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Reviewing Higher Education Leadership and UNP

Al Mukhollis Siagian

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It can be said that higher education institutions in all parts of the world today have been intensively conducting research efforts to improve leadership practices in order to increase didactic efforts in higher education institutions. Looking back, the Bologna Declaration in 1999 has significantly influenced higher education to be of high quality not only in Europe, but also throughout the world.

In this case, the problem that the writer is trying to point out refers to a specific reference to higher education institutions, especially Padang State University starting from the Vision, Mission, and the goals and leadership style in realizing all of that. As we know in organizations, both higher education and other institutions, leadership is very important to achieve the success of its objectives. Without it, the organization will not be able to function, thus higher education will become chaotic and possibly collapse. Not only in terms of existence, but the essence and urgency.

Referring to the ideas of Biggs and Tang, that leaders in any higher education organization leadership have three types of leaders. First, leaders in the governance process of various adoption phases and institutionalization of higher education initiatives. Second, content experts whose role is to provide advice and coordinate technical issues. And third is a political leader with comprehensive knowledge of how the system functions and the skills needed to ensure smooth execution.

Therefore, in supporting and implementing higher education efforts to be of high quality, higher education leadership is divided into different roles and responsibilities. At the level of one tertiary educational institution there are the Chancellor, Deputy Chancellor I / Vice Chancellor, Vice Chancellor II, Vice Chancellor III, and Vice Chancellor IV. Likewise at the faculty level there are Deans, Vice Deans I, Vice Deans II, Vice Deans III, and Vice Deans IV. Then with the division of roles and responsibilities of these leaders, we are familiar with the concept of distributed leadership (shared leadership).

UNP Transformational Leadershi

Padang State University (UNP) is one of the state higher education institutions in Indonesia. UNP as one of the tertiary institutions has a vision of “Becoming an International Dignified and Reputable University” and five missions, to: carry out international quality higher education, carry out innovative research and global publications, carry out community service to solve problems and contribute to the development of the Indonesian nation, implement world class university governance, and implementing well-implemented international cooperation. As well as the objectives of seven points, including: the implementation of international quality learning, producing competitive and innovative graduates, producing innovative products that are in accordance with market needs (entrepreneurship), produce scientific publications with a global reputation, provide benefits in the economic and socio-cultural development of the Indonesian people, the implementation of cooperation at the international level that is beneficial for national development; (international faculty, international student), and produces moral and religious professionals in the fields of higher education, science, technology, sports and arts.

To realize the vision and mission, Prof. Ganefri as the Chancellor of UNP urged WR and all officials to work together in pursuit of targets that were formulated in the strategic plan (strategic plan) for the development of the 2020-2024 UNP in line with the development program delivered by the Ministry of Education and Culture. There are four discourses focused on sustaining the strategic plan. First, strengthening internal quality by developing modern and creative learning. In its realization, it is the responsibility of the Deputy of Record I to design modern and creative learning that can still meet the competency standards that must be mastered by students, not only in education, but also in research and dedication.

Second, universities are required to continue to innovate various policies and governance in UNP. Innovation must be used as a culture to stimulate students, to lecturers, to think of something new. the third thing that must be done and carried out is to maintain the spirit of the institution, the marwan of the state and this nation which must be the responsibility of all. For institutions, how to strengthen, how the international world view of UNP is getting better.

And fourth, UNP must be an intelligence campus or a smart campus. All services and processes carried out at UNP must be digitalized. This is very important. Because it is undeniable, technology that can bring us foam brings us change faster. If you cannot utilize technology optimally, you will definitely be left behind.

From the affirmation delivered by Prof. Ganefri as the leader of UNP shows the transformational leadership style. Transformational leadership was initially introduced by leadership expert James MacGregor Burns. According to Burns, transformational leadership can be seen when leaders and followers work with one another to progress to a higher level of morality and motivation. Through the power of their vision and personality, transformational leaders are able to inspire followers to change their hopes, perceptions and motivations positively and work towards shared goals. Transformational leaders are generally energetic, enthusiastic, and passionate. Is Prof. Ganefri is truly a leader with a transformational leadership style, it is not the business of the writer but indeed a necessity for Prof. Ganefri to lead the UNP transformational. Because Ganefri is the rector of UNP who was able to defeat the incumbent in 2016 and when he became incumbent in 2020, Ganefri was able to maintain it. The leadership style must now do everything in its power to ensure and maintain quality in the formulation and implementation of quality education.

Southeast Asia

Countering Chinese String of Pearls, India’s ‘Double Fish Hook’ Strategy

Prof. Pankaj Jha

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India and Indonesia held their defence dialogue between the defence ministers on July 27, 2020 and discussed issues related to defence cooperation, promoting investment in each other’s defence enterprises and helping each other in extending logistical support. This meeting was held in person, instead of online meeting.

 India has started engaging its eastern Indian Ocean neighbours particularly Indonesia, Australia, and island nations in the Southern Indian Ocean region such as Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, and French territories spread across the Indian Ocean. India’s entry into Indian Ocean Commission (an intergovernmental group of island nations- Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros, Reunion islands, and Seychelles, dealing with maritime governance) as observer was facilitated by France. India and France have started conducting of regular maritime surveillance sorties from Reunion islands. This shows that India is keen on developing strategic and defence ties with France in the Indian Ocean region. This also hints to the fact that Indian navy has been working on ‘double fish hook’ strategy.

This ‘Fish Hook’ strategy of India is expected to complement the fish hook strategy undertaken by the US along with its allies in the Pacific Ocean. Media reports also state that China has floated many surveillance pods in South China Sea to monitor movements of US and its allies’ ships and submarines. With the upgradation of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and an investment of more than US $ 6.67 million which has been allocated during Prime Minister Modi visit to the islands, shows that India have larger designs with regard to these islands. This includes developing jetties, deep sea harbour and extending landing strips to facilitate landing of maritime surveillance aircrafts. There is also proposal of developing hangers for stationing of Sukhoi-30MKI aircrafts on a permanent basis.

In the past also when India was upgrading the facility in late 1980s it was seen as a launching pad erstwhile Soviet Union to make inroads into the Indian Ocean, and there were apprehensions raised by countries such as Indonesia and Australia. At that point of time the Andaman and Nicobar island group was stated to be known as Fortress Andaman(FORTRAN).Andaman Nicobar Command (ANC) was developed at Port Blair in 2001 as first integrated joint command centre. India again is exploring this possibility of upgrading the facilities in Andaman and Nicobar Islands so as to project its power in the Bay of Bengal and Closer to The Malacca Straits.

China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy has developed a concept that India has been surrounded by Chinese developed ports (Gwadar, Hambantota and Chittagong) developed in connivance with the ruling regimes in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. The ‘String of Pearls’ has gained lot of academic mileage in the international discourse related to the Indian Ocean security. As a countermeasure, India started engaging its littoral partners which includes the formidable navies in the region including US, France and Australia- all strategic partners of India. With US India has already engaged through the LEMOA agreement giving access to each other’s military bases and naval ports.

In June 2020, India has signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) with Australia which will provide support for maritime reconnaissance missions undertaken by the two countries with the use of their island facilities. The islands which have been listed for such a logistics arrangement is Andaman and Nicobar Islands(India) and Coco(Keeling) islands of Australia. Australia has been upgrading its facilities in the Coco Islands and also trying to upgraded facilities in Darwin and Keynes. This kind of complimentary logistics support agreement would enhance surveillance and reconnaissance activities of the two countries. Apart from Australia, India has also signed a port development project with Indonesia and has agreed to developed civilian and military facilities in the Sabang port which is located at the northern tip of Aceh archipelago. This acts as the first fish hook strategy spanning across the eastern Indian Ocean starting from Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Sabang port(Indonesia) and thereafter extending all the way to Coco(Keeling) Islands, the tip of this fish hook lands at the DiegoGarcia, the US military base in Chagos archipelago.

Similarly, the western fishhook strategy starts from Duqm port in Oman where India has entered into Maritime Transport Agreement and has gained access facility for Indian navy. India has also been working with regard to entering an agreement with the Djibouti so as to avail the logistic support in the Horn of Africa. Further engagements with Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar through training and visiting of the ships as well as giving them coastal radar systems, and few fast attack crafts shows that India is keen on anchoring its naval security through these engagements.

France has been very keen on developing maritime linkages with India and also undertaking fortnightly sorties through maritime surveillance aircraft such as P– 8 I Poseidon. The surveillance sorties have started in January 2020 and likely to continue in regular intervals along with France. France has acknowledged the fact that in order to secure its territories in the Indian Ocean region it has to build confidence and interoperability with the Indian Navy. Therefore if one draws a line connecting the ports  then it would look like a fish hook which again will land in the end at Diego Garcia.

The strategy which is known as ‘double fish hook’ strategy would help India in countering Chinese activities undertaken by unmanned submersibles and also know the activities of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean region. China has increased deployment of its personnel at its Djibouti base, and has been enhancing its presence in the Indian Ocean region. The reclamation of one of the Maldivian islands-Feydhoo  Finolhu Island, which is nearly 600 km from Indian coast, shows that China is willing to take risks so as protect its energy supply lines and maritime commerce. In fact, its Maritime Silk Road strategy would depend much on Chinese military heft in the region and also its dominance in the strategic waters of the Indian Ocean.

India has also understood the importance of blocking Chinese maritime traffic in case the border issue aggravates to the point of a war. During the 1971 war with Pakistan which led to the emergence of Bangladesh, the role of the Indian Navy has been appreciated in blocking the Karachi port, and also helping in protecting the Bangladesh from any external intervention.

This double fishhook strategy would depend much on development of the facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands which includes developing airports in the Northern reaches of this island group, increasing the maritime traffic as well as developing docking facilities for naval ships. The chief of defence staff has already alluded to the fact that it will be a joint command of the three services and also it will be a rendezvous point for the Quad forces. In one of the RAND studies titled ‘Overseas Basing of US Military Forces’ it was stated that Andaman and Nicobar Islands can be a very good operating base for US drones as it would give edge in case of operations against China. The development of this double fish hook strategy would undermine String of Pearls and would give India an edge in case of tensions between the two countries in the maritime domain. This in every variably will mean that Chinese inroads into Indian Ocean will be noticed and countered by the Indian navy with Quad countries before it can change maritime power configuration in the Indian Ocean region.

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Southeast Asia

What Indonesia Can Do to Prevent Nuclear Arms Race in Asia Pacific?

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As the follow-up to the first round of talks convened last month, top diplomats from the US and Russia attended three-day meeting on 28 – 30 of July 2020 in Vienna, Austria, to discuss the future of nuclear arms control. One of the most highlighted issues of the talks is the possible replacement of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear arms control deal which is due to expire next year. The Treaty is considered essential to maintain strategic stability as it is aimed at reducing arsenals of the two nuclear powers.

Despite the claim that the first round of meetings in Vienna was productive, it remains unclear whether the second talks will end up in an extension of the New START or not. In this connection, experts are skeptical and questioning the genuine efforts of the US to pursue the process, as its administration keeps on putting conditions that is difficult to attain. One of those conditions is the broadening of nuclear arms control agreement by pushing China to join the talks, despite multiple rejection from Beijing. 

Concerns over the uncertain future of nuclear arms control also emerged in August last year, following the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the US and Russia. After indicating its readiness to negotiate a new and better treaty, Washington expressed its difficulty to remain abide by the Treaty as Russia did not comply with it. In an act of reprisal, Moscow denied US allegations and pulled out from the landmark agreement which prohibited the two countries from launching nuclear-capable missiles with ranges from 500 to 5.500 kilometers.

As the INF Treaty has been abandoned and the continuation of the New START remains uncertain, the future of global nuclear arms control is at risk. Without the INF Treaty and presumably the New START limitations in place, nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear powers would be practically unimpeded. Under this condition, both countries may swiftly develop ground-based missiles and engage countries in different regions, including in Asia Pacific, to secure strategic bases for deployment of those missiles through new or strengthened security cooperation frameworks.

Overshadowed by this situation, countries in Asia Pacific, including Indonesia, should be cognizant and explore their necessary capabilities to prevent the region from becoming an arena for a new arms race and nuclear weapons exchange.

As for Indonesia, its prominent roles in global nuclear arms control must be no longer be downplayed. Indonesia has long standing records in mitigating nuclear weapons threats. Indonesia has been a coordinator of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) working group on disarmament and non-proliferation since 1994, is an initiator of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (SEANWFZ), and is also considered strong advocate of initiatives on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament as well as on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Indonesia is also an avid participating country at robust institutional mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and other sub-regional mechanisms that have huge potential as effective mechanisms in building trust between countries. Additionally, on track two diplomacy, there are mechanisms such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and other similar mechanisms where Indonesia is also a member.

With such modalities at hand, Indonesia could actually pursue measures to better anticipate regional challenges stemming from the rising tensions between nuclear-armed states.

Indonesia could encourage a more concerted efforts to raise regional awareness on the negative impact of nuclear weapons. It is imperative to resonate the message across the region that the adverse impact of the use of nuclear weapons recognizes no geographical border. Furthermore, other factors such as human error, negligence, miscommunication, cyber risks and access of nuclear weapons by non-state actors should be highlighted as imminent threats if they are not properly addressed.

Another suggested effort is pushing confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy as a top priority for deliberation on arms control among countries in the region, such as under ARF and EAS. Under current destabilizing developments, maintaining peace and security in the region is of utmost importance. In this context, leaders need to be fully cognizant of the significance of these measures in leading the situation in the right direction and preventing the region from getting caught up in a possible arms race.

In addition to first track, institutional and track two mechanisms could also be maximized to create an enabling environment for political commitment among Asia Pacific countries to refrain from further reducing their commitment to nuclear arms control. While maintaining total and complete disarmament as an ultimate goal, countries in the region, particularly the ones with nuclear weapons capabilities, need to be urged through mechanism such as CSCAP to at least continue upholding their “no first use” nuclear policy. 

The next measure is to foster better interaction, exchanges of views and best practices between countries in the region to develop and strengthen national and regional nuclear safeguards infrastructure. As one of countries with highest compliance level to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)safeguards obligations, Indonesia could encourage countries in the region to further complete their IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the Additional Protocol. This  effort will provide assurances that Asia Pacific countries are only pursuing peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

Finally, Indonesia could convince countries in the region to bolster their collective support for the multilateral approach to international security. In this connection, while waiting for its Review Conference 2020 to be convened as soon as circumstances permit (but no later than April 2021), firm support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) must be reiterated to guarantee its integrity and credibility as an essential foundation for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

All in all, with complexity and security challenges coming from within, including from South Asia and North East Asia, it should be realized that there is no one-size-fits-all formula to keep Asia Pacific  region secure from nuclear weapons threats. Thus, any opportunities for peace and stability must be seized since leaving the region in a limbo with the absence of collective measures to anticipate the possible impact of the nuclear arms control crisis is definitely a risky option.

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Southeast Asia

ASEAN in the Emerging Indo-Pacific

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In 2017, the concept of the Indo-Pacific, after it was included in the discourse of regional issues by US representatives, was unofficially framed as the region’s main discussion issue for the coming years. Having appeared in the Indian analytical magazine in 2007, the term “Indo-Pacific” for a long time only remained the subject of scientific discussions and entered the political vocabulary of only a couple of countries of the future region: India, Japan and Australia. At the initial stage of the emergence of the concept, ASEAN countries experienced serious problems of internal contradictions and really could not join the formation of the concept among the first. In 2013, Indonesia, as a country – one of the leaders in the region, presented an “aseanocentric” vision of the concept of “Indo-Pacific.” The proposal was to create a regional organization that includes all the basic principles of ASEAN (“integration”, “mutual understanding”), based on a symbiosis of two existing institutions: the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Association of East Asian Summit Members. It is not surprising that the proposed construct retained the leading role for ASEAN countries in future decisions of the organization, since it was actually proposed to “bring to a common denominator the heterogeneous and diverse ASEAN external partners» [2]. At the stage of presentation, the path of the “aseanocentric” concept stopped. The main ideas, agendas presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Marty Metalegawa, were not included in the discourse-discussion of the concept in the coming years.

If we give an analytical assessment of the approach proposed by Indonesia, on behalf of ASEAN, we can note its all-inclusive nature, where there were no restrictions on the entry of actors (the most striking example is the dualism of the China-USA pair), which at the time of the promotion of the initiative, which of course was perceived by most countries as anti-Chinese, the idea of forming a future concept fell somewhat out of the general trend of the movement of thought. Considering that in the years following the presentation of the concept by Indonesia, the confrontation between the USA and China only increased, it is not surprising that the «aseanocentric» version of Indo-Pacific seemed inappropriate to potential participants in the future concept. At the same time, the lack of economic opportunities for ASEAN countries to advance the initiative was superimposed on this.

Difficulties in embedding discourse

It is obvious that after the rejection of the “aseanocentric” initiative, the ASEAN countries found themselves in a dependent position on the will of other participants in the dialogue on the formation of a future concept. The absence of the agenda of the Southeast Asian countries in the formation of the future Indo-Pacific concept on the following provisions, which will negatively affect the position of ASEAN countries in the creation of Indo-Pacific.

As early as 2017, ASEAN countries were turned off from a direct discussion of the concept of “Indo-Pacific.” So during the four-way dialogue on the security of the region, among whose participants were the USA, Japan, Australia, India, not a single Southeast Asian country was invited. The lines on the application of the principle of “ASEAN centrality” in shaping the future concept in the final communiqué following the discussion looked all the more ironic [3]. The very format of the meeting, where in the presence of a significant number of regional, time-tested institutions, including ASEAN, this institution was chosen as the venue for the meeting (the four-way dialogue on security cannot be considered one of the main regional venues in the region), which did not include Southeast Asian countries, ASEAN’s potential reduced role in Indo-Pacific.

However, when discussing the non-inclusion of ASEAN countries in the process of adopting the concept of future Indo-Pacific, it is worthwhile to dwell in detail on the chronic internal problems of the organization, especially with regard to the process of developing a unified, consolidated position on any issue. The decision-making problem has already led to the “informality” being proclaimed as the main principle of ASEAN organization, since there are few official situations where the parties could agree on problematic issues (from unsuccessful examples: ASEAN position on SCS, standardization of tariff restrictions) [4]. As part of the ASEAN internal affairs, this lack of maturity is explained not only by the system of consensus decision-making established in the organization (when one abstaining is enough for the decision not to be made), but also by the constant desire for political diversification of previous agreements (example: despite the fact that ASEAN has been a long time trying to build a common market, most of the organization’s states are openly oriented to third markets, which diverges from official political statements and blocks promotion proposed “aseanocentric” initiatives) [5].

A very sensitive internal moment for the ASEAN countries in building the concept of Indo-Pacific is the orientation of the initiating countries to the principles of “freedom” and “democracy” in internal political life, which share the concept of countries. This is a very well-founded fear, since most of the ASEAN countries can be classified as hybrid regimes that combine the practice of democracy and authoritarianism. ASEAN countries that are historically sensitive (“postcolonial syndrome”) to any attempt to influence sovereignty (which at one time even made them completely abandon the idea of creating supranational political institutions) are absolutely reasonably alarmed by the potential changes in the internal political structure that the design of the Indo-Pacific concept can bring.

The main foreign policy concern of the ASEAN countries, in connection with their participation in the development of the Indo-Pacific concept, is the potential possibility of losing China, which is the region’s main economic partner. In the presentation of the main initiators of the USA and Australia, carries a clear anti-Chinese message, which automatically puts all countries that have joined this interpretation of the concept into a situation of potential deterioration in relations with Beijing in the event of a diplomatic dialogue-explanation.

Second ASEAN Vision of Indo-Pacific

Obviously, realizing the danger of developing the final concept of Indo-Pacific without them, ASEAN in 2018-2019 stepped up in terms of developing a unified position of the organization on this issue.

The first attempt to present the “aseanocentric” vision of Indo-Pacific took place at the 13th EAC Summit in Singapore in November 2018. Recognizing the vacuum created by ASEAN’s almost 5-year-old lack of work on the Indo-Pacific concept, the proposal put forward was the most general and included some points that the concept initiators had already tuned for in 2017, namely: “mutual trust and respect”, “centrality ASEAN”,“inclusiveness”,“transparency” [6]. Thus, ASEAN tried to competently enter into the discourse of the formation of the concept by stating some statements that would not cause disagreement between the initiators of the concept. However, in making such a vague proposal, the ASEAN countries once again demonstrated their inability to declare their own position and draw up the boundaries of problematic issues. In the academic community, such an ASEAN speech raised many questions and led to the formation of a public conviction about the transformation of the Southeast Asian region into an arena of rivalry between the great powers [7].

Understanding that specifics cannot be avoided, ASEAN countries at a meeting of senior officials in Thailand in March 2019 announced the creation of a preliminary document of the ASEAN common position regarding the concept of Indo-Pacific. On June 23, 2019, this vision was published.

In its understanding of a future initiative, ASEAN builds on the geographical side of the issue. According to this approach, the region of Southeast Asia is the central place in concept, therefore it is he who should play a key place in the economic and political processes of the future concept. The attempt to declare precisely the message of the “centrality of the region” is expressed by unfounded fears of the potential fragmentation of the region on the issue of Indo-Pacific (which the USA has been actively claiming with the intensification of relations with Vietnam since 2010). It is worthwhile to understand that if ASEAN is fragmented for many years, it will lose political sovereignty as an organization, and for many years it will be in a political crisis. Therefore, the question of finding a common foundation for the Southeast Asian countries is one of the key issues in presenting their vision of the Indo-Pacific initiative.

Another distinguishing feature of ASEAN, which can be seen in the presentation of the initiative, is the absence of a statement on the creation of new institutions. According to the organization, the existing institutions of the region can cope with this: the East Asian Summit (EAC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN +8 Ministerial Conference of Defense (ASEAN CMO + 8). Reliance on the EAC Institute can be explained from the standpoint of ASEAN’s reluctance to oppose China and Russia (to a lesser extent) to the organization’s desire to take part in the Indo-Pacific concept. Given ASEAN’s position on the “inclusive nature” of their vision, the inclusion of this countries in the list of potential foundations of the future concept does not look directly hostile to the countries initiating the anti-Chinese concept format (USA, Australia).

The main benefits for ASEAN, according to their presentation, are the region’s entry into a more intensive economic flow by participating in programs to attract foreign investment, intensifying existing projects and increasing the level of integration with world economic organizations [8] (which sometimes bypass Southeast Asia due to the region’s poor reputation in banking and opaque cash flow).

It is logical that the document does not actually contain any political statements about the future ending, including comparisons with the concept of APR, a vision of political interaction in the future of Indo-Pacific (ASEAN has historically very carefully expressed its political preferences).

Conclusion

After ASEAN’s attempts to intensify the advancement of its vision of the Indo-Pacific initiative, there was a situation where the positions of all actors with a potential concept were announced. It is obvious that the position of ASEAN, due to 5 years of silence and internal difficulties in the framework of decision-making in the organization, looks the most vulnerable. At the moment, ASEAN faces 2 conceptually important tasks:

  1. To convince the main actors of the future concept of Indo-Pacific (USA, Australia, Japan, India) that the «aseanocentric» vision is most appropriate to the current regional situation.
  2. Consolidate the organizations position on the issue of attracting (the principle of «inclusiveness» promoted since 2013) «controversial» players: China and Russia.

It is worth noting that the decision-making center for the prototype of the future Indo-Pacific concept and its potential similarity with the ideas proposed by ASEAN are now completely outside the control of ASEAN. The countries of Southeast Asia by incorrect decisions of previous years brought the region into a state of uncertainty and absolute lack of independence in building a future image of the region. This future is completely dependent on the desires of the countries initiating the concept of Indo-Pacific in 2017, primarily the United States.

The greatest that ASEAN can do now, as a single organization, is through diplomatic negotiations to achieve the greatest possible inclusion of the proposals put forward by them for the future region in the final version of the concept. It is excluded that the ASEAN option will be adopted as the basic prototype of the Indo-Pacific.

Understanding that to accomplish task No. 1, ASEAN will need some negotiation flexibility. It is expected that the organization will not raise uncomfortable issues, in the form of involving China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific.

Thus, it is worth noting that the question of ASEAN in Indo-Pacific initially looked like some kind of test for the political suitability of an organization that it did not pass successfully. The organization’s position was twice late on the impulses of the discussion: first in 2007, then in 2017. The situation with the future of ASEAN in Indo-Pacific was significantly complicated by chronic internal problems in the organization, which ultimately led to the loss of the ability to influence the potential decision on the concept in 2019. The future of the concept of the Indo-Pacific almost entirely depends on the will of more successful countries to push forward.

1. Колдунова Е. (2019) Юго-Восточная Азия перед вызовами Индо-Тихоокеанских концепций. Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития. Том 1, №2 (43), Стр.42

2. Ibid.

3. Acharya A. (2017) The Myth of ASEAN Centrality?. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Studies. Vol 39, N.2.

4. Костюнина Г.М. (2017). Интеграционная модель асеан+1: основные положения соглашений и влияние на внешнеэкономические связи. Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения, 17 (3), 441-457.

5. Дёмина В. (2018). Экономическая интеграция стран Восточной Азии. Вестник Института экономики РАН, (6), 181-194. URL: 10.24411/2073-6487-2018-00082 (Date of the application 08.05.2020)

6. Колдунова Е. (2019) Юго-Восточная Азия перед вызовами Индо-Тихоокеанских концепций. Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития. Том 1, №2 (43), Стр.42

7. The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report. (2019) Singapore: ISEAS, 2019. P.12, 25.

8. Ibid.

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