The detonation at the Trinity test site near Alamogordo, New Mexico in mid-July of 1945 marked the beginning of the ‘nuclear age’. Three weeks later, the world saw what the “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” were capable of after they were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively and the Hibakusha are still the proof of that. This has increased apprehension among countries towards engaging in traditional warfare, thus making it inevitable for revisionist powers to employ alternative tactics to challenge the existing world order without any major escalation. This is where one can observe an increase in the use of the grey zone strategy, which is not a novel tactic and has been present since centuries. However it has reemerged, as the need of the hour in the present political climate is unconventional stratagem. It is an identifying strategy in the nuclear age which is resistant of a full blown out war. This strategic campaign has taken a new form in the current age with the aid of cyber weapons, advanced information technology and civilian tools allowing the increase in importance of the tactic and applicability.
Understanding the Grey Zone Strategy
The new approach has been provided a fertile environment to flourish with an increase in revisionist intent, strategic gradualism and employability of unconventional tool. The revisionist intent stems from the fact that major powers may want to change the existing global order. Although there is a wide spectrum of revisionist states, the “measured revisionists” (Mazarr: 2015) are the rising powers with value for rule-based order and no intent of aggressive warfare but they do expect a transformation of the existing system and to do so they will take cautious and impactful steps to make a difference. The reason behind the tactful approach is that they want to tilt the power axis in their favour without disturbing the system altogether. The international system is being witness to the revisionist states which shall employ the grey zone strategy to cure their dilemmas of being dissatisfied of the system while being dependant on it.
These revisionist states find gradualist strategy appealing, considering their cautious approach towards dismantling the system to their favour. It is a defining aspect of the strategy. The approach achieves gradual gains instead of immediate results. This includes an elaborate set of interrelated measures deliberated to achieve gradual progress. One fundamental purpose behind such an approach is to avoid any foundational conflict that “characterises conclusive strategies” (Mazarr: 2015). Salami Slicing is a classic theory of a gradualist approach that Thomas Schelling discusses in his classic work, Arms and Influence. The ambiguity of commitment is the central theme of the tactic. The reason behind such static according to Schelling is to diminish the credibility of the defender’s deterrent threats. Mazarr (2015) points out Daniel Altman elaborated concept of fait accompli which is “to grab a limited gain before the other side can respond, acting suddenly and decisively in a manner that poses the defender with a dilemma of acquiescing or pursuing a dangerous escalation.” The approach of strategic gradualism makes the task of deterrence and balancing complicated and this is reflected in grey zone conflicts.
The approach of strategic gradualism of the revisionist power is implemented through the employment of unconventional measures of statecraft that allows it to avoid being a traditional conflict. Many tactics and tools which are employed in the grey zone strategy coincides with classic unconventional warfare. Grey zone conflict also reflects a form of political warfare and employs a range of mechanisms to achieve targeted political objectives. According to Mazarr (2015) mechanisms and tools such as economic sanctions, energy diplomacy, cyberattacks, information operations to “generate revisionist narratives”, use of militia, fifth columnists, and nonmilitary forces such as coast guards are not new, however the impact of these tactics have become unprecedented in present times. The amalgamation of these three aforementioned components accounts for the emergence and character of the grey zone strategy.
Zarr (2015) defined “the gr(e)y zone (as) an operational space between peace and war, involving coercive actions to change the status quo below a threshold that, in most cases, would prompt a conventional military response, often by blurring the line between military and nonmilitary actions and the attributions for the events”. The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team conducted a study of the grey zone and they defined (2016) it as “a conceptual space between peace and war, occurring when actors purposefully use multiple elements of power to achieve political-security objectives with activities that are ambiguous or cloud attribution and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet fall below the level of large-scale direct military conflict and threaten (…) by challenging, undermining or violating international customs, norms or laws.” While, according to the Cambridge Dictionary, grey zone can be defined as “activities by a state that are harmful to another state and are sometimes considered to be acts of war, but are not legally acts of war”
The definitions of the term highlight few basic characteristics essential to its meaning. One of the basic element is that of remaining below the threshold of justifying an international military response. Salami slicing is another key feature of this strategy, where they gradually move forward with their strategy towards achieving their objectives which are ambiguous instead of a knee-jerk advance. The third one is the deceiving nature of the actors which allows them to deflect any direct responses by disguising their role in the strategic campaign. The fourth aspect is reliance on historical claims with extensive legal and political justifications. The fifth characteristic is to not challenge the vital or existential interests of the defender of the present order. The hint at the risk of escalation as a source of coercive leverage is another major feature of the strategy which allows then to complicate deterrent threats. The strategy also employs nonmilitary tools to avoid impression of military aggression. Exploitation of specific vulnerabilities in target nations are typical in the working of the grey zone strategy. The primary characteristic of the grey zone is the dexterous use of strategic ambiguity to achieve gradual gains.
The South China Sea Dispute: A Case Study
In recent times, the strategic importance of the ocean waters in East Asia has risen exponentially, thus boosting the relevance of the security environment of South and East China Sea. Some primary reasons amplifying the strategic advantage of the maritime region are the access it provides to the resources of ocean energy, the South and East China Sea territorial conflict and the expansion of the naval power by the countries of the region. The South China Sea (SCS) dispute is considered to be an important territorial and jurisdictional dispute in modern times. It is a resource-rich area which is claimed by China, four Southeast Asian countries namely, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and by Taiwan. Since mid-1970s, numerous incidents have been taking place in the SCS with some major ones being the Paracel Islands incidents in 1974, the Johnson Reef incidents in 1988, the Mischief Reef incidents in 1995 and the Scarborough Shoal incidents 2012; which involved China vis-à-vis other claimant states. The stability of this particular region is relying on actions and reactions of China.
China’s Claims on the South China Sea
Efforts are being undertaken to create a foundation for a confidence building measure, but it has not been able to address the fundamental issues of the maritime region such as, territorial issues, access to natural resources, fishing rights and naval buildup.
The territorial claims of China in the SCS is represented by the “nine-dash line” enveloping 80% of the sea’s area in a U-shape published in 1948 based on a historical claim argument and not a legal justification under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It is considered the main actor steering the events of the dispute. However, the map of the region was not included in any ‘official’ Chinese government document until it a note verbale was submitted to the United Nations by China in 2009 and made its claim known, internationally. Another, diplomatic correspondence asserting the claim was made on 14 April 2011 through a note verbale as a response to Philippines’ protest. The 2012 incident of Scarborough Shoal, led to Philippines initiating arbitral proceedings against PRC to challenge its claims according to UNCLOS. China however argued that subject matter of territorial sovereignty is beyond the jurisdiction of UNCLOS, thus refused to accept and participate in the arbitration.
China, to be able to strengthen its presence and increase its ability enforce naval law with the U-shaped line, the People’s Liberation Army Navy is mobilised by China along with the paramilitary and civilian naval bodies to assert de facto control over the maritime region within the demarcated line. The nine-dash line along with the historical claim is still too ambiguous and it fails to explain the rationale behind those line placed. It is still unclear whether the claim is territorial, historical or a national sea boundary. This specificity shall make all the difference in the framework of UNCLOS.
But, in brief one can understand the claim of China extended to all land features in SCS, traditionally divided into the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, and the Nansha Islands. China also claims all the islands in the SCS along with its adjacent waters on the basis of the historic right that China claims to have.
Security Dilemma of Other South China Sea Claimant States
This section highlights the security dilemma bet China and the five other claimants: Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. Their attitudes towards the claim of China is different because of many factor, with Brunei being the least vocal and the Philippines and Vietnam being the most vocal.
The dichotomy of China vis-à-vis other five claimants exists because of many reasons, such as, all the claimants share the same concern that China might use military power to resolve the dispute, while China feels its legitimacy over the claim is decreasing because of lack of physical presence. All the Southeast Asian claimant states are ASEAN member and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (the 2002 DoC) was made between China and ASEAN, which is political consensus to ameliorate worries of both the sides. There is also more skirmishes and protests between Chia and the Southeast Asian claimant states: the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia, but there is no notorious incident recorded among the Southeast Asian claimant states themselves. In fact, there is record of cooperation among them, such as the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issuing a statement of concern urging parties to practice restraint while invoking UNCLOS and 202 DoC to maintain peace and stability. Malaysian PM also forwarded his support to the then Philippine Vice President in May 2012, proposing a peaceful resolution in term with the international law.
The overall security dilemma is primarily stemming out of anxiety. Uncertainty is the key element that has been dominating the series of tension in the maritime region among the Southeast Asian states, especially because the tension that rose between the period of 2007 and 20099 was unexpected.
Security Dilemma of the United States of America
The rigid attitude of China towards the SCS in recent times, has provided United States with the opportunity to increase its presence in Asia again. The strategic approach of the United States towards the region and adjacent waters is based three elements, first being to emphasise and strengthen the American relation with the treaty allies in the region and simultaneously increase contribution to regional multilateral organisations. Maintaining a strong presence military wise, in the region to maintain access to the maritime resources along with freedom of actions, while adhering to the international law is the other key element. The third element is integral to the strategy as it focuses on positioning the American naval power as the main actor promoting and upholding the international rules-based order.
The “pivot to Asia” security strategy of then President Barack Obama puts forth the United States as an Asia Pacific country, aspiring for an international order while providing a foundation for peace and prosperity, with rights and responsibilities for countries of the region, along with free trade and free transit which are not infringed upon. The American policy towards the sovereignty of the South China Sea has been consistent since 1990s, although at the July 2010 ARF Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the United States will not involve itself in territorial disputes but it has maintained a clear position on the establishment of maritime border the claims of which must be on land, challenging the nine-dash line.
However, the issue has not been internationalised by the United States and is insisting on it being handled at regional level through bilateral negotiations. This is mostly because escalating uS military involvement is inconceivable, as tasing a role in strengthening the security in South China Sea will result in increased Sino-American discord.
Understanding the Grey Zone Campaign of China in South China Sea
The efforts of China to solidify its hegemony in the South China Sea, is suggested to be a case of grey zone strategy campaign. The actions involving series of disconnected incidents can be considered to be a the employment of two major tactics of the grey zone strategy, the salami slicing approach and fait accompli. The involvement of China, a revisionist power as the main actor with the approach of strategic gradualism through the employment of unconventional tools, fulfil the criteria to be categorised under the grey zone strategy. In the case of attempting to achieve one’s goal one can observe a series of disconnected steps by China, which add up to be a coherent grey zone strategy campaign towards the goal.
There are a number of actions of China which can be seen through the characteristics of the Grey Zone Strategy. Such as, the characteristic of pursuing political objectives through integrated campaigns can be seen in the action of China, outlining the political foundation to be able to claim the South China Sea area, through narratives, propagandas, and more. There are many components that seem like a coordinated coherent campaign involving: maritime, political, economic and military actions. They have also laid a groundwork for theoretical foundation to be able to incorporate an integrated non-military approach.
China has been observed to employ tools which are non-military or non-kinetic, which is also a characteristic of the strategy. They have instead employed economic tools, such as offering of aid, trade deals which are favourable, access agreements or threatening and imposing of economic sanctions on the other claimant states. The deployment of civilian fishing fleets and aircrafts to the disputed area to establish presence and reinforce claim is a paramilitary tool. They have also used energy as a tool by using oil rigs, energy agreements and aid as inducement. Diplomacy has also been employed through direct coercive diplomacy, by engaging in negotiation to establish a parallel rule-based order with the influence shift in the favour of Beijing. Informational tools such as statements, social media campaigns, spreading of narratives which is shaped by the information gathered through cyber capabilities and then threaten punitive actions are also employed extensively by China in the case of the South Can Sea dispute. These tools are unconventional and non-military, thus fulfilling a key component of the strategy.
China has also managed to stay below the escalatory threshold avoiding any outright aggressive military engagement or warfare. This can be observed through their use of unconventional tools which remain outside the UN Charter definition of “aggressive actions” that might trigger an escalation, leading to a war. They have also left enough space to manoeuvre and retreat to preserve that threshold and ease tension. China as also been taking long-term and incremental series of steps to achieve strategic objectives, showing their willingness to step back to be able to ease tension while preserving the progress they have made so far. This can be seen through the perspective of strategic gradualism by not seeking immediate decisive results in short period of time.
If one looks a all the disconnected steps as a whole, one can see a coherent picture of the strategy at play by the revisionist power. This places the Unites States in a difficult situation as the guardian of the present world order. Any sort of retaliation might seem as an overreaction or too soft to make any difference to the current situation in the maritime region of the South China Sea.
The Legality of Grey Zone Coercion in the South China Sea
The South China Sea law at this point in time is anything but clear. The older form of law governs the point of ‘historical claims’ to territory, while the newer form is defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), governing the maritime claim measurable by territorial claim. South China Sea dispute fall at the intersection of these two laws at play, colliding with each other unable to provide a clear understanding of the outcome. The principle of international maritime law is the land govern the sea and China has tried to reconcile with the law through its official SCS claim document, with China’s official position iterating it as the “indisputable sovereignty” over the islands in the SCS region, along with the adjacent waters, seabed and subsoil.
China lays historical claims on Paracel and Spratly Islands in the SCS dating back to the second century BC, Western Han Dynasty. Although it is true that China has strong connection to them but the claim was not indisputable. According to international law, there are various ways of acquiring sovereignty over territories, however conquest and subjugation is dismissed by Article 2 of UN Charter. It can be analysed that actions of China in the SCS were inconsistent and not uninterrupted, thus its claim to be the country first to continuously exercise sovereign powers over them is contestable. The maritime claim in the South China Sea is also vague, as the rights of historical claim is ambiguous and not governed by UNCLOS. The application of it varies from one coastal state to another, with one having only fishing rights with the other exercising full sovereignty. The problem with China’s claim of historic right is that is does not specify the rights that the country claims in its capacity to be considered historic.
China had enacted a Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, thus establishing a maritime zone extending 12 nautical miles from its shores. 1998, a Law on the EEZ and Continental Shelf was passed setting 200 nautical miles for EEZ and because the U-shaped demarcated tea predates UNCLOS, geographical designation of waters inside the demarcated line is unspecified.
The point of origin has not been claimed by China, yet. China has the right to dispute its right over its claim in the sovereignty of SCS, however its claim is not indisputable. But, China often employs legal narrative and diplomatic overtures to legitimise its stance while undermining the claims of the other states. China has also started funding research on alternative approaches to international law, with focus on law of the seat and international economic law favouring China’s position.
When laws are created, set categories, actors and elements are established. The purpose of it is to have a predictable and principled manner in which a conflict can be dealt with, which also acts as a deterrent. But in recent times, when grey zone strategies has managed to remain under the threshold of what can be understood as a violent act, thus making it difficult to apply the basic legal concepts related to war and the use force. Grey zone actors intentionally exploits these gaps present in the legal framework which predates this new normalcy of advanced tactics and strategies that are beyond violent and aggressive disruption of world peace.
The actions of China in the matter SCS has contributed to the weakening of the international law of the sea hurting all the countries, including itself because by defying the law, one might instigate to topple down a rule based order, allowing competitions to go beyond the purview of law. This has the ability to diminish the stability of the international order, gradually. A strong way to respond to the maritime grey zone campaign is bringing a clarity in understanding the international law involved at the epitome of it in this regard.
The grey zone strategy, especially in the maritime domain will never be an easy situation to tackle. With sufficient suggestive evidence, one can assume that China in the case of the South China Sea dispute has opted to deal with the situation through the employment of the grey zone strategy to pursue its revisionist goals. But it is of course only suggestive and not conclusive, neither can be categorised in a watertight compartment. One must also keep in mind, that this strategy is not only time consuming but also ends up exhausting a lot of resources while at it. Therefore, the cannot be the only approach towards achieving ones revisionist goals, rather it can be one of the approaches while moving towards their ultimate goal. To retaliate such an approach, the ones safeguarding the present global order must have a coordinated response which is resolute enough to bring the situation under control. They must also portray a sense of enthusiasm to maintain such response ensuring that instigator rethinks the plans at hand.
Presently however, China has maintained a stronghold over this approach in the area of the South China Sea dispute and one can only wait to see what is their next step, for grey zone strategy is all about strategic gradualism.
 it is a Japanese word, which literally translates to “explosion affected people”, for the survivors of the bombing
 a group within a country at war who are sympathetic to or working for its enemies.
 “grey zone.” dictionary.cambridge.org, Cambridge Dictionary 2020. Web. 2 July 2020
 “Scarborough Shoal Dispute ‘Of Concern’,” Viet Nam News, 26 April 2012, https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/223972/scarborough-shoal-dispute-of-concern.html (accessed 07 July 2020).
 Jerry E. Esplanada, “Malaysia Too Wants Peace in Panatag Shoal,” Inquirer, 31 May 2012, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/38389/malaysia-too-wants-peace-in-panatag-shoal (accessed 07 July 2020).
 China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea (People’s Republic of China Response to the 12 July 2016 ruling on the South China Sea territorial claims by the UNCLOS Tribunal), Beijing, 13 July, 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1380615.htm (accessed 08 July 2020).
 Ben Blanchard, “Amid Sea Disputes, China to Set Up Maritime ‘Judicial Center,’”Marine Insight, March 12, 2016. https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/amid-sea-disputes-china-to-set-up-maritime-judicial-center/ (accessed 08 July 2020)
How nations states are limited
After the World War II, the establishment of the United Nations and the beginning of cooperation between the states was considered by many governments as a positive step. It was a useful step for all governments to start cooperating with European states that had been at war with each other for many years and failed in European history, and for other states to join this process and maintain positive political and diplomatic relations. However, after the recent two world wars, the desire of states to sit at the table of peace has made them forget something. These were the influences of the global government (UN) that would affect the sovereignty of states. Therefore, as liberal relations and the process of globalization develop in international relations, nation-states have begun to move away from the status of individual states to the management of global power. Today, global governance has become a reality. When national states decide on an act in international politics, they are forced to act and implement acts not only in the national interests of the state, but also in the opinion of international organizations. Today, it is not as easy as in the past to seriously change the geopolitical situation and violate international law without the opinion of international political organizations. Because today in the system of international relations there is a control and power through global governance, which will influence the sovereign decisions of states. Therefore, today I will share my views on how global governance, which is a reality today, has brought nation-states closer to decline.
Although the emergence and functioning of international organizations dates back to the 19th century, the formation of global governance is largely thought of as the history of the United Nations and some of the political organizations that have emerged since then. As I said, the emergence of global governance is associated with the end of World War II in 1945 and the establishment of the United Nations. As we know, after the Second World War, the world began to move on different realities. With the establishment of the United Nations, a mechanism of global governance has already begun to emerge. However, due to the geopolitical consequences of World War II and the transfer of Eastern Europe to the USSR, global governance through the UN could not cover the whole world, but simply led to the emergence of international organizations with its roots and the division of the world into two poles. As we know, the signing of the North Atlantic Pact in 1949, the emergence of NATO and the formation of the Western bloc, and later the signing of the Warsaw Pact and the establishment of the Eastern bloc in the same year divided the world into two poles. On the one hand, there was the capitalist West in global governance. On the other hand, there was the communist-ruled USSR. This continued until the 1990s.
Then, in 1991, with the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, global governance began to take over the world and the world came to global power, and liberal relations began to take over the world. Even Fukuyama, when he said the end of history, in fact meant that global governance would cover the world and that the world’s states would operate in the process of globalization based on a liberal tradition. All of this was a small history of how global governance came into being and when it covered the whole world. After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Eastern European states that had already seceded from the USSR began to integrate into the West. In short, they have joined global governance. Later, some countries in the region, such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine, which gained independence from the USSR, entered the global system of governance, maintaining ties with the West. However, states such as Russia and Iran, in order to further protect their sovereignty, did not allow the influence of this administration to influence them and began to sever ties with the West over time.
However, the process of globalization did not move much with its positive aspects. Not only did global governance influence the decisions of states to control them, but it also had to create hierarchical control over them by creating global hegemony. The ideal option for this was the hegemonic equator. In this hegemonic equator, states are legally and formally equal, but over time they have become economically, politically and militarily unequal. Thus, after a while, this unequal situation began to form a hierarchy of power between states. States with weaker economic resources and militaries are already under constant pressure from powerful states and under the influence of powerful states.
For example, we can see an example of this in our country today. We are all equal in the South Caucasus region. Although Georgia, Iran, Russia and Azerbaijan are formally equal, there is a hierarchy in terms of global hegemony. For example, Russia comes first in this hierarchy. Because Russia is much luckier than others in military, economic and geopolitical terms. The second is Iran. Because the possibility of Iran becoming a nuclear weapon results in its military superiority over other countries in the region. The third is Azerbaijan. Because Azerbaijan’s oil economy, such as oil and gas, makes it more economically viable and stronger than Armenia. Therefore, such differences created by global governance and the limits imposed on sovereign decisions by states have formed a critique of globalization over time, leading to criticism and debate by various academics. This criticism has long focused on the question of whether globalization can lead to the decline of nation-states.
As we know, the long-term impact of the globalization process on states has led to serious criticism about whether globalization has transformed states. While some academics believe that global governance destroys and degrades nation-states, others argue that globalization serves the national interests of nations.
The first critical approach is that the process of globalization is very powerful in a globalized world. In this case, we have already moved to a system of non-sovereign states. Today, states are no longer able to make independent political decisions in the long run for their national interests and to act accordingly. This process also weakens the power of states in the world and in international relations, and transnational companies gain a dominant position.
However, in the second critical approach, academics think differently and contradict the first criticism. Academics believe that although globalization affects the independent acts of states, the superpowers of their regions are still the most important entities in global politics. Because both international organizations and economic transnational organizations, which are the concepts of the globalization process, were created by these countries themselves. Therefore, globalization does not harm these countries, but serves their national interests. They can violate international law and the rules of global governance at any time, and even the geopolitical situation can change despite global governance. (For example, the US invasion of Iraq, Russia’s imperialist act against Georgia and Ukraine)
In addition, there is a third and final critical approach, which is the approach of global governance to other forms of power, interests, goals and acts of states. As globalization is now considered a world reality, states are forced to choose between two options. Either Iran, like North Korea, will remain closed and protect its national sovereignty outside of global governance, or, like other countries in the world, will join the process of globalization and cooperate with each other. Since there is an economic reality created by global governance in the world, global governance can keep states under its influence by changing the interests, goals and acts of states.
However, the decline of the state today is not only due to the process of globalization and global governance. In addition, there are institutions such as the global economy, business, large companies, non-governmental organizations and international organizations, which pose a serious threat to the sovereignty of states. Today we live in a world of more international, economic companies and organizations than national states. 49% of these companies and organizations belong to the states and 51% to the international economy. The economic power of some of these companies (Exxon Mobil, General Motors) is already greater than in many Eastern European and African countries. From this we can conclude that the second concept that leads to the decline of nation-states, along with international organizations, is the international economic companies.
As a result, I can say that today the globalized world and international organizations have become a system that borders states and limits their national decisions. If in the 20th century it was so easy to make a decision to start a world war, to use any type of weapon, it has become almost impossible to do so in a globalized world. But in addition, globalization and international organizations can sometimes help strengthen states. For example, today, because states play an important role in international organizations, decisions made through international organizations
sometimes depend on states. For example, the UN Security Council, the Consulate General of the European Union, is a process that depends on states in the decision-making process. The decisions of the member states are considered very serious and decisive in the decision-making process. In this case, too, we can see that international organizations do not act as a tool for the decline of nation-states, but as a concept that strengthens them. Therefore, I do not think it is right to assess globalization today as a system that leads to the decline of nation-states.
- Andrew Heywood. (2013, fourth edition). Politics s.18
- Robert Jackson & Georg Sorensen: Introduction to İR, s. 4
- Mazarr, M. (1999). Global trends 2005: An owner’s manual for the next decade. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Zygmunt BAUMAN, Küreselleşme-Toplumsal Sonuçları, Çev: Abdullah Yılmaz, Arıntı Yayınları, İstanbul, 2010, s.83
Do dominant strengths lead to heavy commitments?
In the middle of a global recession, in which almost all facets of our lives are now carried out on-line, technology firms are experiencing a massive increase in their customer base. These businesses are over-influenced by the necessities and the popularity of internet content and networks in our lives. It is through this force that our civil rights are upheld.
Transparency International has reported that the 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has revealed that chronic corruption threatens health care services and leads to the pandemic’s democracy. OnThursday Transparency International updated its annual survey, revealing that in 2020 the situation in Pakistan had deteriorated. Countries with strong results in the index are more spending on health care and more able to have basic health security and less likely to contravene political laws and institutions or rule of law. By their view of public corruption, the 2020 version of CPI rated 180 countries and territories based on 13 expert reviews and business executive surveys. The index was illuminated this year by Denmark and New Zealand, both with 88 points. At the bottom of the table, there are 14, 12, and 12 points respectively in Syria, Somalia, and South Sudan. Pakistan was 120 last year. The country’s corruption scale is 31 one point below the 32-last year at the scale of 0-100, where zero is ‘Extremely Corrupt’ and 100 is ‘Very Clean,’ suggesting a steadily deteriorating view of corruption in the public sector.
The annual CPI in 2020 shows that persistent corruption threatens healthcare services and leads to the political retreat of the COVID-19 pandemic.
What is a report on transparency exactly?
A transparency report is a frequently released document that analyzes the activities of entities that have a particular impact on the privacy or freedom of expression, information about the enforcement of internal rules such as community policies and service requirements, and provides statistics on original government and third-party user data demands, materials, and account limitations. The compliance report should include public and private third-party requests, company implementation information and recommendations for the Group, and the amount of customer information and content notifications and orders regulating or blocking content. Published every year, at least, and convenient for all users to use.
This involves ensuring, at a minimum, that records are regularly easy to access:
1) are consistent on the website of the organization
2) intuitive user interface is used
3) people with disabilities are formatted
4) glossaries or definitions of words in appropriate languages, where possible.
While the frequency of disclosure data is not standardized, we find more regularly published information more valuable. Especially as the pandemic will change our culture in the next few months, regular monitoring will provide a vital snapshot of how businesses respond.
Take TikTok’s illustration. As last year’s Chinese Social Media app broke into the western market, many people asked whether the Chinese government would track users. TikTok eventually published its first accountability report last January in response to rising pressure from champions of human rights. Although the study asked several concerns, it indicates the increasing value of reporting accountability to encourage trust in enterprises.
Who should post the transparency reports?
Everybody is the short answer. To date, in our Disclosure Monitoring index, we have gathered data from 70 companies worldwide. There are social media sites, gig enterprises, VPN services, telco firms, and everything between. A transparency report should be released by any firm managing consumer data. While transparency reports are only applicable for ICT firms, companies such as auto manufacturers, healthcare equipment manufacturers and even hotels manage consumer data as well as for conventional “technically” companies. Therefore, disclosure reports will need to be released. In North American companies we have had more reporting than in any other region. However, the field of openness should not be limited. In reality, South Korean and Japanese are new studies. Users around the world have the right to know what corporations are doing to preserve their performance. Home law may limit the amount that corporations may print in some countries, but this is not a reason for companies to refrain from reporting fully. Users must understand how government oversight can be limited.
From here, where are we going?
The rising need for technology solutions provides businesses with a rare opportunity to enhance their processes in transparency. We urge businesses that have published the disclosure reports over the years to follow the periodic, reliable reporting practice and to find means of providing their customers with more transparency in these unpredictable times. The time has come to demonstrate your respect for human rights to the companies new to this practice, particularly videoconferencing and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services. Especially as the pandemic will change our culture in the next few months, regular monitoring will provide a vital snapshot of how businesses respond.
Surviving in a Deregulated Strategic World
Russian-American strategic relations are entering uncharted waters with the demise of the arms control regime; rapid technological revolution; the rise of nuclear multipolarity; the asymmetry of the two countries’ positions amid their growing confrontation and an increasing likelihood of military conflict among major powers; and the complete lack of trust and a glaring deficit of decency in relations between Moscow and Washington. Preventing a nuclear war between the two powers will be as hard a task as it ever was, and the environment for that immensely more complex and fluid than ever.
Deterrence as the only pillar of stability
Russia’s nuclear doctrine, like the U.S. one, is based on the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence, in turn, is rooted in the concept of mutually assured destruction. To make deterrence credible, one has to have a realistic capability of absorbing the enemy’s first massive nuclear attack, and still of destroying him as a functioning entity in the second strike. This is assured by launching one’s missiles once a certified warning is received that the enemy has launched a massive attack. Thus, the party that fired first would assuredly die second. Knowing that, neither party would initiate an attack, and peace would be preserved. As the U.S. and Soviet presidents agreed in a 1990 joint statement, “Nuclear war cannot be won, and should not be fought”.
A credible strategy of deterrence needs to deal with a range of challenges.
Ballistic missile defenses, offering a promise of intercepting a certain proportion of incoming missiles, by definition, undermine deterrence. For three decades, ballistic missile defenses (BMD) were constrained by the ABM Treaty, which Moscow considered to be a cornerstone of strategic stability. After the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty in 2002, Russia embarked on a program designed to nullify any advantages the United States would get through implementing its missile defense programs. Thus, the BMD challenge to deterrence was – and still is being – met by improving the capacity of one’s missile fleet to penetrate enemy defenses and deliver their payloads to targets.
At this moment, the Russian leadership feels assured that its strategic arsenal will be capable of overwhelming any missile defenses the United States would be able to deploy for several more decades.
The enemy’s decapitating strikes from close range, whether from advantageous geographical positions or outer space, carry the risk of eliminating one’s national command and control centers before they can issue orders to activate a nuclear response. To meet this challenge, command and control centers are hardened to withstand any conceivable attack. Other potential counter-measures, both laden with heightened risk, include placing the adversary in a similarly vulnerable geographical position by moving one’s attack assets within close range of his key centers and bases, or by adopting a first strike deterrence posture which sends the message to the adversary that, in a crisis, one would have to launch a nuclear attack first, in order not to be annihilated by the enemy. As President Vladimir Putin put it in an interview with a U.S. TV station, “We don’t need as world without Russia”.
Other technological challenges include the use of artificial intelligence and particularly of cyberattacks to paralyze nuclear command and control systems. The importance of cyber defenses has risen sharply in the last decades. Efforts are being made to make sure that nuclear communications remain immune from cyber penetration.
Political challenges look more serious. A massive nuclear attack which was the basis of strategic thinking in the second half of the 20th century is growing less and less likely. This undermines the stabilizing function of nuclear deterrence because the threat it once sought to prevent is moving. Indeed, Russia itself, in the hour of its military weakness and domestic political disarray in the 1990s announced that it would use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack if such an attack would put the existence of the Russian state in jeopardy.
Prior to that, Russia rejected the idea of limited nuclear war and did not engage in thinking too much about the ladder of nuclear escalation. Under conditions of the mid-to-late 20th century, such a war would have been likely fought in Europe, including the European portion of the Soviet Union, and would spare the United States. Moscow was never going to give Washington such an advantage and said that, once the nuclear Pandora’s box was opened, limiting war would be impossible. This was certainly part of the deterrence strategy.
Now, with the specter of a nuclear holocaust receding very far, and the confrontation between the United States and Russia rising to the point when their military platforms or units can actually collide in various parts of the world; and when the United States and Russia are involved in armed conflicts on different sides and are operating in close proximity to each other, like in Syria; when frozen conflicts can unfreeze and escalate (think Donbas), preventing war between Russia and America has become perhaps the only real issue on the otherwise de fact barren U.S.-Russian agenda. It is thus vitally important to understand what Moscow and Washington are up to.
In the nuclear area, both Russians and Americans are concerned that their adversary will use nuclear weapons first at the tactical level, to seal one’s conventional success and make the other side accept defeat. Underlying this is a belief (which appears to be a fateful illusion, more present among American scholars and experts) that war and achieving victory in it have again become possible, with the stakes much lower than during the Cold War, and the prospect of total annihilation itself is enough to deter the weaker party, Russia, from using its nuclear weapons on a massive scale. This is the principal danger these days.
Misperceptions – or lack of clear understanding – between the two exist not so much regarding their nuclear doctrines but with respect to their broader foreign policy strategies. Absolute lack of trust and high levels of mutual suspicion complicate strategic assessment.
Strategic stability in a multipolar nuclear environment
Strategic stability as defined in the decades of the Cold War was narrowly focused on relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The countries with the largest nuclear arsenals and military establishments were also the two principal antagonists in the competition not so much for state primacy but for world ideological and socio-political hegemony. With the end of the Cold War, this is all over. Russia and the United States still possess the world’s largest by far nuclear weapons arsenals, but their relationship is no longer the main axis of world politics. The United States continues to be a superpower, but Russia is now a power of a different caliber with no ambition to prevail in the world.
America’s main challenger now is China, which has surpassed it in terms of GDP in PPP terms and is expected to surpass it in nominal USD terms soon. China is also challenging America’s technological primacy and offers a model of governance that has been able to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic much more effectively than the United States. Yet, China’s nuclear arsenal is small compared to American and has a very different structure. Unlike the Soviet Union in the 1970s, China has no desire to engage in arms control at this stage, believing (correctly) this to be to America’s unilateral advantage. Such a situation creates a mismatch: U.S.’s strategic relations are better developed with Russia, which is no longer America’s principal strategic rival, and are very thin with China, which is.
Besides the geopolitical downgrading of Russia which is not reflected in a comparable decrease in its nuclear capabilities, and the steep economic/technological rise of China, not accompanied on the same scale by the growth of its nuclear forces, there are other powers who have joined the nuclear weapons states club as independent players. The United Kingdom and France, which developed their weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, have always been U.S. allies within NATO, and their weapons were always considered by Moscow to be part of the Western bloc’s combined nuclear arsenal. Cold War-era nuclear bipolarity that coincided with a similar ideological and geopolitical division (China remained largely introverted during that period) transformed into multipolarity. Strategic stability ceased being an issue for Moscow and Washington exclusively to tackle.
When India and Pakistan both acquired nuclear weapons at the turn of the 21st century, this materially changed the previous situation. Delhi and Islamabad are in no need to coordinate their policies and strategies with others. Ever since independence and partition, the two countries have maintained tense relations, leading to full-scale wars and border conflicts. Armed with nuclear weapons and delivery means and sharing a long border, they now got the ability to start the world’s first nuclear war. What is also important to note here is the strategic asymmetry: while Pakistan trains its weapons on India, India sees China as its main strategic rival, and Pakistan, China’s friend, as an adversary. Maintaining strategic stability between India and Pakistan through arms control on the U.S.-Soviet model was impossible due to geographical proximity and territorial issues, the general power imbalance between the two countries, and the asymmetrical strategic position of India and Pakistan.
North Korea, which developed its nuclear weapons and long-range missiles in the 21st century, presented another problem. Its arrival as a nuclear-armed state sent the message that any country whose leadership was determined to go nuclear and was prepared to withstand serious international pressure was able to achieve its goal, provided it stayed the course. The North Korean regime learned one thing about nuclear deterrence: all you need to do to deter the world’s most powerful country from attacking you and toppling your regime is to make it unsure about wiping out completely your nuclear arsenal or intercepting every nuclear-tipped missile that you launch against it. Pyongyang’s example essentially demonstrates that any country anywhere can effectively deter any conceivable opponent with relatively crude weapons and missiles.
During the Cold War, strategic stability used to be essentially about high-yield nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. In the 21st century, strategic non-nuclear systems have achieved a degree of precision that allows them to do the job that in the earlier era could only be assigned to nuclear systems.
With the U.S.-Soviet confrontation no longer the only major military concern, the so-called tactical weapons – both nuclear and non-nuclear – have acquired salience. These are certainly the ones that are pointed in opposite directions on the Indian Sub-Continent; they also form the bulk of the Chinese nuclear arsenal and missile fleet. Assuring stability within that class of weapons is exceedingly more difficult than with strategic weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The United States and the Soviet Union never managed to control their tactical weapons – which, it was true, was less important then.
Guardrails and communications instead of treaties
Formal arms control treaties are becoming a thing of the past. Developing a new U.S.-Russian treaty to succeed New START will be extremely difficult, given the complexity of the issues involved, and the poisonous climate prevailing in the United States attitudes toward Russia. Negotiating agreements in a multipolar nuclear environment appears next to impossible. Even a trilateral U.S.-Russian-Chinese understanding – realistic in principle, given that they are currently the world’s top three military and geopolitical players by far – appears very long in coming.
Given this situation, strengthening strategic stability requires strengthening deterrence in the sense of eliminating all hopes of a victory in a nuclear war.
No new technological developments should be allowed to create an illusion of achieving victory in a war between nuclear powers. There should also be no illusion of a nuclear power defeating a nuclear opponent using only conventional means of warfare.
A military collision between the United States and Russia in the 21st century can be the result of incidents between military units or platforms – such as aircraft, ships – operating in close proximity to one another; local or regional conflicts escalating and drawing in Moscow and Washington on opposite sides; misperceptions about the actions of the other side, such as surprise exercises, and the like. In all these and similar cases, preventing military conflict between Russia and America requires the flawless operation of communications channels between the military and security authorities of the two countries. Such communication, on the model of the deconfliction mechanism that has been in place in Syria since 2015, would help clarify the situation, prevent escalation and avoid misperception or misunderstanding.
However, a complete lack of trust between the U.S. and Russian governments makes mutual suspicion irreducible. In a serious crisis, communication per se will not fully satisfy either party. Messages passed along communications channels can be perceived as disinformation. Much more value will be placed on one’s own intelligence assets, from the national technical means of reconnaissance and intelligence gathering to human sources. Interpretation of that information will be of crucial, even vital importance. Technical or human error and political and other considerations leading to misrepresentation can lead to disaster.
There can be various confidence-building measures. Under the START I Treaty, Moscow and Washington agreed to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. Such centers were ready to become operational in the early 2000s. However, the project fell through due to technical problems. A variation of that idea could be useful under the present circumstances of new hostility between the two countries. Yet, before this happens, a modicum of decency needs to be restored in the U.S.-Russian relations. Decency will not bring trust, but it can instill an element of mutual respect and self-respect to the relationship which is painfully lacking now. Without this, the only basis for strategic stability between Russia and the United States will remain fear of nuclear war.
Mutual fear may be as good a deterrent as any. It worked, after all, during the Cold War. The problem is that, in a relationship as highly asymmetrical as the present U.S.-Russian one, the two countries can stumble into a nuclear first use, and then a nuclear exchange, through the thick fog of mutual misperceptions borne out of U.S. arrogance, Russian resentment, reciprocal hostility, and utter disrespect.
Avoiding collision in uncharted waters
Even if New START is extended, the United States and Russia will have bought only a short reprieve. Five years – if this is the timeframe of the extension – will hardly be enough for negotiating a new treaty. So, extension or no extension, the 50-year-long era of arms control between Moscow and Washington is drawing to a close. From now on, deterrence will not only be the principal basis of strategic stability but its only basis.
True to its core philosophical assumptions, political goals, and doctrinal objectives, the United States will continue to strive for strategic superiority over Russia and China. For its part, Russia will seek to protect its nuclear deterrence capability vis-à-vis America. The nuclear arms race is already on. This is not a game of numbers of weapons but rather of their capabilities. President Putin, in his 2018 annual address to the Federal Assembly, laid out what measures had been taken by Russia in response to the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Further modernization efforts will continue on both sides.
Strategic decisions by either party that change force postures can lead to changes to the other party’s doctrines. The U.S. withdrawal in 2019 from the INF Treaty has opened the way to the development and deployment of a new generation of INF systems in both Asia and Europe. If such U.S. systems are deployed in Japan and South Korea, this would put China’s key centers of decision-making and strategic assets at high risk, as well as cover much of the Russian Far East and Siberia. Russia would certainly respond with its own deployments, modifying its force posture accordingly. If, by contrast, U.S. INF missiles are deployed to Europe (e.g., Poland) from where they can quickly reach Moscow and all targets in European Russia, this would place Russia in ultimate danger. There will certainly be changes to Russia’s own force posture. However, Russia might logically have to go farther and adopt a first-strike deterrence strategy in order to pre-empt a decapitating U.S. attack against itself. Having escaped nuclear war when U.S.-Soviet antagonism was absolute, the two countries might thus put the world’s existence at risk out of sheer contempt for each other.
This dangerous outcome needs to be prevented. Deconflicting and communications are vitally important, confidence building, such as the resurrection of nuclear risk reduction centers might help, but without a meaningful improvement in Russian-U.S. political relations to the level of serious dialogue on security issues between the two governments, the situation will continue to deteriorate. Right now, U.S.-Russia relations are clouded in a toxic fog, which makes avoiding kinetic collision between them much more difficult. It looks that the Biden Administration, while supporting New START extension and arms control in general, is going to take a hard line toward the Kremlin, aiming to squeeze Russia even more than its predecessor. Moscow is bracing for a new round of confrontation. Tough times are lying ahead.
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