Connect with us

Middle East

Raging Lebanon: The Country In Deep Crisis

image source: Wikipedia

Published

on

“And that’s just one of the many problems plaguing the country and shutting the system down, making ‘LebanOFF’ more than just an amusing slogan

Lebanon is apprehended in a deep political division mirroring the regional fault lines. Sectarianism has been the key element entrenched in the system of Lebanon. Lebanese political institutions thwart the country’s idea by making it dependent on the sectarian leaders. The political leaders from each sect have maintained their power and influence through a system of patronage to shield the passion of the religious communities by lending financial incentives, legal and illegal means of aid to its people. The Taif Agreement is considered the bedrock of this political system. The root of the problem today evoked from the protests of the 14th March protest which was led by Saad Hariri’s political block with the backing of Saudi Arabia and the USA, whereas the March 8th protest led by Michel Aoun’s party and the Hezbollah, with the support of Syria and Iran. The new technocrat government in Lebanon has the support of the March 8th alliance. The Hezbollah is identified as a terrorist organization by the US and the EU has blacklisted its armed wing. Lebanon’s religious diversity makes the country prone to external power interference, like Iran’s backing of the Shia militant Hezbollah movement, which is actively involved in Syria’s civil war. Hezbollah is a fundamental power intermediary that dominates the government of Lebanon.

 Syria influences Lebanon’s foreign policy and internal policies, and its military forces from 1976 until 2005. After the civil war, former militia leaders took control over the government ministries and public institutions by patronizing networks into the bowels of the system. Government jobs, contracts, and other resources are allocated by the sect through the process known as muhasasa.

U.S.-Lebanon Relations

Lebanon’s foreign policy captures the dynamic overlap between domestic and foreign politics. Often in Lebanese politics, local actors deploy transnational ideologies or bandwagon with external actors to gain a stronghold in domestic political struggles. Lebanese Government compromised with the sovereignty of the state and its foreign policy. The March 14 alliance, led by Saad al-Hariri,  Walid  Jumblatt,  and  the  Lebanese  Forces,  sought  to  realign Lebanon’s international foreign  policy with USA whereas the alliance led  by  Hizbullah,  Michel  ‘Awn’s  Free Patriotic Movement, and Nabih Berri, resisted this foreign policy since then. The country needs international funds to break out from 152% debt of GDP ratio. It needs billions of dollars to bailout from the IMF and the World Bank. Lebanon’s currency is falling by 60% and banks are limiting cash withdrawal. The United States pursue close ties with Lebanon, to preserve its independence, sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity. The United States, along with the international community, supports the exercise of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1559, 1680, and 1701, including the disarming of all militias, delineation of the Lebanese-Syrian border, and the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) throughout Lebanon. The United States assures a peaceful, prosperous, and stable Lebanon significant to peace in the Middle East. Lebanon hosts the highest per capita number of refugees in the world, with over one million registered refugees from Syria, between 170,000 and 270,000 longstanding Palestinians registered with the UN, and over 20,000 Iraqi and other refugees. Since the Syrian crisis, U.S. humanitarian assistance in Lebanon reconciles the Syrian refugees and host communities with food, shelter, medical care, clean water and sanitation, education, and psychosocial support.

The Deep-Rooted Crisis

The recent colossal explosion in Beirut, nearly 200 people died with 6,000 injured and left a quarter of a million became homeless. Initially, people believed a blast is an act of war or terrorism as residents of Lebanon’s capital tended to the injured and cleared the wreckage for survivors. The Lebanese had worst experiences; frequent airstrikes and car bombings because of the wars than the industrial disasters. Reconstructing the areas damaged by the blast could cost up to $15 billion and is likely to accelerate an economic collapse in Lebanon that coincided with the 2019 protests. Lebanon ranks 138th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s global Corruption Perceptions Index. The very system of sectarian power-sharing which is fuelling the patronage networks has handicapped Lebanon’s governance.

The environmental crisis began decades ago in Lebanon. In 2015 Lebanon’s waste crisis began with a landfill site closed and government authorities failed to implement a contingency plan in time to replace it. Its dumping and burning waste on the streets became rampant causing environmental and health issues. The Human Rights Watch calls it “a national health crisis”. The Lebanese government is relying on oil and gas reserves in the Mediterranean to fuel even opening up tenders for France’s Total and Russia’s Novatek for offshore drilling. The power plants pump out plumes of thick grey smoke into an otherwise bright blue sky. Plastic is turning up on beaches around the world, but the difference in Lebanon is that rubbish is also being directly dumped into the sea and coastal landfills are spelling disaster for the shoreline’s ecosystem and public health.

The shortage of US dollars in the country’s commercial banks, which led to the Lebanese pound losing value against the dollar for the first time in two decades on the newly emerged black market. The economic upheaval emerged when the importers of wheat and fuel demanded to be paid in dollars, bakeries, and petrol station unions called for strikes. Lebanon is dealing with its worst economic crisis in decades. It has the third-highest public debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio in the world at 150%. Youth unemployment is 37%, while the overall unemployment rate has reached 25%. A third of the population is living below the poverty line, according to the World Bank. Interest payments consume almost half of government revenues crippling public finances. A public sector wage increase in 2017 and higher interest rates have added to the budget deficit.

Considering the ratio of Human Rights Violation in Lebanon; during the October 2019 anti-government demonstrations the security forces of the nation propelled excessive violence force against the protesters, including prosecutions for defamation and menacing freedom of speech. The 2017 anti-torture law fell short of civil society expectations and Lebanon’s obligations under international law. Lebanon continues to try civilians, women, children in its military courts for taking part in the protest. Transgender women in Lebanon also face systemic violence and discrimination in accessing basic services, including education, employment, health care, and housing.

The Quick Fix

Lebanon has several social and economic issues even the judicial system is faulty in assistance to the promotion of workforce employability and productivity, good governance, social cohesion, and economic growth. The major issues include; lack of access to clean water and improved education services to Lebanese communities, electricity, and refugee crisis. Including the growing economic crisis, escalating violence and trampled liberty needs to be concluded in the 21st century. The increasing problems like high taxes and lack of jobs have agitated the new generation. The truth is Lebanon never really recovered from a long and devastating war. The corrupt political and finance game in the region is creating havoc. But a majority supports the sectarian politics seeing ideology and the ripped out benefits in the power-sect. There should be advanced science labs and research technology for recycling and improved waste management systems in the country. Lebanon’s government must ensure the safety of its people including common environmental and health issues. The youth needs healthcare, jobs, and good educational institutions; end the sectarian opportunists’ system of politics and high-level corruption outright a democratic regime.

The author is a post-graduate scholar who completed her M.A in politics and International Relations from Pondicherry University, 2020. She has published articles on various topics related to the field of study and analysis in different platforms

Continue Reading
Comments

Middle East

An Enemy Among Us

Published

on

The upcoming talks regarding the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, that are due to take place on January 25, should not disillusion us from the dangers of Turkey’s unilateral aggression on all fronts. Erdogan has made no real efforts to improve ties with the EU, except for the occasional vain promise of turning over a new leaf. Since October, he has urged the Muslim world to boycott French products, continued gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, blatantly ignored the arms embargo in Libya and has aided Azerbaijan in committing war crimes in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Despite the numerous warnings issued by the EU and the many failed attempts at resolving the crisis in the East Med diplomatically, the latest EU summit concluded with an anti-climactic promise to sanction certain Turkish officials regarding the East Med. This minimally symbolic promise could only be described as a mere slap on the wrist that will prove unsuccessful in deterring Turkey’s belligerent tendencies. Turkey’s increasingly hostile attitude, its callous use of the refugee crisis and its clear violation of international law in the East Med, Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh represent a danger to European values, identity and security.

We are witnessing before our eyes a dictator in the making who dreams of a return of the Ottoman empire and seeks to destroy the democratic and secular legacy of Atatürk. He is a fervent supporter of political islam – particularly the muslim brotherhood – and he relentlessly accuses the West of wanting to ‘relaunch the crusades’ against Islam. In fact, since 2014, Erdogan and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) have continuously facilitated cross-border movement into Syria and shipped illegal arms to a number of radical jihadist groups. The Turkish government also uses SADAT Defense, an islamist paramilitary group loyal to Erdogan, to aid groups that can be considered as terrorist organizations such as Sultan Murad Division and Ahrar al-Sham in Northern Syria and use their jihadi fighters to send to Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh and, most recently, Kashmir in order to bolster Turkey’s foreign policy.

Erdogan uses a mixture of islamism and nationalism to expand Turkey’s influence around the world and to consolidate power within. The two most influential factions in Turkey are the radical islamists and secular neo-nationalists, who despise each other but share a deep disdain for the west. Courtesy of neo-nationalist and former Maoist terrorist leader Dogu Perinçek, the NATO member has also enjoyed warmer ties with Russia and China over the past 5 years. As a result of these shifts in alliances and growing anti-western sentiments, Turkey is becoming increasingly at odds with the West. 

Furthermore, the growing discontent at home pushes him to adopt more aggressive tactics, divisive policies and his behavior mirrors that of a panicked authoritarian leader. Erdogan is desperately looking for a conflict to distract the Turkish population from the fall of the lira, the spread and mishandling of COVID-19, and the overall declining economy that predates the pandemic. Turkey’s future will most likely be determined by the upcoming general election that is set to take place within the next three years. If Erdogan wins the next election, it will solidify his power and bring him one step closer in turning Turkey into a dictatorship. During his stay in power, he has already conducted a series of purges to weaken and silence dissidents. Turkey now has the most imprisoned journalists in the world. 

Yet, the loss of Istanbul and Ankara in the last municipal election of 2019 demonstrate his declining popularity, and offer a glimmer of hope for the opposition. Political figures like the new mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, or the new mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavaş, represent a brighter future for Turkey. Erdogan currently finds himself in a position of weakness, which represents a rare window of opportunity for the EU to strike. Unfortunately, the EU remains deeply divided on how to handle a situation that continues to deteriorate. It seems that some member states, particularly Germany, are holding on to the naive belief that Erdogan can still be reasoned with. 

Our reluctance to impose the slightest sanctions against Turkey demonstrates our division and weakness, which emboldens the neo-sultan. A strong and united response from the European Union is the only way to curb Erdogan’s expansionist agenda. This should include renegotiating the migrant pact, imposing targeted sanctions against SADAT Defense and its leader Adnan Tanrıverdi, imposing an arms embargo, suspending the EU-Turkey customs union and finally suspending Turkey’s membership in NATO. 

Ultimately, Erdogan’s bellicose foreign policy and his contentious nationalist-islamist rhetoric makes it impossible to consider Erdogan’s Turkey as our ally. As the EU reaches out yet another olive branch, Erdogan has his eye on the wars to come. 

Continue Reading

Middle East

Is Erdogan’s Obsession with Demirtas a Personal Vendetta or a Calculated Strategy?

Published

on

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) Grand Chamber ruled that the former co-chair of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), Selahattin Demirtaş must be immediately released. The Court ruled that his years-long detention “had pursued the ulterior purpose of stifling pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate”. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan swiftly reacted to the ECHR’s ruling and characterized the decision as hypocritical’ and accused the Court of defending a ‘terrorist.’

To many, Erdogan’s reaction to the Court’s ruling should not be a surprise,but his resentment and anger toward Demirtaş are quite shocking. So, why does Erdogan pursue a vendetta against him? Or is it a calculated political strategy? How could Demirtaş’s release affect the political landscape in Turkey? What could be the implications of releasing or not releasing him be on the US-Turkey relations during the Biden era?

Yes, the ECHR’s ruling is a significant and expected development. What is more significant is that Erdogan’s quick reaction shows his deeply rooted frustration with Demirtaş, which dates back to the pre-June 2015 elections. In March 2015,Demirtaş made a short but a spectacular speech at the Turkish Parliament when he said, “we will not make you the President.” He also said, “We are not a movement of bargaining, a party of bargaining. There has never been a dirty deal between us and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and there will never be…” His reference to ‘dirty deal’ was believed to be an offer from the AKP to HDP in exchange for support during the general election. In the June 2015 election, HDP managed to secure the electoral threshold with 13% vote for the first time in the pro-Kurdish parties’ history. Additionally, they secured 80 seats in parliament which made them the second biggest opposition party in Turkey. This was an unprecedented victory for the pro-Kurdish party and a breakthrough in Turkish political history. It is fair to say that, based on the author’s experience, Demirtaş’s rising charisma has become a liability, not only for Erdogan but also for Ocalan, PKK’s once unquestionable leader.  

Erdoğan’s hateful outburst towards the call for Demirtaş’s release is more about Erdoğan’s political self-interest and concerns than his personal vendetta. Demirtaş’s release could likely have far bigger implications on the political calculations in Turkey. They would primarily impact on the future of the People’s Alliance, the coalition between the Justice and Development Party (AK) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), where AKP focuses its efforts to maintain control over the Kurdish issue. For the AKP, having an alliance with the MHP has been beneficial so far but not without major tradeoffs. These includethe MHP’s stance against the Kurdish issue and its eroding voter support nationwide.

AKP’s strategy to maintain power partly relies on its ability to create factions within the existing political parties. The pro-Kurdish parties are no exception. Strategies include consolidating Kurdish votes around AKP or dividing them to create enough division as to not let the HDP run as one single dominant Kurdish party in the next elections.

Demirtaş’s release could pose risks for AKP’s three-fold strategy: Dominate, divide and maintain the status quo. First, by arresting MPs, local politicians, mayors, and activists, AKP aimed to paralyze and dominate the Kurdish voter base. So, preventing Demirtaş’s release could serve to kill the electoral enthusiasm at the party’s voting base and prevent unity among the Kurdish constituency. Demirtaş’s potential release could give rise to his popularity, not only among the Kurdish voters but also the left-wing secularists. Such a scenario could force the AKP towards more pro-Kurdish narratives and policies that could eventually weaken the AKP-MHP coalition.

Second, dividing and deepening fractions; and creating splinter parties would mean that the HDP could not consolidate the Kurdish constituency. Although having a smaller base, an Islamist Kurdish Free Cause Party (Hüda-Par)has supported Erdogan during the 2018 Presidential election. They are a group with alleged ties with the Kurdish Hezbollah, which has committed the atrocities in Turkey in the 1990s and early 2000s.Recently, the leader of Hüda-Par expressed his disappointment with ECHR’s ruling after he paid a visit to Erdogan in the Presidential Palace. Another example is establishing the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), allegedly politically in line with Barzani’s tradition, to divide HDP votes.

Third, by cutting new deals with Öcalan again, they aim to appeal to his supporters to maintain the status quo. Just like during the local elections in 2019, AKP might take another step to re-instrumentalize Öcalan despite his failed emissary role in the last Istanbul local re-run. Öcalan called for HDP’s neutrality, which meant not supporting the opposition candidate Ekrem Imamoglu. Öcalan’s message was contradicting with HDP’s former co-chair Selahattin Demirtas’s call for support for Imamoglu. Though AKP’s strategy of revitalizing Öcalan may not produce the desired outcome for AKP, it could buy some time by diverting public attention from the victimhood of Demirtaş and HDP.

While releasing Demirtas could pose challenges for the AKP and its leader Erdogan domestically, not releasing him could prove costly. As a pragmatic leader as anyone could be, to survive politically Erdogan has made several U-turns domestically and internationally. Facing an economic crisis and continuing decline in approval ratings Erdogan could, unwillingly, comply with the Court’s ruling. This could help him have a fresh start with President-elect Biden,  who called Erdogan an autocrat.

Regardless of whether he would be released or not, as a political leader, Demirtaş will dominate domestic politics in Turkey and continue to be a critical actor in the region vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue.

Continue Reading

Middle East

Saudi-Turkey Discourse: Is a Resolve Imminent?

Published

on

The two prominent Muslim countries: Saudi Arabia and Turkey have had an undulating relationship over the course of decades and despite of the geographical and religious proximity, the two have rarely been on the same page. Recent tide over the relation is an outcry by the Saudi Chambers of Commerce to ‘Boycott everything Turkish’. Allegedly the boycott spans over a wide range: level of investment in the country, tourism interchange and even the imports are to be curbed. This was deemed as a “moral responsibility” of every Saudi citizen against the nation’s enemies; as per the statement of Saudi’s Chamber of Commerce head Ajlan Al Ajlan.

The duo have taken opposing sides for decades, especially when it narrows down to regional conflicts. The history relays strong relations between the two Sunni-majority Muslim countries, however, with polar position in the Syrian crisis followed by a blood-ridden civil war, the relations never recovered to a modest degree. The Saudi Kingdom, under the premiership of Muhammad Bin Salman, shifted its Syria policy in late 2018, seeking to normalize Assad’s regime while Turkey continued to support the opposing forces. Meanwhile, in Libya, Riyadh aided warlord Khalifa Haftar, while Ankara intervened to channel militarily assistance to the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).

The relations between the two Islamic nations were again triggered by the statement of Turkish president, Receb Tayyib Erdogen, accusing the Gulf nations for the instability in the region. This was the statement that incited such a hoarse reaction from the economic entity within the kingdom. The tie between the two was never a strong one but a major incident strained the relations back in 2018. The murder of Saudi citizen and a columnist of The Washington Post, Jamal Ahmed Khashoggi, back in October 2018 set all fires loose when Saudi government was outright accused of involvement in the brutal murder at Saudi Consulate. The Turkish president went as far as insinuating the involvement of crown prince, Muhammad bin Salman, in the gruesome murder. Earlier in 2017, Ankara stood as a vital support mechanism, alongside Tehran,to Doha in terms of the rudimentary facets of finance and military when Qatar was excluded and sectionalised by Saudi Arabia and its allies on account of close affiliation with rebellious groups in the region backed by Iran; accounts that were repeatedly denied by the Qatari regime.

The two Islamic republics have been at head once again ever since the recent controversial decision of UAE, Bahrain and Morocco to join hands and normalise relations with Israel came to light. Turkey and Iran, despite of the Shia-Sunni disparity, have relatively been close in ties since both have stood at odds with the foreign involvement in the region while Saudi Arabia has welcomed it with open arms. Even with the normalisation of relations with Israel, UAE and Bahrain met heavy criticism around the Muslim world but majorly championed by Iran and Turkey: former calling the move as a “Stab in the back” while the latter threatening to sever ties with the Gulf states. Both the statements were shrugged by the Saudi representatives as an ‘internal matter’ and warning the duo to refrain from interference. The Saudi position on the normalisation was clear when Israeli flights were allowed to fly through the Kingdom’s airspace en route to UAE.

The growing animosity is not novel between the duo as they have been in contrasting positions on multiple foreign policy issues and have even held starkly different positions over the islamist groups operating in the west European region. Although Saudi government officials have not confirmed the implication of the statement of its Chamber of Commerce, the signs of blooming tensions were sensed earlier this year. Even pre-Covid, the tourism dropped 17% between the countries and Turkey, being the 12th highest trade partner of the kingdom, saw a steady decline in bi-lateral trade. Albeit the externalities of the pandemic, the relations continue to deteriorate, and the signs might turn more apparent over time.

Now with Mr. Joe Biden prepared to take on the United States’ foreign policy, the Middle East would be the prime focus as per his pensive thoughts over the issues of the region. As he mentioned to ‘Reassess’ the relations with Saudi Arabia, the regard is clearly in terms of Saudi’s nefarious role in fanning the steps of Trump in the region, more specifically its involvement in the Yemen civil war and the controversial killing of the Washington Post columnist, Jamal Ahmed Khashoggi. With isolation looming and need for solid alliance for better foundations for US relations, Saudi Arabia may have started with reconciling with Qatar but Turkey is optimistically the next on the radar.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Trending