israel discovered their natural gas reserves. However, as a peninsular state, Turkey has more than 8,333 kilometers of coastline. The country also has more than 462,000 square kilometers of potential maritime jurisdictional area. In these years, Turkey is also conducting oil and gas exploration activities with six oil and gas exploration and drilling vessels in the Black Sea and East Mediterranean Sea. However, Turkey’s efforts seem to bother some countries in the region. Turkey’s relations with neighboring Greece came to the brink of a hot war due to the continental shelf discussions.

On the other hand, France saw the Mediterranean’s developments as an opportunity and managed to sell Rafale jets to Greece. Countries such as Israel and UAE have also clearly positioned themselves, particularly after November 27, when Turkey and Libya signed a maritime agreement that established the EEZ of both countries under UNCLOS principles. Although Turkey’s bilateral relations experienced a downfall with the mentioned countries (Israel, UAE, and France), Turkey is continuing in a determined manner for the first time in the history of exploration and drilling activities. These activities continue today under the doctrine of the “Mavi Vatan” (Blue Homeland) doctrine. So why Blue Homeland doctrine is essential for Turkey’s new maritime orientation?

The concept of MaviVatan was first indoctrinated in 2006 by Retired Admiral Cem Gürdeniz. According to Gürdeniz, the scope of Blue Homeland doctrine consists of all maritime jurisdiction zones (inland waters, territorial waters, continental shelf, exclusive economic zone), declared or undeclared, and rivers and lakes. The Blue Homeland, in an exact sense, is an extension at sea and seabed of our homeland located between 26-45 East longitudes and 36-42 North latitudes. The Blue Homeland is the name of the Turkish zone of interest and jurisdiction over salty and fresh waters located between 25-45 East longitudes and 33-43 North latitudes. On the other hand, it designates Turkey’s maritime policy as its grand strategic goal for its people in the 21st century. It symbolizes the redirection from a land-based to a new sea-based orientation.  

Nowadays, Turkish authorities and the Turkish people are undoubtedly appreciating the intensity of petrol and gas exploration activities at both seas after Turkey’s long hiatus at two seas. Some authorities even trace back this hiatus to the Ottoman Empire’s 16th century, supposedly the most glorified Ottoman maritime era. Contrary to the previous periods, the Turkish government’s realization of these exploration activities and the investment of national capital and ships’ deployment receive significant support from the Turkish people. This policy also alleviates the public’s reaction against the Turkish economy’s deterioration, which is in a downward trend, especially after the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic. It is also important to point out that the sharp decline of the Turkish Lira against the U.S Dollar since January 2020 has become another critical issue that has been observed closely by Turkish people. Amid the economic crisis, Turkish people consider the Eastern Mediterranean’s developments and the relations with their neighbor Greece, also a Turkish ally in NATO, as a more outstanding national issue. These developments bring some relational problems to the homeland.

Nevertheless, both the public opinion from the pro-government and opposition sides have united a legal pot in Turkey’s most prominent cause. This unity was rooted in the Turkish public’s concern on the Black Sea’s economic potential and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. After some exploration period, President RecepTayyip Erdogan announced that the Fatih drillship discovered 320 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves off the Black Sea coast on August 21, 2020. Although the Turkish people welcomed this news with great joy, experts argued that the mentioned gas extraction would take approximately 3-5 years. The Turkish government is planning to extract the gas resources during the 100th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey in 2023.

Indonesia and The Vision of Global Maritime Fulcrum

Despite holding status as one of the largest archipelagic states globally, Indonesia did not pay much attention to its maritime policies until very recently. Some works have been done in the past to operationalize Indonesia’s sovereignty in its ocean. Deklarasi Djuanda (Djuanda Declaration) and Wawasan Nusantara (Indonesia’s geopolitical outlook) are fundamental works that tried to strengthen Indonesia’s status archipelagic nation. Nevertheless, the strong focus on land-based security and defense policy has forsaken Indonesia’s maritime credentials.

The rediscovery of the sea and maritime policy in Indonesia began when Marty Natalegawa (Indonesian Foreign Minister, 2009-2014) tried to formulate a new approach towards the current geopolitical issue in the Asia-Pacific. According to Natalegawa, the key to managing the potential conflicts in Asia-Pacific is maintaining the “warm peace” through ‘multi stakeholdership.’ Multi stakeholder ship could be defined as a way to ensure that the conflict between parties contested zone (such as the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea) is solved through continuous dialogues and deliberations. This idea proposed by Natalegawa was also known as “dynamic equilibrium.” The legacy of dynamic equilibrium was carried on by Natalegawa’s successor, Retno Marsudi (Indonesian Foreign Minister, 2014-now). Using the principle of inclusiveness and multi stakeholdership, Indonesia is trying to reinstate itself as one of the key leaders in ocean governance. Through Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) vision, Indonesia was keen to take greater responsibilities in domestic maritime and global ocean politics. Related ministries and agencies, such as the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, were created following the vision. During Indonesia’s chairmanship in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Indonesia has tried to put its ideas on maritime governance issues by proposing IORA Concord. IORA Concord has become one of the roadmaps that reflects Indonesia’s agenda as a global maritime fulcrum.

The idea attracted the Indonesian society’s attention since many thought that this would be one of the main breakthroughs that would create a more significant impact on the Indonesian economy and Indonesian foreign policy. Many Indonesian lawmakers have also indicated their support toward the GMF. Lawmakers also noted that the Indonesian government should fully utilize and dedicate all of its resources so that the people could enjoy the maximum benefit from this policy. In this context, lawmakers highlighted that the Indonesian government should protect its ocean resources, particularly in the fisheries sectors. Some ideas under the GMF doctrine were realized. One of these is creating fisheries’ docks and tollaut (sea highways) that help with the distribution of needs and resources through Nusantara’s vast islands.

Nevertheless, the GMF was eventually abandoned during the second term of Joko Widodo’s presidency. The coordinating ministry responsible for the maritime issue is still operational, but this coordinating ministry’s works focused on managing foreign trade and investments in Indonesia. Some limited activities to ensure coastal security is still handled by the coordinating ministry with the Ministry of Defence. Unfortunately, the works to ensure the resource sovereignty in the Indonesian oceanic territory remains in limbo.

Conclusion

Turkey and Indonesia have dedicated themselves to assert their identities as maritime nations. Despite having differences in geographical and geopolitical conditions, both governments have similarities in considering the sea as part of their future. Taking notes of the geopolitical conflicts and the potential of undiscovered resources in their oceanic sovereignty zones, Turkey and Indonesia establish doctrines that align with their foreign policy principles. Turkey, perhaps trying to achieve its economic goals for the first time in its history with a genuinely neo-realist and active policy in both seas. However, this neo-realist attitude is seen as disturbing steps by other states trying to have a say in the region. Even though the AK Party government has not given up its determination and attitude with the support of its people, Turkish authorities have idealistically emphasized that they are ready to talk with other states in the context of good faith.

Meanwhile, Indonesia is staying away from the bigger goals of becoming a regional leader in maritime governance. The main factor that finally determines Indonesia’s current maritime vision is the fulfillment of Indonesia’s economic and development goals. Therefore, most maritime sectors’ works are more focused on attracting investors and building infrastructures instead of constructing a grand vision and comprehensive policy frameworks that entail all sectors. A more pragmatic and bilateral-oriented Jokowi is trying to avoid more problems to gain more advantages. Finally, in Indonesia’s case, foreign policy must be home-originated and based on domestic needs, but a more confident stance needs to be taken.

*Hadza Min Fadhli Robby, Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia

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