Localism has been a common characteristic of all post-Soviet Central Asian Republics. However, this trait emerged in different ways; the result has been almost similar. The phenomenon is stemmed in unbalanced developing process and deliberate unequal share of power between regional ethnic groups of Communist leadership.
In Tajikistan, the localism emerged with more complexity and has had more important consequences. In some opinions, a main root of Tajik Civil war of 1990s, had been localism which followed by religious and ethnic gaps. In essence, the war was between privileged and unprivileged areas[i]. Akbar Turjanzoda, prominent cleric and former deputy Prime Minister of Tajikistan, who is also known as an influential figure of peace process, in his book “Between water and Fire” emphasizes on a “balanced localism” and suggests the balance between representatives of different regions is the only solution for a peaceful country[ii]. After the Peace Accord, everyone expected to do so, however the balance never achieved.
In Soviet era, the Khujandis were the most influential group that enjoyed the power and wealth. Moscow-based leadership made this due to dual Uzbek-Tajik identity of the Khujandis, who were under influence of regional focal point, Tashkent. On the other hand, any possibility for anti-Russian integration in North was less than any other region in Tajikistan. Moreover, contemporary history of revolutionary groups, such as Basmachis, shaped basically in other regions. Furthermore, in separation of Tajikistan from Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920s, the Khujandi elites made the most important role[iii]. These factors made the Khujandto become the prominent region in the Soviet Republic.
If we consider the identity based division of regions as Shavkat Kasymov did in his paper “Regional fragmentation in Tajikistan: The shift of powers between different identity groups[iv]”, we can categorize the Tajik regions into Khujandis, Kulobis, Gharmis and Pamiris. The geographical position of these 4 group is shown in Map-1.
Map-1: Geographical position of identity-based division of localism in Tajikistan[v]
However, after about 3 decades of geopolitical changes, more geographical features should be considered on Tajik localism. As you can see in Map-1, the identity based divisions do not cover all provinces of 1920s in Tajikistan. North, South, East and Center are the 4 contemporary key regions of the country which represent a political clan. Map-2shows the political map of independent Tajikistan.
Migration process is a factor that should be considered in second division, especially about capital, Dushanbe. The city is geographically included in Centre, but the political view is unknown due to migration flow[vi]. It is also true about those who were displaced from Gharm to Qurghonteppa for agricultural purposes during Soviet era.
Map-2: the political map of independent Tajikistan[vii]
The Southerners leading by Emomali Rahmonhave enjoyed the power in post-peace era. In all political arrangements, the localism has been affected roguishly. Danghara, Kulob and Farkhor from Khatlon province are the main power spots in South. The major powerful and influential structures within the state such as President, Defense, Internal and external affairs ministries and State committee for National Security are all occupied by elites from these regions. Interestingly, opposition believes that according to peace accord, the power-based ministries such as defense and internal affairs should have been allocated to opposition, but never done[viii]. Even the potential president of the country, the Chairman of National Assembly is from south. According to the country’s constitution, in case of death, resignation and incapability of the President, his duties prior to the beginning of assignment by the new President, shall be taken over by the Chairman of National Assembly[ix].
Although the Northerners’ share of power has been marginalized dramatically after the Soviet dissolution, they have still a better situation comprising to Center and East. According to the political traditions rooted in contemporary coalition during the civil war, the Prime Minister belongs to North. However, his power has been limited, and the authority shared with 3 deputies from south. The position is personally under the control of the President.
The Eastern Pamirs have even the smallest share of power, due to their different culture, language and especially religion. It seems that the Eastern elites trend to have more control to their homeland as an autonomous region, rather having national power positions. After 2018 conflicts, as a sign of appeasement, Rahmon appointed a figure close to Aga Khan, the religious leader of the Pamiris as provincial chief. But in National share of power, nothing considerable.
Understanding the share of Center is a bit more complicated. Today, the Islamist opposition is mainly from this part of the country. This clan is known to its religious identity. Sayid Abdulloh Nuri, the former leader and founder of Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and former United Tajik Opposition (UTO) is a well-known politician of this share. Other prominent political Islamist figures such as former deputy PM, Akbar Turjanzoda, and Muhiddin Kabiri also belong to this clan. While the first circles of IRPT had a Gharmi identity,a senior member of the party believes that they have moved beyond localism and as an example, the party introduced Muhammadalihayit, deputy chairman of the party, who was from South.
On the other hand, there are also small shares within the State. Chairman of the Assembly of Representatives belong to Center. There are also some ministries from cities like Hisor and Vahdat.
Muhammadjon Kabirov, a Tajik expert and senior member of IRPT believes that the current power sharing system in the country is even deceptive. First, there are always parallel state institutions which belong to Southerners such as Energy and electricity institutions. On the other hand, while the head of these structures have been granted to non-Southerners, the deputies and bodies of the ministries are mainly from South. Thirdly, these elites cannot and not let to apply their local identity in their share of power. And eventually, these points are while the state positions are not sold by money or allocated by political affiliations.
|Chairman of National Assembly||Rustam Emomali||Danghara|
|Prosecutor General||Yusuf Rahmon||Vose|
|Min. of Defense||SheraliMirzo||Hamadoni|
|Min. of Internal Affairs||Ramazon Rahimzoda||Kulob|
|Min. of Foreign Affairs||Sirojiddin Muhriddin||Temurmalik|
|Chmn., State Committee for National Security||Saymumin Yatimov||Farkhor|
|Mayor of Capital||RustamEmomali||Danghara|
|Min. of Education & Science||Muhammadyusuf Imamzoda||Temurmalik|
|Min. of Finance||Fayziddin Qahhorzoda||Vose|
|Min. of Industry & New Technologies||Zarobiddin Fayzullozoda||Danghara|
|Min. of Health & Social Protection||Jamoliddin Abdullozoda||Danghara|
|Min. of Agriculture||Amonullo Solimzoda||Danghara|
|Min. of Economic Development & Trade||Zavghi Zavghizoda||Hamadoni|
|North||Prime Minister||Qohir Rasulzoda||Ghafurov|
|Min. of Justice||Rustam Shohmurad||Konibodom|
|Min. of Labor, Migration, & Public Employment||Golru Jabbarzoda||Isfara|
|East||Min. of Culture||Zulfia Davlatzoda||Khorog|
|Min. of Transport||Khudoyor Khudoyorzoda||Rushon|
|Center||Chairman of the Assembly of Representatives||Muhammadtoer Zokirzoda||Rasht|
|Min. of Energy & Water Resources||Usmonali Usmonzoda||Vahdat|
Table1: Distribution of power in Tajikistan based on localism[x]
Localism and Shift in power
At the first shift in power in Tajikistan, the localism played a prominent role. In the post-Soviet era, th power was in hands of Northern pro-communists. At the same time that the central Gharmis and Easters were seeking a share in the country’s politics, the Southerners made a clever coalition with weakened North and simply came into power. At that time, when the opposition groups were mainly in unstable and disconnected regions of the country as well asAfghanistan, the political competition defined between North and South. In 1994, the Northern candidate, Abdumalik Abdullajanov lost the election to the Southern Emomali Rahmon (with 58%)[xi]. Then the war started, the peace achieved and due to the peace accord, 30 percent of the state’s power should have been allocated to opposition. However, step by step it tends to less than 5 percent.
There are evidences that the country is moving toward another shift in power. The amendments applied to the constitution in 2016 and paved the way for Rustam’s (Rahmon’s elder son) presidency. In the meanwhile, Rustam is experiencing different positions and rising up for a hard inter-family competition (maybe with his more experienced sister Ozoda) and a wider confrontation with potential and indeed opposition (Internal power groups and exiled opposition).
There is still a possibility that due to recent security issues and Corona Virus pandemic, Rahmon run for another term and keep the power by himself. Maybe he will learn from Nazarboyev’s experience. After achieving the leadership of country’s National Assembly by Rustam, it is more likely to happen. The situation allows Rahmon to leave the power anytime he wants and does surprise everyone.
Any of the mentioned scenarios happen to the shift in power, the localism’s affect is inevitable. As Rahmon raises his effective/ineffective authoritarianism with less legitimacy, he will try to change the regional balance in power in a kleptocratic space of the country’s politics. The change in Badakhshon and other changes of more politicians from Danghara were the first spark. But still no one guarantee that the unrests won’t happen again. We should also expect consolidating the ties with North by various means.Recent change in the Minstry of Labor, Migration and Public Employment, that a politician from North (GolruJabbarzoda) replaced a Southern Minister (Sumangul Taghoyzoda from Kulob) is a sign. Also Rahmon’s granddaughter married to a Northern family (grandson of the governor of the Sughd region)which was unprecedented in large presidential family[xii].
How the exiled opposition will play their role in a country increasingly closing, is a vague question at the moment. Forming the coalition such as “National Alliance” is unlikely to affect dramatically. However, the restricted figures inside the country, has a potential to fire the spark. That’s the reason that Rahmon will strictly keep control over these two potentials.
[i]For example HoonanPeimani in his book “Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey, and Russia” believes that; P. 28.
[ii]АкбарТӯрадчонзода, Миёниобуоташ, Саҳифа 5-6.
[iii]Talking to a Tajik expert, MuhammadaliBurhanov.
[iv]Kasymov, Shavkat, (2012), Regional fragmentation in Tajikistan: The shift of powers between different identity groups, Asian Geographer, 30:1, 1-20.
[v]The map is obtained from “Tajikistan: A Political and Social History” written by Kirill Nourzhanov and Christian Bleuer, published by ANU E Press, P. 93.
[vi] Three Tajik experts suggested that Dushanbe does not represent any political clan.
[vii] The map is obtained from: https://geology.com/world/tajikistan-satellite-image.shtml.
[viii]Interview with MuhammadjonKabirov, Tajik expert and senior IRPT member.
[x] The data in table mainly obtained by official websites and in some cases by talking to Tajik experts.
[xii]Tajikistan: Marriage Folds Northern Elite Into Presidential Family, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-marriage-folds-northern-elite-into-presidential-family.
Turkmenistan’s Permanent Neutrality: A Key Foreign Policy Tenant
Turkmenistan is a country in Central Asia which got independence on 27 October 1991 from the Soviet Union after its disintegration. After independence, Turkmenistan adopted and promoted a neutral position because it wants to live peacefully with its neighbours, to improve its relations with all countries and develop mutually beneficial economic relations with them. It also adopts neutral policy on almost all domestic and international issues. It did not join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and maintained cordial relations with the Taliban and their opponents, the northern alliance to remain neutral. It provided northern alliance very limited support against the Taliban after 9/11attacks on world trade centre because of its neutrality and peaceful approach to resolve all international issues.
The neutrality of Turkmenistan was deep-rooted in its constitution; therefore, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) recognized its neutrality on 12 December 1995 in its special resolution. After the resolution, it became the only state whose permanent neutrality was recognized by the UN. 185 countries voted in favour of the resolution which portrays that it is playing a very efficient role in the peaceful development of world affairs, ensuring communal security and unbiased progress. On 3 June 2015, UNGA passed another resolution to support Turkmenistan neutral and legal status which was the accreditation of better direction of its foreign policy. It was the success of Turkmenistan’s active foreign policy that UNGA declared 12 December as International Day of Neutrality. In 2020, Turkmenistan is celebrating 25th anniversary of its neutrality. According to the neutrality of Turkmenistan, international law is the law of peace and neutral states should act upon that in both situations of peace and war. Turkmenistan with permanent neutrality status always adheres to its constitution, UN charter and international obligations.
After permanent neutral status, Turkmenistan got international recognition and became a member of 44 international, regional and multinational organizations, established diplomatic relations with 44 countries and became a member of United Nations and its specialized agencies like UNDP, WHO, UNICEF, UNRCCA, UNHCR and Management for drugs and crime. It has now got such importance that whenever it decided to join any organization or group of states, it can demand changes according to its neutral status and join as a full member after those changes. Turkmenistan’s neutrality has provided a new concept of world peace and cooperation. It has offered its neutral space for different countries to host several meetings and conferences to find the solution of complicated issues like intra-Tajikistan and intra-Afghan dialogues. The permanent neutral status of Turkmenistan had remained very productive for its economic development, its promotion as an active player and strengthening security and stability in the region and the world.
Turkmenistan is a very responsible country and it always believes on respecting the sovereignty and development of every state and adheres to these points even in a difficult situation even at the time of tension with Uzbekistan in 2002 to 2004 on some bilateral disputes.
Turkmenistan is using its positive neutrality status for the betterment and promotion of world cooperation, sustainable development and international peace. Turkmenistan with its world’s fourth-largest energy resources and permanent neutrality is initiating a plan to provide stable and reliable energy to the world. It also nominated a constructive proposal in the field of transit and trade which was well responded by the international community and acknowledge by UNGA with the adoption of a resolution on “The role of transport and transit corridors in ensuring international cooperation for sustainable development” on 19 December 2014.Turkmenistan is a proponent of permanent neutrality, therefore, with its support the UN has established a group of friends of neutrality for peace, security and development and Turkmenistan have the chairmanship of that eighteen member group. The main purpose of the group is to promote and achieve regional stability, safety and shared prosperity. The United Nations also opened an Ashgabat based United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia on Turkmenistan’s initiative.
The international community and the UN have accepted that permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan is unbreakable and it will stick to it in every situation so now they are giving it different responsibilities as an international liable player. It was elected as the Vice-Chair of UN General Assembly in 58th, 62nd, 64th, 68thand 71stsession, in 2012; it was elected first time to the United Nation Economic and Social Council between 2013 and 2015, the member of United Nations Commission on Population and Development and was elected to UNESCO’s Executive Committee from 2013 to 2017.
Turkmenistan as a prominent, positive and neutral country is in a good position to guide the world in a better way. Turkmenistan’s neutrality potential has a lot of demand in the world at this time to solve outstanding issues like Afghan matter, the process of disarmament and weapon reduction, reasonable solution of water, energy problem and ecological issues. The main point is that it has the potential to play a constructive role in resolving the issues which had become a danger for world peace.
Turkmenistan is getting benefits from its neutral policy and has chosen the approach which is constructive and flawless. Every country adopts a policy to achieve its goal but the most important thing about Turkmenistan’s neutral policy is no harm to others which is the most important approach every state must adopt. In the current environment where every country has historical issues with other countries, Turkmenistan with its neutral policy has set standards which other countries should adopt to minimize their problems and differences. If the world will adopt this approach then it will be easy to achieve sustainable development and to the prosperity of their population which the sole purpose of every state.
The State of Civil Society in Central Asia: Insights from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
The power transitions in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have raised a series of unanswered questions regarding their domestic and foreign policy implications. This paper specifically focuses on the challenges and opportunities of a vibrant civil society emergence in post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan and post-Karimov Uzbekistan.
A vibrant civil society has long been thought to be a crucial instrument for political change in countries in transition and a key component of a democratic society.
Meanwhile, according to widely held beliefs, the Soviet authoritarian legacy combined with local conservative political culture has obstructed the emergence of democratic values and a vibrant civil society in Central Asian countries.
Kazakhstan represents a distinct Central Asian model of civil society, comparable to Russia but qualitatively different from that in Europe, where civil society is more cooperative with the authoritarian system and offers less resistance to state. As for Uzbekistan, while Islam Karimov’s authoritarian governance would put heavy restrictions on civil society organizations, a question arises as to what extent the government change in 2016 has trickled down to civil society. The presidential decree ‘On measures for strengthening civil society institutes’ role in democratization processes’ of April 2018 is seen as a considerable stride towards setting the foundations to build dialogue between civil society and the government while removing the procedures that would restrict NGOs activities.
Civil society in Uzbekistan has been primarily associated with mahallas, which are self-governing bodies responsible for helping members of the community and other social work (conflict resolution, overall community upkeep, etc.).
The question remains as to what the main challenges to the emergence of a youth-driven, issue-specific civil society are.
Essentially, one of the main priorities on the path to a vibrant civil society emergence in Uzbekistan includes developing the capacities of NGOs, particularly secular civil society organizations. Even though there are over 9000 NGOs registered in Uzbekistan, unlike conservative religious organizations, the opportunities for secular civil society organizations to represent societal interests remain limited due to their organizational weakness and lack of financial support. As a result, many of them have long been inactive with little to no potential to represent certain interest groups and influence decision making.
Similarly, the NGOs in Kazakhstan remain weak and unsustainable. The explanations of institutional ineffectiveness lay in disconnect with local traditions, low visibility of NGOs, and unsupportive government. Survey of general population suggests that people in Kazakhstan know little about NGOs and do not appreciate their utility.
Studies show that one of the main dimensions on the path to a vibrant and consolidated civil society is the “change on the inside”, related to the nature of civil society per se: such as the way it is organised and operates. This has a great deal to do with the development of adequate institutional and professional capacity in civil society organisations and networks as a vital tool for influencing policy making. The institutional development at the organisational level includes building organisational capacities for governance, decision-making, and conflict management, as well as clarifying organisational identity, values, and strategy of impact. The latter is of crucial relevance as a lot of CSOs in both countries were established with no predefined mission, strategic plans, and organization structure. That said, they were doomed to failure in terms of addressing the specific needs of their constituencies.
Another formidable challenge to civil society advancement is restrictive environment, compounded by state repression of dissent and pluralism in the two countries.
The freedom of expression remains severely restricted in both countries. The Karimov’s administration would meticulously control media narrative on politically sensitive issues in Uzbekistan, while shuttering or blocking independent outlets. Even though domestic media, including news websites and live television programs, now cautiously discuss social problems and even criticize local officials, it is not uncommon for journalist to avoid self-censorship to avoid harassment by government. As a result, they avoid openly criticizing Mirziyoyev and the government. Not surprisingly, as suggested by Human Rights Watch reports, censorship is still widespread in Uzbekistan, with the authorities consistently restricting the media through the official state bodies that issue registration for media outlets and regulate journalistic activity.
As for Kazakhstan, the new legislation that came into force in January 2018 has further exacerbated the crackdown on freedom of expression. The law requires journalists to verify the accuracy of information prior to publication by consulting with the relevant government bodies or officials, obtaining consent for the publication of personal or otherwise confidential information, and acquiring accreditation as foreign journalists if they work for foreign outlets.
Clearly, the restrictive legislation has taken its toll on Kazakhstan’s NGO landscape. In effect, NGOs operate under the conditions of mounting harassment by the government and are at risk of incurring fines and other punishments for obscurely stated offences, such as ‘interfering with government activities or engaging in work beyond the scope of their charters’. It is not uncommon for civil society activists to face criminal prosecution and imprisonment just for being outspoken and critical.
Along with the restrictive legislation, low trust, and misperceptions of civil society organizations, have significantly obstructed the advancement of a vibrant civil society. It has common for post-Soviet societies to treat civic associations as threat to the power and stability of the state together with the conviction that the state bears the responsibility for the wellbeing of the society.
As a matter of fact, establishing a civil society platform for NGOs, and media organizations to monitor government activity is essential for the emergence of a vibrant civil society. In the past two years, Uzbekistan has introduced several reforms and amended legislation, but there has been no analysis or monitoring of their implementation or potential or real impact on society. Meanwhile, the input from NGOs, think tanks and media can significantly contribute to the implementation of those state programs that are deemed useful by civil society. This, in turn, comes down to the changes in the very nature of civil society relations with the state and its potential and ability to foster reform, or what is often referred to as “change on the outside.”This has a lot to do with increasing their impact on public policy, through intensifying their interaction with public institutions and actors and most importantly, through engaging more with their constituencies.
A major impediment to civil society advancement in both countries is prevailing post-Soviet “informality” in the form of behavioral practices, such as considerable tolerance towards informal governance, the use of informal networks and connections in exchanges of favors, phone justice, corruption, etc. The latter has long condemned both countries to a vicious circle of underdevelopment and bad governance. Even though it would be an oversimplification to contend that graft is a way of life it takes a long time for deep rooted behavioral practices to change.
Moreover, the rise of ‘illiberal civil society’ or movements with a conservative agenda is a common phenomenon across Central Asia, and elsewhere. In Central Asia, Russian-language media, and religious-based outlets, have become instruments to spread illiberal ideas, which use ‘traditional family values’ and ‘national identity’ to condemn progress, often related to the rights of LGBT, the role of women in society or different minorities.
Overall, the core hindrances to the advancement of a vibrant civil society in the two Central Asian countries include severe limits on the freedom of expression, association, as well as the Uzbek and Kazakh governments’ tendency of silencing dissent. Meanwhile, eradicating these malpractices is critical to reassuring and reinforcing post-Nazarbayev and post-Karimov governments’ promises and pledges of significant democratic reforms.
Tajikistan: Building Blocks for a Dynamic Post-COVID-19 Economy
The pandemic year is slowly drawing to a close, but not all challenges associated with it will disappear with the beginning of the millennium’s third decade. Households, firms, and government are all focusing their efforts to ensure the security of food, income, and/or electricity over the next few months. At the same time, the country is in the middle of making decisions that will determine whether Tajikistan can transform this crisis into an opportunity to “build back better”.
The current crisis is the fourth over the last twelve years, with three of them having been outside Tajikistan’s influence and control. Following the impacts of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008, the oil price collapse of 2014 (with massive impacts on the value of remittances flowing back into Tajikistan’s economy), and the banking crisis of 2016 (having required a major budget-financed bail-out), the current difficulties have hit the country at a moment of fiscal fragility and a high risk of debt distress. Despite high rates of economic growth, these crises meant that Tajikistan has been struggling to respond with adequate fiscal resources to the combination of these inherited and emerging challenges.
But not all is gloom. In fact, the key to unlocking an effective crisis response— one with minimal upfront costs and future benefits to the budget—is found outside the government’s direct scope of control: if the state strengthens its partnership with entrepreneurs and (potential) investors, with clear and uniform rules, Tajikistan could tap into the considerable potential of sustainable economic dynamism. With profit opportunities in domestic and neighbouring markets (of which there are many) and the clarity and predictability of obligations towards the state (a current policy priority), the private sector is certain to exploit these. This, in turn, will open doors to addressing a long list of priority challenges influencing economic policymaking, well beyond the immediate one of broadening the tax base to a much larger number of successful firms. For instance, the (frequently prohibitively) high interest rates would be lowered when more firms and employees deposit their incomes in the banking sector and when financial institutions share the confidence in a firms’ future success. The trend depreciation of the Tajik somoni, with detrimental effects on, especially, the most vulnerable segments of the population, could be countered by having private companies exploit available export opportunities to the very large (now accessible), underserviced markets in the country’s direct vicinity. This would lead to an increased influx of foreign currency, which, in turn, would strengthen the domestic currency. Risks to social cohesion would be reduced by generating more and higher-paid employment opportunities—particularly in the remote and rural regions of the country—while food insecurity could be addressed by increasing local self-reliance on food production and agricultural inputs provided.
It is well understood that Tajikistan requires the private sector to play a more dynamic role, with considerable preparatory work having already been done to put into place the required reforms to boost private-sector confidence, domestic productivity, local production, exports, and job creation. The three following areas of reform are especially promising in providing the population with an environment characterized by lower inflation, interest, and tax rates, while accelerating the rate of job creation, and lifting average wages beyond the current levels prevailing in the market.
First, adopting a tax reform that aligns incentives and fosters compliance. Tajikistan’s current economic model, largely remittance-financed and import-reliant, is a legacy from an earlier period of reconstruction and transition. One element of this legacy relates to revenue collection. The levying of taxes, required to meet pre-defined tax collection targets, has been based disproportionately and non-transparently on tax penalties and pre-payment requests. To counter the negative effects on business confidence, very generous tax incentives—estimated at around six to ten percent of national income—were granted. These, however, did not generate commensurate socio-economic benefits (investments, innovations, employment, and/or regional development). The ongoing preparation of tax reforms thus aims at combining a modern, consistent, and simplified tax code with the redefinition of the Tax Committee’s overarching mission statement—with a focus on maximizing voluntary tax compliance. This would shift the tax authorities’ principal focus on analysing all information on the accuracy of tax-payer statements and conducting audits on the basis of identified inconsistencies. The reliance on risk-based tax audits would increase the tax authorities’ effectiveness and firms’ incentives to submit accurate tax statements. In parallel, temporary tax incentives would be subject to specific expectations that are monitored, recorded, and made the basis for subsequent decisions on potential extensions. The decision to launch public consultations on the new draft code would be a critical signal of the country’s commitment to developing a real partnership with the private sector as foundation for a strong, sustainable, and inclusive recovery.
Second, providing for the foundations of the economy’s digital transformation. The government is preparing reforms that would enable the country to “leap-frog” towards a modern, digital economy with a faster, less expensive internet. This would allow for dynamics that could increase (1) the quality of, and access to, public services (e-government, e-health, distant learning, smart city, or cashless payments); and (2) the scope for new digital firms, including in rural and remote areas, to explore new opportunities and create additional employment opportunities. For results that are both fast and tangible, the government would need to modernize the legal framework in the telecom sector and establish an independent (public) regulator to allow for proper competition to bring down prices and increase the quality of services. The government is in negotiations with international development partners that have shown interest in supporting foundational reforms and most providing critical investments needed for the national roll-out of e-government priorities that can finally utilize the potential for Tajikistan’s digital transformation.
Third, developing a modern supply chain from agricultural production to food processing. The COVID-19 crisis has heightened the risks of food scarcity during the off-season months, notwithstanding increased production during the summer and autumn. To this end, the government has focused important activities on planning measures to guarantee sufficient, high-quality food.
This includes measures to provide farmers with seeds and fertilizers, build resilient livelihoods and institutions, and create additional jobs in the agriculture and food-processing sectors for the next years to come. It is being sought to strengthen the crisis resiliency of the agricultural sector, increase the sustainable production of food, ensure safety, foster processing, and facilitate export competitiveness—especially in the high-potential horticulture sector. This can only be done with a viable sector of (new) micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises in rural areas. If linked to the digital agenda, farming and food production could allow for a dramatic increase of agricultural productivity, thereby transforming Tajikistan’s low-productivity, segmented, and crisis-prone agricultural sector to a modern one comprising effective systems of (1) managing seeds, seedlings, and planting materials; (2) promoting market-led, high-value horticulture value chains; (3) strengthening systems of quality control, food safety, and certification; and (4) linking these to strengthened systems of early warning and response.
In all of these efforts, Tajikistan finds itself well-prepared, on the eve of making the required—albeit difficult—decisions necessary to alter perceptions and dynamics. A view on the budget’s revenue side, in relation to the most urgent expenditure obligations, shows that tax revenues alone would not suffice in responding to current and future challenges. The state needs, as a partner, a dynamic, innovative, employment-generating, and tax-paying private sector. Its decisions to invest and innovate reflect perceptions of future profitability. In support, the government would need to continue to improve the environment and move towards guaranteeing the predictability in tax obligations, ensuring the ability to enforce contracts, and fostering the enormous development potential that is inherent in fair competition on a level playing field. With innovative, dynamic, exporting, and profitable enterprises, current priority challenges to economic policymaking—from taxes over interest and exchange rates, to employment opportunities—fade into the background, providing the state more space to focus on strengthening health, education, and the necessary investment needed to increase the human capital of every citizen of Tajikistan, along with their standards of living and resilience to fragility and future crises.
Originally published in Asia Plus via World Bank
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