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Hong Kong Developments: India’s Tactical Punch To China

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Hong Kong’s National Security Legislation: A Brief Overview

A new wide-ranging Security Law was passed by China for Hong Kong on May 28, 2020 outstripping it of its autonomy, and giving Beijing exceptional power over Hong Kong’s affairs. In the wake of growing resentment against China all over the world, owing to the pandemic and the mystery surrounding its origins in Wuhan and the bitterness against Xi Jinping’s aggressive leadership, the Hong Kong move is going to further tarnish the Dragon’s domestic and global image. With China using its destabilising power over Hong Kong by ensuring that the city has a stern law against rebellion against Beijing’s authority, policies and actions, the National Security Legislation for Hong Kong is highly problematic. The government in Beijing has repressed Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement and contravened on its promised semi-autonomous status with the National People’s Congress (NCP), unilaterally introducing a new legislation that criminalises any act of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign and external forces. It curtails the freedom enjoyed by people in Hong Kong, restraining freedom of speech and the right to protest.

On December 19, 1984, the governments of the UK and China reached an agreement on Hong Kong. The Sino-British Joint Declaration was registered with the UN on June 12, 1985. It is a legally-binding international treaty that ensured that Hong Kong’s autonomy, freedom and independent judiciary, rule of law and rights would see no alteration for the next 50 years. The British handed back Hong Kong to China in 1997, under a unique agreement, the ‘Basic Law’, the ‘One country, Two systems’ framework. This was done to safeguard certain liberties for the prosperity and development of Hong Kong and needed to uphold its stability and culture: the freedom of speech and assembly, an independent judiciary and some democratic rights that people in China did not have. The same agreement gave the people of Hong Kong the right to enact their own national security law under Article 23 of the Basic Law.

China as a co-signatory of the Joint Declaration has flouted its promise, ignoring the need for constructive political dialogue and bypassing Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, by approving the new legislation that was enacted on June 30, 2020. The National security Legislation will, in time, be inserted in the Annex III of Hong Kong’s Basic Law. The anti-government demonstrations by the unhappy Hong Kong population against Beijing have been a source of discontent and embarrassment for Xi Jinping and a major “security threat” to the Dragon. The anti-Beijing protests with broader anti-China and pro-democracy movement have been gaining greater impetus than before in Hong Kong since June 2019. Xi Jinping is set to thrash this with this new legislation that is seen, more or less, as a vengeance regarding the withdrawal of Beijing’s contentious extradition bill of the previous year.

“The key provisions of the Security Legislation include that:

  • Crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces are punishable by a maximum sentence of life in prison
  • Damaging public transport facilities can be considered terrorism
  • Those found guilty will not be allowed to stand for public office
  • Companies can be fined if convicted under the law
  • Beijing will establish a new security office in Hong Kong, with its own law enforcement personnel – neither of which would come under the local authority’s jurisdiction
  • This office can send some cases to be tried in mainland China – but Beijing has said it will only have that power over a “tiny number” of cases
  • In addition, Hong Kong will have to establish its own national security commission to enforce the laws, with a Beijing-appointed adviser
  • Hong Kong’s chief executive will have the power to appoint judges to hear national security cases, raising fears about judicial autonomy
  • Importantly, Beijing will have power over how the law should be interpreted, not any Hong Kong judicial or policy body. If the law conflicts with any Hong Kong law, the Beijing law takes priority
  • Some trials will be heard behind closed doors.
  • People suspected of breaking the law can be wire-tapped and put under surveillance
  • Management of foreign non-governmental organisations and news agencies will be strengthened
  • The law will also apply to non-permanent residents and people “from outside [Hong Kong]… who are not permanent residents of Hong Kong”.[i]

The Hong Kong population faces a huge blow to their civil liberties and freedoms with the enactment of this law, histrionically changing life in the region. It is clearly without any accountability and transparency, being kept as a secret from the government of Hong Kong and the public, till its enactment. There have been instances of its abuse since it has come into being, using it to clampdown on peaceful and legitimate protests and stiffens control over media, social networking, education, and the social organisations operating in the region, giving undue and extensive authority to the Chinese investigating authority to search properties, prohibit and restrict movement and travel, censor online content and engage in covert surveillance, freeze or confiscate assets, and engage in intercepting communications without a court directive. The new draconian law has set up another new body in the government of Hong Kong, the Committee for Safeguarding National Security, with a delegate from the Chinese central government to “advise” and oversee it. This body is not subject to any checks and balances, besides being not accountable to any other structure of the government, bypassing legislative scrutiny. The government in Beijing is setting up the “Office for Safeguarding National Security” in Hong Kong with the staff and the office not falling under the city’s jurisdiction, hereby ensuring that their actions cannot be reviewed by the Hong Kong local courts. The personnel of the office have complete immunity and cannot be subject to inspection, examination or custody by local law and administration in Hong Kong.

This legislation will have a huge effect on the business and financial community as well as tarnish Hong Kong’s image as a global financial hub integrating in with China. With the enragement building against China in the pandemic period, Hong Kong will drastically suffer due to this legislative imposition. It is bound to have a hugely negative impact on the educational and social systems with heavy economic and political toll for the region.

India’s Diplomatic Move against China

China is facing an image deficit, global pushback and loss of allies in a world grappling with the unprecedented, havoc wreathing COVID-19 pandemic. With this backdrop, the controversial security legislation for Hong Kong that redefines the relationship between the people of Hong Kong and mainland China has been met with great criticism from the pro-democracy parts of the world like the US, Japan, Australia and the co-signatory of the Joint Declaration, the UK, among others. There has been great pushback against Xi Jinping’s policies that seek to flout the international norms and code of conduct and significantly, India has shed its silence and raised concern against the outrageous Chinese actions that seek to mould the world led by an order dictated by it. 

India played rather tactically, breaking its silence on Hong Kong for the first time ever, raising China’s new security legislation for Hong Kong at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva. This diplomatic move by India is likely a consequence of the deteriorating Sino-Indian engagement and the recent border clashes in Galwan Valley in Ladakh. India’s permanent representative to UN in Geneva, Rajiv Chander expressed India’s optimism that “the relevant parties will take into account these views and address them properly, seriously and objectively.” Without naming the India’s hostile neighbour, Mr.Chander argued that New Delhi is engaged in “a close watch on recent developments” in Hong Kong due to the presence of the large Indian diaspora in the region. With a number of bilateral agreements and MoUs signed between Hong Kong and India, the former is host to a number of Indian companies, various professionals in sectors like IT, banking, as a centre for conferences and exhibitions and vice versa with New Delhi having huge stakes in the region in question. The India-Hong Kong relationship has a number of facets from academic collaboration, bilateral trade and investments to tourism and cultural links.

This raising up of the issue of Hong Kong, China’s Achilles Heel, comes as a surprise and is a strategic move as New Delhi in the past, remained a mute and calculated spectator of the developments in the region. As China has been overtly as well as covertly involved in the domestic issues in India stimulating unrest in various parts of the country, even raising the Kashmir issue at UN Security Council after the abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir on August 5, 2019, it was imperative for New Delhi to take a firm stand against the regional bully by reviewing its approach and studied silence on Chinese matters. It landed a strategic knockback to Beijing in the aftermath of Chinese aggression in the Sino-Indian border and its belligerent approach in the South Asian region. The Sino-Indian relationship has undergone a significant technological and diplomatic tailspin, with India banning a number of Chinese applications, making it clear to Beijing to restrain from commenting on India’s internal matters and the Hong Kong reaction is another changing diplomatic stance of India, showing its firm resolve against the dictatorial and hegemonic ambitions of China. These events show New Delhi’s revised approach to the tyrant state in the aftermath of its pugnacious advances.

While India, in the past, had been unwilling to give visas to Hong Kong’s pro-democracy activists and even denied meeting the activists at G-20 summit last year for a petition to pressurise Beijing, the recent events at Galwan Valley have rocked the basic foundational structure of the relationship between these two neighbours.

With China acting out of line and raking up issues pertaining to India’s domestic issues and further, expanding and deepening its ruthless activities in creating troubled waters for India, both regionally and globally, New Delhi’s tactical punch is a welcome move in times of emerging uncertainties about China’s unruly and anarchic misdoings. This is an opportune moment for India, hence, to support the countries against a hegemonic China that seeks to advance a world in a mould that suits its needs and designs.


HONG KONG DEVELOPMENTS: INDIA’S TACTICAL PUNCH TO CHINA

Hong Kong’s National Security Legislation: A Brief Overview

A new wide-ranging Security Law was passed by China for Hong Kong on May 28, 2020 outstripping it of its autonomy, and giving Beijing exceptional power over Hong Kong’s affairs. In the wake of growing resentment against China all over the world, owing to the pandemic and the mystery surrounding its origins in Wuhan and the bitterness against Xi Jinping’s aggressive leadership, the Hong Kong move is going to further tarnish the Dragon’s domestic and global image. With China using its destabilising power over Hong Kong by ensuring that the city has a stern law against rebellion against Beijing’s authority, policies and actions, the National Security Legislation for Hong Kong is highly problematic. The government in Beijing has repressed Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement and contravened on its promised semi-autonomous status with the National People’s Congress (NCP), unilaterally introducing a new legislation that criminalises any act of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign and external forces. It curtails the freedom enjoyed by people in Hong Kong, restraining freedom of speech and the right to protest.

On December 19, 1984, the governments of the UK and China reached an agreement on Hong Kong. The Sino-British Joint Declaration was registered with the UN on June 12, 1985. It is a legally-binding international treaty that ensured that Hong Kong’s autonomy, freedom and independent judiciary, rule of law and rights would see no alteration for the next 50 years.The British handed back Hong Kong to China in 1997, under a unique agreement, the ‘Basic Law’, the‘One country, Two systems’ framework. This was done to safeguard certain liberties for the prosperity and development of Hong Kong and needed to uphold its stability and culture: the freedom of speech and assembly, an independent judiciary and some democratic rights that people in China did not have. The same agreement gave the people of Hong Kong the right to enact their own national security law under Article 23 of the Basic Law.

China as a co-signatory of the Joint Declaration has flouted its promise, ignoring the need for constructive political dialogue and bypassing Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, by approving the new legislation that was enacted on June 30, 2020. The National security Legislation will, in time, be inserted in the Annex III of Hong Kong’s Basic Law. The anti-government demonstrations by the unhappy Hong Kong population against Beijing have been a source of discontent and embarrassment for Xi Jinping and a major “security threat” to the Dragon. The anti-Beijing protests with broader anti-China and pro-democracy movement have been gaining greater impetus than before in Hong Kong since June 2019. Xi Jinping is set to thrash this with this new legislationthat is seen, more or less, as a vengeance regarding the withdrawal ofBeijing’s contentious extradition bill of the previous year.

“The key provisions of the Security Legislation include that:

  • Crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces are punishable by a maximum sentence of life in prison
  • Damaging public transport facilities can be considered terrorism
  • Those found guilty will not be allowed to stand for public office
  • Companies can be fined if convicted under the law
  • Beijing will establish a new security office in Hong Kong, with its own law enforcement personnel – neither of which would come under the local authority’s jurisdiction
  • This office can send some cases to be tried in mainland China – but Beijing has said it will only have that power over a “tiny number” of cases
  • In addition, Hong Kong will have to establish its own national security commission to enforce the laws, with a Beijing-appointed adviser
  • Hong Kong’s chief executive will have the power to appoint judges to hear national security cases, raising fears about judicial autonomy
  • Importantly, Beijing will have power over how the law should be interpreted, not any Hong Kong judicial or policy body. If the law conflicts with any Hong Kong law, the Beijing law takes priority
  • Some trials will be heard behind closed doors.
  • People suspected of breaking the law can be wire-tapped and put under surveillance
  • Management of foreign non-governmental organisations and news agencies will be strengthened
  • The law will also apply to non-permanent residents and people “from outside [Hong Kong]… who are not permanent residents of Hong Kong”.[i]”

The Hong Kong population faces a huge blow to their civil liberties and freedoms with the enactment of this law, histrionically changing life in the region. It is clearly without any accountability and transparency, being kept as a secret from the government of Hong Kong and the public, till its enactment. There have been instances of its abuse since it has come into being, using it to clampdown on peaceful and legitimate protests and stiffens control over media, social networking, education, and the social organisations operating in the region, giving undue and extensive authority to the Chinese investigating authority to search properties, prohibit and restrict movement and travel, censor online content and engage in covert surveillance, freeze or confiscate assets, and engage in intercepting communications without a court directive. The new draconian law has set up another new body in the government of Hong Kong, the Committee for Safeguarding National Security, with a delegate from the Chinese central government to “advise” and oversee it. This body is not subject to any checks and balances, besides being not accountable to any other structure of the government, bypassing legislative scrutiny. The government in Beijing is setting up the “Office for Safeguarding National Security” in Hong Kong with thestaff and the office not falling under the city’s jurisdiction, hereby ensuring that their actions cannot be reviewed by the Hong Kong local courts. The personnel of the office have complete immunity and cannot be subject to inspection, examination or custody by local law and administration in Hong Kong.

This legislation will have a huge effect on the business and financial community as well as tarnish Hong Kong’s image as a global financial hub integrating in with China. With the enragement building against China in the pandemic period, Hong Kong will drastically suffer due to this legislative imposition. It is bound to have a hugely negative impact on the educational and social systems with heavy economic and political toll for the region.

India’s Diplomatic Move against China

China is facing an image deficit, global pushback and loss of allies in a world grappling with the unprecedented, havoc wreathing COVID-19 pandemic. With this backdrop, the controversial security legislation for Hong Kong that redefines the relationship between the people of Hong Kong and mainland China has been met with great criticism from the pro-democracy parts of the world like the US, Japan, Australia and the co-signatory of the Joint Declaration, the UK, among others.There has been great pushback against Xi Jinping’s policies that seek to flout the international norms and code of conduct and significantly, India has shed its silence and raised concern against the outrageous Chinese actions that seek to mould the world led by an order dictated by it. 

India played rather tactically, breaking its silence on Hong Kong for the first time ever, raising China’s new security legislation for Hong Kong at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva. This diplomatic move by India is likely a consequence of the deteriorating Sino-Indian engagement and the recent border clashes in GalwanValley in Ladakh. India’s permanent representative to UN in Geneva, Rajiv Chanderexpressed India’s optimism that “the relevant parties will take into account these views and address them properly, seriously and objectively.” Without naming theIndia’s hostile neighbour, Mr.Chanderargued that New Delhi is engaged in “a close watch on recent developments” in Hong Kong due to the presence of the large Indian diaspora in the region. With a number of bilateral agreements and MoUs signed between Hong Kong and India, the former is host to a number of Indian companies, various professionals in sectors like IT, banking, as a centre for conferences and exhibitions and vice versa with New Delhi having huge stakes in the region in question. The India-Hong Kong relationship has a number of facets from academic collaboration, bilateral trade and investments to tourism and cultural links.

This raising up of the issue of Hong Kong, China’s Achilles Heel, comes as a surprise and is a strategic move as New Delhi in the past, remained a mute and calculated spectator of the developments in the region. As China has been overtly as well as covertly involved in the domestic issues in India stimulating unrest in various parts of the country, even raising the Kashmir issue at UN Security Council after the abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir on August 5, 2019, it was imperative for New Delhi to take a firm stand against the regional bully by reviewing its approach and studied silence on Chinese matters. It landed a strategic knockback to Beijing in the aftermath of Chinese aggression in the Sino-Indian border and its belligerent approach in the South Asian region. The Sino-Indian relationship has undergone a significant technological and diplomatic tailspin, with India banning a number of Chinese applications, making it clear to Beijing to restrain from commenting on India’s internal matters and the Hong Kong reaction is another changing diplomatic stance of India, showing its firm resolve against the dictatorial and hegemonic ambitions of China. These events show New Delhi’s revised approach to the tyrant state in the aftermath of its pugnacious advances.

While India, in the past, had been unwilling to give visas to Hong Kong’s pro-democracy activists and even deniedmeeting the activists at G-20 summit last year for a petition to pressurise Beijing, the recent events at Galwan Valley have rocked the basic foundational structure of the relationship between these two neighbours.

With China acting out of line and raking up issues pertaining to India’s domestic issues and further, expanding and deepening its ruthless activities in creating troubled waters for India, both regionally and globally, New Delhi’s tactical punch is a welcome move in times of emerging uncertainties about China’s unruly and anarchic misdoings. This is an opportune moment for India, hence, to support the countries against a hegemonic China that seeks to advance a world in a mould that suits its needs and designs.

The author is a graduate in History from Miranda House, University of Delhi and currently pursuing Masters in Politics and International Relations, Pondicherry University.

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Shared Territorial Concern, Opposition to US Intervention Prompt Russia’s Support to China on Taiwan Question

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image credit: kremlin.ru

The situation around the island of Taiwan is raising concerns not only in Chinese mainland, Taiwan island or in the US, but also in the whole world. Nobody would like to see a large-scale military clash between China and the US in the East Pacific. Potential repercussions of such a clash, even if it does not escalate to the nuclear level, might be catastrophic for the global economy and strategic stability, not to mention huge losses in blood and treasure for both sides in this conflict.

Earlier this week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Moscow continued to firmly support Beijing’s position on Taiwan as an integral part of China. Moreover, he also underlined that Moscow would support Beijing in its legitimate efforts to reunite the breakaway province with the rest of the country. A number of foreign media outlets paid particular attention not to what Lavrov actually said, but omitted his other remarks: the Russian official did not add that Moscow expects reunification to be peaceful and gradual in a way that is similar to China’s repossession of Hong Kong. Many observers of the new Taiwan Straits crisis unfolding concluded that Lavrov’s statement was a clear signal to all parties of the crisis: Russia would likely back even Beijing’s military takeover of the island.

Of course, diplomacy is an art of ambiguity. Lavrov clearly did not call for a military solution to the Taiwan problem. Still, his remarks were more blunt and more supportive of Beijing than the standard Russia’s rhetoric on the issue. Why? One possible explanation is that the Russian official simply wanted to sound nice to China as Russia’s major strategic partner. As they say, “a friend in need is a friend indeed.” Another explanation is that Lavrov recalled the Russian experience with Chechnya some time ago, when Moscow had to fight two bloody wars to suppress secessionism in the North Caucasus. Territorial integrity means a lot for the Russian leadership. This is something that is worth spilling blood for.

However, one can also imagine that in Russia they simply do not believe that if things go really bad for Taiwan island, the US would dare to come to its rescue and that in the end of the day Taipei would have to yield to Beijing without a single shot fired. Therefore, the risks of a large-scale military conflict in the East Pacific are perceived as relatively low, no matter what apocalyptic scenarios various military experts might come up with.

Indeed, over last 10 or 15 years the US has developed a pretty nasty habit of inciting its friends and partners to take risky and even reckless decisions and of letting these friends and partners down, when the latter had to foot the bill for these decisions. In 2008, the Bush administration explicitly or implicitly encouraged Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili to launch a military operation against South Ossetia including killing some Russian peacekeepers stationed there. But when Russia interfered to stop and to roll back the Georgian offensive, unfortunate Saakashvili was de-facto abandoned by Washington.

During the Ukrainian conflicts of 2013-14, the Obama administration enthusiastically supported the overthrow of the legitimate president in Kiev. However, it later preferred to delegate the management of the crisis to Berlin and to Paris, abstaining from taking part in the Normandy process and from signing the Minsk Agreements. In 2019, President Donald Trump promised his full support to Juan Guaidó, Head of the National Assembly in Venezuela, in his crusade against President Nicolas when the government of Maduro demonstrated its spectacular resilience. Juan Guaido very soon almost completely disappeared from Washington’s political radar screens.

Earlier this year the Biden administration stated its firm commitment to shouldering President Ashraf Ghani in Afghanistan in his resistance to Taliban advancements. But when push came to shove, the US easily abandoned its local allies, evacuated its military personal in a rush and left President Ghani to seek political asylum in the United Arab Emirates.

Again and again, Washington gives reasons to conclude that its partners, clients and even allies can no longer consider it as a credible security provider. Would the US make an exception for the Taiwan island? Of course, one can argue that the Taiwan island is more important for the US than Afghanistan, Venezuela, Ukraine and Georgia taken together. But the price for supporting the Taiwan island could also be much higher for the US than the price it would have paid in many other crisis situations. The chances of the US losing to China over Taiwan island, even if Washington mobilizes all of its available military power against Beijing, are also very high. Still, we do not see such a mobilization taking place now. It appears that the Biden administration is not ready for a real showdown with Beijing over the Taiwan question.

If the US does not put its whole weight behind the Taiwan island, the latter will have to seek some kind of accommodation with the mainland on terms abandoning its pipe-dreams of self-determination and independence. This is clear to politicians not only in East Asia, but all over the place, including Moscow. Therefore, Sergey Lavrov has reasons to firmly align himself with the Chinese position. The assumption in the Kremlin is that Uncle Sam will not dare to challenge militarily the Middle Kingdom. Not this time.

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Russia-Japan Relations: Were Abe’s Efforts In Vain?

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Expanding the modest elements of trust in the Japan-Russia relationship, talking through reciprocal concerns before they lead to conflict, avoiding bilateral incidents, and engaging in mutually beneficial economic cooperation is the way forward.

One year after the end of Shinzo Abe’s long period of leadership, Japan has a new prime minister once again. The greatest foreign policy challenge the new Japanese government led by Fumio Kishida is facing is the intensifying confrontation between its large neighbor China and its main ally America. In addition to moves to energize the Quad group to which Japan belongs alongside Australia, India, and the United States, U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration has concluded a deal with Canberra and London to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines which in future could patrol the Western Pacific close to Chinese shores. The geopolitical fault lines in the Indo-Pacific region are fast turning into frontlines.

In this context, does anything remain of the eight-year-long effort by former prime minister Abe to improve relations with Russia on the basis of greater economic engagement tailored to Moscow’s needs? Russia’s relations with China continue to develop, including in the military domain; Russia’s constitutional amendments passed last year prohibit the handover of Russian territory, which doesn’t bode well for the long-running territorial dispute with Japan over the South Kuril Islands; and Russian officials and state-run media have been remembering and condemning the Japanese military’s conduct during World War II, something they chose to play down in the past. True, Moscow has invited Tokyo to participate in economic projects on the South Kuril Islands, but on Russian terms and without an exclusive status.

To many, the answer to the above question is clear, and it is negative. Yet that attitude amounts to de facto resignation, a questionable approach. Despite the oft-cited but erroneous Cold War analogy, the present Sino-American confrontation has created two poles in the global system, but not—at least, not yet—two blocs. Again, despite the popular and equally incorrect interpretation, Moscow is not Beijing’s follower or vassal. As a power that is particularly sensitive about its own sovereignty, Russia seeks to maintain an equilibrium—which is not the same as equidistance—between its prime partner and its main adversary. Tokyo would do well to understand that and take it into account as it structures its foreign relations.

The territorial dispute with Russia is considered to be very important for the Japanese people, but it is more symbolic than substantive. In practical terms, the biggest achievement of the Abe era in Japan-Russia relations was the founding of a format for high-level security and foreign policy consultations between the two countries. With security issues topping the agenda in the Indo-Pacific, maintaining the channel for private direct exchanges with a neighboring great power that the “2+2” formula offers is of high value. Such a format is a trademark of Abe’s foreign policy which, while being loyal to Japan’s American ally, prided itself on pursuing Japanese national interests rather than solely relying on others to take them into account.

Kishida, who for five years served as Abe’s foreign minister, will now have a chance to put his own stamp on the country’s foreign policy. Yet it makes sense for him to build on the accomplishments of his predecessor, such as using the unique consultation mechanism mentioned above to address geopolitical and security issues in the Indo-Pacific region, from North Korea to Afghanistan. Even under Abe, Japan’s economic engagement with Russia was by no means charity. The Russian leadership’s recent initiatives to shift more resources to eastern Siberia offer new opportunities to Japanese companies, just like Russia’s early plans for energy transition in response to climate change, and the ongoing development projects in the Arctic. In September 2021, the annual Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok did not feature top-level Japanese participation, but that should be an exception, not the rule.

Japan will remain a trusted ally of the United States for the foreseeable future. It is also safe to predict that at least in the medium term, and possibly longer, the Russo-Chinese partnership will continue to grow. That is no reason for Moscow and Tokyo to regard each other as adversaries, however. Moreover, since an armed conflict between America and China would spell a global calamity and have a high chance of turning nuclear, other major powers, including Russia and Japan, have a vital interest in preventing such a collision. Expanding the still very modest elements of trust in the Japan-Russia relationship, talking through reciprocal concerns before they lead to conflict, avoiding bilateral incidents, and engaging in mutually beneficial economic cooperation is the way forward. The absence of a peace treaty between the two countries more than seventy-five years after the end of the war is abnormal, yet that same unfinished business should serve as a stimulus to persevere. Giving up is an option, but not a good one.

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Kishida and Japan-Indonesia Security Relations: The Prospects

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image source: twitter @kishida230

In October, Japan had inaugurated Fumio Kishida as the new prime minister after winning the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election earlier. Surely this new statesmanship will consequently influence Tokyo’s trajectory in international and regional affairs, including Southeast Asia.

Not only that Japan has much intensive strategic cooperation with Southeast Asians for decades, but the region’s importance has also been increasing under Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Southeast Asia, as a linchpin connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, is key to Japan’s geostrategic interest and vision.

Since the LDP presidential election debate, many have identified Kishida’s policy trajectory, including in the defense and security aspect. Being bold, Kishida reflected its hawkish stance on China, North Korea, and its commitment to strengthening its alliance with Washington. Furthermore, Kishida also aimed to advance the geostrategic and security initiatives with like-minded countries, especially under FOIP.

One of the like-minded countries for Japan is Indonesia, which is key Japan’s key partner in Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific.

This article maps the prospect of Japan’s security cooperation with Indonesia under the new prime minister. It argues that Prime Minister Kishida will continue to grow Japan’s security cooperation with Indonesia to adjust to the changing security environment in Indo-Pacific.

Japan – Indonesia Common Ground

In its basic principle, Japan and Indonesia shared the same values in democracy, rules-based order, and freedom of navigation in developing strategic cooperation, especially in the maritime security aspect. 

In the geostrategic context, Japan and Indonesia also have significant similarities. Both countries are maritime countries and seeking to maximize their maritime power, as well as having formally synchronized geostrategic vision. While Japan has FOIP, Indonesia has Global Maritime Fulcrum (Poros Maritim Dunia) and leading initiator for ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP).

In capitalizing on this shared vision, since Shinzo Abe and Joko “Jokowi” Widodo era, Japan and Indonesia have initiated much new security cooperation ranging from a high-level framework such as 2+2 Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting in 2015 and 2021 to capacity building assistances and joint exercises. Furthermore, defense equipment transfers and joint technology development were also kicked off under Abe-Jokowi.

Kishida’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Profile

Compared to his predecessor, Suga Yoshihide, Prime Minister Kishida is more familiar with foreign affairs.

Personally, Kishida comes from a political family and spent several years living in the United States, reflecting his exposure to the international and political environment from an early age. This is significantly different from Suga, who grew up in a strawberry farmer family in a rural area in Akita Prefecture.

Politically, served as foreign minister under Shinzo Abe, Fumio Kishida is the longest-serving foreign minister in Japan’s history. This reflects his extensive understanding of current world affairs, compared to Suga who spent most of his prime political career in the domestic area such as being chief cabinet secretary and minister for internal affairs & communication.

Specifically, in defense and security posture, Prime Minister Kishida is willing to go beyond the status quo and not blocking any key options in order “to protect citizens”. During his policy speeches, he stated that he is not ruling out the option to build attacking capabilities due to the severe security environment surrounding Japan. Also, Kishida will not limit the defense budget under 1% of Japan’s gross domestic product if necessary.

Future Security Cooperation Trajectory with Indonesia 

In short, policy continuity will play a huge role. One of the reasons why Kishida was able to win over more popular Kono was due to his moderate liberalness, demonstrating stability over change. This was more preferred by faction leaders in LDP.

In defense and foreign affairs, the continuity is boldly shown as despite appointing entirely new ministers in his cabinet, the only two ministers retained by Kishida are Foreign Minister Motegi and Defense Minister Kishi. By this, it sent the narrative to the international community that there will not be significant turbulence caused by the changing leadership on Japan’s side.

As a background context on Indonesia, Fumio Kishida was the foreign minister from the Japanese side behind the 2+2 Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting with Indonesia in 2015. Indonesia is the only country Japan has such a high-level security framework within Southeast Asia. This framework has led Japan and Indonesia to have a second edition of the 2+2 meeting in 2021, resulting in many practical cooperation deals in defense and security.

The other setting supporting Kishida’s policy continuity, especially in the context with Indonesia is that his foreign minister’s counterpart, Retno Marsudi, was still in charge from the last time Kishida left the foreign minister post in 2017, until today. Initiating the 2+2 framework together, it will be easier for Kishida to resume his relationship with both President Jokowi and Foreign Minister Retno in advancing its strategic cooperation with Indonesia, especially in the defense and security area.

The prospect of continuity is also reflected in Kishida’s commitment to continue the geostrategy relay of both his predecessors, Shinzo Abe and Suga Yoshihide, in achieving the FOIP vision.

Not only that Indonesia is having a similar vision of maritime prosperity and values with Japan, but Indonesia is also concerned with South China Sea dynamics as it started to threaten Indonesia’s remote islands, especially Natuna Islands. As this is a crucial cooperation opportunity, Kishida needs to continue assisting Indonesia to improve the security and prosperity of its remote islands. Thus, as Kishida also admitted that Indonesia is a major country in ASEAN, having favorable relations with Indonesia is important for Japan’s geostrategy.

Challenges

To capitalize on the potentials with Indonesia, Kishida needs to support Indonesia’s strategic independence as well as to make the best of his position as one of the United States’ allies in Asia.

Despite his tougher stance on China and Taiwan issues, Kishida cannot fully project Japan’s rivalry with China to Indonesia. In addition to its strategic independence, Indonesia has and needs strong strategic relations with China to support many of the vital development projects surrounding Indonesia. This cannot be touched.

Also, Japan needs to bridge Indonesia, as well as other like-minded Southeast Asian countries, with the Quad and AUKUS proponents. Indonesia is formally stated that it is concerned about the ownership of nuclear-powered weapons by its neighboring countries. On the other side, Japan supported AUKUS and is a close ally of the U.S. Kishida’s ability to grab this opportunity will solidify Japan’s credibility and position among Southeast Asians.

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