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The Grey Zone: Understanding a Nuclear Age strategy through the South China Sea Dispute

Ananya Raj Kakoti

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The detonation at the Trinity test site near Alamogordo, New Mexico in mid-July of 1945 marked the beginning of the ‘nuclear age’. Three weeks later, the world saw what the “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” were capable of after they were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively and the Hibakusha[1] are still the proof of that. This has increased apprehension among countries towards engaging in traditional warfare, thus making it inevitable for revisionist powers to employ alternative tactics to challenge the existing world order without any major escalation. This is where one can observe an increase in the use of the grey zone strategy, which is not a novel tactic and has been present since centuries. However it has reemerged, as the need of the hour in the present political climate is unconventional stratagem. It is an identifying strategy in the nuclear age which is resistant of a full blown out war. This strategic campaign has taken a new form in the current age with the aid of cyber weapons, advanced information technology and civilian tools allowing the increase in importance of the tactic and applicability.

Understanding the Grey Zone Strategy

The new approach has been provided a fertile environment to flourish with an increase in revisionist intent, strategic gradualism and employability of unconventional tool. The revisionist intent stems from the fact that major powers may want to change the existing global order. Although there is a wide spectrum of revisionist states, the “measured revisionists” (Mazarr: 2015) are the rising powers with value for rule-based order and no intent of aggressive warfare but they do expect a transformation of the existing system and to do so they will take cautious and impactful steps to make a difference. The reason behind the tactful approach is that they want to tilt the power axis in their favour without disturbing the system altogether. The international system is being witness to the revisionist states which shall employ the grey zone strategy to cure their dilemmas of being dissatisfied of the system while being dependant on it.

These revisionist states find gradualist strategy appealing, considering their cautious approach towards dismantling the system to their favour. It is a defining aspect of the strategy. The approach achieves gradual gains instead of immediate results. This includes an elaborate set of interrelated measures deliberated to achieve gradual progress. One fundamental purpose behind such an approach is to avoid any foundational conflict that “characterises conclusive strategies” (Mazarr: 2015). Salami Slicing is a classic theory of a gradualist approach that Thomas Schelling discusses in his classic work, Arms and Influence. The ambiguity of commitment is the central theme of the tactic. The reason behind such static according to Schelling is to diminish the credibility of the defender’s deterrent threats. Mazarr (2015) points out Daniel Altman elaborated concept of fait accompli which is “to grab a limited gain before the other side can respond, acting suddenly and decisively in a manner that poses the defender with a dilemma of acquiescing or pursuing a dangerous escalation.” The approach of strategic gradualism makes the task of deterrence and balancing complicated and this is reflected in grey zone conflicts.

The approach of strategic gradualism of the revisionist power is implemented through the employment of unconventional measures of statecraft that allows it to avoid being a traditional conflict. Many tactics and tools which are employed in the grey zone strategy coincides with classic unconventional warfare. Grey zone conflict also reflects a form of political warfare and employs a range of mechanisms to achieve targeted political objectives. According to Mazarr (2015) mechanisms and tools such as economic sanctions, energy diplomacy, cyberattacks, information operations to “generate revisionist narratives”, use of militia, fifth columnists,[2] and nonmilitary forces such as coast guards are not new, however the impact of these tactics have become unprecedented in present times. The amalgamation of these three aforementioned components accounts for the emergence and character of the grey zone strategy.

Zarr (2015) defined “the gr(e)y zone (as) an operational space between peace and war, involving coercive actions to change the status quo below a threshold that, in most cases, would prompt a conventional military response, often by blurring the line between military and nonmilitary actions and the attributions for the events”. The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA)  team conducted a study of the grey zone and they defined (2016) it as “a conceptual space between peace and war, occurring when actors purposefully use multiple elements of power to achieve political-security objectives with activities that are ambiguous or cloud attribution and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet fall below the level of large-scale direct military conflict and threaten (…) by challenging, undermining or violating international customs, norms or laws.” While, according to the Cambridge Dictionary, grey zone can be defined as “activities by a state that are harmful to another state and are sometimes considered to be acts of war, but are not legally acts of war”[3]

The definitions of the term highlight few basic characteristics essential to its meaning. One of the basic element is that of remaining below the threshold of justifying an international military response. Salami slicing is another key feature of this strategy, where they gradually move forward with their strategy towards achieving their objectives which are ambiguous instead of a knee-jerk advance. The third one is the deceiving nature of the actors which allows them to deflect any direct responses by disguising their role in the strategic campaign. The fourth aspect is reliance on historical claims with extensive legal and political justifications. The fifth characteristic is to not challenge the vital or existential interests of the defender of the present order. The hint at the risk of escalation as a source of coercive leverage is another major feature of the strategy which allows then to complicate deterrent threats. The strategy also employs nonmilitary tools to avoid impression of military aggression. Exploitation of specific vulnerabilities in target nations are typical in the working of the grey zone strategy. The primary characteristic of the grey zone is the dexterous use of strategic ambiguity to achieve gradual gains.

The South China Sea Dispute: A Case Study

In recent times, the strategic importance of the ocean waters in East Asia has risen exponentially, thus boosting the relevance of the security environment of South and East China Sea. Some primary reasons amplifying the strategic advantage of the maritime region are the access it provides to the resources of ocean energy, the South and East China Sea territorial conflict and the expansion of the naval power by the countries of the region. The South China Sea (SCS) dispute is considered to be an important territorial and jurisdictional dispute in modern times. It is a resource-rich area which is claimed by China, four Southeast Asian countries namely, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and by Taiwan. Since mid-1970s, numerous incidents have been taking place in the SCS with some major ones being the Paracel Islands incidents in 1974, the Johnson Reef incidents in 1988, the Mischief Reef incidents in 1995 and the Scarborough Shoal incidents 2012; which involved China vis-à-vis other claimant states. The stability of this particular region is relying on actions and reactions of China.

China’s Claims on the South China Sea

Efforts are being undertaken to create a foundation for a confidence building measure, but it has not been able to address the fundamental issues of the maritime region such as, territorial issues, access to natural resources, fishing rights and naval buildup.

The territorial claims of China in the SCS is represented by the “nine-dash line” enveloping 80% of the sea’s area in a U-shape published in 1948 based on a historical claim argument and not a legal justification under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It is considered the main actor steering the events of the dispute. However, the map of the region was not included in any ‘official’ Chinese government document until it a note verbale was submitted to the United Nations by China in 2009 and made its claim known, internationally. Another, diplomatic correspondence asserting the claim was made on 14 April 2011 through a note verbale as a response to Philippines’ protest. The 2012 incident of Scarborough Shoal, led to Philippines initiating arbitral proceedings against PRC to challenge its claims according to UNCLOS. China however argued that subject matter of territorial sovereignty is beyond the jurisdiction of UNCLOS, thus refused to accept and participate in the arbitration.

China, to be able to strengthen its presence and increase its ability enforce naval law with the U-shaped line, the People’s Liberation Army Navy is mobilised by China along with the paramilitary and civilian naval bodies to assert de facto control over the maritime region within the demarcated line.  The nine-dash line along with the historical claim is still too ambiguous and it fails to explain the rationale behind those line placed. It is still unclear whether the claim is territorial, historical or a national sea boundary. This specificity shall make all the difference in the framework of UNCLOS.

But, in brief one can understand the claim of China extended to all land features in SCS, traditionally divided into the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, and the Nansha Islands. China also claims all the islands in the SCS along with its adjacent waters on the basis of the historic right that China claims to have.

Security Dilemma of Other South China Sea Claimant States

This section highlights the security dilemma bet China and the five other claimants: Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. Their attitudes towards the claim of China is different because of many factor, with Brunei being the least vocal and the Philippines and Vietnam being the most vocal.

The dichotomy of China vis-à-vis other five claimants exists because of many reasons, such as, all the claimants share the same concern that China might use military power to resolve the dispute, while China feels its legitimacy over the claim is decreasing because of lack of physical presence. All the Southeast Asian claimant states are ASEAN member and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (the 2002 DoC) was made between China and ASEAN, which is political consensus to ameliorate worries of both the sides. There is also more skirmishes and protests between Chia and the Southeast Asian claimant states: the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia, but there is no notorious incident recorded among the Southeast Asian claimant states themselves. In fact, there is record of cooperation among them, such as the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issuing a statement of concern urging parties to practice restraint while invoking UNCLOS and 202 DoC to maintain peace and stability.[4] Malaysian PM also forwarded his support to the then Philippine Vice President in May 2012, proposing a peaceful resolution in term with the international law.[5]

The overall security dilemma is primarily stemming out of anxiety. Uncertainty is the key element that has been dominating the series of tension in the maritime region among the Southeast Asian states, especially because the tension that rose between the period of 2007 and 20099 was unexpected.

Security Dilemma of the United States of America

The rigid attitude of China towards the SCS in recent times, has provided United States with the opportunity to increase its presence in Asia again. The strategic approach of the United States towards the region and adjacent waters is based three elements, first being to emphasise and strengthen the American relation with the treaty allies in the region and simultaneously increase contribution to regional multilateral organisations. Maintaining a strong presence military wise, in the region to maintain access to the maritime resources along with freedom of actions, while adhering to the international law is the other key element. The third element is integral to the strategy as it focuses on positioning the American naval power as the main actor promoting and upholding the international rules-based order.

The “pivot to Asia” security strategy of then President Barack Obama puts forth the United States as an Asia Pacific country, aspiring for an international order while providing a foundation for peace and prosperity, with rights and responsibilities for countries of the region, along with free trade and free transit which are not infringed upon. The American policy towards the sovereignty of the South China Sea has been consistent since 1990s, although at the July 2010 ARF Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the United States will not involve itself in territorial disputes but it has maintained a clear position on the establishment of maritime border the claims of which must be on land, challenging the nine-dash line.

However, the issue has not been internationalised by the United States and is insisting on it being handled at regional level through bilateral negotiations. This is mostly because escalating uS military involvement is inconceivable, as tasing a role in strengthening the security in South China Sea will result in increased Sino-American discord.

Understanding the Grey Zone Campaign of China in South China Sea

The efforts of China to solidify its hegemony in the South China Sea, is suggested to be a case of grey zone strategy campaign. The actions involving series of disconnected incidents can be considered to be a the employment of two major tactics of the grey zone strategy, the salami slicing approach and fait accompli. The involvement of China, a revisionist power as the main actor with the approach of strategic gradualism through the employment of unconventional tools, fulfil the criteria to be categorised under the grey zone strategy. In the case of attempting to achieve one’s goal one can observe a series of disconnected steps by China, which add up to be a coherent grey zone strategy campaign towards the goal.

There are a number of actions of China which can be seen through the characteristics of the Grey Zone Strategy. Such as, the characteristic of pursuing political objectives through integrated campaigns can be seen in the action of China, outlining the political foundation to be able to claim the South China Sea area, through narratives, propagandas, and more. There are many components that seem like a coordinated coherent campaign involving: maritime, political, economic and military actions. They have also laid a groundwork for theoretical foundation to be able to incorporate an integrated non-military approach.

China has been observed to employ tools which are non-military or non-kinetic, which is also a characteristic of the strategy. They have instead employed economic tools, such as offering of aid, trade deals which are favourable, access agreements or threatening and imposing of economic sanctions on the other claimant states. The deployment of civilian fishing fleets and aircrafts to the disputed area to establish presence and reinforce claim is a paramilitary tool. They have also used energy as a tool by using oil rigs, energy agreements and aid as inducement. Diplomacy has also been employed through direct coercive diplomacy, by engaging in negotiation to establish a parallel rule-based order with the influence shift in the favour of Beijing. Informational tools such as statements, social media campaigns, spreading of narratives which is shaped by the information gathered through cyber capabilities and then threaten punitive actions are also employed extensively by China in the case of the South Can Sea dispute. These tools are unconventional and non-military, thus fulfilling a key component of the strategy.

China has also managed to stay below the escalatory threshold avoiding any outright aggressive military engagement or warfare. This can be observed through their use of unconventional tools which remain outside the UN Charter definition of “aggressive actions” that might trigger an escalation, leading to a war. They have also left enough space to manoeuvre and retreat to preserve that threshold and ease tension. China as also been taking long-term and incremental series of steps to achieve strategic objectives, showing their willingness to step back to be able to ease tension while preserving the progress they have made so far. This can be seen through the perspective of strategic gradualism by not seeking immediate decisive results in short period of time.

If one looks a all the disconnected steps as a whole, one can see a coherent picture of the strategy at play by the revisionist power. This places the Unites States in a difficult situation as the guardian of the present world order. Any sort of retaliation might seem as an overreaction or too soft to make any difference to the current situation in the maritime region of the South China Sea.

The Legality of Grey Zone Coercion in the South China Sea

The South China Sea law at this point in time is anything but clear. The older form of law governs the point of ‘historical claims’ to territory, while the newer form is defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), governing the maritime claim measurable by territorial claim. South China Sea dispute fall at the intersection of these two laws at play, colliding with each other unable to provide a clear understanding of the outcome. The principle of international maritime law is the land govern the sea and China has tried to reconcile with the law through its official SCS claim document, with China’s official position iterating it as the “indisputable sovereignty” over the islands in the SCS region, along with the adjacent waters, seabed and subsoil.

China lays historical claims on Paracel and Spratly Islands in the SCS dating back to the second century BC, Western Han Dynasty.[6] Although it is true that China has strong connection to them but the claim was not indisputable. According to international law, there are various ways of acquiring sovereignty over territories, however conquest and subjugation is dismissed by Article 2 of UN Charter. It can be analysed that actions of China in the SCS were inconsistent and not uninterrupted, thus its claim to be the country first to continuously exercise sovereign powers over them is contestable. The maritime claim in the South China Sea is also vague, as the rights of historical claim is ambiguous and not governed by UNCLOS. The application of it varies from one coastal state to another, with one having only fishing rights with the other exercising full sovereignty. The problem with China’s claim of historic right is that is does not specify the rights that the country claims in its capacity to be considered historic.

China had enacted a Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, thus establishing a maritime zone extending 12 nautical miles from its shores. 1998, a Law on the EEZ and Continental Shelf was passed setting 200 nautical miles for EEZ and because the U-shaped demarcated tea predates UNCLOS, geographical designation of waters inside the demarcated line is unspecified.

The point of origin has not been claimed by China, yet. China has the right to dispute its right over its claim in the sovereignty of SCS, however its claim is not indisputable. But, China often employs legal narrative and diplomatic overtures to legitimise its stance while undermining the claims of the other states. China has also started funding research on alternative approaches to international law, with focus on law of the seat and international economic law favouring China’s position.[7]

When laws are created, set categories, actors and elements are established. The purpose of it is to have a predictable and principled manner in which a conflict can be dealt with, which also acts as a deterrent. But in recent times, when grey zone strategies has managed to remain under the threshold of what can be understood as a violent act, thus making it difficult to apply the basic legal concepts related to war and the use force. Grey zone actors intentionally exploits these gaps present in the legal framework which predates this new normalcy of advanced tactics and strategies that are beyond violent and aggressive disruption of world peace.

The actions of China in the matter SCS has contributed to the weakening of the international law of the sea hurting all the countries, including itself because by defying the law, one might instigate to topple down a rule based order, allowing competitions to go beyond the purview of law. This has the ability to diminish the stability of the international order, gradually.  A strong way to respond to the maritime grey zone campaign is bringing a clarity in understanding the international law involved at the epitome of it in this regard.

Conclusion

The grey zone strategy, especially in the maritime domain will never be an easy situation to tackle. With sufficient suggestive evidence, one can assume that China in the case of the South China Sea dispute has opted to deal with the situation through the employment of the grey zone strategy to pursue its revisionist goals. But it is of course only suggestive and not conclusive, neither can be categorised in a watertight compartment. One must also keep in mind, that this strategy is not only time consuming but also ends up exhausting a lot of resources while at it. Therefore, the cannot be the only approach towards achieving ones revisionist goals, rather it can be one of the approaches while moving towards their ultimate goal. To retaliate such an approach, the ones safeguarding the present global order must have a coordinated response which is resolute enough to bring the situation under control. They must also portray a sense of enthusiasm to maintain such response ensuring that instigator rethinks the plans at hand.

Presently however, China has maintained a stronghold over this approach in the area of the South China Sea dispute and one can only wait to see what is their next step, for grey zone strategy is all about strategic gradualism.


[1] it is a Japanese word, which literally translates to “explosion affected people”, for the survivors of the bombing

[2] a group within a country at war who are sympathetic to or working for its enemies.

[3] “grey zone.” dictionary.cambridge.org, Cambridge Dictionary 2020. Web. 2 July 2020

[4] “Scarborough Shoal Dispute ‘Of Concern’,” Viet Nam News, 26 April 2012, https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/223972/scarborough-shoal-dispute-of-concern.html (accessed 07 July 2020).

[5] Jerry E. Esplanada, “Malaysia Too Wants Peace in Panatag Shoal,” Inquirer, 31 May 2012, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/38389/malaysia-too-wants-peace-in-panatag-shoal (accessed 07 July 2020).

[6] China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea (People’s Republic of China Response to the 12 July 2016 ruling on the South China Sea territorial claims by the UNCLOS Tribunal), Beijing, 13 July, 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1380615.htm (accessed 08 July 2020).

[7] Ben Blanchard, “Amid Sea Disputes, China to Set Up Maritime ‘Judicial Center,’”Marine Insight, March 12, 2016. https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/amid-sea-disputes-china-to-set-up-maritime-judicial-center/ (accessed 08 July 2020)

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International Law

Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in a Populist World: Behind the Facade of Dichotomies

Rida Fatima

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The Rise of Anti-System Politics

The walk into the twenty-first century is marked by enormous structural shifts. The rise of neoliberal capitalism and the vulnerability created by financial crises has mobilized the politics of resentment. This process of asymmetrical development has created both the winners and the losers of modernity. The nuanced horizontal and vertical inequalities are giving rise to what Jonathan Hopkin calls the ‘Anti-system Politics’ or simply populism. This phenomenon is marked by the tussle of two homogenous groups; the people and the elite, which are at loggerheads with each other.

However, there is not any stream of anti-system politics; rather it falls at both ends of the political spectrum; left and right. It is marked by the Pink Tide in Latin America, rise of nationalist strongmen in the Central and Eastern European states, Hindu nationalism in India and the white ethnic nationalism in the Anglosphere. And the reason why the materialization of populism is distinctive in the spatial-temporal zones is because all the states have different welfare systems. They have distinct ways of filtering the effects of socio-cultural or economic changes. In doing so, they cushion some groups while exposing others to risks. In such a scenario, populism with its alternative action channel fills in the vacuum through its ‘moralist appeal’ to reclaim power of ‘the people’.

Both populism and nationalism being mass movements hold a focus towards the collective. And the ‘empty heart’ of populism with its ambiguous definition of the people, finds ‘elective affinities’ with nationalism. This profusion has further tangled the varying streams of anti-system politics. However, there are two similarities. First, all anti-system politics is about caching power. And secondly, it acts on myths of dichotomies. In furtherance, when the Kohnian civic ethnic distinction is applied to right-wing left-wing populism, the conclusions become mostly erroneous. It leads to an assumption that right-wing populism is nativist, exclusionary, and ethno-cultural by nature whereas left-wing populism is more inclusive and civic.But both civic and ethnic dimensions of nationalism are the part of populist politics. 

The right-wing populism of the BJP in India, Tea Party wing and Donald Trump of the Republican Party in the US, Le Pan in France and United Kingdom Independence Party in the UK are all marked by an appeal to right-wing populism. But in addition to that, these movements are not ethno-nationalist in the Kohnian sense rather they are ‘ethno-traditional nationalist’.And they instrumentalize the civic nationalist narrative to broaden their vote-base. This is precisely the justification of exclusion carried out in civic terms as the biological language is replaced by an ideological one.

Political Entrepreneurship: Instrumentalization and Mobilization

The political entrepreneurs: in both electoral populism and populist movements, act as an agency for strategically articulating the latent grievances. Thus, both the demand and supply side perspectives are crucial vantage points for a prudent analysis of the populist rise.The demand-side resentment is both addressed and tailored by the supply-side entrepreneurs through the perspective of nationalism.

In electoral populism, dissent is instrumentalized and it is mobilized through nationalistic appeals. Populism coupled with nationalism leads to the radical right-wing politics that it is witnessed in both Eastern and Western Europe, Latin America, and South Asia. Both the ideologies indicate a sense of social closure in one dimension or another. It is done by fixing what Bankim Chandra calls the ‘cultural attitudes’ which limit the sense of inclusivity and pluralism. But the question is why to appeal to the people on national, cultural, or ethnic grounds? Isiah Berlin suggested in the 1960s that nationalism is a core characteristic for the success of any political movement. And as both the ideologies are an antithesis of an open society, their profusion generates cognitive, social, and political rigidities.

The political entrepreneurs utilize these ‘banal’ ideas to introduce their own political agenda. It helps in building a foundation of the new system on the entrenched realities of the old system. A case study of various electorally successful right-wing populist parties like the Swiss People Party in Switzerland, French National Front of France, National Democratic Party of Germany and Pim Fortuyn List in Denmark indicate that populist leader or political entrepreneurs who make use of national ‘symbolic resources’ with a civic appeal perform better in their political system. And the civic nationalism in the West provides the platform to the radical-right populists who attain and maintain their share of power based on civic values without undermining their exclusionary ethno-traditional policies. Civic and ethnic nationalism are the means to attain the ends of populist politics. The political entrepreneurs tactically oscillate between both the civic and ethnic dimension of nationalism by persistently engendering a sense of threatened ‘bounded moral community’ at risk from the outsiders.

Akin to electoral populism, populist movements use grievances as a latent force. But that does not explain why the anti-immigration protests by PEGIDA were not instigated prior to 2014, or why the Occupy Wall Street movement came after the major shockwaves of the Great Recession were absorbed. To explain this there is a need to understand the role of political entrepreneurs as opportunity seekers who articulate the shared grievances when the time is ripe to fulfill their agenda backed with shared resentments.

Populism and Nationalism: A Bi-Dimensional Analysis

In all mass movements, ‘sociological necessities’ are invented and instrumentalized by the political elite. Nationalism and populism are no exceptions. A national myth is invented through a common heritage and mobilized through horizontal differences. Whereas the populist myths are brought back from ‘under the rug’ and mobilized through vertical antagonisms. And when combined, this the bi-dimensional dissidence defines the politics of the new age.

The resentment against those at the top and outsiders are mutually constitutive of the populist politics. The right-wing variant of this infusion criticizes multicultural politics, acceptance of refugees and the elite’s consideration of the indigenous population as xenophobic. This is the prime scene in the European and North American contexts as Hilary Clinton reportedly called Trump’s supporters as ‘basket of deplorables’. Such differences accentuate the need of people’s sovereignty over the state. And because the ethnic/cultural nationalism signifies ‘the people’ over the nation, it is easily juxtaposed with the populist discourse.

The ‘civic nationalism normalization’ strategy is used to disguise the exclusionary cultural politics behind the facade of legitimizing only the interests of the in-group. The Front National (FN) and the Alterative for Germany (AfD) both use a value-laden out-grouping of the Muslims based on their anti-Islamist agendas. And they instrumentalize civic nationalist discourse to legitimize their claims that Muslims are not an outgroup based on their ethnic descent rather on voluntarist reasons as they do not adhere to the democratic values. This is a supply of populist ideas through nationalist channels; covertly ethnic/cultural and overtly civic.

Manichean Myth to Chameleon Reality

Nationalism has its roots in the Greek city states and was crystallized as an idea of organization in the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. During the decolonization from 1945-1960, nationalism was at its pinnacle. However, since then it has been on a downward trajectory. But the populist utilization of the nationalist concepts has given it a new color. The entrenched resentments are being voiced not just by the minority ethnic/cultural groups but also the majority who feel threatened by the minority’s rising rights and political participation in what Rawls calls the post diversity era. The Muhajirs in Karachi are a classic example of a chameleon nationalism which has utilized both ethnic and civic strands to widen the vote base. Both the political movements, populism and nationalism are political projects which are in continual process of transition.

Despite modernization, the center-periphery distinction still pertains based on a deliberate exclusion of the peripheral identities to form a homogenous power circle at the center. And the grievances and opportunities created in this gap are mobilized and exacerbated by the political entrepreneurs. And the infusion of populism and nationalism are changed with the changing socio-political and economic contexts to cache the rising opportunities. The right-wing populism is not based on rigidities of objective identities but on the flexibility to catch the opportunity situations.

The ethnic groups too are not homogenous which indicates their divided politics to gain benefits. The myth of groupism is instrumental not factual. In this way they utilize both civic and ethnic nationalist appeals firstly, to cater to their in-group and secondly, to widen their prospects of political ins. In this way their politics becomes amorphous which is easily utilized by thin ideology like populism and the mix generates popular differences.Thus, the ethnic conflicts in the populist world are not the pure outcome of ethnic groups rather of ethnic organizations and populist political entrepreneurs.

Conclusion

Ethnic and cultural nationalism are not primarily nativist rather opportunistic. The populist world has provided nuanced avenues for the articulation of the ethno-cultural resentments which are exacerbated by the modern inequalities. However, the Kohnian civic-ethnic dichotomy is too rigid to explain the anomalous instrumentalist nature of the populist movements which build up on the combination of both ethnic and civic nationalism.

The analysis suggests that the populist world is a juggernaut of various thick ideologies which are used as an opportunistic context to propagate the agenda of the political entrepreneurs. Civic and ethnic nationalism were relevant before and instrumental now. They are both entrenched and tailored, natural, and transitive and contextual and opportunistic. Hence, the idea of nationalism is in a vicious cycle of constructive usage by the populist leaders and not merely a matter of some fixated identities.

Before the coronavirus in late 2019, there was a rise of a counter-populist wave on the fringes as observed through the leaderless protests where the middle class who once supported the populist movements was ‘revolting against the revolt’. However, the rise of the pandemic exacerbated a kind of nationalist populist response.Now the question is about who writes a better political bargain to satiate the rising middle class and that shall determine the course of future politics.

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Refugees In The Outbreak Of The Pandemic

Parismita Goswami

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Rohingya refugees fleeing conflict and persecution in Myanmar (file photo). IOM/Mohammed

The COVID-19 today is having an adverse impact on our lives although it has brought exceptional changes in climate and human behavior. The increasing number of refugees and internally displaced persons in the 21st century explains the intensified global scenario. The refugee crisis is the greatest humanitarian crisis the world has ever seen where most of them are internally displaced persons. Yet, they are humans with unique life experiences; they had dreams, children who are dwelling hopes of normal life, and a better tomorrow. The mothers are longing to return home, fathers yearning to work again, and an identity. Leaving behind their homes, being prosecuted from the country, and losing their loved ones; refugees had gone through the worst of time. Refugees are the worst sufferers in this 21st century. Around 80 million homeless people in the world most of them are from Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia. The Syrian crisis reported being the greatest refugee crisis in the world. The United Nations also estimated the women and children to be the worst sufferers.

The refugees were tormented by years of poverty, poor health, and lack of basic infrastructures like education, food, health care, sanitation, social security, and etc. Humanitarian organizations have stretched beyond their capacity to help millions of refugees over the years. The WHO and UN Refugee Agency have signed new agreements to provide health services and benefits to the displaced and vulnerable population around the world. Among the 79.5 million forcibly displaced individuals lacks access to clean water or soap. Despite social and economic setbacks due to the pandemic, health is still the paramount factor affecting the poor and homeless. During the COVID-19 situation around the world food, medicine or sanitary products and even clean water have become inaccessible for many refugees. Social distancing has become a major concern in the refugee camps.

Challenges Upfront

The COVID -19  is severely affecting the education of the children in the refugee camps. In the refugee camps only 63% of refugees are enrolled in primary school and 24% in secondary education where most of the children are left out. The limit in pursuing education continues potentially in the refugee camps and its worsening due to the pandemic. There is a growing possibility of discrimination and xenophobia is affecting the process of socialization in their host country. Nevertheless, an unequal world with challenges to achieve education and skill training for self-development must be ceased.

In Yemen, more than 3 million people have been displaced and approximately 17 million require food. Yemen’s health facilities have either been destroyed or damaged in the conflict and with the unbridled transmission of COVID‑19 in Aden; Yemenis are living through the worst humanitarian crisis. Only a few health centers are operational in Yemen where the numbers of patients suffering from malnutrition, cholera, dengue fever, and injuries of war are very high.

In India almost 18,000 Rohingya refugees are taking shelter where thousands of them live in densely populated settlements in preposterous conditions; a third world country with the second-highest population in the world. India can hardly feed its population and especially it hosts a huge number of Refugees. Tibetan and Sri Lankan refugees have access to certain rights as assisted by the government, while the Rohingyas are still struggling for it. But, in Bangladesh, the WHO is working with governments to secure the health of nearly one million Rohingya refugees against the multiple threats of the pandemic and including natural disasters in the upcoming monsoon season.

The COVID-19 is increasing the needs and vulnerabilities of the Refugees. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is concerned about the collateral effects of the pandemic among the Refugees. According to the UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, due to the degrading socio-economic plight of the forcibly displaced people and poverty among them has made them a target to several traffickers that are immorally exploiting and profiteering from their culpability. The adolescent girls and children have become the victims of sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, and organ removal, forced recruitment into armed groups, forced marriages, or forced begging. The COVID-19-related impacts on restricted movements, closures, or availability of proper help, support services are put to constrain. The pandemic has limited the opportunity for the refugees, particularly women to seek legal support for sexual and gender-based violence.

On the World Day against Trafficking, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNHCR proposed for support in the prevention of trafficking and response efforts globally. The Governments and humanitarian actors together must ensure and assist the victims of trafficking

mostly among the displaced people where they are in immediate need of protection. A major initiative was taken by the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office (EMRO) to monitor the events and trend of COVID-19 among displaced populations in camps and non-camps settings for their safety.

Conclusion

 Resources are available in scanty, refugee camps and settlements are becoming overcrowded and many are being forced to sleep outside in freezing temperatures during the winters. For those living in refugee camps or camp-like situations, they also face an increased risk of COVID-19. In refugee camps, it is difficult to practice public health measures like frequent hand washing or social distancing. Therefore, it is also the responsibility of the host government to provide aid and essentials to the refugees living in their country. But in many cases, the host governments don’t have enough financial capability but can arrange testing services in certain regions, regardless of whether an individual is a national or a refugee. Secondly, even though high-income countries are currently most affected, they need to assist low- and middle-income countries because those countries don’t have the means to deal with COVID-19. The outbreak of the pandemic in populous and poor countries will put the rest of the world at continued risk.

It’s true of the fact that the world was not prepared for a pandemic and COVID-19 does not respect any boundaries. But, the governments should not use pandemic as an excuse for applying repressive policies. Efforts should be made spread information in every camp that have limited source to reliable information about COVID-19 and measures of protection.

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International Law

Understanding the unlawfulness of the Law of Armed Conflict

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The contravention of rules outlined in the Law of Armed Conflict has created an environment of exploitative exceptions in the understanding, and applicability of human rights and security in theatres of modern warfare. As these exceptions pave way for the proliferation of national might in the name of national security, and combatant safety, the human suffering for non-combatants also witnesses a proportionally massive upsurge. The changing (mis)understanding of these regulations calls for a review on the accountability and necessity of jus in bello, and its weakened importance under the ambit of the law of armed conflict, and the greater International Humanitarian Law.

More than often, man-made conflicts have been responsible for the decimation of life and property around the globe. Even though human casualty stands divided between conventional and non-conventional threats in a modern world, the protraction of man-made conflict is mainly responsible for loosening up tides after tides of bloodshed for physical or territorial gains. However, with the advent of the prospect of domestic/international accountability, and a fool-proof system of checks and balances, mankind’s warfare is held by tighter strings of transparency and justifiability, adorned by rules and regulations. Nonetheless, it is very important to analyse and understand if its techniques of armed conflicts and subsequent regulation are stringed by laws of conduct to create a policy of accountability and fairness equally amongst participating parties or are riddled with discriminatory practices, apropos to an obscure understanding of who is sacred and who is profane. Rather unsettling, the horrors of war have time and again been governed with a rather small yet informative account of jus in bello (justice in war) or the law which governs how warfare is conducted, centred in the Law of Armed Conflict.

Jus in bello falls within the ambit of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and as the semantics suggest, it indeed is purely humanitarian in its objective to limit human suffering in modern warfare through a strict set of pre-decided rules. Jus in bello is independent of the questions about the reason for war, or its basic rules, which in turn is explained by jus ad bellum(the law of waging war). Jus in bello, if we analyse through its literary content, consists of two parts. The first part explains principle determinants for a proper quantum of force required in armed warfare if limiting warfare is ever the case in humanitarian laws. The second part guides us through limitations and prohibitions in warfare if not complete cessation, which reminds of the old age tradition of centripetal discussions around international peace and security, albeit to no practical effect. In contrast to the humanitarian nature of the IHL, the first part of jus in bello aims to indulge the parties in conflict with a categorised, and diverse set of paradigms for use of violence. In a dubious exception, it can also encourage the parties to use toolkits of violence on adversaries, if it is justified with international/domestic military necessity, regardless of the means of interpretation, e.g. Turkey’s raid over Syria. Nonetheless, the rule of active distinction in IHL between combatants and non-combatants aims to impose limits on destruction and suffering in armed conflicts. However, the interpretation of the exceptional military necessity, proportionality, and distinction (MNPD) principles in IHL makes the death and injury of non-combatants casual, by emphasising on the miscued understanding that any unintentional attack with extreme unaccountability on non-combatants can, and will be classified as “collateral damage”. It ends up giving a sense of irresponsibility, justifiability, and immunity to the unprejudiced actions of the armed combatants since their actions are no longer a criminal or civil liability.

Fortunately, the second part of jus in bello adheres to the responsibilities in humanitarian law and imposes strict, absolute limits on certain instruments and modes of violence which can most certainly, if given a free hand, increase human casualty and suffering. These rules are extremely significant and cannot be exploited for potential military advantages. It is extremely altruistic to non-combatants. Nevertheless, a major limitation of the second part, as a general exception concerns the legality of warfare in the treatment and torture of prisoners of war by nation-states, regardless of the combatant and non-combatant status. One such example of that exploited limitation is the question on the authorization of torture, and indignation by US Personnel in the infamous Abu Ghraib prisons, which is backed by a textbook excuse that under US military commissions, information acquired through torture, generally inadmissible in domestic US civil/military courts will be considered as evidence for the sake of its internal security, and can ignore international laws and declarations. Fundamentally, even though this rule is in contrast with The Military Commission Act of 2006 section 6 (c)(1), the international organisations, honouring their commitment to the UN Charter Chapter 1, Article 2(7), limit their intervention in the matter. This is even though the US has ratified UNCAT Convention against Torture, and stands in clear violation of international decrees.

Moreover, the penumbra veiling the opacity of scores of military commissions, omissions and laws in this particular matter by different nation-states has threatened to unsettle various humanitarian provisions in jus in Bello, to evolve with the growing needs of armed conflict, primarily after the US’s war on terrorism. Major western nation-states like the UK and the US have called for a case by case approach into evidence gained from torture, taking a cue from Churchill’s “supreme emergency” dictum, henceforth, threatening to make torture a tool of plausible military necessity, which is unproportioned and discriminatory towards non-combatants.

Articulating the terminology change in IHL over due course of time, and an itemization of new crimes post-World War II, it is to be brought into notice the alarming plethora of provisions that have changed course in jus in bello. Regardless of the differentiation between combatants/prisoners of war, and non-combatants in Article 37(1) of Additional Protocol I and Article 44 of Protocol I of Geneva Convention, the lack of trust among state actors over doubtful logic and morality due to the inclusion of irregular fighters, non-state actors, and foreign fighters in modern warfare leads to unprecedented failure to comply with the second part prohibitions. This has resulted in the loss of a great majority of non-combatants in the conflicts of the 21st Century.

Furthermore, with the increasing reliance on tech-based warfare to minimise combatant casualty among state actors, WMDs have been the instrument of choice against the belligerent party. Unfortunately, the volatile firepower of such weapons, as well as its unprejudiced understanding between combatants, and civilians are judged under MNPD principles. Regardless of its clear military, and political danger over misuse, it is still accepted frivolously in the international community, and among state actors as a weapon of choice. The existence of nuclear weapons even after strengthened efforts towards non-proliferation, and its evolving doctrines of use among various nation-states, is an example of this effort to sham jus in bello, which is acting towards effective distinction in conflicts. The concept of the use of WMDs as a possible deterrent or a method of national self-defence is heavily prejudiced and debated in the international legal community, which openly admits that it cannot regulate the legality or illegality of such weapons by a nation-state in cases of self-defence, whatever the interpretation may be. Instead, they added this responsibility on MNPD principles, and un-verified claims of user assessment for self-defence, which technically does nothing to put a halt on the proliferation of WMD usage as an instrument of fear-mongering, e.g. the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

In the end, the lack of political will, and international compliance, marred by selfish national interests have worked more to change the law of armed conflicts, rather than strictly implementing it. The increasing reliance on the first part of jus in bello threatens to omit the second part from IHL, resulting in warfare and conflicts in modern times without a leash to save civilians from the unavoidable line of fire. It is high time that the international community takes a stand to promote and propagate the relevance of IHL to preserve the purity of conventions in place years ago, without pressure from major nation-states. These conventions find their relevance even now until mankind in its very nature of gaining more power decides to uproot it once and for all.

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