Middle Eastern battlegrounds are alive and kicking even though rivals seek to balance contentious relations.

Take efforts by the United Arab Emirates, and more recently Saudi Arabia, to bring Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in from the cold in a bid to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran and address numerous fallouts from the more than decade-long brutal war he waged to keep himself in power.

Sanctioned by the United States and Europe, Mr. Al-Assad was also a pariah in the Arab world after the 22-member Arab League suspended Syrian membership in response to his conduct in the war. A meeting of the League’s foreign ministers decided on Sunday to readmit Syria.

With sanctions and international isolation failing to topple Mr. Al-Assad or moderate his policies, the UAE and Saudi Arabia hope engagement will be more productive.

That hasn’t prevented the UAE from continuing to counter the influence of Turkey and Iran in Syria, two countries with which it has formally buried its hatchets.

In the latest round, Mazlum Abdi, the commander-in-chief of the US-backed, predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), also known as Mazloum Kobani, reportedly traveled last month to Abu Dhabi to seek UAE assistance in negotiating an agreement with the Assad government.

The SDF played a crucial role in helping the United States defeat the Islamic State in Syria.

Mr. Abdi was accompanied by Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Bafel Talabani. The PUK is one of two major rival factions in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Emirati officials confirmed Mr. Abdi’s visit but denied reports that he met UAE national security adviser Tahnoun bin Zayed al Nahyan.

The UAE is concerned that further engagement with the Kurds could strain relations with Mr. Al-Assad.

Mr. Abdi’s visit came days after a Turkish drone targeted him as he was travelled in northern Syria with three US military personnel in a PUK convoy.

Kurdish officials read the drone attack and an almost simultaneous Turkish ban on flights from Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan, a PUK stronghold, as a warning against involving the UAE in Kurdish affairs.

Turkey said its airspace was closed due to increased activity in Sulaymaniyah of the outlawed Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Turkey asserts that Mr. Abdi’s SDF is the Syrian wing of the PKK.

The PKK has been waging a decades-long intermittent guerrilla war for greater Kurdish rights in Turkey.

The attack on Mr. Abdi was part of a relentless Turkish drone campaign designed to weaken, if not destroy, the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria. It was also intended to facilitate the return of some four million Syrian refugees in Turkey, which hosts the world’s largest Syrian refugee community.

Thousands of Turkish troops were dispatched to northern Syria to support the campaign.

The attack likely reinforced Mr. Abid’s fear that uncertainty about the US commitment to the Kurds, a potential rapprochement between Turkey and Syria that would involve a withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Syria, and a restoration of Mr. Al-Assad’s control of Kurdish areas could put the Kurds at risk.

Even so, the Kurdish administration has been reaching out to the Assad government since 2019 when the Trump administration initially announced it was withdrawing US troops from Syria, essentially abandoning the SDF and the Kurds. Due to  bipartisan pressure in Congress, Mr. Trump subsequently reversed his decision.

In response, in a deal brokered by Russia, the Kurds allowed Syrian troops to deploy along the border with Turkey to deter a Turkish military offensive.

Mr. Al-Assad has demanded a return to the situation prevalent in northern Syria before the civil war outbreak and the Turkish incursions as a condition for a rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus.

Mr. Abdi’s concerns were likely heightened last week when the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq joined their Syrian counterpart to demand the restoration of the Assad government’s sovereignty in all of Syria and an end to operations by armed groups, militant organizations, and all foreign forces in Syria.

Mr. Al-Assad sees as foreign interference the presence of some 900 military personnel in Syria, US support for the SDF, and the deployment of thousands of Turkish troops in the north.

A UAE-mediated agreement between the Kurds and Mr. Al-Assad would facilitate a Turkish withdrawal from Syria and Mr. Al-Assad’s rehabilitation.

Russia has facilitated talks between senior Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian officials to achieve that goal. However, the officials have disagreed on the terms of a meeting between Mr. Al-Assad and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Mr. Al-Assad has made a meeting conditional on Turkey’s willingness to withdraw its military from northern Syria and restore the situation that prevailed before the Syrian war.

For now, that seems unlikely.

On the campaign trail in advance of presidential and parliamentary elections on May 14, Mr. Erdogan used the Kurds as a foil to prepare the ground for a possible judicial coup should he fail to be reelected.

“My nation will never hand over this country to someone who becomes president with the support of Qandil,” Mr. Erdogan said in a reference to PKK bases in Iraq’s Qandil Mountains and Kurdish support for his opposition, which scores well in opinion polls.

Mr. Erdogan’s posturing, alongside the Russian and Emirati moves, suggests that improved relations between rival states have yet to do much, if anything, to resolve the region’s powder kegs.

The same applies to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt, which maneuver in conflict areas such as Sudan, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.

Instead, conflicts and rivalries play out differently.

The jockeying also demonstrates the risks inherent in fighting proxy wars by supporting armed non-state or renegade state actors, like the various Kurdish groups, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan (RSF).

The risks run from reducing conflict to a zero-sum game to proxies exercising their agency and weakening state institutions.

As evident with Turkey and the Kurds, recent de-escalation in the Middle East highlights those risks.

Mr. Al-Assad was likely strengthened in his resolve to get Turkish troops out of Syria and restore  his control over the Kurds by last week’s visit to Damascus by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, the first by an Iranian head of state since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Iran, like Russia, has supported Mr. Al-Assad throughout the war.

A Jordanian plan to “step by step” return Syria to the Arab fold notes that “current conditions” enable “Iran to continue imposing its economic and military influence on the Syrian regime and several vital parts of Syria by taking advantage of the people’s suffering to recruit militias.”

The paper warns that “Iran’s proxies are becoming stronger in the main areas, including the southern region, and the drug trade generates significant income for these groups while posing an increasing threat to the region and beyond.”

Mr. Raisi opted for Damascus rather than seeking to deepen Iran’s China-mediated rapprochement with Saudi Arabia by honoring Saudi King Salman’s invitation to visit the kingdom.

On the back of the Arab rapprochement, a victory for Iran and Russia, Mr. Al-Assad’s main backers, Mr. Raisi hoped to fortify Tehran’s relations with Damascus by tightening economic cooperation. His foreign, defense, oil, transport, and telecommunications ministers accompanied him.

At the same time, hopes that Iranian-Saudi de-escalation would facilitate an end to Yemen’s war are diminishing. Talks between the kingdom and Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, who control the north and the capital Sana’a, are likely to produce a longer ceasefire at most.

The talks began long before China mediated an agreement in March to restore diplomatic relations between the kingdom and Iran.

Eight years after intervening in Yemen, Riyadh wants a face-saving exit from a war that has failed to oust the Houthis, weakened its negotiating position, and proven costly in economic and reputational terms.

The Houthis have made a timetable for the unconditional withdrawal of Saudi and Emirati foreign forces a condition for a more permanent ceasefire.

A withdrawal under those conditions offers little opportunity to save face.

Moreover, a ceasefire may not halt UAE support for the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) in south Yemen and proxy militias in Shabwa and Hadramawt. That support has increased since the Emirates said in 2019 that it was withdrawing its troops from the country.

Similarly, the civil war in Sudan underscores the risks of supporting non-state or dissident state actors.

This week, supporters of Army Gen. Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman al-Burhan, Sudan’s de facto ruler, demanded the expulsion of Emirati diplomats in retaliation for the UAE’s backing of Rapid Support Forces commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, a.k.a. Hemedti.

The UAE has long worked with Mr. Hemedti and facilitated his lucrative gold exports through Dubai but was put in a difficult position by the eruption of hostilities in Khartoum that threatened Emirati strategic and maritime interests and could yet spark a broader conflict in the Horn of Africa.

The Kurds, Iran, and Sudan demonstrate that, in the end, the principle of “The king is dead, long live the king” applies to de-escalation in the Middle East.

De-escalation may dial tensions down a notch and help manage conflicts to ensure they do not spin out of control. It offers no resolution and allows open wounds like Kurdish aspirations to fester.

Author’s note: Responsible Statecraft published an earlier version of this story.

On Sunday, May 14, Turkish electorate will vote in the most consequential presidential election since the foundation of the Turkish republic by Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in October 1923. And the whole world is watching. Whichever candidate wins this election will define Turkey’s political, economical and geopolitical trajectory, fate and identity into the future.

The frontrunner, according to opinion polls thus far, is the opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of the Nation Alliance who is facing the current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the People’s Alliance. As the elections day approached, the campaign narratives and rhetoric from both alliances were intense, heated and full with stereotypical populist promises to the voters. Moreover, character assassinations, subtle insults and dog whistling arguments have dominated the election campaign period.

This election will have significant impact on Turkish history. The two contesting candidates have two different and divergent visions for the Turkish society and the State. If Kılıçdaroğlu wins, it will be a new dawn for Turkey; if Erdoğan wins, he will inscribe his name and vision on Turkey for the next century.

Never has Erdoğan been challenged in an election until this one. The sitting President has never lost an election contest against the opposition. But it seems this legendary winning track-record might be altered by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu come May 15 or in the second round in May 28. Whatever the outcome in this Turkish election, there is no doubt this is the most important election in the world this year; and people across the globe are following it closely like a Turkish soap opera.

Erdoğan: From Trauma, Success and then Failure

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s political career started with a political trauma and a strongly held sense of grievance against the Turkish state and its secularist establishment. He was jailed for his political opinions and banned from politics at one point in time. Many assumed at that time, that the political career of this young, vocal and charismatic Istanbul mayor was over.

However, the heavens had something else in store for Erdoğan. In dramatic turn of fates, he eventually became the country’s Prime Minister in March 2003. The rest is history. During his Premiership era, Turkey became economically prosperous as its middle-class burgeoned and its economic indicators improved year by year. Erdoğan and his party, the AK Party, seemed invincible in politics and his popularity rates soared. Turkish economy at this period became a model of success envied across the world in the post-2008 economic crisis.

But soon things started to go south around 2014, when Erdoğan was elected in a new role as a President. There was a power struggle between him and the then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. And after the 2016 deadly and tragic coup, Turkey descended into a quagmire economically and politically. The economy started to underperform; The Turkish Lira gradually lost its stability and lost value against the US dollar; and more significantly, inflation gripped the Turkish population. Moreover, Turkey witnessed a skyrocketing brain-drain in the last five years as the educated and the youths felt hopelessness of their future in the country. Furthermore, Turkey fell back in liberty and freedom of speech indicators as the county jailed numerous journalists, activists and politicians.

Kılıçdaroğlu: From Hopelessness to Hope

The opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was a career bureaucrat before he joined national politics. The soft spoken long-time leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) is a politician known for his deliberations-oriented politics, patience and compassion. Indeed one would argue that Kılıçdaroğlu lacks the bravado, charisma or the ego required to thrive in politics in Turkey and in the Middle East. Kılıçdaroğlu’s personality is soft and lenient. And maybe this is his secret for ruling and leading the party of Ulu onder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s for almost a decade.

While in electoral politics Kılıçdaroğlu’s has been unsuccessful in defeating Erdoğan for a decade, he nevertheless was a staunch opposition politician of patience, resilience and hope against Erdoğan’s majoritarian identity politics and rhetorics. And after winning the municipal elections of Istanbul and Ankara in 2019, it seems the tide has turned in favor of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

The politician who was emblematic of failure and hopelessness in Turkish politics has become a source of hope for Turkey’s democracy. Moreover, Kılıçdaroğlu is the candidate of a broad coalition of parties that consists of Islamists, Nationalists, Kemalists and Liberals. And it seems he has the tacit support of the main Kurdish Party, The People’s Democratic Party (HDP).

The Kurds: Kingmakers in Turkish politics

The Kurdish people have had a predicament historical relationship with the Turkish state since its inception. Their culture and identity have been suppressed and stigmatized invariably throughout history. As an undergraduate and graduate student in Ankara and Istanbul for the last 11 years I have witnessed closely how Kurdish students are subtly marginalized, otherized and even excluded in classroom and campus social settings.

However, the last two decades Turkey has witnessed a mushrooming of Kurdish political parties and they have become significant players in the Turkish political landscape. And in this year’s Presidential elections, Kurds are the kingmakers: whoever garners the Kurdish votes will win the presidency.

The Kurdish party HDP doesn’t belong to any electoral alliance and they are not fielding any Presidential candidate. Yet, it is quite clear that the HDP leadership tacitly supports the candidacy of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu strategically. Since 2016, Erdoğan has been in bed with the nationalist MHP and he had jailed numerous HDP politicians including their leader Selahattin Demirtaş “Selo”. Turkey’s Kurds have moved from the margins of Turkish politics and they have become the kingmakers of Turkish politics.

May 14, 2023

May 14 will go down in Turkish history as a fateful day. How Turks vote in May 14, 2023 will define Turkish history and destiny. While the majority of opinion polls unanimously indicate that Kılıçdaroğlu is ahead of Erdoğan, I personally think that it is too close to call it.

Erdoğan has accomplished many things in the last two decades but he also has his own shortcomings and mistakes. In terms of infrastructure and in the military-security industry his governments have accomplished many things Turks should be proud of. But when it comes to the education sector, youths’ employments and in the human rights and freedom of speech aspects his governments have performed poorly most recently. Moreover, the economy has been in tatters for the last five years and I think it will be a crucial factor in this election.

Kılıçdaroğlu promises an alternative vision for Turkey. He is an experienced career bureaucrat and a longtime opposition leader who can withstand the heat of the moment and all sorts of criticisms. If he wins he will focus more on the economy and welfare issues since he has a social democrat political leaning and rhetoric. Moreover, Kılıçdaroğlu could be a uniting figure for a country whose societies have been polarized by identity politics based on ethnicity, religion and even sects.

Finally, contemporary Turkey is a transformed Turkey in terms of demography and economically. Whoever wins will face a young population that has global ideals and values.  Old tricks in the Turkish political toolbox might not work. Turkey’s population is highly educated, more ambitious in terms of life expectations and is competing with the rest of the world. As a sociologist who studied and lived in Turkey for the last 10 years, I will argue that Turkey has become a “global country” and its destiny and fate is intertwined with its region and the whole world. Whoever wins will face enormous old and new challenges inside the country and in the globe.

The next presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey are scheduled for May 14, 2023. The voting will take place amid a challenging socioeconomic environment, aggravated by the aftermath of February’s natural disasters. Deadlines for a number of promising projects have been pushed back, and the country has proved unprepared for the problems it is now facing. The ruling coalition’s hopes for a convincing victory often seem dubious, with the struggle for power accompanied by fierce disputes over how to resolve the current problems and proceed with political and economic development. Meanwhile, old and forgotten cards are being played along with new ones as external interference in national affairs has become more frequent. It is difficult to say unequivocally what the outcome of this complicated electoral process might be. We shall try to identify the most likely scenarios of the political dynamics as well as the outcome of the upcoming elections, which, according to many experts, promise to be the most competitive in the entire history of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule.

Today, power in Turkey is held by the People’s Alliance (“Cumhur İttifakı”) coalition led, in fact, by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The coalition consists of the AKP, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Great Unity Party (BBP) and the New Welfare Party (YRP). The need to form this coalition is fostered by the risks of repeating the scenario of June 2015, when, in the absence of political allies, the ruling AKP lost its majority in parliament, despite winning the elections. This led to a political crisis in the country, as no government was formed and the vote had to be repeated in November of the same year. According to the Turkish constitution, to form a government alone, a party must secure more than half of the seats in parliament, which, under current conditions, is an unattainable goal for existing political parties. Thus, in the current political configuration, supporters of the ruling party expect to form a government in alliance with other conservative forces, while supporters of other parties in the ruling coalition intend to

In addition to the People’s Alliance, at least four other political blocs will participate in the elections. The main opposition coalition force is the Nation Alliance, the so-called Table of Six, consisting of the following parties: 1) Republican People’s Party (CHP), led by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, one of the favorites in the presidential race; 2) the Party of Humanity, Innovation and Goodness (Good Party), led by Meral Akşener; 3) the Felicity Party (PS) led by Temel Karamollaoğlu; 4) the Party of Democracy and Progress (PDP) led by Ali Babacan; 5) the Future Party (PB) led by Ahmet Davutoğlu; 6) the Democratic Party (DP) led by Gültekin Uysal.

The third coalition, also comprised of six parties, is known as the Alliance of Labor and Freedom. It includes the following political forces: 1) the pro-Kurdish Democratic People’s Party (HDP); 2) the Workers’ Party of Turkey (WPT); 3) the Labor Party (EMEP); 4) the Labourist Movement Party (EHP); 5) the Social Freedom Party (TӦP); and 6) the Party of Greens and the Left Future (YSGP).

Another coalition is called the Union of Socialist Forces. This political association consists of parties ideologically similar to those in the Alliance of Labor and Freedom, although united under much more radical political views, slogans and programs. The coalition includes the following parties: 1) the Left Party (ӦDP), 2) the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), 3) the Communist Movement of Turkey (TKH), 4) the People’s United Revolutionary Movement or HBDH and 5) the Revolutionary Socialist Workers’ Party (DSİP).

Finally, the fifth coalition that managed to nominate its own single presidential candidate (Sinan Oğan) is the Ancestral Alliance (ATA İttifakı), consisting of the Victory Party (PP), the Justice Party (JP), My Country Party (MCP) and Turkey Alliance Party.

Thus, five political coalitions have been formed several weeks prior to the elections. Yet, not all parties of the Republic followed the path of coalition engagement, though this is an exception rather than the rule. One such party is the Homeland Party established and led by Muharrem İnce, who, running for president from the PPR in 2018, won just over 30% of the vote, while his main opponent, R.T. Erdoğan, received over 52% of the vote. In other words, we can say that the practice of coalition formation keeps on taking root in the political life of Turkey, as it becomes an integral part of both the current election and the electoral process as a whole.

The Table below gives the most graphical representation of the current balance of political forces in the Turkish parliament that has 600 seats.

Table 1: Distribution of Seats in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey

No.	Party Name	Leader	Chairperson	Position	Number of seats	Relation to coalition
1	Justice and Development Party (AKP)	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Naci Bostancı	Right-wing populism, conservative democracy	285	People’s Alliance
2	Republican People’s Party (CHP)	Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu	Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu	Centre-left social democracy, kemalism	134	Nation Alliance
3	Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP)	Mithat Sancar & Pervin Buldan	Pervin Buldan	Left-wing, radical democratic socialism	56	Labour and Freedom Alliance
4	Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)	Devlet Bahçeli	Devlet Bahçeli	Far-right ultranationalism, idealism	48	People’s Alliance
5	Good Party (İYİ)	Meral Akşener	İsmail Tatlıoğlu	Centre-right Turkish nationalism	36	Nation Alliance
6	Workers’ Party of Turkey (TİP)	Erkan Baş	–	Far-left socialism, Marxism	4	Labour and Freedom Alliance
7	Democratic Party (DP)	Gültekin Uysal	–	Centre-right Liberal conservatism	2	Nation Alliance
8	Homeland Party (MP)	Muharrem İnce	–	Centre-left Kemalism, patriotism	2	–
9	Great Unity Party, BBP	Mustafa Destici	–	Far-right Turkish Islamic synthesis	1	People’s Alliance
10	Democracy and Progress Party, DPP or DEVA	Ali Babacan	–	Centre Liberal democracy	1	Nation Alliance
11	Democratic Regions Party, DBP	Saliha Aydeniz & Keskin Bayındır	–	Left-wing Democratic socialism	1	–
12	Felicity Party (SP)	Temel Karamollaoğlu	–	Far-right, political Islam, Millî Görüş	1	People’s Alliance
13	Innovation Party (YP)	Öztürk Yılmaz	–	Centre-left, civic nationalism, patriotism	1	–
14	Victory Party (ZP)	Öztürk Yılmaz	–	Centre-left, Turkish nationalism, anti-immigration party	1	Ancestral Alliance (ATA İttifakı)
15	Independents				4	–
16	Vacant				23

We would like to call your attention to another table, which highlights the current balance of political forces in the country. Thus, Table 2 shows the results of sociological surveys recently conducted in Turkey. The first column indicates the sociological companies which conducted the polls.

Table 2. The Results of Turkish Citizenry Political Preference Surveys (Average Numbers)

Average Results of the Latest Election Polls

Justice and Development Party (AKP) — 32.8%
Republican People’s Party (CHP) — 27.6%
Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) — 10.7%
Good Party (İYİ) — 10.5%
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) — 6.5%
Homeland Party (MP) — 2.9%
Democracy and Progress Party, DPP or DEVA — 1.6%
Future Party (PB) — 1.6%
New Welfare Party (YRP) — 1.3%
Workers’ Party of Turkey (TİP) — 1.2%
Victory Party (ZP) — 1.1%
Felicity Party (SP) — 0.9%

Thus, according to the average results of the latest polls, the ruling coalition may garner about 41% of the votes, while the opposing coalition may reach just slightly over 45%. In other words, the balance of power in parliament may change in favor of the opposition bloc.

As for the position of Recep Erdogan himself, most experts believe that the incumbent President feels more confident than the ruling bloc. This state of things became especially clear after the political parties from the main opposition alliance decided on a single candidate, namely K. Kılıçdaroğlu. But how justified is such overconfidence?

Indeed, as per the results of opinion polls conducted by pro-government companies, Mr. Erdogan can get more than 50% of the votes already in the first round. Building on this, predictions speculate that the president will likely repeat the success of 2018. However, the results of opinion polls conducted by companies closely associated with opposition forces generally show that the main candidates will still have to contend in the second round to be held on May 28. Notably, the main favorite in the presidential race is Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu.

Proceeding from the above-mentioned data, one should admit that forecasts made on the basis of sociological surveys conducted by the opposition forces look more realistic. This state of affairs makes us turn to the current realities and come up with forecasts taking into account not only the results of the opinion polls, but also the current reality and the processes taking place in modern-day Turkey.

First of all, the diverse position of the opposition parties united in the Nation Alliance is what catches the eye. To understand the actual incapacity of the Nation Alliance, it would suffice to recall a series of last year’s fruitless meetings of the opposition Six, as well as the incident with Meral Akshener, when she actually left the six-party platform for a while, having stated that the alliance “has lost the ability to express the people’s will.” Indeed, this assessment is not an overstatement as the parties in the Nation Alliance are far from developing a unified and consistent political program, the main agenda of these opposition meetings revolving around two topics—the collective opposition to Erdogan and the proposal to strengthen the parliamentary system.

In other words, the coalition’s members do not share a political platform, with each promoting their own political agendas and cherishing their own plans for distribution of powers and authorities in a possible coalition government. So far, there is no reason to expect a compromise between the leaders of the main opposition parties on these key issues, which is alarming, because it could lead to another political crisis. This is the last thing Turkish voters want. Quite indicatively, more than half of those polled expressed doubts in the ability of the main opposition bloc to solve the country’s current economic problems, according to a survey conducted by the Metropoll agency.

Let us talk about the main advantages of Erdogan in the context of the current electoral process. First of all, the incumbent president is actively pursuing the idea of establishing Turkey as a major regional hub for logistics and energy as well as an international transport artery for food freights. The almost simultaneous launch of all these transit initiatives in 2023 can provide Turkey with a brilliant prospect, resulting in a viable way of replenishing the state treasury. Mr. Erdogan is already garnering certain political dividends from the practical implementation of these large-scale regional projects, and we have to admit that their monetization will not be long in coming. The Turkish leader is aware of that, making great effort to ensure that these initiatives start working at their full capacity within the set deadlines.

Second, the commissioning of some major infrastructure facilities is anticipated this year, including those in the industrial, energy and logistics sectors. It is planned to expand some of the already existing large-scale projects in both infrastructure and high technology (civil, military and dual-use), which were launched during the AKP rule, bringing them to a new quality level.

Third, the Turkish president seriously expects his monetary policy to start bearing fruit already by the end of this year. It should be mentioned that his insistence on restraining and even lowering the key rate of the central bank does not fit into the generally accepted laws of economic theory, according to which one of the ways to tackle inflation is the central bank raising the key interest rate. In other words, the usual course of action should look as follows: the central bank raises the rate, while banks adapt their interest rates on loans and deposits to match the Central Bank’s higher rate. As a result, loans become more expensive, and deposits—more profitable. Accordingly, the funds of the population are drawn to deposits, the money supply is compressed, which ultimately leads to a slowdown in inflation.

However, according to Mr. Erdogan, inflation could be reined using the opposite method, which is the reduction of the Central Bank’s interest rate. This should increase the availability of cheap money in the country, boosting the production of domestic goods and services, which are then exported in exchange for foreign currency. Foreign currency is sold on the domestic market, strengthening the Turkish lira exchange rate and slowing the rate of inflation. The government expects that there will be a slowdown in annual inflation to some 20% by the end of 2023. Accordingly, in the medium term, the growing trade surplus should strengthen the national currency, as is forecast by the government. Today, the refinancing rate of the Central Bank in Turkey is going down in the face of severe pressure, amounting to 8.5% (last year it stood at 14%). If this approach, based mainly on promoting the exports of goods and tourism, is successful, Mr. Erdogan might rest on the laurels as the “innovator economist,” which will automatically make him the main author of the Turkish model of economic development, as he displaces Turgut Ozal from this pedestal, who was the father of the “Turkish miracle” and initiator of socioeconomic reforms in Turkey in the late 20th century.

Critics of this economic policy warn that the growth-oriented policy pursued in the run-up to the elections is unstable and could cause a systemic economic crisis. In turn, Turkish voters do not share the optimism of the authorities, albeit seeing no real alternatives from the opposition either.

Today, about 42% of respondents approve of what Erdogan does as president. It should be noted that this is not a bad indicator in the current difficult economic situation, but it may not be enough for Erdogan’s coalition to win the upcoming elections. Perhaps, that was the reason why the Turkish authorities were going to launch military operations against Kurdish forces in northern Syria. Another successful operation, which could have resulted in a crushing blow to the plans of a “Syrian Kurdistan,” could have strengthened the position of Erdogan and his party on the eve of the upcoming elections. In the meantime, the Turkish media review shows that public opinion is now least concerned about a new Syrian front. Moreover, the military operation is seen mostly in the context of a possible influx of new refugees. Under such circumstances, the normalization of relations with Syria looks like a much better prospect.

The incumbent President has been pointing to Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu’s weakness and even incompetence in foreign policy as well as security matters in every way possible. After Mr. Erdogan was announced the official candidate of the People’s Alliance for president, he addressed 10 questions to the leader of the CHP, which cornered him, as he was confronted with a difficult dilemma. These questions remained unanswered, which gave the Turkish president grounds for stating that the opposition acts not in the best interests of the Turkish electorate but to promote the interests of external forces.

It is obvious that Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu turned out to be “the most convenient” presidential candidate for Mr. Erdogan in comparison with other possible contenders—the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara. Ekrem Imamoglu and Mansur Yavaş were once the favorites among the opposition, garnering the support of 60.4 percent and 50.7 percent of voters, respectively. But in the words of Kılıçdaroğlu, these surveys are now “irrelevant.”

Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu has led the CHP, the oldest Republican Party of Turkey, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, for 13 years. Under his leadership, Ataturk’s party has evolved from a nationalist and Kemalist party into a more progressive and leftist force. The party leader abandoned opposition to the hijab and tried to build bridges with other political movements, including Islamists and conservative democrats. He also managed to convince Turkey’s nationalistic Good Party and the pro-Kurdish HDP to support the same candidate in the 2018 mayoral elections, when the opposition defeated the ruling AKP in Istanbul and Ankara for the first time in nearly two decades.

Kılıçdaroğlu promised to send millions of Syrian refugees back home and to restore relations with Syrian President Bashar Assad as part of his election program. The CHP leader does not approve of Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems, believing it has caused a rift with Washington. He also stated that, if elected, he would review the Central Bank’s management and stop interfering in its policies. Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu’s position on the Kurdish question is not so clear-cut. This may be due to the disputes between the nationalist and social-democratic wings of the AKP over this issue. In 2013, the politician condemned the peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as part of a plot to create a Great Kurdistan, and the party consistently supported military action against the group and its Kurdish-Syrian allies until recently. By 2021, however, Kılıçdaroğlu had changed his position, stating that the former co-chairman of the HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş, was “unjustly” put behind bars. In September 2021, he declared that the HDP was a “legitimate body” and called it a viable partner to “address the Kurdish question”.

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Today, none of the main contenders for presidency in Turkey has a clear advantage. The electoral process is quite tense, while the arguments of the parties are multifaceted, spilling over from foreign policy into economic and domestic policy domains and vice versa. Supporters of political parties often resort to polarizing society in an attempt to strengthen their base.

An important feature of the current election race in Turkey has been a blatant interference of the U.S. in the process. Even before his election, U.S. President Joe Biden said, “We need to make it crystal clear that we support the opposition leaders and that we have a road map. We have to speak louder about what we think. Erdogan needs to be overthrown by way of elections. He was kicked out in Istanbul, and his party was kicked out as well.” Notably, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeffrey Flake held meetings with all representatives of the country’s main opposition political forces. The Turkish president openly accused him of an unprofessional approach.

Amidst the growing anti-American, anti-NATO and anti-Western sentiments in Turkey, fostering cooperation with Russia looks quite advantageous practically in all areas. As for this track, all the parties (both members of the ruling alliance and members of the opposition bloc) hold on to a similar position, generally speaking. Most likely, this has to do with a clear demand existing in the Turkish society. There is an understanding that Turkey is a player that is to a certain extent dependent on Russia—particularly, in economic, trade, energy, tourism and other domains. Turkey remembers very well that the entire tourism industry of the Republic was seriously impaired with the sharp decline in tourist flows from Russia in 2015-2016, with hundreds of hotels closed and resort areas suffering huge losses. The Russian market is extremely attractive for Turkey; this explains the fact that recently, with the departure of Western brands from Russia, the Turks have been actively building up their presence in almost all sectors. The country understands that Russia’s position largely determines the level of its presence in a number of regions, including Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Black Sea region, etc. Russia and Turkey interact effectively within the framework of international formats to negotiate settlements in Syria, Libya, Karabakh.

Turkey is seeking to play a mediating role in the Ukrainian crisis. Ankara sees this as an opportunity to strengthen its position in the international arena. As an initiator and mediator in implementing the new regional mechanism under the auspices of the UN, aimed at addressing issues related to global food security, Turkey gets an additional opportunity to assert itself as a responsible global player. This is a completely new perspective for the country, which followed from permanent contacts with Russia. Today, Ankara has become virtually the only player in the Collective West, who is capable of maintaining a normal dialogue with both Moscow and Kiev. Turkey has not joined the anti-Russian sanctions and currently enjoys Moscow’s trust. It is making the most of this privilege in its communication with Western countries by demanding certain concessions from them. Such diplomatic maneuvers have provided Turkey with important advantages that its other potential competitors on the issue of the Ukrainian settlement do not possess. In other words, the growing engagement with Russia can guarantee the incumbent Turkish government success, both domestically and internationally. This circumstance is certainly taken into account by both the incumbent authorities and the opposition forces. Thus, cooperation with Russia promises to be an important and constant topic of discussion in the Turkish presidential election race.

From our partner RIAC