Authors: Thet Thu Thu Aye and Jamal Ait Laadam
Although Myanmar is one of the least developed countries in the world, it does have a couple of advantages to become an economically middle-level income and politically stable country in Asia. Geographically surrounded by China, India and Indochina, Myanmar is rich in terms of natural resources and has strategic importance as well. In addition, Myanmar won independence even earlier than its neighbors. Yet, during the Cold War, the leadership of Myanmar (then Burma) declared that it did not want to join ASEAN, which was seen as an imperialist pawn given its policy of neutrality. Officially speaking, Myanmar was admitted into ASEAN in 1997, yet the two sides saw each other with suspicion and uncertainties. One of the main reasons is that Myanmar could receive all kinds of its needs including security from China. However, politically since the 1990s, the pro-democracy leader of the country Aung San Suu Kyi wrote an open letter to the leaders of the ASEAN calling on the regional grouping to “nudge Burma towards democracy”. Yet, the reply was cautious as it said that since the ASEAN had advocated a policy of “constructive engagement” with Myanmar, it would do little good now to take a more confrontational approach. Due to this, it is pragmatic not to pursue a policy of exclusion, including economic sanctions simply because it was not likely to achieve the desired end.
But the last three decades of the 20th century witnessed the sea-changes all over the world: China’s start of economic reform, then the end of the Soviet Union as an ideological beacon, and meanwhile increased globalization of trade and FDI. In light of this, many ASEAN member states re-evaluated their interests and oriented the policy tools to meet the new situation. One aspect of this approach was the rekindling of ASEAN’s interest in Burma as a means to fortify its security, economic and political position. With the perception among ASEAN members evolved that China posed more of a threat at a time when the US security presence in East Asia obviously diminishing, this spurred interest in a security arrangement that would come to include China and Myanmar. Equally, by the end of the 1980s, Southeast Asia emerged as one of the most vibrant economic areas in the world. From 1981–90, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the region grew at a steady average of 6.1% per annum, and some countries grew at an even higher rate of 7–10% per annum. Fueling this growth was trade and investment from East Asia, such as Japan, South Korea and later China. Accordingly, ASEAN began to take measures to deepen its integration and engage new markets as its leaders became aware of growing economic competition from other regional trade blocs like North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU. One aspect of ASEAN’s action to remain competitive has been its enlargement to include all of Southeast Asia, such as Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar included. That means the ASEAN-10 offered a population of about 500 million, an area of 4.5 million square kms and a combined gross national product of US$ 685 billion, a total trade of US$ 720 billion and an ample supply of cheap natural resources. In the long term, Myanmar held the potential of 50 million new consumers for Southeast Asian goods as well as natural resources.
It is true that Myanmar has an abundance of inexpensive natural resources coveted by ASEAN, including lumber, natural gas and minerals. Politically, what had happened in the country also prompted ASEAN’s interest in constructive engagement. Since 1988, Myanmar began to implement far-reaching reforms of its economic system and foreign relations since the military government realized that it would have to seek external assistance to maintain control. As scholar Donald Seekins argued, the open economic policy in Myanmar after 1988 must be understood primarily in power political terms – a device for generating revenues for the military and building a stronger state. One crucial result was the flow of Chinese assistance in terms of military hardware, trade and investment blossomed overnight. In the span of 10 years, trade between Burma and China grew from $15 million to US$ 800 million. One influential aspect of the assistance was increased military training and hardware. From 1991 to 1995, about US$ 740 million of approximately US$ 1 billion in arms purchased by Burma came from China, including quite advanced weapon such as jet-fighter aircrafts, tanks, armored personnel carriers, radar, 3 frigates with missile capability, patrol boats, rocket carriers and small arms. Along with the Chinese hardware came other types of assistance: infrastructure development projects supported by the Chinese including the construction of a road and railways intended to link China’s landlocked hinterland – Yunnan province – with a deep water port on the Andaman. The infrastructure projects also provided easier access for China to the Indian Ocean. Other policy reforms inspired by the political uprising in 1988 included the liberalizing of foreign investment regulations in Burma, so that the regime could earn hard currency to support the country’s ailing economy. FDI flowed in from ASEAN, now that the terms were conducive to investment. One chief interest was the extraction of natural resources such as timber, gems, and offshore oil exploration. Key foreign investors included Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia, along with Big Three from outside ASEAN.
As the region’s largest investor in Myanmar, Singapore’s support for the country’s admission into ASEAN was based upon a different set of concerns. Singapore had little if not nothing interest in human rights issues and no real objections to the Myanmar regime’s treatment of its political opponents, but was concerned about its handling of the country’s economy and particularly its policies towards foreign investment. Through their support of the Myanmar’s status in ASEAN, Singapore hoped to gain influence over the economic thinking of the military leaders and gain greater access to the country’s natural resources and huge market for weapons. Singapore has also long been a major supplier of arms to Burma. Equally, Indonesia’s support had historical roots, given the active role in the 1955 Bandung Conference of Asia-African solidarity. But ultimately it has been geopolitical considerations that tipped the balance of opinion in favor of granting membership to Myanmar. Besides the fear that excluding Myanmar from ASEAN could be viewed as an invitation to China to take a more prominent role in the country, Western condemnation of the regime, culminating in sanctions imposed by the United States, was perceived by some as an attempt to impose alien values on the region. At a time when the supposed superiority of “Asian values” was still a favorite theme of Asian leaders eager to argue that the region’s increasing prosperity was deeply rooted in their countries’ cultures, any attempt by the West to take the moral high ground was met with resentment and derision. For some Asian leaders, particularly Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, but to a lesser extent even others with more liberal views, admitting Myanmar was a way for ASEAN to indicate their rejection of Western condescension. The coincidence of these two events – the admission of Burma into ASEAN and the Asian economic crisis – immediately ignited speculation about a possible Western conspiracy. Meanwhile, after 2000 the EU began to adopt a softer approach towards Myanmar in the hope that some fresh overtures between the government and the opposition groups would emerge. Although some EU member states such as the U.K., Sweden and Denmark have continued to maintain their hardline position, they still want to see political openness and are ready to give in to the argument that sanctions against Burma have not worked; therefore it has become necessary to seek a compromise to end the current political deadlock. They urged Myanmar to solve political conflict through dialogue because only through dialogue will there be a national reconciliation that will bring about a stable and prosperous Myanmar.
In sum, the essence of Myanmar’s foreign policy is to develop friendly relations with all the countries of the world, particularly with its neighbors. Therefore it joined ASEAN with a view to promote regional peace, stability and prosperity through cooperation and integration with the other nations of Southeast Asia. While Southeast Asian leaders continue to hope that ASEAN’s constructive engagement policy serves to mitigate Chinese leverage on Myanmar, some are not at all sanguine about the country’s prospects. For example, Singapore’s senior minister Lee Kuan Yew expressed his view that “ASEAN cannot rescue Myanmar even if it wants to, and I have the awful feeling rescuing Burma is beyond the capability of even the USA. The Myanmar’s government may resent its growing dependency on China, but it is likely to remain necessary as long as it finds itself isolated from most of the rest of the international community. Particularly, China is not only a great neighbor but also the most vital economic and security partner, followed by Japan and India. As Myanmar’s leader expects China to act as a defender of its interests and image in the world affairs. In light of this, it is reasonable for Myanmar to work together with both ASEAN and China for mutual benefit in the peace and progress.
Ready for the Dry Years: Building Resilience to Drought in Southeast Asia
Authors: Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana and Lim Jock Hoi*
South-East Asia has long endured severe droughts, which occur on average every five years. The prolonged 2015 and 2018 droughts were the worst on record for two decades. They simultaneously affected more than 70 per cent of the land area, with over 325 million people exposed. No ASEAN member States was spared from the devastating impacts including the disruption to livelihoods and food security, as well as forest fires and haze.
The drivers of drought risk in South-East Asia are inherently complex, resulting in considerable year-to-year variations. Drought is heavily influenced by various climatic drivers, mainly the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD). Yet, despite this complexity, clear trends point to an intensifying drought risk across the region.
New analysis of observed data and climate projections in the second edition of Ready for the Dry Years: Building Resilience to Drought in Southeast Asia, a joint report by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) reveals a statistically significant increase in temperature from 1981-2020, that is expected to continue. This means that drought severity will increase as the climate gets warmer.
This urgency has been enhanced by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has converged with the climate crisis. Both disasters have simultaneously disrupted people’s health, livelihoods and supply chains across the region. These compounding impacts have led to severe economic stress and undermined the ability of the region to deal with current and future disaster risks. It is crucial that we understand how recurrent droughts and the current pandemic are interacting, to identify appropriate policies that can address these crises simultaneously.
ASEAN and ESCAP are working together to prevent the destructive impacts of droughts by promoting a paradigm shift towards more adaptive drought risk management and governance. This cooperation is anchored in a forward-looking, science-based approach to drought risks. The adaptive policy interventions must support the most vulnerable and those furthest behind in the region.
The latest evidence shows that 15 to 25 per cent of the region’s population lives in drought hotspots, with low levels of socio-economic development and high exposure to recurring droughts. Targeted policy interventions in these areas will be essential to prevent the cumulative impacts of recurring droughts, which over time, pose a serious threat to hard-won development gains, particularly the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. These interventions must follow three clear policy tracks to reduce and prevent droughts from occurring; prepare and respond to droughts when they happen; and restore and recover after a drought has passed. Accordingly, they should cover a wide range of policy areas, from the management of food, water and energy systems, to the implementation of early warning systems and drought risk financing.
Governments should capitalize on several opportunities to meet this challenge. Firstly, the cyclical and slow-onset nature of drought provides time for us to take risk-informed actions now, to prevent a drought hazard from becoming a crisis. Secondly, governments can benefit from ASEAN’s extensive experience and expertise through greater regional cooperation, driven by ASEAN’s agenda on drought and the newly adopted ASEAN Declaration on the Strengthening of the Adaptation to Drought. Thirdly, the COVID-19 pandemic offers an opportunity to act now to reduce the impacts of future droughts, by incorporating measures to build resilience into COVID-19 recovery stimulus packages.
The latest developments in science and technology will underpin the successful scale up of drought management interventions. ASEAN member States must take concrete steps now to strengthen national and regional drought monitoring and improve our understanding of the causes of drought. It is now more vital than ever for the region to build resilience to drought. By working together, we can mitigate the impact of future droughts and ensure that the entire ASEAN Community will be ready for the dry years ahead.
On this note, strong partnerships between the United Nations, ASEAN and national governments and other stakeholders are essential to deal with the increasingly complex and uncertain extreme weather and climate situations along with the impacts of transnational slow-onset disaster risks. ASEAN and the United Nations has enjoyed fruitful cooperation through implementation of the Comprehensive Partnership and the Plan of Action. This joint ASEAN-ESCAP work has reflected our cooperation and partnership for the benefit of our peoples.
*Lim Jock Hoi, Secretary-General of ASEAN
Cambodia’s Hun Sen, Asia’s longest-serving PM, continues to quell the Opposition
For the past 35 years, the former French colony of Cambodia is ruled by the 68-year-old Prime Minister Hun Sen, Asia’s longest serving head of the government. His policies are regarded as autocratic, aimed at forcibly limiting the scope for the Opposition to rise politically and come to the forefront of democratic activism.
The latest in line of such policies is the politically-motivated mass trials of more than a hundred members and supporters of the banned Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP).
The 2012-founded CNRP’s unexpected success in the polls of 2013 and 2017 was seen by Hun Sen and his ruling Cambodian People’s Party with trepidation. The democratic opposition party’s performance came amid sustained pressures of intimidation and electoral malpractice.
The CNRP was the only opposition represented in the country’s National Assembly or lower house of the parliament, with 55 out of 123 seats, until November 2017 when the pro-Sen Supreme Court ruled to dissolve the party, ending its five years of existence.
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights referred to this arbitrary move as the final nail in the coffin for Cambodian democracy. Also, CNRP’s leader Kem Sokha was arrested on fake charges of treason, accusing him of conspiring with the US to overthrow the prime minister and his government, a claim which Washington has categorically rejected.
Strikingly, these moves came ahead of the 2018 election. In the absence of an effective Opposition, Hun Sen’s CPP unsurprisingly won 100% of parliamentary seats in the last elections held in July 2018.
Meanwhile, Sen’s biggest political rival during his three-and-a-half decade rule, Sam Rainsy, has been living in exile in Paris for the past fifteen years. Last year, he was planning to return to Cambodia along with other senior opposition figures via Thailand, but was denied boarding on the Thai flight due to Cambodian threats to the airlines.
However, to Sen and the CPP’s dismay, in January 2020, some former members of the CNRP and other democratic activists announced the formation of a new party named the Cambodian Nation Love Party (CNLP) to continue the CNRP’s legacy and participate in future elections.
The Cambodian people’s undying quest for democratic reforms was exemplified with the formation of a new democratic party. Sen’s previous attempt to prevent the erstwhile CNRP from reconstituting itself under another name, by banning more than 100 of its leading members from politics for a period of five years thus failed to reap sustainable gains.
As the suppression of democratic expression continues for a long time now, relations with the West have deteriorated in the past few years, pushing the ASEAN country further into Beijing’s orbit. The US is also watching the trial closely. Meanwhile, the European Union, a key export destination for Cambodia, has withdrawn special trade privileges given earlier.
Now, the recent summoning of 140 ex-CNRP members and supporters, for charges of conspiracy and attempting to overthrow the government, is the latest political drama in the long set of desperate moves from Hun Sen to cling on to power.
Among those who showed up in court include former opposition senator Thach Setha and Cambodian-American human rights lawyer, Theary Seng. But, there are many who fled into exile believing that they would not be given a fair trial.
Cambodia, bearing the painful memory of a genocide that happened under Pol Pot’s notorious Khmer Rouge regime in the late 1970s killing 2 million people, saw the country slipping into the hands of another would-be autocratic leader, Hun Sen, in 1985.
The interventions by the United Nations and other human rights-oriented organisations appear to be failing in the Southeast Asian nation as long-established democratic processes drift away and elections are held for namesake, adding up to the political drama. With Sen unwilling to forfeit power, the future prospects for Cambodia seem to be a dreary continuation of the past.
The 2020 Myanmar Election and China: Push and Pull factor in ‘Paukphaw’ friendship
National Democratic League (NLD), the ruling party of Myanmar under Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had a landslide victory in the election, which led the party to continue in power for another five years. While Myanmar still struggling with the civil war crisis and without any solution-oriented approach the crisis in Rohingya is nowhere near to end since the breakout of the severe crisis in 2017.
The pre-election and post-election international media coverage and scholarly discussion on Myanmar bring back the China factor in the Myanmar election and general China’s undeniable ties with Myanmar. It’s been argued that a vote for Aung San Suu Kyi would mean the continuation of the unprecedented expansion of China in the country and a vote for multi-ethnic parties would mean resistance to China-backed infrastructure and other projects.
While the backlashes against China among multi-ethnic parties and towards China-led infrastructure projects are omnipresent in Myanmar, however, China has not loosed its heart to engage in the Myanmar peace process. It is also to be noted that China does not only have good relation with NLD but it also keeps its relationship with the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). It also frequently engages itself in discussion with ethnic groups. What China likes to call itself is a “neutral player”. Thus, the election results would not have a significant impact on the China-Myanmar relationship.
The irk of Western countries towards Myanmar, who initially supported Myanmar’s democratic transition only intensified with the 2020 election as the Myanmar election commission only allowed election in 8 townships in Rohingya state, and denied election in 9 other townships. A joint statement was issued under the leadership of the UK and the US regarding the inclusion of left out Rohingyas into the election along with urging Myanmar to be more serious regarding the global ceasefire and confidence-building steps that include lifting restrictions on access to health, education, and basic services, lifting restrictions on freedom of movement. China’s as under the principle of non-interference abstained from commenting on the exclusion of nine districts in Rohingya state from the election. Chinese government since 2017 has blocked draft resolutions at UNSC regarding international intervention in the crisis in Myanmar. China, however bilaterally posited itself as a mediator between Myanmar and Bangladesh on the repatriation of Rohingyas. A role, China now often seems to play in conflict-ridden countries, for example in the Afghan peace process China plays a similar mediator role.
Myanmar’s foreign policy after 2015 and China
After the first democratic election in Myanmar in 2015, and NLD’s new manifesto was focused on upholding ‘an active and independent foreign policy’. Under the AngSyu Ki leadership, the foreign policy of Myanmar was considered to be hedging towards a neutralist foreign policy to work together for the benefit of the region on issues relating to regional organizations and programs. Another important pledge in Myanmar’s 2015 foreign policy manifesto was to “to identify and cooperate with other countries on joint economic enterprises of mutual benefit. In particular, to work together for the benefit of the region on issues relating to regional organizations and programs.” Which, as mentioned by Moe Thuzar of Singapore’s ISEAS-YusofIshak Institute is missing in the 2020 Manifesto. The reason for missing the important article from the 2020 manifesto could be Myanmar’s subtle attempt to balance China’s unprecedented presence in the region. As, it also aligns with some of the recent activities of other international actors in Myanmar. Such as high-level delegation visits by India, in October 2020, Myanmar’s growing interest in business engagement with Hong Kong, and eagerness to expand its economic co-operation with other Asian countries such as South Korea and Singapore. All this renewed interest within a span of two months from September to October 2020, before the election in Myanmar also could be an attempt to recover the focus in Myanmar’s democratic transition as opposed to growing clout over claiming Myanmar as an authoritarian regime, especially after 2017.
In terms of Myanmar’s policy towards China, Myanmar could not be seen as prey to China’s economic interest. As, even though the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor is kicking off, Myanmar is still apprehensive regarding embracing all of the Chinese lead projects. According to Irrawaddy times, from China’s originally proposed 40 projects, only nine projects were tentatively agreed to implement from both sides under China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).
AyungSyu Ki’s diplomatic shrewdness is evident in Myanmar’s China policy. The country despite using China as a shield to defend itself from international intervention, China has not completely able to unlock all economic leverages. China’s patience with Myanmar also relates to the fact of ensuring security in its border province.
Yang Jiechi, the head of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party’s short September visit to Myanmar was an indication that China does not take Myanmar for granted to materialize the economic projects, it has started in the country under the banner of BRI, Especially after the 2017 launch of China Myanmar Economic Corridor. Before NLD came into power in 2015, the anti-Chinese sentiments in Myanmar were more prominent, as it has led to President Thein Sein to halt the Myitsone Dam in 2011. Scholars have argued that Myanmar’s skepticism over Chinese led projects between 2011-2012 could be seen as a reaction to its proximity with the West, as Western sanctions were slowly lifted for a brief period (Ganesan, 2017). Thus, as the Western sanctions grew after 2017, Myanmar hedged towards China. Even though, Myanmar is always dubious about China’s economic diplomacy in Myanmar.
However, Myanmar does return the favor to China diplomatically by recognizing the ‘one-China principle’. Myanmar’s President U Win Myint during the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in January 2020, states Myanmar’s firm adherence to the One China principle, respects the “one country, two systems” policy China has implemented in Hong Kong and Macao and has always recognized Taiwan as an inalienable part of China’s territory.
Myanmar is also one of the 53 countries that supported the Hong Kong National Security Law.
China’s multifaceted engagement in Myanmar
The question arises can Myanmar altogether keep China aside, especially from its peace process? As China’s border is at the stake, China is pretty much invested in Myanmar’s peace process. In the third Union Peace Conference, China played important role in pressurizing ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to attend the peace conference. For China’s interest, the member of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FNPCC) includes the Northern Alliance EAOs, which are known for attacking commercial interests in northern Shan State and Kachin state that shares a border with China. China-funded the EAOs to attend the conference, which was the first time all the ethnic groups attended it with Chinese aid and diplomacy. Thus, Myanmar can’t shun Chinese help when it comes to the peace process. As of August 2020, the fourth Union peace conference marked the absence of many of the ethnic groups as due to COVID and other factors China was not seen pushing much for their inclusion. Yun Sun noted that the reason could be the absence of any specific request of the Myanmar government to China regarding the same.
Apart from, engagement with the peace process and supporting Myanmar at the international front regarding the Rohingya crisis, and mediating between Bangladesh and Myanmar, China seem to have a resilient network approach towards Myanmar. This has led China to engage different actors in its diplomacy towards Myanmar. Chinese government NGOs (GONGO)’s such as the China International Poverty Alleviation Foundation (CIPAF), Blue Sky are becoming more present in Myanmar. These GONGO’s are not only providing humanitarian aid but also organizing skill development programs for locals. The Chinese government also sometimes organizes training programs for Myanmar’s diplomats and officials and businessman. Hence, China is more engaging at the grassroots level, a diplomatic style China has adopted from its experience of engagement in unstable states in Africa.
Thus, as for now, it is both a win-win game for China and Myanmar, as both seem to seek leverages from each other. However, it would interesting to see if more international actors, especially the US lifts the ban on Myanmar and get engage with the country how Myanmar would design its policies towards China.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author.
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