On June 17, the United States began implementing the Caesar Act (the “Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act”) following a six-month grace period that was granted to the administration so that it could prepare secondary sanctions against foreign citizens for cooperating with Damascus in oil, gas, aviation, defence and construction. The original sanctions list was made up of 39 Syrian individuals and legal entities, including Bashar al-Assad, his wife and his brother and sister. Paradoxically, however, not only do the new restrictive measures create difficulties, but they also form prerequisites for mobilizing Syria’s internal resources and expanding Russia’s economic presence in the country.
Factors Aggravating the Socioeconomic Situation in Syria
The COVID-19 Pandemic
At first glance, Syria does not appear to be a coronavirus hot spot. The country has a population of over 16.4 million, yet the Ministry of Health has reported just 496 cases, 25 deaths and 144 recoveries as of July 17. Humanitarian NPOs reported the first case of COVID-19 in the mutinous city of Idlib on July 9 — it had been previously noted that the number of COVID-19 cases could have been greater by an order of magnitude due to the lack of quarantine measures. The Kurdish Self-Administration identified two more cases in northeast Syria back on April 28.
Initially, Syrian experts thought that the country’s marginalization in the global economy would make it less vulnerable to the pandemic. The authorities established a governmental headquarters and deployed a standard set of measures to combat the infection: borders were closed, air travel was suspended, people arriving in the country from abroad had to quarantine, a curfew was introduced, travel between governorates was restricted, public events were banned, and schools, universities, markets and restaurants were closed. The elections to the People’s Council (Parliament) were rescheduled for July 19, 2020. In order to support the population and businesses, the Ministry of Labour launched the “National Campaign for Social Emergency Response,” while the Ministry of Tourism approved a plan for supporting the tourism industry. The government abolished the 40-per cent import deposits and allowed private enterprises to import flour. Sugar, rice, tea and fuel were distributed at subsidized prices under the “smart card” programme. In late May, the government followed the example of other countries around the world, started to relax the protective measures: the curfew was abolished and government agencies resumed their regular operations.
However, it should be noted that, according to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, the conflict in Syria meant that the country was poorly prepared to handle the pandemic. The lack of consensus among foreign actors on how to provide aid to Syria did not help — the country’s additional needs totalled USD 385 million, according to the May 7 briefing of UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric. Damascus had to be content with donor deliveries from China, India and Russia. The sanctions took away the competitive edge of the local products due to high prices on energy, diesel fuel and gas and the shortage of raw materials and skilled labour, which played into the hands of commercial monopolies.
The pandemic nullified the government’s effort to present the reconstruction effort as a “prize” for investors, since all exhibitions, including the 62nd Damascus International Fair, were rescheduled for 2021 (despite Washington’s warnings, 38 countries participated in the 61st Fair, including business delegations from the United Arab Emirates and Oman). The coronavirus paralyzed trade with Iraq through the Abu Kamal — Qaim border checkpoint that was opened on September 30, 2019, and on which both parties had pinned great hopes.
The falling living standards produced an upsurge in protests: in January and June 2020, the Druze population in the relatively calm southern governorate of As-Suwayda held rallies demanding the resignation of Bashar al-Assad. To defuse social tensions, the President dismissed the unpopular Prime Minister Imad Khamis, who had been in office since 2016.
The Lebanese Crisis
The crisis in neighbouring Lebanon, which was particularly acute in October–November 2019 and April 2020, had a far greater effect on Syria’s economic situation than the pandemic. By early 2020, Syrian deposits in Lebanese banks had reached USD 40–50 billion — a quarter of all deposits. Tighter control over cash withdrawals and banking transactions made it harder to transfer assets out of banks and diminished the effectiveness of the Intervention Fund for Supporting the Syrian pound established by the Syrian government. Wire transfers from Syrian diasporas abroad also dropped, which impacted the state’s foreign currency revenues and narrowed the domestic investment base. Syria’s total net wealth (USD 21.1 billion as of June 2019, according to Credit Swiss) is still many times less than Lebanon’s (USD 232.2 billion), not to mention that of Saudi Arabia (USD 1.56 trillion, making it the richest country in the Arab world).
The Caesar Act immediately delivered a blow to the banking cooperation between Damascus and Beirut, as Lebanon’s CSCGroup stopped servicing Syrian ATMs. On June 23, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria Walid Muallem spoke about coordinating efforts to prevent secondary American sanctions, but never received a clear response from Lebanon.
Devaluation of the Syrian Currency
The high demand for U.S. dollars on the back of the devaluation of the Lebanese pound (the exchange rate had long sat at around LBP 1500 to the dollar, but has now fallen to LBP 2200 to the dollar) accelerated the depreciation of the Syrian currency. By mid-January 2020, the Syrian pound had dropped below the record figure of SYP 1000 to the dollar, while the pre-war exchange rate was SYP 47 to the dollar. The situation was also negatively affected by Turkish liras circulating in Idlib and northern regions that are formally controlled by the opposition’s “transitional government” formed with Ankara’s support.
In an attempt to keep control of the situation, on January 18, Bashar al-Assad issued Order 2/2020, introducing harsher punishment for illegal transactions in foreign currencies. In February, the government capped currency imports at USD 100,000, with currency in excess of USD 5000 subject to declaration. Currency exports by Syrian citizens were capped at USD 10,000. The government took the unprecedented step of allowing a private company to put an e-currency (lira) into circulation starting on January 1, 2020, which was to be tied to domestic accounts nominated in Syrian pounds, but it could be used abroad as an alternative to the dollar in order to finance imports. The idea was that it would stimulate demand for Syrian pounds since participants in such transactions would buy them in order to exchange them for liras.
The Fragmentation of Syrian Territory
Thus far, Bashar al-Assad has failed to keep his promise to “liberate every inch of the Syrian land.” Approximately 40 per cent of the country, including Idlib, the north, and the trans-Euphrates territory is not under Damascus’ control. The lawyers at the Syrian Law Journal website hit the nail on the head when they noted that the Caesar Act is intended primarily to isolate government-controlled regions, which will inevitably result in the growth of “shadow” commerce. In October 2017, Herbert McMaster summed up the gist of the American approaches, “We should ensure that not a dollar […] goes to reconstruct anything that is under the control of this brutal [Syrian] regime.”
Discord in Syria’s Top Echelons
The economic crisis was compounded by Bashar al-Assad’s cousin Rami Makhlouf, the most prominent of the “state bourgeois” whom Syrians nicknamed the “children of the power” (Awlad alsulta), falling out of favour. Last year, he was rumoured to have been placed under house arrest for his refusal to donate the bulk of his 5-billion-dollar fortune to advance the Syrian President’s personal efforts to involve the private sector in the reconstruction of the country. Foreign commenters put forward an ambiguous version claiming that Makhlouf had a complicated relationship with Bashar al-Assad’s wife Asma, who was planning to create, together with Samer Foz, another “child of the power,” Syria’s third cellular service provider to compete with Syriatel, the flagship of Makhlouf’s “empire.”
The Caesar Act as an Aggravating Factor
While the Department of State insists that secondary sanctions do not extend to the humanitarian sphere, they cannot but have an effect on regular Syrians, since they aggravate the economic crisis in the country. This is an apt place to quote Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Vershinin who said at the IV Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region on June 30, 2020, that the Caesar Act ignores UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s call to suspend restrictions in the face of the global coronavirus pandemic.
Along with its destructive influence on the situation inside Syria, the Caesar Act is clearly intended to scare away those who may want to invest in the country’s reconstruction efforts. This applies primarily to Washington’s Arab allies, even against the backdrop of positive signals sent to Damascus, such as the telephone conversation between Crown Prince of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Bashar al-Assad, when the parties discussed aid to Syria in combating the COVID-19.
The Caesar Act and Russia’s Economic Presence in Syria
Nothing Good Can Come of it for Moscow?
Despite the obvious obstacles that the Caesar Acts creates for Russian companies, the are a number of examples where the reverse is true in terms of Syria leaning more and more towards Russia economically. Russian business has experience in dividing up the roles with Iran, the leading economic player in Syria. For instance, the global media took notice of the agreement to jointly develop the phosphate fields in Palmyra, which was liberated from ISIL by pro-Iranian units.
New sanctions will most likely postpone China’s involvement in the reconstruction effort, since China was already somewhat cautious, confining itself to humanitarian aid on a rather modest scale by Chinese standards (on March 4, an agreement was signed for Beijing to provide a 14-million-dollar grant). Lebanon’s domestic crisis rendered the possibility of non-sanctioned Lebanon acting as an intermediary, suggesting that China invest in the Tripoli port in order to transform it into a “hub” for entry into Syria, moot.
The potential of Abkhazia and Crimea, which have already been hit by sanctions, to act as intermediaries is objectively increasing. For instance, the Agreement between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea and the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade of the Syrian Arab Republic on Trade and Economic Cooperation as part of plans to create a joint trading house to export grain and industrial products to Syria with payments to be made in roubles, and the Agreement on Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Abkhazia and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in the Field of Trade Promotion and Economic Cooperation may be injected with specific substance.
The Caesar Act may prompt Syrian IT sector operators to choose Russian analogues or unique technologies instead of the American software they previously used, thus bypassing the sanctions, or instead of cooperating with India. The first sign that this may be the case was the launch of the Electronic Signature Certification Centre with the assistance of RusinformExport LLC in September 2019.
Russia’s Economic Strategies in Syria
There are two emerging approaches concerning Russia’s participation in Syria’s post-war reconstruction effort. The “broad” concept entails involving large- and medium-sized business with financial and administrative governmental support and under the auspices of the Permanent Russian–Syrian Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation (which held its 12th in Moscow meeting on December 23–25, 2019). The Commission prioritizes energy, transportation and the IT sector.
The “narrow” strategy entails putting the “Syrian dossier” within the purview of a very narrow circle of entrepreneurs who have experience of working in Syria in peacetime and wartime, such as Gennady Timchenko’s Stroytransgaz JSC (STG), which assisted in the construction of two gas-processing plants and now focuses on ensuring the end-to-end cycle of producing, processing and exporting phosphates. STG’s bodies have leased the Syrian port of Tartus for 49 years as a result.
Given the appearance of the Caesar Act, it would appear that Moscow will choose the “narrow” option in order to avoid secondary sanctions being imposed on Russian businesses, many of which work in Europe and with the member states of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. Companies such as STG are used to operating under sanctions and dealing with security issues. They have a “financial security margin” for investing and wealthy local partners. They could help recoup the money spent on the military operation in Syria by mining valuable minerals on exclusive terms.
Russia’s Prospective Role in Restoring Economic Ties
Moscow is prepared to act as an intermediary in implementing projects throughout Syria by using summit-level dialogue with Turkey, connections in Kurdish business circles, and the presence of the Military Police of Russia in Syria’s northern regions and other parts of the country. It should be remembered that Recep Tayyip Erdogan proposed that Turkey, Russia and the United States jointly manage oil fields in the Deir-ez-Zor Governorate, which he believes would benefit all the parties to the conflict, including the Syrian authorities, the opposition’s “transitional government” and the Syrian Democratic Forces.
Possible Responses of Damascus to the Caesar Act
Complicated Relations with Iran and Russia
It is no secret that Damascus has to manoeuvre between Moscow and Tehran, as they pursue different interests. Iran banks on proxy militias as it advances its influence “beyond the Syrian state” as part of its anti-Israel “Shia Crescent” project. These actions open up the Syrians to U.S. sanctions and make them a target of Israel’s surgical strikes. They also allow Tehran to claim a special role in the reconstruction effort, which, once again, prompts a harsher retaliation from the United States. Russia, on the contrary, is interested in bolstering the official institutions of “al-Assad’s Syria” which, by ousting non-state actors, would monitor business projects, primarily those related to valuable minerals.
If there is a shortage of commercially profitable projects, we cannot rule out the possibility of Russia rigidly protecting its interests by keeping Damascus from escalating the conflict and getting too friendly with Iran. Western media reported some backstage agreements between Syria and the United Arab Emirates that entail Syria continuing the operation in Idlib in exchange for “financial compensation” and in contravention of Russia–Turkey arrangements. It was against this backdrop that the Russian media ran stories of Moscow’s discontent with Bashar al-Assad this past May.
Paying for Russian and Iranian Aid with Valuable Minerals
Heeding the imperative to provide its main allies with access to its mineral resources, the People’s Council of Syria ratified three oil field development agreements in December 2019, just as Donald Trump was signing the Caesar Act. These agreements were concluded between the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and Mercury Limited (units and 19) and Velada (unit 23). Since little is known about these companies, it was speculated that they are a front for an entrepreneur with ties to the Kremlin. In an attempt to maintain a balance between Moscow and Tehran, the Syrian parliament opened discussions in May on giving unit 12 near Abu Kamal to the Iranians as partial repayment of loans received from Iran in 2013–2019. A new military agreement with Iran was signed in Damascus on July 8, 2020. Adviser to the President of Syria Bouthaina Shaaban called it the first step to defeating the Caesar Act.
The Syrian Government’s Dialogue with Kurds
Despite the fact that the Syrian government does not recognize the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, it did not interrupt its commercial and economic contacts with the Kurds. In June, the government approved an increase in the purchase price of wheat from SYP 225 to SYP 400 per kilogram, as opposed to SYP 315 per kilogram paid by the local authorities, in order to purchase maximum amounts of wheat in Jazira (in the north-eastern Al-Hasakah Governorate) known as Syria’s “grain stores.” This showed that Damascus was ready to restore economic ties before the political settlement of the Kurdish problem had been achieved.
The EU’s Stance on the Caesar Act
Much will depend on the stance that Europe takes on the Caesar Act, and this is a complicated matter. In May, Brussels once again extended its sanctions against Syria for another year. On the other hand, Europe is debating adjusting its approaches to the Syrian reconstruction effort. The German expert Muriel Asseburg notes that the European Union’s consolidated standing is eroded by differences between the United Kingdom, Germany and France on the one hand, as they favour preserving the hard-line approach, and Austria, Hungary, Italy and Poland on the other, as they are ready to expand their economic presence in “al-Assad’s Syria.” The proposal is to become involved in the reconstruction effort in the areas controlled by the authorities, thus raising living standards under the slogan of “sustainable stabilization” and refraining from completely normalizing relations with Damascus.
To sum up, even though the Caesar Act is a challenge for Syria and its allies, there is real potential there for neutralizing its consequences through the mobilization of Syria’s internal reserves and strengthening economic cooperation with Russia.
From our partner RIAC
Israel and Turkey in search of solutions
Twelve and eleven years have elapsed since the Davos and Mavi Marmara incidents, respectively, and Turkey-Israel relations are undergoing intense recovery efforts. They are two important Eastern neighbours and influence regional stability.
Currently, as in the past, relations between the two countries have a structure based on realpolitik, thus pursuing a relationship of balance/interest, and hinge around the Palestinian issue and Israel’s position as the White House’s privileged counterpart. However, let us now briefly summarise the history of Turkish-Jewish relations.
The first important event that comes to mind when mentioning Jews and Turks is that when over 200,000 Jews were expelled by the Spanish Inquisition in 1491, the Ottoman Empire invited them to settle in its territory.
Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognise Israel in 1949. Israel’s first diplomatic Mission to Turkey was opened on January 7, 1950 but, following the Suez crisis in 1956, relations were reduced to the level of chargé d’affaires. In the second Arab-Israeli war of 1967, Turkey chose not to get involved and it did not allow relations to break off completely.
The 1990s saw a positive trend and development in terms of bilateral relations. After the second Gulf War in 1991 -which, as you may recall, followed the first Iraqi one of 1980-1988 in which the whole world was against Iran (with the only exception of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Syria, Libya and the moral support of Enver Hoxha’s Albania) – Turkey was at the centre of security policy in the region. In that context, Turkey-Israel relations were seriously rekindled.
In 1993, Turkey upgraded diplomatic relations with Israel to ambassadorial level. The signing of the Oslo Accords between Palestine and Israel led to closer relations. The 1996 military cooperation agreement was signed between the two countries in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, which provided significant logistical and intelligence support to both sides.
In the 2000s, there was a further rapprochement with Israel, due to the “zero problems with neighbours” policy promoted by Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party. I still remember issue No. 3/1999 of the Italian review of geopolitics “Limes” entitled “Turkey-Israel, the New Alliance”.
In 2002, an Israeli company undertook the project of modernising twelve M-60 tanks belonging to the Turkish armed forces. In 2004, Turkey agreed to sell water to Israel from the Manavgat River.
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to Israel in 2005 was a turning point in terms of mediation between Palestine and Israel and further advancement of bilateral relations. In 2007, Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas spoke at the Turkish Grand National Assembly one day apart. High-level visits from Israel continued.
On December 22, 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert came to Ankara and met with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In that meeting, significant progress was made regarding Turkey’s mediation between Israel and Syria.
Apart from the aforementioned incidents, the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations occurred five days after the above stated meeting, i.e. Operation “Cast Lead” against Gaza on December 27, 2008. After that event, relations between the two sides were never the same as before.
Recently, however, statements of goodwill have been made by both countries to normalise political relations. In December 2020, President Erdoğan stated he wanted to improve relations with Israel and said: “It is not possible for us to accept Israel’s attitude towards the Palestinian territories. This is the point in which we differ from Israel – otherwise, our heart desires to improve our relations with it as well”.
In its relations with Israel, Turkey is posing the Palestinian issue as a condition. When we look at it from the opposite perspective, the Palestinian issue is a vital matter for Israel. It is therefore a severe obstacle to bilateral relations.
On the other hand, many regional issues such as Eastern Mediterranean, Syria and some security issues in the region require the cooperation of these two key countries. For this reason, it is clear that both sides wish at least to end the crisis, reduce rhetoric at leadership level and focus on cooperation and realpolitik areas.
In the coming months, efforts will certainly be made to strike a balance between these intentions and the conditions that make it necessary to restart bilateral relations with Israel on an equal footing. As improved relations with Israel will also positively influence Turkey’s relations with the United States.
Turkey seeks to avoid the USA and the EU imposing sanctions that could go so far as to increase anti-Western neo-Ottoman rhetoric, while improved relations with Israel could offer a positive outcome not only to avoid the aforementioned damage, but also to solve the Turkish issues related to Eastern Mediterranean, territorial waters, Libya and Syria. Turkey has no intention of backing down on such issues that it deems vital. Quite the reverse. It would like to convey positive messages at the level of talks and Summits.
Another important matter of friction between Turkey and Israel is the use of oil and gas in the Eastern Mediterranean reserves between Egypt, Israel, Greece and Cyprus (Nicosia).
This approach is excluding Turkey. The USA and the EU also strongly support the current situation (which we addressed in a previous article) for the additional reason that France has been included in the equation.
The alignment of forces and fronts in these maritime areas were also widely seen during the civil war in Libya, where Turkey, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, France, as well as other players such as Russia, Italy, etc. came into the picture.
Ultimately, a point of contact between Turkey and Israel is the mediation role that the former could play in relations between Iran and Israel, especially after the improvement of Turkish-Iranian relations.
Indeed, in the aftermath of the U.S. airstrike in Baghdad – which killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020 -the Turkish Foreign Minister stated that the U.S. action would increase insecurity and instability in the region. He also reported that Turkey was worried about rising tensions between the United States and Iran that could turn Iraq back into an area of conflict to the detriment of peace and stability in the region. There was also a condolence phone call from President Erdoğan to Iranian President Rouhani, urging him to avoid a conflictual escalation with the United States following the airstrike.
Consequently, it is in the Turkish President’s interest to maintain an open channel with Iran, so that he himself can soften the mutual tensions between Israel and Iran, and – in turn – Israeli diplomacy can influence President Biden’s choices, albeit less pro-Israel than Donald Trump’s.
Turkey is known to have many relationship problems with the United States – especially after the attempted coup of July 15-16, 2016 and including the aforementioned oil issue – and realises that only Israel can resolve the situation smoothly.
In fact, Israel-USA relations are not at their best as they were under President Trump. President Erdoğan seems to be unaware of this fact, but indeed the Turkish President knows that the only voice the White House can hear is Israel’s, and certainly not the voice of the Gulf monarchies, currently at odds with Turkey.
Israel keeps a low profile on the statements made by President Erdoğan with regard to the Palestinians- since it believes them to be consequential – as well as in relation to a series of clearly anti-Zionist attitudes of the Turkish people.
We are certain, however, that President Erdoğan’s declarations of openness and Israeli acquiescence will surely yield concrete results.
The 25-year China-Iran agreement
On March 27, 2021, a document entitled “Comprehensive Document of Iran-China Cooperation” was signed by Javad Zarif, Iran’s Foreign Minister, and his Chinese counterpart. The Iranian regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had previously called “the agreement between the presidents of Iran and China correct and wise.” However, the Iranian people have widely criticized it as entirely against their national interests. Iranian officials have not even publicized the document’s contents yet probably because it is highly contentious.
In 2019, excerpts from this document were revealed by the Economist Petroleum news site. The details included:
- China invests $460 billion in Iranian oil and transportation sectors. China will get its investment back from the sale of Iranian crude during the first five years.
- China buys Iranian petroleum products at least 32% cheaper.
- The Chinese can decide before other companies whether to participate in completing all or part of a petrochemical project.
- 50,000 Chinese security personnel will be deployed to protect Chinese projects in Iran.
- China has the right to delay the repayment of its debts for up to two years in exchange for Iranian products’ purchase.
- At least one Russian company will be allowed to participate in the Tabriz-Ankara gas pipeline design together with the Chinese operator.
- Every year, 110 senior Revolutionary Guards officers travel to China and Russia for military training. 110 Chinese and Russian advisers will be stationed in Iran to train Revolutionary Guards officers.
- Development of Iranian military equipment and facilities will be outsourced to China, and Chinese and Russian military aircraft and ships will operate the developed facilities.
Even some circles within the regime have criticized the agreement. The state-run Arman newspaper wrote, “China has a 25-year contract with Iran and is investing $460 billion in Iran. It is somewhat ambiguous. Presently, China is holding the money it owes us and blames it on the U.S. sanctions. How can we trust this country to invest $460 billion in Iran?”
Last year, Iran and China had the lowest trade in the previous 16 years, and according to statistics, by the end of 2020, the volume of trade between Iran and China was about $16 billion, which, including undocumented oil sales, still does not reach $20 billion.
Jalal Mirzaei, a former member of Iran’s parliament, said: “If in the future the tensions between Tehran and Washington are moderated, and we see the lifting of some of the sanctions, China can also provide the basis for implementing the provisions of this document, but if the situation continues like today, Beijing will not make any effort to implement the document, as it is essentially unable to take concrete action on the ground because of the sanctions.”
Iran is vital to China in two ways, through its geopolitical location and its geo-economic importance. China knows that it does not have enough natural resources and is currently having a hard time supplying them from Russia and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia supplies its energy needs from oil giant Aramco, half of which is owned by the United States. That is why China is looking for a safe alternative that the United States will not influence, and the only option is Iran. They may also have a two-pronged plan in Iran, which involves using Iran’s profitable market and making Iran into a lever of pressure against the United States for additional concessions.
The Iranian regime’s objectives
The deal could deepen China’s influence in the Middle East and undermine U.S. efforts to isolate the Iranian regime. While the international dispute over the Iranian regime’s nuclear program has not been resolved, it is unclear how much this agreement could be implemented. The regime intends to make it a bargaining chip in possible future nuclear negotiations. However, some of Iran’s top authorities believe that China and Russia cannot be trusted 100 percent.
Due to the sanctions, the regime has a tough time to continue providing financial support to its proxy militias in the region. The regime also faced two major domestic uprisings in 2017 and 2019. Khamenei’s regime survived the widespread uprisings by committing a massacre, killing 1,500 young protesters in the 2019 uprising alone, according to the Iranian opposition, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and later confirmed by the Iranian regime’s Interior Ministry officials. Now with the coronavirus pandemic, Khamenei has been able to delay another major uprising.
Iran’s economy is on the verge of collapse. Khamenei must bow to western countries’ demands regarding the nuclear issue, including an end to its regional interventions and its ballistic missile program. Khamenei will struggle to save his regime from s imminent uprisings and a deteriorating economy that will undoubtedly facilitate more protests by the army of the unemployed and the hungry at any moment.
Unlike the 2015 JCPOA, the Iranian regime in 2021 is in a much weaker position. In fact, by many accounts, it is the weakest in its 40-year history. By signing the recent Iran-China agreement and auctioning Iranian resources, Khamenei wants to pressure the United States to surrender and restore the 2015 JCPOA as quickly as possible. But in the end, this pivot will not counteract domestic pressures that target the regime’s very existence.
China-Arab Relations: From Silk to Friendship
China and the Arabs have a long and rich economic and cultural history, and this distinguished relationship still exists today, with a promising future. This bilateral relationship between the two nations is based on the principles of respect and non-interference in internal affairs or foreign policies. Therefore, China’s relationship with the Arabs as well as with other nations is unique and a model to be followed. If you meet a Chinese person, the first phrase will be “Alabo” or an Arab in Mandarin, and he/she will welcome you. The Chinese state’s dealings with its counterparts can be measured based on the model of this Chinese citizen. China deals with the Arabs on the basis of friendship and historical ties.
The history of Sino-Arab relations goes back to the Tang Dynasty, and these relations developed with the flourishing of trade between the two nations. Since China was famous for its high quality silk, this trade route was called the “Silk Road”. Baron Ferdinand Freiherr von Richthofen, better known in English as Baron von Richthofen, was a German traveller, geographer, and scientist. He is noted for coining the terms “Seidenstraße” and “Seidenstraßen” = “Silk Road” or “Silk Route” in 1877.
Chinese-Arab relations have developed in contemporary history. In 1930, China established official relations with the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A library in China was named the “Fouad Islamic Library”, after the late Egyptian king, “Fuad the First”. In 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser cut ties with China and established relations with the Communist People’s Republic of China and inaugurated an embassy in Egypt. In the same year, the Arab League established relations with the People’s Republic of China. By the year 1990, all Arab countries cut their relations with the Republic of China and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.
In 2004, the China-Arab Cooperation Forum was established, and today it is considered a milestone for the Sino-Arab relationship. At its inauguration, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing delivered a speech stating:“The Arab world is an important force on the international scene, and that China and the Arab countries have enjoyed a long friendship. Our similar history, our common goals and our broad interests have been credited with enhancing cooperation between the two sides; no matter how the international situation changes, China has always been the sincere friend of the Arab world”. The China-Arab Cooperation Forum was officially established during the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to the headquarters of the League of Arab States in January of 2004.
Hu Jintao indicated at that time that the formation of the forum is a continuation of the traditional friendship between China and the Arab world. The Chinese president said at the time, “The establishment of the forum is conducive to expanding mutual cooperation in a variety of fields. He added that China had made four proposals; First, maintaining mutual respect, fair treatment and sincere cooperation at the political level. Second, strengthening economic and trade relations through cooperation in the fields of investment and trade, contracted projects, labor services, energy, transportation, communications, agriculture, environmental protection and information. Third, expand cultural exchanges. Finally, conducting training for the employees.”
During the second session of the forum in Beijing in 2006, China showed its sympathy for the issues of the Arab world and its interest in the peace process between Palestine and Israel, since China is a peace-loving country; it presented the idea of “a nuclear-free Middle East”. China is the best friend of the Arab countries today. Although some Arab countries have strong relations with the West whose policy does not match the Chinese policy, but all Arab countries agree on friendly and good relations with the People’s Republic of China.
The Arab citizen is not interested today in the foreign policy of the US, the deadly weapons of the US and Russia, or European culture, but rather the livelihood and economy, and this is what China provides through its wise economic policy. In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative, or New Silk Road, which will restore glow to China-Arab relations; as the Arab world is in a strategic location on the initiative map. Thus, the Arab countries are an important partner for China in the initiative. Although the volume of trade exchanges between China and the Arab countries exceeded 200 billion US dollars, which increased 10 times over the past decade, there was no commercial and institutional arrangement to facilitate trade between the two sides.
China, as a peaceful and non-invasive country, aims to promote economic cooperation with Arab region on an equal basis because it considers the Arab world a historic partner. The historical experience of the Arabs with the Chinese through the Silk Road has confirmed that China differs from the nations of colonialism and imperialism, which consider the Arab region a place rich in natural resources only. In his historic speech at the Arab League, Chinese President Xi stressed that China will not seek to extend influence and search for proxies in the Middle East. The Chinese initiatives will contribute to establishing security and stability through economic development and improving the people’s livelihood, in line with the post-2015 development agenda and the aspirations of the Arab people for a better life, as the Chinese experience proves that development is the key to digging out the roots of conflicts and extremism in all its forms.
China is a neutral country and does not favor the use of violence. During the Syrian crisis, for example, the Chinese envoy to the Security Council raised his hand three times, meaning that China, with its wise diplomacy, supported the Syrian regime without entering the military war. During the recent Chinese military parade, Chinese President Xi Jinping revealed some Chinese military capabilities and thus sent a message to the enemies that China will always be ready if a war is imposed on it, and a message of support to China’s allies. The Arab region today needs a real partner who possesses economic and military power and international political influence, such as China; to ensure the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, and to consolidate the China-Arab relations and raise it to the level of a strategic alliance.
Pakistan and Germany are keen to Sustain Multifaceted and Mutually beneficial Cooperation
Pakistan has varied history of relationship and cooperation with other countries in international arena. Despite of proactive foreign policy Pakistan...
Disability policies must be based on what the disabled need
Diversity policies, especially when it comes to disabled people, are often created and implemented by decision makers with very different...
Preparing (Mega)Cities for the 2020s: An Inmovative Image and Investment Diplomacy
Globalized megacities will definitely dominate the future, in the same way as colonial empires dominated the 19th century and nation-states...
The Galwan Conflict: Beginning of a new Relationship Dynamics
The 15th June, 2020 may very well mark a new chapter in the Indo-Chinese relationship and pave the way for...
Aviation Sector Calls for Unified Cybersecurity Practices to Mitigate Growing Risks
The aviation industry needs to unify its approach to prevent cybersecurity shocks, according to a new study released today by...
7 Driving Habits That Are Secretly Damaging Your Diesel Engine
When it comes to driving, no one is perfect, and everyone makes mistakes. But could these habits be costing you...
Ммm is a new trend in the interaction between the EU and Turkey:”Silence is golden” or Musical chair?
On April 6, a protocol collapse occurred during a meeting between President of Turkey R. Erdogan, President of the European...
Economy3 days ago
Future of Work: Next Election Agenda 2022
Economy2 days ago
North Macedonia’s Journey to the EU
Eastern Europe3 days ago
Peace, Problems and Perspectives in the Post-war South Caucasus
Middle East3 days ago
Israel and Turkey in search of solutions
Southeast Asia2 days ago
New Leadership Takes Charge in Vietnam: Challenges and Prospects
Intelligence3 days ago
COVID-19 As an Agent of Change in World Order
Economy3 days ago
How to incorporate the environment in economic ventures for a sustainable future?
Africa3 days ago
Scaling Up Development Could Help Southern African leaders to Defeat Frequent Miltant Attacks