Authors: Dr Satoru Nagao and Gitanjali Sinha Roy
The Coronavirus Pandemic has shaken the world to the highest possible risks the civilisation has seen in this century and has led many countries to cooperate and collaborate with one another in these trying times. China is the only country which seems to play the card of being an ‘opportunist’ and has prevailed as an economic and maritime aggressor. Keeping the Chinese aggressiveness in mind, this article tries to pave a way for a QUAD+ Decoupling Fund in order to tackle China.
The aggressive behaviour in the maritime domain has left most countries with a bad taste especially as Chinese aggressiveness has increased in leaps and bounds in the South China Sea, East China Sea, India-China border area, Indian Ocean and the Taiwan Strait which has made countries like Japan, India, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and the United States of America rather uncomfortable. In addition, recently, China imposed “sanction” against Australia by stopping import beef, wines, 80 percent tariff on barley imports has greatly affected the Australian farmers and has impacted tourism and education as many Chinese students studies in universities in Australia. This sanction came in after Australia suggested an international investigation about COVID-19 on China. China has also blamed New Zealand as they supported Taiwan to participate in World Health Organisation meeting. The Chinese government passed the national security law to crack down on the democratic movement in Hong Kong. All this has resulted in Chinese aggressive behaviour which is intimidating many countries all at the same time. Thus, it is important to analyse why China choose such a course and what should be done?
One interesting point to think about the reason of China’s attitude is that China has been aggressive against Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia India, but not so aggressive against the US. China didn’t expect that its aggressive attitude toward these countries except the US will not create a serious crisis for China as these countries depend on the economic relations with China. China has been a manufacturing destination since the 1980s and ever since then, it has been growing its manufacturing footprint across the world with an abundance of cheap labour, a weak currency and speedy decision making under the authoritarian regime and infrastructural support from Japan has contributed to the rise of China as the factory of the world.
Therefore, one way of dealing with China is to reduce economic dependence toward China as it helps China become more aggressive. Countries which are facing the rut of China need to rethink their economic dependence. It is important to understand China was a preferred kernel until the tensions between the United States of America and China began resulting in a trade war and as the tensions worsened, talks of the US shifting its manufacturing base to other countries, imposing huge taxes on each other made China’s future economic prospect dark. What worsened the situation for China was that it hid vital information of the COVID-19 spread from all the countries like US, Japan, Australia, US allies in Europe and this has made all these countries rethink their relation with China through the policy ofde-coupling from China. As China’s Wuhan emerged as the epicentre of this deadly virus, it led to the disruption of supply chains world over and the over-dependence that all countries have on China was needed to be reduced and rectified.
In a meeting of the Council on Investments held on 5 March, 2020 led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe decided to relocate the Japanese manufacturing bases to Japan from China and the Government extended help by setting up a budget of 220 billion yen to move the production units out of China and also set aside 23.5 billion yen for Japanese firms to move their production line to Southeast Asian countries as February 2020 onwards their supply chains suffered bringing home a financial slump. Recently, in Japan57 companies are set to be incentivised with a subsidy of 57.4 billion yen to move out of China and it includes companies like Iris Ohyama Inc and Sharp Corp among many others. Thereby, it was suggested to diversify the manufacturing and supply chains to Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand and India which is the need of the hour. The US has been the leader of the pack by pushing to create an alliance of ‘trusted partners’ aiming for a ‘Post-COVID Economic Prosperity Network’ consisting of Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam to move the global economy forward along with restructuring the supply chains and making sure that this kind of situation is prevented from happening in the future.
India has been worried that the pandemic has exposed the over-reliance on China and so, there is a major need to become self-reliant or ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’, a 20 lakh crore stimulus package was released with an aim to ‘build locally to go global’ which would help and integrate within the global economy. European nations like the United Kingdom and Spain has faced a large number of people succumbed to death due to coronavirus and it has made these Europeans countries highly angry about China’s handling of the coronavirus. Also, the European companies businesses were less affected by the trade war, but a threat to tariffs coupled which made some of these companies to move their supply chains out of China and move to closer homes supply chains like Romania, Portugal, Turkey and Africa.
China’s bad handling of the coronavirus and misinformation about the same has led the world today at a standstill and thousands of helpless lives have paid a price. Further, the virus has torn the world apart, shaken the supplies chains and all this has given birth to an anti-China sentiment globally. The United States along with the Quad members and the US allies are paving a way a Quad+ policy of decoupling from China. The US along with its trusted friends are aiming to form the ‘Post-COVID Economic Prosperity Network’ which should also set up a decoupling fund to help all the others who are willing to diversify out of China and this could be called the ‘Quad+ Decoupling Fund’ which would prevent China’s arm-twisting and bullying. Once all the countries back off from China’s manufacturing hub, China would be forced to abide by the rules and would be forced to behave properly as then it would be at the mercy of the other countries economically and since China will become economically weak due to the moving out these factories, it would also learn to constraint its behaviour in the western Pacific which in turn would help the US and all the Quad members and the US allies to have a free and open Indo-Pacific without any threat from Chinese maritime aggression.
Talking of maritime aggression, this Quad+ Decoupling Fund can also form a ‘Post-COVID Security Prosperity Network’. We are aware that the United States, Japan and India have been in close cooperation with regard to QUAD as well as Japan-America-India (JAI). The introduction of Quad plus countries like Vietnam, South Korea and New Zealand have been included keeping in mind their direct and indirect issues with China and most face security issues primarily in the maritime domain. Also, Australia was recently invited by India to join the maritime exercises and the recent India-Australia meeting was a way to woo Australia back into the QUAD as Australia has been facing flak from China. The recent India-Japan maritime exercise in the Indian Ocean could be seen as another addition of strengthening the maritime grouping against Chinese aggressiveness. Thereby, a QUAD+ Decoupling can be formed in the realm of economic as well as security to tackle China.
What Indonesia Can Do to Prevent Nuclear Arms Race in Asia Pacific?
As the follow-up to the first round of talks convened last month, top diplomats from the US and Russia attended three-day meeting on 28 – 30 of July 2020 in Vienna, Austria, to discuss the future of nuclear arms control. One of the most highlighted issues of the talks is the possible replacement of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear arms control deal which is due to expire next year. The Treaty is considered essential to maintain strategic stability as it is aimed at reducing arsenals of the two nuclear powers.
Despite the claim that the first round of meetings in Vienna was productive, it remains unclear whether the second talks will end up in an extension of the New START or not. In this connection, experts are skeptical and questioning the genuine efforts of the US to pursue the process, as its administration keeps on putting conditions that is difficult to attain. One of those conditions is the broadening of nuclear arms control agreement by pushing China to join the talks, despite multiple rejection from Beijing.
Concerns over the uncertain future of nuclear arms control also emerged in August last year, following the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the US and Russia. After indicating its readiness to negotiate a new and better treaty, Washington expressed its difficulty to remain abide by the Treaty as Russia did not comply with it. In an act of reprisal, Moscow denied US allegations and pulled out from the landmark agreement which prohibited the two countries from launching nuclear-capable missiles with ranges from 500 to 5.500 kilometers.
As the INF Treaty has been abandoned and the continuation of the New START remains uncertain, the future of global nuclear arms control is at risk. Without the INF Treaty and presumably the New START limitations in place, nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear powers would be practically unimpeded. Under this condition, both countries may swiftly develop ground-based missiles and engage countries in different regions, including in Asia Pacific, to secure strategic bases for deployment of those missiles through new or strengthened security cooperation frameworks.
Overshadowed by this situation, countries in Asia Pacific, including Indonesia, should be cognizant and explore their necessary capabilities to prevent the region from becoming an arena for a new arms race and nuclear weapons exchange.
As for Indonesia, its prominent roles in global nuclear arms control must be no longer be downplayed. Indonesia has long standing records in mitigating nuclear weapons threats. Indonesia has been a coordinator of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) working group on disarmament and non-proliferation since 1994, is an initiator of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (SEANWFZ), and is also considered strong advocate of initiatives on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament as well as on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.
Indonesia is also an avid participating country at robust institutional mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and other sub-regional mechanisms that have huge potential as effective mechanisms in building trust between countries. Additionally, on track two diplomacy, there are mechanisms such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and other similar mechanisms where Indonesia is also a member.
With such modalities at hand, Indonesia could actually pursue measures to better anticipate regional challenges stemming from the rising tensions between nuclear-armed states.
Indonesia could encourage a more concerted efforts to raise regional awareness on the negative impact of nuclear weapons. It is imperative to resonate the message across the region that the adverse impact of the use of nuclear weapons recognizes no geographical border. Furthermore, other factors such as human error, negligence, miscommunication, cyber risks and access of nuclear weapons by non-state actors should be highlighted as imminent threats if they are not properly addressed.
Another suggested effort is pushing confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy as a top priority for deliberation on arms control among countries in the region, such as under ARF and EAS. Under current destabilizing developments, maintaining peace and security in the region is of utmost importance. In this context, leaders need to be fully cognizant of the significance of these measures in leading the situation in the right direction and preventing the region from getting caught up in a possible arms race.
In addition to first track, institutional and track two mechanisms could also be maximized to create an enabling environment for political commitment among Asia Pacific countries to refrain from further reducing their commitment to nuclear arms control. While maintaining total and complete disarmament as an ultimate goal, countries in the region, particularly the ones with nuclear weapons capabilities, need to be urged through mechanism such as CSCAP to at least continue upholding their “no first use” nuclear policy.
The next measure is to foster better interaction, exchanges of views and best practices between countries in the region to develop and strengthen national and regional nuclear safeguards infrastructure. As one of countries with highest compliance level to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)safeguards obligations, Indonesia could encourage countries in the region to further complete their IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the Additional Protocol. This effort will provide assurances that Asia Pacific countries are only pursuing peaceful applications of nuclear energy.
Finally, Indonesia could convince countries in the region to bolster their collective support for the multilateral approach to international security. In this connection, while waiting for its Review Conference 2020 to be convened as soon as circumstances permit (but no later than April 2021), firm support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) must be reiterated to guarantee its integrity and credibility as an essential foundation for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
All in all, with complexity and security challenges coming from within, including from South Asia and North East Asia, it should be realized that there is no one-size-fits-all formula to keep Asia Pacific region secure from nuclear weapons threats. Thus, any opportunities for peace and stability must be seized since leaving the region in a limbo with the absence of collective measures to anticipate the possible impact of the nuclear arms control crisis is definitely a risky option.
ASEAN in the Emerging Indo-Pacific
In 2017, the concept of the Indo-Pacific, after it was included in the discourse of regional issues by US representatives, was unofficially framed as the region’s main discussion issue for the coming years. Having appeared in the Indian analytical magazine in 2007, the term “Indo-Pacific” for a long time only remained the subject of scientific discussions and entered the political vocabulary of only a couple of countries of the future region: India, Japan and Australia. At the initial stage of the emergence of the concept, ASEAN countries experienced serious problems of internal contradictions and really could not join the formation of the concept among the first. In 2013, Indonesia, as a country – one of the leaders in the region, presented an “aseanocentric” vision of the concept of “Indo-Pacific.” The proposal was to create a regional organization that includes all the basic principles of ASEAN (“integration”, “mutual understanding”), based on a symbiosis of two existing institutions: the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Association of East Asian Summit Members. It is not surprising that the proposed construct retained the leading role for ASEAN countries in future decisions of the organization, since it was actually proposed to “bring to a common denominator the heterogeneous and diverse ASEAN external partners» . At the stage of presentation, the path of the “aseanocentric” concept stopped. The main ideas, agendas presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Marty Metalegawa, were not included in the discourse-discussion of the concept in the coming years.
If we give an analytical assessment of the approach proposed by Indonesia, on behalf of ASEAN, we can note its all-inclusive nature, where there were no restrictions on the entry of actors (the most striking example is the dualism of the China-USA pair), which at the time of the promotion of the initiative, which of course was perceived by most countries as anti-Chinese, the idea of forming a future concept fell somewhat out of the general trend of the movement of thought. Considering that in the years following the presentation of the concept by Indonesia, the confrontation between the USA and China only increased, it is not surprising that the «aseanocentric» version of Indo-Pacific seemed inappropriate to potential participants in the future concept. At the same time, the lack of economic opportunities for ASEAN countries to advance the initiative was superimposed on this.
Difficulties in embedding discourse
It is obvious that after the rejection of the “aseanocentric” initiative, the ASEAN countries found themselves in a dependent position on the will of other participants in the dialogue on the formation of a future concept. The absence of the agenda of the Southeast Asian countries in the formation of the future Indo-Pacific concept on the following provisions, which will negatively affect the position of ASEAN countries in the creation of Indo-Pacific.
As early as 2017, ASEAN countries were turned off from a direct discussion of the concept of “Indo-Pacific.” So during the four-way dialogue on the security of the region, among whose participants were the USA, Japan, Australia, India, not a single Southeast Asian country was invited. The lines on the application of the principle of “ASEAN centrality” in shaping the future concept in the final communiqué following the discussion looked all the more ironic . The very format of the meeting, where in the presence of a significant number of regional, time-tested institutions, including ASEAN, this institution was chosen as the venue for the meeting (the four-way dialogue on security cannot be considered one of the main regional venues in the region), which did not include Southeast Asian countries, ASEAN’s potential reduced role in Indo-Pacific.
However, when discussing the non-inclusion of ASEAN countries in the process of adopting the concept of future Indo-Pacific, it is worthwhile to dwell in detail on the chronic internal problems of the organization, especially with regard to the process of developing a unified, consolidated position on any issue. The decision-making problem has already led to the “informality” being proclaimed as the main principle of ASEAN organization, since there are few official situations where the parties could agree on problematic issues (from unsuccessful examples: ASEAN position on SCS, standardization of tariff restrictions) . As part of the ASEAN internal affairs, this lack of maturity is explained not only by the system of consensus decision-making established in the organization (when one abstaining is enough for the decision not to be made), but also by the constant desire for political diversification of previous agreements (example: despite the fact that ASEAN has been a long time trying to build a common market, most of the organization’s states are openly oriented to third markets, which diverges from official political statements and blocks promotion proposed “aseanocentric” initiatives) .
A very sensitive internal moment for the ASEAN countries in building the concept of Indo-Pacific is the orientation of the initiating countries to the principles of “freedom” and “democracy” in internal political life, which share the concept of countries. This is a very well-founded fear, since most of the ASEAN countries can be classified as hybrid regimes that combine the practice of democracy and authoritarianism. ASEAN countries that are historically sensitive (“postcolonial syndrome”) to any attempt to influence sovereignty (which at one time even made them completely abandon the idea of creating supranational political institutions) are absolutely reasonably alarmed by the potential changes in the internal political structure that the design of the Indo-Pacific concept can bring.
The main foreign policy concern of the ASEAN countries, in connection with their participation in the development of the Indo-Pacific concept, is the potential possibility of losing China, which is the region’s main economic partner. In the presentation of the main initiators of the USA and Australia, carries a clear anti-Chinese message, which automatically puts all countries that have joined this interpretation of the concept into a situation of potential deterioration in relations with Beijing in the event of a diplomatic dialogue-explanation.
Second ASEAN Vision of Indo-Pacific
Obviously, realizing the danger of developing the final concept of Indo-Pacific without them, ASEAN in 2018-2019 stepped up in terms of developing a unified position of the organization on this issue.
The first attempt to present the “aseanocentric” vision of Indo-Pacific took place at the 13th EAC Summit in Singapore in November 2018. Recognizing the vacuum created by ASEAN’s almost 5-year-old lack of work on the Indo-Pacific concept, the proposal put forward was the most general and included some points that the concept initiators had already tuned for in 2017, namely: “mutual trust and respect”, “centrality ASEAN”,“inclusiveness”,“transparency” . Thus, ASEAN tried to competently enter into the discourse of the formation of the concept by stating some statements that would not cause disagreement between the initiators of the concept. However, in making such a vague proposal, the ASEAN countries once again demonstrated their inability to declare their own position and draw up the boundaries of problematic issues. In the academic community, such an ASEAN speech raised many questions and led to the formation of a public conviction about the transformation of the Southeast Asian region into an arena of rivalry between the great powers .
Understanding that specifics cannot be avoided, ASEAN countries at a meeting of senior officials in Thailand in March 2019 announced the creation of a preliminary document of the ASEAN common position regarding the concept of Indo-Pacific. On June 23, 2019, this vision was published.
In its understanding of a future initiative, ASEAN builds on the geographical side of the issue. According to this approach, the region of Southeast Asia is the central place in concept, therefore it is he who should play a key place in the economic and political processes of the future concept. The attempt to declare precisely the message of the “centrality of the region” is expressed by unfounded fears of the potential fragmentation of the region on the issue of Indo-Pacific (which the USA has been actively claiming with the intensification of relations with Vietnam since 2010). It is worthwhile to understand that if ASEAN is fragmented for many years, it will lose political sovereignty as an organization, and for many years it will be in a political crisis. Therefore, the question of finding a common foundation for the Southeast Asian countries is one of the key issues in presenting their vision of the Indo-Pacific initiative.
Another distinguishing feature of ASEAN, which can be seen in the presentation of the initiative, is the absence of a statement on the creation of new institutions. According to the organization, the existing institutions of the region can cope with this: the East Asian Summit (EAC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN +8 Ministerial Conference of Defense (ASEAN CMO + 8). Reliance on the EAC Institute can be explained from the standpoint of ASEAN’s reluctance to oppose China and Russia (to a lesser extent) to the organization’s desire to take part in the Indo-Pacific concept. Given ASEAN’s position on the “inclusive nature” of their vision, the inclusion of this countries in the list of potential foundations of the future concept does not look directly hostile to the countries initiating the anti-Chinese concept format (USA, Australia).
The main benefits for ASEAN, according to their presentation, are the region’s entry into a more intensive economic flow by participating in programs to attract foreign investment, intensifying existing projects and increasing the level of integration with world economic organizations  (which sometimes bypass Southeast Asia due to the region’s poor reputation in banking and opaque cash flow).
It is logical that the document does not actually contain any political statements about the future ending, including comparisons with the concept of APR, a vision of political interaction in the future of Indo-Pacific (ASEAN has historically very carefully expressed its political preferences).
After ASEAN’s attempts to intensify the advancement of its vision of the Indo-Pacific initiative, there was a situation where the positions of all actors with a potential concept were announced. It is obvious that the position of ASEAN, due to 5 years of silence and internal difficulties in the framework of decision-making in the organization, looks the most vulnerable. At the moment, ASEAN faces 2 conceptually important tasks:
- To convince the main actors of the future concept of Indo-Pacific (USA, Australia, Japan, India) that the «aseanocentric» vision is most appropriate to the current regional situation.
- Consolidate the organizations position on the issue of attracting (the principle of «inclusiveness» promoted since 2013) «controversial» players: China and Russia.
It is worth noting that the decision-making center for the prototype of the future Indo-Pacific concept and its potential similarity with the ideas proposed by ASEAN are now completely outside the control of ASEAN. The countries of Southeast Asia by incorrect decisions of previous years brought the region into a state of uncertainty and absolute lack of independence in building a future image of the region. This future is completely dependent on the desires of the countries initiating the concept of Indo-Pacific in 2017, primarily the United States.
The greatest that ASEAN can do now, as a single organization, is through diplomatic negotiations to achieve the greatest possible inclusion of the proposals put forward by them for the future region in the final version of the concept. It is excluded that the ASEAN option will be adopted as the basic prototype of the Indo-Pacific.
Understanding that to accomplish task No. 1, ASEAN will need some negotiation flexibility. It is expected that the organization will not raise uncomfortable issues, in the form of involving China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific.
Thus, it is worth noting that the question of ASEAN in Indo-Pacific initially looked like some kind of test for the political suitability of an organization that it did not pass successfully. The organization’s position was twice late on the impulses of the discussion: first in 2007, then in 2017. The situation with the future of ASEAN in Indo-Pacific was significantly complicated by chronic internal problems in the organization, which ultimately led to the loss of the ability to influence the potential decision on the concept in 2019. The future of the concept of the Indo-Pacific almost entirely depends on the will of more successful countries to push forward.
1. Колдунова Е. (2019) Юго-Восточная Азия перед вызовами Индо-Тихоокеанских концепций. Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития. Том 1, №2 (43), Стр.42
3. Acharya A. (2017) The Myth of ASEAN Centrality?. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Studies. Vol 39, N.2.
4. Костюнина Г.М. (2017). Интеграционная модель асеан+1: основные положения соглашений и влияние на внешнеэкономические связи. Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Международные отношения, 17 (3), 441-457.
5. Дёмина В. (2018). Экономическая интеграция стран Восточной Азии. Вестник Института экономики РАН, (6), 181-194. URL: 10.24411/2073-6487-2018-00082 (Date of the application 08.05.2020)
6. Колдунова Е. (2019) Юго-Восточная Азия перед вызовами Индо-Тихоокеанских концепций. Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития. Том 1, №2 (43), Стр.42
7. The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report. (2019) Singapore: ISEAS, 2019. P.12, 25.
From our partner RIAC
What does the West need Pacific’s youth for?
The rapid increase in the proportion of young people in Pacific Island countries is forcing researchers to assess the risks that could bring about demographic shifts in the composition of the Pacific population.
This brings to mind the 1988-1998 civil war on Bougainville Island, or the 1998-2003 conflict on the Solomon Islands that socially destitute local youth actively participated in. During the years leading up to the war, 70 percent of Bougainville’s population was under the age of 26, and 80 percent between the ages of 12 and 25 had only primary education. Experts confirm that one reason why the conflict on the Solomon Islands has been flaring for so long is the high proportion of unemployed young people there.
This potential for conflict is still there, since seven out of ten inhabitants of the Solomon Islands are under 30 with basically the same social status. On the Fiji Islands, although the Youth Parliament was established there in 2018 to give young people better representation in political institutions, it has still been unable to shake up the traditional political system, where older people still call the shots in managing state affairs, just as they do in Papua New Guinea (PNG). This is fraught with a destabilization of the socio-economic situation in these countries, which, in turn, will inevitably take on a political dimension.
With all that being said, Fiji and PNG are still recognized by the human rights organization Freedom House as the only democratically non-free island states in the Pacific Ocean. They also account for a hefty 90 percent of the population of all 22 island states and territories. According to demographers’ forecasts, by 2035 the Solomon Islands will overtake Fiji in terms of the size of its population, and will become one of the region’s three demographic leaders.
This population “bulge” is coupled with its high density and the small size of the island states. In terms of territory PNG, the Solomon Islands and Fiji are the largest of them all, and in terms of population density, they are in the same league with Nauru, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands. The region’s total population is projected to escalate from the current 11.9 million to 19.7 million by 2050, which will further overstrain the countries’ social infrastructure. (1) The current median age is 22 across the region, and half the population is aged under 23. (2) In 2019, PNG Prime Minister James Marape admitted that the country’s GDP growth was not keeping pace with the rising birth rate. The situation in most other Pacific island states is much the same.
The island states of the Pacific are now in the focus of attention of such regional “heavyweights” as the United States, Australia and New Zealand on the one hand, and China on the other. Taiwan is also weighing in with big investments in a bid to win diplomatic recognition for itself from the Pacific states (Nauru, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands).
The amount of financial assistance that the Pacific states need depends on the effectiveness of their social institutions. This, in turn, will determine who exactly will be the investor and will manage to convert financial influence into a political one. Fearing that China may become exactly such an investor, Beijing’s geopolitical rivals are already looking ahead for ways to deal with this prospect.
Australia is currently the Pacific states’ main sponsor, with the amount of its assistance in 2019-2020 expected at $1.4 billion. (3) Canberra has awarded 312 scholarships for high school graduates from the Pacific island states and 440 such grants directly to PNG alumni for higher education. It has also launched the Pacific Labor Scheme, which enables citizens of ten island nations, aged between 21 and 45 to take up low and semi-skilled work opportunities in rural and regional Australia for up to three years. Australia is thus trying to ease social pressure on the governments of these states in an effort to prevent the emergence of an undesirable sponsor and investor in this region.
The way that the “collective West” is trying to tackle the socio-economic problems of the Pacific island states is not entirely conflict-free though.
First, experts say that this is setting the stage for increased alienation between different generations of islanders.
Secondly, the local culture with its inherent system of socio-political hierarchy will find itself the first victim of this approach, which would inevitably lead to the erosion of traditional cultural values as a whole.
Third, there is no reason to believe that bringing young and inexperienced people into politics will necessarily make it healthier and “cleanse” them from all their inherent local vices. Even less so if Western structures wade in with their all-too-well-known ideology. Their active work with young people is actually widening social rifts in the countries of the region which, according to local politicians, may lead to attempts to seize power by force.
This is exactly what happened during the “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine.
Youth activism is used by the West as a means of creating opposition-minded social segments in other countries, cement the gap in the ideological continuity of generations and use alleged human rights violations as a reason for meddling in the countries’ domestic affairs. One indirect proof of this is the Western analysts’ increased interest in the situation with young people mainly in strategically important regions of which the Pacific Ocean is one.
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