Connect with us

Eastern Europe

The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route in the face of New Danger

Published

on

The recent skirmishes along the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan pose significant threats to the development of East-West trade and transport corridor.

On July 12, another military confrontation sparked between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This time, the parties of the three-decades-old conflict over occupied territories of Azerbaijan by Armenian Armed Forces fought along international state border on the site of Tovuz region and Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, not the “Line of Contact” around the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Fitful skirmishes involved artillery fire and aerial drones which is sufficient enough to characterize it as the most severe incident since the “April War” in 2016. According to the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, 12 Azerbaijani servicemen and 1 civilian died including a major-general and a colonel while the Armenian Ministry of Defense reported that their number of deaths constituted for 5, which is surprisingly low considering the tense of confrontation.

The both sides immediately accused each other of initiating the fire. However, taking into consideration potential drawbacks of the armed clashes to international projects due to close proximity of strategic facilities to the border area, it is crystal-clear that escalation of military engagement fails to represent any interests of Azerbaijan, unlike Armenia which does not carry much responsibility as it is out of main regional connectivity projects in South Caucasus. More particularly, in accordance with goals embodied on “Strategic Road Map for the development of logistics and trade” approved in 2016, stability and security around the respective state border is of vital importance for Azerbaijan which, on the other hand, fills a gap of Armenia’s leading motive in choosing this place for new skirmishes. Namely, the last stop of Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway in Azerbaijan before it arrives at Rustavi station in Georgia is the Aghstafa station that is situated within approximately 33-45 km away from Dondar Qushchu and Kokhanabi villages of Tovuz region where Armenian Armed Forces were shelling along the border. In addition, the distance between the Baku-Alat-Qazakh-Georgia Highway and another suffering villages such as Ashagi Qushchu and Aghdam is more or less 4-5 km.

The recent developments in the East-West trade as a driving factor behind the clashes.

It is essential to lay an emphasis on the coincidence of clashes with the latest events occurred on the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) in order to draw correlation. Azerbaijan, as one of originators of the TITR along with Kazakhstan and Georgia, gradually advances its connectivity role thanks to the efficient use of Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway as well as Baku Alat Port. Recently, the TITR achieved a new freight transportation record in compliance with its2020 development plan on cargo tariffs, delivery time and volume of container traffic according to the report of Azernews. Citing to the press service of Trans-Caspian International Transport Consortium on July 15, Azernews informs that shuttle trains consisting of 47 containers arrivedin Istanbul from Xi’anin 16 days, 3 days earlier than the relevant time of the last year due to further harmonization and electrification of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line.

In addition, the Azerbaijan Railways CJSC confirmed to Trend News Agency on July 16 that between January and May 2020, there were 149,137 tons of cargo delivered via the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which was 3.9 times higher compared to the same period of 2019.Such improvement was also noticeable on the Global Competitiveness Report 2019 of the World Bank Group where Azerbaijan was ranked the 11th among 141 countries in the category of “Efficiency of train services”. It is important to note that the BTK has yet reached its maximum operational capacity as it is expected to carry 3-5 tons by the end of 2020 and up to 17 tons of cargo and 3 million passengers by 2023.

Furthermore, in early July, there was a meeting held among presidents of three countries– Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan to discuss cooperation on the integration of Lapis-Lazuli Transport Corridor to the TITR which connects landlocked Afghanistan with Europe. As soon as the BTK railway was linked to the Lapis-Lazuli route in 2018, products from Afghanistan began to flow through Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and further to the west. In particular regards to the volume of containers throughout the first half of 2020, President Aliyev stated that 55,500 tons of cargo were shipped through Azerbaijan towards Afghanistan and back during the specified time.

A frequent use of pro-war rhetoric entails a direct threat to Azerbaijan’s strategic facilities onthe TITR.

It is no secret that positive resonance of Azerbaijan’s participation in transnational projects makes Armenian government concerned about the change of balance of power in Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Such anxiety was also explicitly stated by the former leader of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan on his interview to Armenia TV when he noted that Armenia had to purchase Russian-made 9K720 Iskander-M ballistic missile with nuclear warheads with a caliber of striking any facilities within 300 miles (500 km) in order to balance the situation with Azerbaijan. Commenting on the demonstration of ballistic missiles during a military parade in Yerevan, Head of the Operational Department at the Armenian army’s General Staff, Major-General Artak Davtian revealed that Armenia’s missile systems were in the capability of targeting “all strategic facilities in Azerbaijan”.

On one hand, it is reasonable to have such a concern. Because in marked contrast to Armenia where political and economic unrest sprawled all around the country and a real “game of thrones” arises for the current government, Azerbaijan seems to be more equipped with opportunities for fast recovery during the post-pandemic period owing to a potential rise of the volume of international trade and transportation. According  to president of Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ), Askar Mamin, Azerbaijan can gain a net profit of US$600-700 million from transit route alone, while net profit of all member states is worth US$1 billion. The corridor also improves trade turnover of Azerbaijan with several countries along the route, especially China. Shahin Mustafayev, Minister of Economy of Azerbaijan confirmed on his interview to Global Times that the trade turnover between Azerbaijan and China reached US$1.7 billion from January to September in 2019, a rise of 96 percent compared to the same period of 2018.

In conjunction with such hostilities being conducted at regular intervals along the “Line of Contact” and state border, Armenian leadership also actively takes advantage of the pro-war rhetoric in a bid to discredit Azerbaijan’s competitiveness and create a notion of its insecurity. During the flare up along the border, Davit Tonoyan, Defense Minister of Armenia confirmed to Shushan Stepanyan, spokesperson of the relevant ministry “personal and command of the Armenian Army are instructed to be restrained for time to seize new advantageous positions in case of provocations received by the enemy on the borders of the Republic of Armenia.” Another aggressive and provocative statement of Minister was received in the gathering of Armenian community members in last March in New York. At the meeting, Tonoyan announced his dream for “new territories in the event of a new war” and promised that the option of return of “territories for peace” (regarding the occupied territories of Azerbaijan) would no longer be on the table.

Furthermore, some threats of Armenian leadership with a risk of more catastrophic consequences also targets to destabilize the region. In this regard, the statement of the “Defense Minister” of self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Levon Mnatsakanyan may serve an example. On 24 July 2018, Mnatsakanyan noted in a press conference that oil and gas installations as well as Mingachevir hydroelectric station of Azerbaijan, the largest dam in South Caucasus was included in tactical plans of the “Defense Army” of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Besides, some direct threats have already been put into force too. For example, when MP Hrant Bagratyan, ex-Prime Minister of Armenia said in his press conference on 29 April 2016that Armenia had to create its atomic weapons to fight against Azerbaijan and Turkey, very few people would believe that his words had actually incapsulated the partial truth until an unexploded 122-millimeter ordnance consisting of chemical code of white phosphorus was used against civilian population of Askipara village of Tartar region of Azerbaijan on 27 July 2016.

Conclusion

All aspects stated above lead us to some inferences regarding correlation between recent skirmishes and regional development and security in South Caucasus. Firstly, it reveals an obvious clarification that Azerbaijan as a promising contributor to the East-West transport corridor cannot be an interested party in escalation of military confrontation along the border as it constitutes an impediment to Azerbaijan’s strategic goal to become a logistics and trade hub not to mention further political and legal repercussions for the country. This fact generates the second deduction that Armenia, by undermining Azerbaijan’s connectivity role between Asia and Europe tries to keep the power dynamics of Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict balanced which ultimately aims at maintaining the status-quo. Nevertheless, in my opinion, it still requires another investigation to uncover additional motives of the Armenian government in conducting such provocations, especially from the perspective of aggravated domestic situation and its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The third and the most important takeaway note of this article is that Armenian provocations not only attempt to distract international and domestic community from the ground of Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict by opening another hot zone, but also pose significant risks to the development of regional connectivity projects as well as threaten economic incentives of all countries involved along the TITR due to any attacks on infrastructure facilities of Azerbaijan.

It is no doubt that such clashes stick all efforts of negotiation process of Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict; similarly, keep alive a risk of waging into a full-scale war in such an important region. Therefore, the time has come for international community not only to react Armenian aggression in the same way with other cases of violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty around the world, but also to immediately ensure the peaceful settlement of the conflict based on principles and norms of international law.

Javid Alyarli (@javidalyarli) received an M.A. in China Studies from Zhejiang University in 2019. His current research interests include Belt and Road Initiative, Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, "Digital Silk Road" and Chinese investments in South Caucasus.

Continue Reading
Comments

Eastern Europe

Lithuania: pensioners get ready for death

Published

on

Main attention of the Lithuanian media has been focused on migrant crises and security issues for several weeks. This problem has become also a good reason to once again draw the attention of the population to the need of increasing defense capabilities. This problem has become a good excuse for further increasing of the armed forces funding, new purchases in the defense sector. Talks, meetings, visits as usually ended with the promises to support the country on condition of increasing military spending by Lithuania itself. And Lithuanian agree without hesitation. Although it would be worth thinking.

Finance Minister Gintarė Skaistė told a press conference the day before that this would raise defence spending from 2.03% in 2021 to 2.05% in 2022, Lithuanian Radio and Television (LRT) reported on its website on 11 October. She added that Lithuanian political parties support the gradual increase of defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2030.

These numbers are not only in the files. These are million of euros! Only this year the national defence spending is about EUR 1.017 billion or 2.02% of GDP. Next year the planned amount is EUR1.176 billion.

It should be noted that the recipients of this money will be the Ministry of Defenсe, and not the The State Border Guard Service at the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, which would be logical in this situation.

The more so, not only the State Border Guard Service urgently needs more funding.

The situation for pensioners in Lithuania is more difficult than ever. The pension they receive is not enough, ”says Grasilda Makarevičienė, President of the Lithuanian Association of Elderly Persons.

According to Grasilda Makarevičienė, there are different retirees. There are pensioners who worked in the government, they receive good pensions, but it is very difficult for an ordinary pensioner to survive. Moreover, now, during this period of the pandemia, medicines are very expensive. And prices went up significantly. Even potato, which is the main product of pensioners, have risen in price, ”G. Makarevičienė told LNK. She mentioned the absence of sufficient number of clinics in small towns and villages.

G. Makarevičienė noted that pensioners are already angry and they are on the brink of despair. She bitterly noted that when elderly people paid taxes and bought medicines, only from 70 to 100 euros remain for food. It should be said that every third person gets pension in Lithuania. It is awful, but about 30% of the elderly in the country live in poverty.

Do the authorities wait for Covid-19 to kill a large number of elderly people and thus, there would be no need to take measures and pay more pensioners?

Continue Reading

Eastern Europe

Shifting Geography of the South Caucasus

Published

on

nagorno karabakh

One year since the end of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war allows us to wrap up major changes in and around the South Caucasus. Most of the changes discussed in the scholarly works so far focused on the role of Turkey and Russia. The shifting geography of the South Caucasus, however, has been disregarded.

In many ways, the war accelerated the pre-existing trends, but also initiated new developments. The first and foremost change concerns geography. The South Caucasus has been historically dominated by neighboring states. Whether it is the Sasanian and Byzantine empires in late antiquity or later Ottoman and Persian states, the region was exclusively subject to one or two powers. The idea is that the region was mostly closed to the outside, non-regional influence. The trend continued in 19th-20th centuries when the South Caucasus was exclusively dominated by Russian power. The end of the Soviet Union changed this geopolitical reality when several powers were able to penetrate the region. Yet the pace of the change was relatively slow – Russia was still able to minimize the extent to which the neighboring or non-regional countries were able to act in the South Caucasus: Turkey, Iran, US, EU, and to a certain extent, China have been influencing the region to a limited degree.

But the second Nagorno-Karabakh war accelerated this process. The South Caucasus’ borders are increasingly shifting. No single power or even a duo of countries can dominate the region. It reflects geopolitical changes in the world where the emerging multi-polar world ushers in a different set of rules. Exclusive geopolitical control is no longer viable and the 2020 war showed exactly this.

There is also yet another dimension of the unfolding geographic change. The war also solidified that the Caspian basin and South Caucasus are inextricably linked to the greater Middle East. Russia and Turkey are basing their strategies in the region on developments in the Middle East and the Black Sea region. Not since the end of the Soviet Union has the South Caucasus been such a critical point for the powers around it. In a way, this re-emergence of close contacts between the South Caucasus and the Middle East is a return to normalcy which was disrupted in the early 19th century by Russian annexation of the South Caucasus. Indeed, in pure geographic terms the region is better connected to Turkey and Iran than to Russia, with which it shares the impassable Caucasus Mountain range.

This also means that the role of the South Caucasus in the thinking of Iran and Turkey, and by extension Russia, has grown. Considered if not as a complete backwater region in the calculus of large powers, the South Caucasus has nevertheless experienced a lack of attention. This was especially true for Iran, which now struggles to retain its weakening position in the region.

It is true that Iran was never a dominant power in the South Caucasus. Unlike Russia or Turkey, the traditional power brokers, it has not had a true ally. Tehran was certainly part of the calculus for states in the region, but it was not feared, like Ankara or Moscow. And yet, the South Caucasus represents an area of key influence for Iran, based on millennia of close political and cultural contacts various Persian empires had with the South Caucasus.

The 2020 war changed Iran’s calculus in the region as the Islamic Republic’s interests were largely unheeded. Iran has now to adjust to the changed geopolitical landscape and it can be even argued that the recent escalation it had with Azerbaijan over the detained trucks, drills, and alleged Israeli influence, was an effort to wedge itself back into the geopolitics of the South Caucasus.

Yet there is little Iran can realistically do to boost its position in the region. The South Caucasus will certainly feature higher in Tehran’s foreign policy agenda than before. But Tehran does not have an ally in the region, nor does it have financial means to strengthen its soft power. Iran can support Armenia in its efforts to balance the triumphant Azerbaijan.

The lifting of US-imposed sanctions could augment Iran’s projection of financial and diplomatic power in the South Caucasus. Still, a more realistic approach for Tehran would be to build closer cooperation with Russia. Both loath growing Turkish influence and the Islamic Republic does not object to growing Russian influence as much as it does resent the West’s and Turkey’s presence. Surely, interests with Russia do not align always, but for Tehran, Moscow is a traditional power in the South Caucasus which is about maintaining a status quo. Turkey, on the other hand, disrupts it seeking greater influence.

There has been a certain retrenchment of the Western influence in the South Caucasus. While it does not signify a definitive decline in West’s fortunes, it is nevertheless important for Washington and Brussels to formulate a more robust approach toward the region. Decreasing the tensions with the Turkey could be one of the steps. Increasing economic engagement with the region would be another. Delay could be damaging. Georgia, which serves as a door for the West to the Caspian basin and on to Central Asia, could be the biggest loser if Washington shifts its foreign policy away from the region. An alternative could be a Russian model of peacebuilding and regional order where Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan will face a lack of foreign policy options if the West’s unwillingness to commit to the region continues to grow. Author’s note: first published in caucasuswatch

Continue Reading

Eastern Europe

Russia: The Neighbor From Hell

Published

on

Photo: Kuźnica Białostocka, Poland. Migrants' encampment area. Army, Border Guard and Police on the border. Credit: Polish Territorial Defence Force

From Belarus to Ukraine to Georgia, an arc of instability has emerged, offering opportunities for malign activities by foreign powers. This has proved too tempting for Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which openly pursues an activist foreign policy seeking gains for the Kremlin at whatever cost to its neighbors. For the West, it is time to consider the wider Black Sea region as a whole and to develop a strategy. 

The migrant crisis unfolding on the Belarusian-Polish border is the most pressing and serious emergency. For some months, the Belarus dictator Aliaksandr Lukashenka and his security services have been funneling thousands of Middle Eastern migrants toward the EU border. Officially, Russia has distanced itself from the crisis, with President Vladimir Putin on November 13 denying claims he had helped to orchestrate a crisis.  

Russia is often disbelieved by neighbors with unhappy experiences of its statecraft. In this case, too, there are reasons to doubt Putin’s words. Firstly, the Belarus migrant drama bears an uncanny resemblance to the events of 2016, when the Kremlin unleashed a sudden wave of developing world migrants across Finland’s and Norway’s Arctic borders. Secondly, few believe Lukashenka’s regime on its own is sufficiently organized to orchestrate events of complexity spanning two continents.  

Russia’s rapid dispatch of advanced combat aircraft and paratroopers (two of whom died in the exercise) to the Belarus-Poland border and Putin’s contemptuous dismissal of Germany’s Chancellor and the EU’s senior head of government Angela Merkel (she was told to call Lukashenka herself) were open signals of approval for the Belarusian position. Only when Lukashenka mused that he might cut off gas supplies to Europe was he publicly slapped down by Russia. It was also notable that Russia and Belarus recently agreed on further steps in their on-again-off-again Union state. 

To the south, in eastern Ukraine, the clouds are also gathering. Fighting is worsening with Russia’s separatists in Donbas, and ceasefire violations are spiking. US briefings now suggest around 100,000 military personnel and large amounts of armored equipment are located within reach of the border; military movements are being organized at night. Not only does this follow the deployment of large Russian formations for exercises in the Spring, but it also matches a threatening drumbeat of anti-Ukrainian rhetoric from Russian leaders including Putin, who have questioned the country’s right to an independent existence. The Kremlin has increased funding for the Donbas and pledged humanitarian support to the rebel-controlled regions thus facilitating trade between Russia and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. 

The bottom line is that Russia is putting Ukraine back on the agenda and — as some predicted — forcing the Biden administration to take notice, despite its desire to park Russia and focus on China. Putin and his aides remain determined to build a near-exclusive sphere of influence in its neighborhood and Ukraine is the crown jewel in its geopolitical thinking. If Russia is finally seeking a settlement to its seven-year-long forever war, that would require agreement from Ukraine to effectively hand control of eastern regions to Russia and its local agents, plus a commitment to stop the country from joining Western military and economic institutions. There is no sign that Ukraine will agree to such constraints on its sovereignty. 

Further south in the South Caucasus, Georgia, the West’s only partner in the region, is suffering a continuing crisis following the municipal elections in October and the former president Mikheil Saakashvili’s stealthy return to the country. He is now in prison on a hunger strike. Russia lurks here too. It might not be orchestrating the crisis, as in Belarus, but it does benefit. Russian media has been actively addressing the events in Georgia and playing on recurrent tensions between the country and its Western partners, especially the European Union (EU). As always, chaos — sometimes resulting from direct Russian interference, and sometimes not — makes it harder for candidate countries to meet the membership terms of Western clubs while emboldening those European countries sympathetic to Russia and skeptical of expansion. This makes it harder for organizations like the EU to engage Georgia.

Russia’s grand strategic aim is to maintain its power in neighboring states. That means keeping the West at bay, and political instability serves that purpose. Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia are distant, but the Kremlin is always present. In some cases, it resorts to military pressure to gain momentum, in other cases it sits and waits, but the pattern signals a clever use of opportunities as they arise, exploiting the space given by a West signaling decreasing willingness to engage in the wider Black Sea region. 

Seen from the long-term perspective, the 1990s and 2000s were a period of a slow but steady decline of Russian influence in what then constituted the former Soviet Union. From the Kremlin’s point of view, the present period is much more productive, with concrete gains and the reversal of the West’s military and economic expansion. For Putin and his ministers, it seems likely that the US considers defending Ukraine, Georgia, and even involvement in the Belarus-Poland border crisis costlier than the potential benefits of having these countries within America’s geopolitical perimeter.

The ground is now prepared to seek a reversal of the West’s geopolitical gains and cast aside the wishes of the people of Ukraine and Georgia. The push against aspiring liberal democracies is now gathering pace, timed to coincide with a wider geopolitical shift, namely the recalibration of US foreign policy to east Asia. 

Author’s note: first published in cepa

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Trending