As the follow-up to the first round of talks convened last month, top diplomats from the US and Russia attended three-day meeting on 28 – 30 of July 2020 in Vienna, Austria, to discuss the future of nuclear arms control. One of the most highlighted issues of the talks is the possible replacement of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear arms control deal which is due to expire next year. The Treaty is considered essential to maintain strategic stability as it is aimed at reducing arsenals of the two nuclear powers.
Despite the claim that the first round of meetings in Vienna was productive, it remains unclear whether the second talks will end up in an extension of the New START or not. In this connection, experts are skeptical and questioning the genuine efforts of the US to pursue the process, as its administration keeps on putting conditions that is difficult to attain. One of those conditions is the broadening of nuclear arms control agreement by pushing China to join the talks, despite multiple rejection from Beijing.
Concerns over the uncertain future of nuclear arms control also emerged in August last year, following the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the US and Russia. After indicating its readiness to negotiate a new and better treaty, Washington expressed its difficulty to remain abide by the Treaty as Russia did not comply with it. In an act of reprisal, Moscow denied US allegations and pulled out from the landmark agreement which prohibited the two countries from launching nuclear-capable missiles with ranges from 500 to 5.500 kilometers.
As the INF Treaty has been abandoned and the continuation of the New START remains uncertain, the future of global nuclear arms control is at risk. Without the INF Treaty and presumably the New START limitations in place, nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear powers would be practically unimpeded. Under this condition, both countries may swiftly develop ground-based missiles and engage countries in different regions, including in Asia Pacific, to secure strategic bases for deployment of those missiles through new or strengthened security cooperation frameworks.
Overshadowed by this situation, countries in Asia Pacific, including Indonesia, should be cognizant and explore their necessary capabilities to prevent the region from becoming an arena for a new arms race and nuclear weapons exchange.
As for Indonesia, its prominent roles in global nuclear arms control must be no longer be downplayed. Indonesia has long standing records in mitigating nuclear weapons threats. Indonesia has been a coordinator of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) working group on disarmament and non-proliferation since 1994, is an initiator of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (SEANWFZ), and is also considered strong advocate of initiatives on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament as well as on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.
Indonesia is also an avid participating country at robust institutional mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and other sub-regional mechanisms that have huge potential as effective mechanisms in building trust between countries. Additionally, on track two diplomacy, there are mechanisms such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and other similar mechanisms where Indonesia is also a member.
With such modalities at hand, Indonesia could actually pursue measures to better anticipate regional challenges stemming from the rising tensions between nuclear-armed states.
Indonesia could encourage a more concerted efforts to raise regional awareness on the negative impact of nuclear weapons. It is imperative to resonate the message across the region that the adverse impact of the use of nuclear weapons recognizes no geographical border. Furthermore, other factors such as human error, negligence, miscommunication, cyber risks and access of nuclear weapons by non-state actors should be highlighted as imminent threats if they are not properly addressed.
Another suggested effort is pushing confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy as a top priority for deliberation on arms control among countries in the region, such as under ARF and EAS. Under current destabilizing developments, maintaining peace and security in the region is of utmost importance. In this context, leaders need to be fully cognizant of the significance of these measures in leading the situation in the right direction and preventing the region from getting caught up in a possible arms race.
In addition to first track, institutional and track two mechanisms could also be maximized to create an enabling environment for political commitment among Asia Pacific countries to refrain from further reducing their commitment to nuclear arms control. While maintaining total and complete disarmament as an ultimate goal, countries in the region, particularly the ones with nuclear weapons capabilities, need to be urged through mechanism such as CSCAP to at least continue upholding their “no first use” nuclear policy.
The next measure is to foster better interaction, exchanges of views and best practices between countries in the region to develop and strengthen national and regional nuclear safeguards infrastructure. As one of countries with highest compliance level to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)safeguards obligations, Indonesia could encourage countries in the region to further complete their IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the Additional Protocol. This effort will provide assurances that Asia Pacific countries are only pursuing peaceful applications of nuclear energy.
Finally, Indonesia could convince countries in the region to bolster their collective support for the multilateral approach to international security. In this connection, while waiting for its Review Conference 2020 to be convened as soon as circumstances permit (but no later than April 2021), firm support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) must be reiterated to guarantee its integrity and credibility as an essential foundation for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
All in all, with complexity and security challenges coming from within, including from South Asia and North East Asia, it should be realized that there is no one-size-fits-all formula to keep Asia Pacific region secure from nuclear weapons threats. Thus, any opportunities for peace and stability must be seized since leaving the region in a limbo with the absence of collective measures to anticipate the possible impact of the nuclear arms control crisis is definitely a risky option.
