Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has made it clear that «the future of START-3 Treaty is foregone». During an online session of the Primakov Readings the minister pointed out that «it looks like the United States has already taken a decision not to prolong the treaty». What is meant is, in the first place, the US persistent attempts to turn two-party talks into three-party ones, with the participation of China. How dangerous is Washington’s reluctance to remain committed to strategic nuclear reduction?
Since the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty ceased to exist at Trump’s initiative in August last year, START-3 has been the only bilateral agreement between Russia and the USA which puts restrictions on the two countries’ nuclear missile potentials. START-3, signed in 2010, expires in February 2021. Under the conditions of the Treaty, it can be extended for another five years without resorting to the procedure of obtaining the approval of the two countries’ parliaments. This is particularly essential given the current confrontation between the Democrats and Republicans in the US Congress.
At present, the Russian Federation and the United States have three options to deal with strategic nuclear weapons: to prolong START-3, work out a new agreement, or suspend, for some time, any negotiations on strategic weapons restrictions. Both parties understand that the current state of bilateral relations leaves little hope of coming to agreement over a short period of time and without preparation. Meanwhile, prolongation of START-3 for five years would give Moscow and Washington extra time, a “strategic lull” of sorts, during which both countries would be able to maintain the high level, if not trust, then of awareness of each other’s policies on such an important issue as strategic stability.
In June, Russia and the US held talks in Vienna on the possibility of control and extension of START-3. The two sides agreed to continue consultations I the Austrian capital at the end of July – at the beginning of August. However, the course towards the destruction of the existing system of weapons control, which took upper hand in the US policy long before the arrival of Trump, leaves little hope of seeing the Treaty extended in the future.
According to Russia’s former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, after the disintegration of the USSR, the US «felt the winner and openly proclaimed a departure from international agreements which, in the opinion of several US administrations, could tie US hands on the international scene, or in other words, stand in the way of US attempts to establish its domineering position all over the world». In the area of strategic stability, the United States first initiated the elimination of START, then – of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Washington «did its utmost to stop NATO countries from ratifying the modified version of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty». The United States «evaded a constructive dialogue on other areas of weapons control». Given this, START-3 became «more of an exception».
The US administration insists that negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons should be necessarily joined by China. Only in this case, Washington says, it would make sense to assume “restrictions and commitments” yet again. The United States is thereby trying to put forward its own conditions: either a three-party nuclear agreement between Moscow, Washington and Beijing, or a complete rejection of any commitments in the sphere of nuclear weapons. «Beijing rejects the idea». Moscow is interested in the prolongation of START-3 “without preliminary conditions”, Vladimir Putin pointed out repeatedly.
Throughout his presidency, Donald Trump has pursued a policy which is aimed, he says, at “ridding” America of “unwanted” commitments. Nevertheless, in the case of START-3, the true motives of the Trump administration cause disputes among observers. The Treaty enjoys wide-ranging support amidst the US expert community, while the White House’s intention to necessarily involve China is seen by many American observers as «unrealistic».
In all likelihood, what is meant is a tactical intention to first please the voters, many of which share Trump’s opinion that America “has taken too many commitments” over the past decades. And then, in case of reelection of the incumbent president, the next move will be to clinch “the best deal of all possible”. Some optimists still hope that a consistent refusal of the current administration to sign weapons control and strategic weapons reduction treaties, first of all, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Treaty on Open Skies, is all but collecting “the best cards” “for bargaining” over new agreements.
As it seems, the Trump administration expects to get geopolitical dividends irrespective of what scenario talks on strategic offensive weapons will follow.
Clearly visible are Washington’s attempts to provoke Moscow into taking radical steps in response, which it could then use as a new justification of “consolidation” for NATO and the West as a whole.
Also visible is the economic reasons behind measures to destroy the system of strategic stability: unavoidable, though forced, retaliatory steps by Russia will be described as “aggressive plans” and the reaction to these plans will have to involve an increase of military spending on the part of Washington’s allies. In the first place, it will spill into purchasing costly US-made systems which are designed to “offset” the non-existent “threat from Moscow”.
Apparently, Washington plans to benefit from the situation even if Europe refuses to be dependent on the US interests and chooses to move in the direction of a more resolute and independent policy concerning the buildup of military potential. If that is the case, the US may attempt to worsen the EU split by making countries that are ready to partake in Washington’s strategic arms race hostile towards those that understood the danger and futility of such a policy back in the days of the Cold War.
Washington’s reasons for demanding that “Beijing join the agreements between Washington and Moscow on weapons control” appear questionable. On the one hand, in terms of military might, the United States expresses concern over China’s nuclear potential. Speaking at the Hudson Institute in May last year the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Robert Ashley pointed out that in 2018 China carried out more ballistic missile tests than the rest of the world taken together. According to General Ashley, China is likely to double its nuclear arsenal over the next ten years. But this is only «highly likely».
On the other hand, everyone knows that “the key priority of the Donald Trump administration in foreign policy is to contain China, both as an economic and a military superpower». There are grounds to assume that having reasonable doubts about its ability to subdue China in global competition, Trump opted for dragging China into the costly nuclear missile race. Particularly since in the conditions of the global corona crisis, the economic instruments of pressure that the US has at its disposal are rapidly losing their power. The top priority is to impose on Beijing a zugzwang, in which it will be forced to make a choice between the logic of economic development and «the logic of geopolitical confrontation», between reforms and «security and control priorities». Washington expects to put China in such a position where it will have to react to the rate and scope of an arms race imposed by a rich opponent.
Finally, the intention to destroy the global strategic stability framework bears the cynical expectations to sow seeds of distrust between Beijing and Moscow. US political and expert circles believe that Moscow, like Washington, is concerned about the fact that China, having signed none of the existing agreements on weapons reduction, is building up its missile arsenals without any restrictions. Thus, by provoking China into boosting its missile arsenals, it will be possible to “sell” Moscow a threat to global strategic stability on the basis of the assumption that none of the three nuclear powers can maintain parity with the combined potentials of the other two.
But Beijing has already given it to understand that it is fully aware of Washington’s intentions. At the beginning of July Director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Arms Control Department Fu Cong said that «China is ready to enter three-party weapons control talks with the US and Russia if the United States agrees to cut its nuclear arsenals to the level of China». The Chinese Foreign Ministry also urged the United States to give a positive answer to Russia’s proposal to prolong START-3. This would create «conditions for the participation of other nuclear states in nuclear disarmament talks».
In addition, any attempts at “rationally” calculating hypothetical layouts and new configurations of forces among nuclear powers become useless because it is impossible to foresee the scope of destabilizing consequences of the collapse of START-3 for international security as a whole. According to Alexey Arbatov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, elimination of START-3 will jeopardize the entire system of international treaties on nuclear weapons, including the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As recently as at the end of last year the United States made an attempt to question the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. And since one of the main principles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is contained in Article 6, which deals with nuclear disarmament, «in the event the treaty flops, even if a chain reaction of pulling out of the treaty does not start, the treaty will lose its value. No one will attend these conferences, no one will observe IAEA guarantees, so the system risks falling to pieces very quickly».
In Asia, in case of China entering a strategic arms race with America, such leading powers as Japan, South Korea and Australia, may choose to take independent decisions in the area of strategic security. The strengthening of China’s strategic potential, particularly amid the new deterioration of bilateral relations, is bound to cause response action from India. This, in turn, will lead to a change of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. The most dramatic scenario in this case would be a nuclear arms race in Asia Pacific Region.
Thus, the multiplying hints by the United States at its desire to pull out of START-3 signals Washington’s readiness to blatantly abandon a nuclear dialogue as such. The looming threat of non-prolongation of START-3 creates conditions for the destruction of the established global strategic stability regime. Considering the present state of Chinese-American relations, in case of a new arms race, this time between the United States and China, the prospects of the two countries entering a meaningful dialogue in military and strategic sphere appear vague, to say the least.
At last, the cessation, or suspension of START-3, would mean disappearance of a unique legally binding mechanism of mutual control. Without such a mechanism the dialogue on nuclear disarmament will suffer a dramatic setback. This means that not only Russia and the United States, but any other countries willing to hold talks on the restriction or reduction of nuclear weapons will have to start the whole process from scratch.
From our partner International Affairs
The Greek-Turkish Standoff: A New Source of Instability in the Eastern Mediterranean
Since 2011, Eastern Mediterranean affairs have mainly been marked by instability due to the civil wars in Libya and Syria. Recently, a new source of tensions further perplexes the situation—the Greek-Turkish standoff. Currently, Athens and Ankara disagree over sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. Specifically, they both claim rights in maritime zones which have not yet been delimited. The nature of the problem is not new, dating back to November 1973. What is new is the breadth of maritime zones the two sides disagree upon. The attention has shifted towards the Eastern Mediterranean in the last ten years, while it had only focused on the Aegean Sea before energy discoveries were made in the Levantine Basin in 2009.
Greek-Turkish relations were relatively calm from 1999 until 2016. In 2002, Athens and Ankara launched the so-called “exploratory talks,” a format to exchange views on thorny issues informally. The 60th round of bilateral exploratory talks took place in March 2016 and was the last until now. After 2016, cooperation between Greece and Turkey continued—for example, on the management of the refugee crisis—but the latter employed a different foreign policy approach. Seeing the EU door almost closed and having to deal with the post-coup domestic priorities, President Tayyip Erdogan sought to strengthen his country’s regional role. He placed more emphasis on national security issues and was not hesitant to forge closer ties with Russia and China. He has lacked predictability in international affairs.
Eastern Mediterranean waters could not but come to Turkey’s interest when hydrocarbons were discovered in the Basin. Cyprus followed Israel in proceeding to explore and exploit some reservoirs, such as the Aphrodite field, in close collaboration with some international energy companies. Like any other sovereign country in the world with resources, it had the right to develop them. The Republic of Cyprus had already entered the EU in 2004, but the island remained divided after the Turkish military invasion of 1974. From the very beginning, Turkey disagreed with the practices of the Cypriot government and acted to protect, in its view, the Turkish Cypriot community. Such actions became bolder in 2018. Turkish vessels began researching and drilling in Cypriot waters, although the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus is grounded on international law. The reaction of both the EU and the U.S. was very mild. As a result, Turkish ships uninterruptedly continue their operations as of today. Having been disappointed with the EU’s stance, on September 21, 2020, Cyprus decided not to sign the list of European sanctions against Belarus unless Brussels moves to impose sanctions on Turkey over its violation of Cypriot sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean.
August 2020 saw Turkey expand the same policy in regard to Cypriot waters, particularly maritime zones south of the island of Kastellorizo. The Turkish government sent the “Oruc Reis” ship to conduct research in disputed waters, according to the terminology of the American administration. It was accompanied by frigates causing Greece’s similar reaction. The research lasted for more than four weeks. On September 21, Ankara did not renew the relevant NAVTEX fueling speculation about its motivations. While maintenance reasons are officially presented as the main reason for the return of “Orus Reis” to the Antalya port, the decision is generally seen as a sign to diffuse tensions in view of the EU-Turkey summit of September 24–25, where the possibility of sanctions is likely to de discussed. Nonetheless, Turkey has declared the vessel could soon continue its mission.
The crisis is far from over. External mediators, namely Germany and the U.S., call for dialogue. Other partners such as Russia, China, France and the UK also advocate for a diplomatic solution. In principle, dialogue remains the only way forward. However, Greece and Turkey have completely different agendas. Turkey opts for negotiations without preconditions on a variety of themes. Experience from history—when the Aegean Sea was the epicentre of attention—shows Ankara is aware that international law would hardly favour its position, should talks only be concentrated on the delimitation of the continental shelf. The Turkish government endeavours to boost its argumentation by publicly talking about the geographic position of Kastellorizo, yet steadily combines other demands along with the proposed arrangement of maritime zones. Greece suspiciously sees this tactic.
Another reason for pessimism is that Turkey complements its position about future dialogue with Greece with some proposals on the island of Cyprus. Specifically, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has talked about the establishment of an equitable revenue sharing mechanism and other schemes with the participation of all parties, including the Turkish Cypriots. Whether the two themes, Greek-Turkish relations and the rights of Turkish Cypriot and perhaps a revival of talks on the Cyprus Question are to be linked, will be seen. As a matter of principle, Athens and Nicosia do not accept the participation of the Turkish Cypriot administration in any negotiations or meetings. And they both see the Cyprus Question as an international and European problem. Having said that, Greece and Cyprus raise provocative Turkish actions in the Eastern Mediterranean at the EU level, whereas Turkey prefers direct negotiations on outstanding issues. Despite this alignment, Athens does not negotiate on behalf of Nicosia.
So, where are we? NATO “deconfliction” talks are continuing and Germany is pushing both Greece and Turkey to engage themselves in new exploratory talks. The most delicate part of the task is not to talk about the need for dialogue but to make dialogue a success before a new military crisis occurs. Russia has also offered to mediate if asked, as the problem is an area of concern for the American administration and NATO first. From a Greek perspective, good ties between Russia and Turkey are a thorn in Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s initiative to mediate. Of course, this can also be a blessing in disguise. Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis decided to publicize his interest in holding a telephone conversation with President Vladimir Putin at the end of July, while important meetings between Greek and Russian officials took place in recent days. Foreign Ministers Dendias and Lavrov regularly talk to each other. Greece strives to achieve balance between its clear foreign policy choices and the difficult but possible rewarming of ties with Russia, acknowledging the rising role of the latter in the South.
From our partner RIAC
Why the “Coronavirus Ceasefire” Never Happened
Six months ago, when COVID-19 had just moved beyond the borders of China and embarked upon its triumphant march across Europe and North America, politicians and foreign affairs experts started discussing what will happen after the virus is vanquished. The debate that ensued balanced the fears and concerns of pessimists with the hopes and expectations of optimists, with the latter believing that the pandemic and the global recession that followed would inevitably force humankind to put its differences aside and finally unite in the face of common challenges.
Six months later, we can say without any doubt that, unfortunately, the optimists were wrong. The pandemic did not bring about the changes in world politics they had been hoping for, even with the ensuing recession making things worse. And we are unlikely to see any such changes in the near future. Sadly, COVID-19 did not turn out to be a cure-all for regional conflicts, arms races, the geopolitical competition and the countless ailments of humankind today.
These persisting ailments are more than evident in relations between Russia and the West. No positive steps have been made in the past six months in any of the areas where the positions of the two sides differ significantly, be it the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the unrest in Syria, the political instability in Venezuela or the war in Libya. The fate of the New START and the nuclear nonproliferation regime remains unclear. Moscow continues to be the target of new economic and political sanctions. Russia and the West are locked in an intense information war. There are no signs of a “coronavirus ceasefire,” let alone a full-fledged peace agreement, on the horizon.
Of course, Moscow has placed the blame for the lack of progress squarely on the shoulders of its western partners. While this may indeed be true in many respects, we must admit that the Kremlin has hardly been overflowing with ideas and proposals over the past six months. Even if Moscow did want to reverse the current negative trends in global politics, it has not taken any steps on its own to do so. Nor has it proposed any large-scale international projects, or even tried to temper its usual foreign policy rhetoric and propaganda.
On the contrary, the various troubles that have befallen Russia in the “coronavirus era” – from the public unrest in Belarus to the unfortunate poisoning of Alexei Navalny – are explained away as the malicious intrigues of Russia’s geopolitical opponents. For all intents and purposes, the Kremlin is in the same position now, in September 2020, that it was in back in March. The chances of another “reset” or at least a “timeout” in relations have disappeared completely, if they ever existed in the first place.
So, why did the “coronavirus ceasefire” never happen? Without absolving the West of its share of responsibility, let us try to outline the obstacles that Russia has put in the way of progress.
First, in an environment of unprecedented shocks and cataclysms, there is always the hope that your opponent will eventually suffer more as a result than you will. Many in Russia see the 2020 crisis as the final damning indictment of the West and even an inglorious end to the market economy and political liberalism in general.
The recent statement by Aide to the President of the Russian Federation Maxim Oreshkin that Russia is poised to become one of the top five economies in the world this year is particularly noteworthy. Not because the country is experiencing rapid economic growth, but because the German economy is set to fall further than the Russian economy. If you are certain that time is on your side and that you will emerge from the crisis in better shape than your opponents, then the incentives to work towards some kind of agreement hic et nunc are, of course, reduced.
Second, the current Russian leadership is convinced that any unilateral steps on its part, any shifts in Moscow’s foreign policy, will be perceived in the West as a sign of weakness. And this will open the door for increased pressure on Moscow. Not that this logic is entirely unfounded, as history has shown. But it is precisely this logic that prevents Russian leaders from admitting their past foreign policy mistakes and miscalculations, no matter how obvious they may have been. This, in turn, makes it extremely difficult to change the current foreign policy and develop alternative routes for the future. In fact, what we are seeing is a game to preserve the status quo, in the hope that history will ultimately be on Moscow’s side, rather than that of its opponents (see the first point).
Third, six and a half years after the crisis in Ukraine broke out, we are essentially left with a frozen conflict. Turning the large and unwieldy state machine around, rewiring the somewhat heavy-handed state propaganda machine, and changing the policies that determine the everyday actions of the army of “deep state” officials is tantamount to changing the trajectory of a supertanker carrying a load of hundreds of thousands of tonnes. It is perhaps even more difficult, however, to change the opinion that has taken shape in Russian society in recent years about the modern world and Russia’s place in it. Just because the Russian people are tired of foreign politics, this does not mean that they will enthusiastically support an updated version of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking” of the second half of the 1980s or the ideological principles of Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev’s foreign policy of the early 1990s.
Fourth, the balance of power between the agencies involved in the development and practical implementation of Russia’s foreign policy has changed significantly in recent years. The role of the security forces has been growing in all its aspects since at least the beginning of 2014. Conversely, the role of diplomats, as well as that of the technocrats in the economic structures of the Russian government, has been dwindling with each passing year. It is the security forces that are the main “stakeholders” in Donbass, Syria, Libya and even Belarus today. It would be fair to say that they have had a controlling interest in Russia’s foreign policy. The oft-quoted words of Emperor Alexander III that Russia has only two allies, its army and its navy, perfectly reflect the shift that has taken place in the balance of powers between these agencies. We should add that this shift was largely welcomed and even supported by a significant part of Russian society (see the third point). Of course, the siloviki are, due to the specifics of their work, less inclined to compromise, concessions and basic human empathy than diplomats, economists and technocrats.
All these factors preventing the conceptual renewal of Russia’s foreign policy can equally be applied to its geopolitical opponents. Politicians in the West are also hoping that time is on their side, that Moscow will emerge from the crisis weaker and more vulnerable, and thus more malleable than it was before. They also believe that any unilateral steps, any demonstration of flexibility in relations with the Kremlin, will be met with an even tougher and more aggressive policy. Negative ideas about Russia have also taken root in the minds of people in the West, and foreign policy is being “militarized” there just as much as it is in Russia.
Thus, neither the coronavirus nor the economic recession will automatically lead to a détente, let alone a reset in relations between Russia and the West. We are, in fact, moving in the opposite direction, once again running the risk of an uncontrolled confrontation. However, this unfortunate situation is no reason to give up on the possibility of signing new agreements, even if COVID-19 will no longer be in our corner moving forward.
From our partner RIAC
India’s strategies short of war against a hostile China
Since India’s independence several peace and border cooperation agreements were signed between the India and China. Prominent among them was the Panchsheel Agreement signed in 1954. A majority of the agreements were signed between 1993 and 2013. Recently genuine efforts were made by PM Narendra Modi by engaging Xi Jinping at the Wuhan and Chennai summits. But China is nowhere near to settling the border dispute despite various agreements and talks at the military and civilian levels.
After the 1962 war peace was largely maintained on the Indo China border. During the Mao and Deng era consensus building was the norm in the communist party. XiJinping appointed himself as chairman of the communist party for life. Today power is centralized with XiJinping and his cabal. Through Doklam and Galwan incidents Xi Jinpinghas disowned the peaceful principles laid down by his predecessors. China’s strategy is to keep India engaged in South Asia as it doesn’t want India to emerge as a super power. After solving a crisis on the border China will create another crisis. Beijing has declining interest in the niceties of diplomacy. Under Xi Jinping China has become more hostile.
China has been infringing on India’s sovereignty through salami tactics by changing the status quo and attempting to own the border territory. At Galwan on Xi Jinping’s birthday the PLA demonstrated hooliganism by assaulting Indian border positions. China violated the 1996 and 2005 bilateral agreements which states that both armies should not carry weapons within 1.24 miles on either side of the border. India’s Foreign Minister S Jaishankar mentioned that the standoff situation with China in Galwan Valley of eastern Ladakh is “surely the most serious situation after 1962.”China is constructing infrastructure, increasing forces and deploying weapon systems on the border.
Options for India
India led by PM Narendra Modi has implemented a realist foreign policy and a muscular military policy.India ended the age of strategic restraint by launching special operations and air strikes in Pakistan. Since the Galwan incident India has increased the military, diplomatic and economic deterrence against China. India is constructing military infrastructure and deploying weapon systems like SU 30 MKI and T 90 tanks in Ladakh. India banned a total of 224 Chinese apps, barred Chinese companies from government contracts and is on the verge of banning Huawei. Other measures include excluding Chinese companies from private Indian telecommunications networks. Chinese mobile manufacturers can be banned from selling goods in India.
India should offer a grand strategy to China. India has a plethora of options short of war. Future talks should involve an integrated strategy to solve all the bilateral issues and not just an isolated resolution of a localized border incident. All instruments of military and economic power and coercive diplomacy should be on the table.
China expects other nations to follow bilateral agreements and international treaties while it conveniently violates them. India should abrogate the Panscheel agreement given China’s intransigence and hostility. China claims 35,000 square miles of territory in India’s northeast, including the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. China occupies 15,000 square miles of India’s territory in the Aksai Chin Plateau in the Himalayas. India’s primary objective is to take back territories like Aksai Chin. While the secondary issue is the resolution of the border issue and China’s support to Pakistan. India can leverage the contemporary geopolitical climate to settle all issues. India can target China’s soft underbelly characterized by issues like Taiwan, Xinjiang and the economy. China raises the Kashmir issue at international organizations. As a countervailing measure India can raise Xinjiang at international organizations and conferences.
China has been militarily and diplomatically supporting Pakistan against India. Pakistan is a rentier and a broken state that sponsors terrorism. India can establish bilateral relations with Taiwan thus superseding China’s reunification sensitivities. China has territorial disputes with 18 countries including Taiwan and Japan. India can hedge against China by establishing strategic partnerships with US, Australia, Japanand Vietnam.
An overwhelming military is a deterrence for China’s belligerent foreign and military policy. The 1990Gulf War demonstrated the capabilities of high technology weapon systems. As compared to China’s rudimentary weapons systems India has inducted 4th and 5th generation weapons like the SU 30 MKI, AH 64 Apache and T 90 tanks. The deterrence capacity of fighter aircrafts is reduced as they cannot target China’s coastlines due to their restricted range. Full deterrence can be achieved by ICBMs and nuclear powered submarines. With these weapons India can target centers of gravity like Shanghai and Shenzhen.
China is not a signatory to arms limitations treaties like Start I and Start II. China continues to expand its nuclear weapons stockpile and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) like DF 21 and DF-26B which are banned by the INF Treaty. India is a law abiding stable democracy in an unstable region with two hostile nations on its flanks. US and Russia can relax the arms control mechanism considering India’s’ impeccable record on peace and non proliferation. This will allow India to buy Russian weapon systems like Zircon and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, Topol and Bulava ICBMs and Yasen and Borey class SSBN submarines. While US can sell SSBN submarines and C4ISR gathering platforms like RC 135 and RQ 4 Global Hawk.
China remains a security threat for Asia. As China foments instability the APAC region from South Asia to South China Sea remains volatile. The Quad can be expanded to include Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea and Indonesia and multinational naval exercises can conducted in the South China Sea.
The enemy of my enemy is my friend. China fought small wars with India, Vietnam and Soviet Union. Vietnam defeated the PLA at Lang Son in 1979 with advanced weapon systems and guerilla warfare. India can increase militarily cooperation with Vietnam. China attacked the Soviet Union on the Ussuri river leading to heavy PLA casualties. Historically relations between Russia and India have been close. As a result of the Indo Soviet Friendship Treaty China did not support Pakistan during the 1971 war. India can enhance its military and diplomatic ties with Russia to the next level.
Strategic partnership with US
Its time for a partnership between the world’s largest and the world’s biggest democracies. India and the US have a common objective to preserve peace, maintain stability and enhance security in Asia. India’s reiteration at leaders’ level and international forums that both countries see each other as allies for stability in the APAC region is not enough. India has to go beyond the clichés of the need for closer ties.
Due to the China threat the US is shifting its military from Europe and Middle East to the APAC region.US and India can establish an Asian equivalent of NATO as China’s destructive policy frameworks and threatening postures remain a strategic threat. India should enhance and deepen cooperation with the US intelligence community in the fields of MASINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, TECHINT and CYBINT. Both countries can form an alliance of democracies. If China militarily or economically targets one of the member country then the alliance can retaliate under a framework similar to Article 5 of NATO. Thus power will be distributed in the APAC region instead of being concentrated with China. A scorpion strategy will ensure that China does not harass its neighbors. The strategy involves a military pincer movement by India from the west and US from the East against a hostile China. India can conduct joint military exercises with the US in Ladakh. China cannot challenge Japan and Taiwan due to the US security agreements with these countries.
The world has entered the age of instability and uncertainty. The 21st century is characterized by hybrid warfare through military and coercive diplomacy. South Asia is not a friendly neighborhood where peaceful overtures lead to harmonious relations. China is a threat to India even in the context of a friendly relationship. Diplomatic niceties have no place in India’s relations with China. India can impose costs on China which can be more than the benefits offered by normalizing relations. The application of measures short of war without engaging the PLA will reap benefits. India can fulfill its national security requirements and global responsibilities through a grand strategy.
A policy of engagement and deterrence is crucial against an antagonistic China. While India attempts to develop cooperative ties with China it will need to continue to enhance and implement its military and coercive diplomatic strategies. China does not represent a direct military threat to India but at the same time one cannot deny that challenges remain.
As Businesses Embrace Sustainability, a Pathway to Economic Reset Emerges
In the midst of a deep recession brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a growing consensus that the...
Right to Education as an elementary Human Right: From Thinking to Living it
The situation of education in general, and of higher education in particular, is not considered as a priority in developing...
Reflection of Indonesia’s National Farmer’s Day
September has been a memorable and recorded month in the nation’s development process. One important event that should not be...
Rebuilding Cities to Generate 117 Million Jobs and $3 Trillion in Business Opportunity
COVID-19 recovery packages that include infrastructure development will influence the relationship between cities, humans and nature for the next 30...
Russia expanding influence in India and Sri Lanka
Authors: Srimal Fernando and Vedangshi Roy Choudhuri* In the post-World War II era the diplomatic influence of former Soviet Union...
From Intellectual Powerhouse to Playing Second Fiddle
A multi-ethnic, multi-religious culture built Spain into an intellectual powerhouse so much so that after the reconquesta scholars from various parts of...
How environmental policy can drive gender equality
Environmental degradation has gendered impacts which need to be properly assessed and monitored to understand and adopt gender-responsive strategies and...
South Asia2 days ago
Pakistan’s War with COVID-19: A Victory for Now
Newsdesk3 days ago
The Great Reset: A Global Opening Moment to Turn Crisis into Opportunity
Economy3 days ago
Protectionist headwinds in the US Trade Policy under Trump Administration
Europe2 days ago
Gas Without a Fight: Is Turkey Ready to Go to War for Resources in the Mediterranean?
Intelligence2 days ago
Chinese Private Security Companies Along the BRI: An Emerging Threat?
Newsdesk3 days ago
3 Best MBA Programs in Europe
Middle East2 days ago
Untangling Survival Intersections: Israel, Chaos and the Pandemic
Energy News3 days ago
World Economic Forum and IRENA Partner for Sustainable Energy Future