Connect with us

Defense

The Russian missile and nuclear system

Giancarlo Elia Valori

Published

on

 The new Russian nuclear threat/deterrence policy is defined in the Executive Order No. 355, called “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”, which came into effect on June 2, 2020.

Firstly, Russian nuclear weapons are defined “only as means of deterrence”, while their use is always and anyway an “extreme and compulsory” measure.

 Moreover, retaliation is “inevitable” especially in the case there is a direct nuclear attack against the Russian Federation, while Russia also wants to keep for itself the possibility of inflicting “a guaranteed and unacceptable damage” on any kind of opponent, i.e. its quasi-destruction as a society and as a productive system.

The military dangers that the Russian Federation could incur in the future could be the creation of a wide conventional force by a Russian opponent- which, however, also has a nuclear arsenal, especially on the borders of the Russian Federation – or the deployment of missile defence systems, but also of non-nuclear, hypersonic, UAV and direct energy weapons, by States that consider Russia a potential enemy.

 Or also the development of a missile defence and attack system – even a non-nuclear one – in the space by a potential opponent.

 There is also the mere possession – by other States, seen as “opponents” or as parts of enemy alliances – of nuclear weapon systems and/or other types of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) which can, however, alsohypothetically be used against the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, in the mind of the Russian decision-makers, there is also the opponents’ uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, of their launch or use instruments, as well as the evolution of their technology.

Finally, Russia’s military system carefully monitorsthe development of nuclear weapons and their presence in countries that have never previously had nuclear weapons on their territory. It deems it a severe threat.

 How is the Russian nuclear or conventional military reaction to an adverse use of nuclear weapons against its own territory and resources triggered, according to the official mechanisms foreseen?

Firstly, with the initial collection of reliable data on a ballistic missile launch targeted against the territory and resources of the Russian Federation.

Secondly, with the obvious use of WMD or other advanced weapons against Russia and its allies. In this strategic calculation, the allies do not include China, but only Belarus and, probably, Kazakhstan to the South.

 The triggering of a Russian nuclear reaction can also be caused by an attack launched by an opponent or an enemy alliance on the critical points of the Russian governmental, military, economic and, in this case, oil and gas organization.

In this case, if the Russian leadership or its primary economic resources were the target of a nuclear attack, the response would be a counter-attack by the Russian Federation against the opponent’s decision-making centres.

 Moreover, a possible nuclear response from Russia should be calculated if the opponents launched a conventional attack capable of endangering the size, strength and control networks of the Russian Federation.

 The supreme decision for the use of the nuclear weapon is in the hands of the Russian Federation’s President alone, who can inform the other States’ decision-makers or the international organisations – if he sees the need to do so – of the Russian willingness to launch a nuclear attack against an invader or attacker, at that moment and in that place.

Furthermore, also in this latest document, Russia sets the line of the “launch of the nuclear weapon together with the strategic warning”.

This makes also the threat selection difficult, considering the reduced time to assess it. Just think here of the hypersonic weapons, which have infinitesimal warning times, or of the U.S. networks which are currently equipped with ballistic missiles with conventional warheads for immediate attack, which makes it increasingly difficult to immediately differentiate between a nuclear and a conventional attack.

 This is where the old, Soviet-era, Russian theory of the nuclear threat also applies to a conventional NATO force having, however, size and weapons capable of “endangering” the very nature and stability of the Russian State.

If Vladimir Putin were to consider also the NATO threat to the strong Russian minorities in the Baltic, in Eastern Europe and in South-Eastern Europe, the strategic calculation would be extremely difficult.

 For the Russian Federation – as was the case for Tsar Peter I – a base in the Mediterranean is also of fundamental importance.

 To this end, the war in Syria has materialized, the last phase of a chain of “coloured wars” or “Arab Spring” which, in the case of Syria, were certainly not successful for the West.

Meanwhile, as has already happened in the Maghreb region, in Latin America and in other regions of the world, Russia wants to maintain some essential strategic assets: its grip on the old “pro-Soviet” areas, from the Middle East to Venezuela and Cuba; the clear reaffirmation of its own role as a great power, and finally Russia’s creation of its own role as a reliable mediator and broker, a stable and credible State, as well as an influential power.

 Moreover, all this happens in a phase in which the modernization of Russian weapons and doctrines of the nuclear war and of what we could call post-conventional warfare (hypersonic, high-energy weapons, etc.) is not yet over.

In 2019, Vladimir Putin said that the updated and modern toolswere over 82% of the Nuclear Triad of the Russian Federation (earth, sea and sky). He also said: “our armament must be the best of the best so as to be able to win in such a clash”.

Apart from the acceptance of new and possible agreements for reducing strategic weapons, Putin also said: “We are building promising new missile and nuclear weapons systems” for deterrence.

 Today, in mid-2020, the Russian Federation is supposed to have 4,310 nuclear warheads of various nature and size, which can be used by both long-range and short-range launchers, only by Strategic Missile Forces.

1,570 of these 4,310 warheads are already positioned: 810 are placed on ground-based strategic missiles; 560 are part of the submarine armament and 200 are placed on aircrafts and in their bases.

870 nuclear warheads are finally stored in a “warehouse”, together with 1,870 non-nuclear warheads.

 In addition to this data, it can be said that at least 2,060 warheads, now being dismantled, are just waiting to be “scrapped”.

Hence the actual total number amounts to 6,370 warheads, considering missile, conventional and nuclear warheads.

 On the date of February 5, 2019 -set by the START Treaty – the Russian Federation reduced the number of strategic warheads in action to 1,444 pursuant to the Treaty provisions.

Later Russia declared additional 1,420 warheads on 517 launchers and, in March 2019, it declared the existence of 524 launchers for 1,461 warheads, but today the data varies very quickly.

In October 2018 Vladimir Putin had stated: “Our strategic doctrine of nuclear weapons does not allow a preventive attack, but a mutual counter-attack”, i.e. “we are able to react quickly to a nuclear or anyway existential attack, only when we know with certainty that a potential aggressor is attacking Russia”.

 The policy line is that of the doctrine of December 2014, which stated: “Russia will reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use that will be made – against Russia or its allies – of nuclear weapons or anyway of mass destruction, or even in the case of the use – against Russia – of conventional weapons if the very existence of the State is in danger”.

 Moreover, some Russian decision-makers have stated that Russian nuclear weapons can be used if there are credible threats against Russian ballistic missile sites, but also in regional scenarios that do not imply an existential threat to the Russian State or anyway do not use WMD.

There is also here the problem of weapons defined as “anomalous”, such as the Poseidon -Kanyon, according to the U.S.jargon orStatus-6(NATO codename) – which is a nuclear torpedo capable of creating a vast area of marine contamination capable of blocking any military or economic operation for a long time.

The Russian Federation is supposed to currently have 302 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in place and operational, with a possible cargo of 1,136 nuclear or non-nuclear warheads.

 Russia, however, stated at various stages of the START negotiations that it had almost 400 ICBMs on the “line of fire” or that the ICBMs were already as many as 513 at the end of September 2019.

The Russian ICBMs are organized in the Strategic Missile Force, for three different sectors, with a total of 11 divisions each consisting of about 39 missile regiments.

However, the 40th Regiment of the 12th Division, stationed in Yurya, has no nuclear weapons.

 Today, however, Russia still has SS-18, SS-19 and SS-25missiles among its ICBMs.

 The SS-18 (RS-20V, or R36M2 Voivoda) is a missile placed in silos, but it can carry a maximum of 10 warheads. There are still 46 SS-18 missiles with 460 warheads, kept as quasi-operational, in the 13th Missile Division stationed in Dombarovsky and in the 62nd Missile Division in Uzhur.

 The SS-18 missiles should be withdrawn at the end of 2020, replaced by Sarmat, the RS-28.

The SS-19 (RS-18, or UR100NUTTH) will soon be replaced by the SS-27, another silo missile, but even today two regiments of the Strategic Missile Force are still very operational with the SS-19 missiles.

 Russia continues to withdraw its SS-25, the Topolself-propelled missiles,at a rate of one-two regiments per year, which will be replaced by the SS-27 Mod. 2.

 The missile that is at the core of the Russian modification of theatre weapons, the aforementioned SS-27, is a missile called in Russia RS-24, or Yars, which can accommodate as many as four Multi Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs). It is assumed, however, that currently Russia already has 140 Yars operational, mobile or in silos, with distribution of these new missiles to the Missile Guards Division in Teykovo, but also to the 39th Missile Guard in Novosibirsk, to the 42ndone in Niznhny Tagil, to the 29thone in Irkutsk, and finally to the 14th Missile Division in Yoshkar-Ola.

Russia is also developing a new version of the SS-29 missile, the Sarmat RS-28 which, as already noted,is supposed to have already largely replaced the SS-18.

With specific reference to the missiles launched by submarines, Russia currently has 10 nuclear submarines of three classes: six Delta IV, one Delta I, and three Borei.

 Each submarine can carry 16 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and each SLBM can carry several MIRVs, for a total of over 720 warheads.

Until 2020, the axis of submarine and missile warfare will be the Delta IV, each equipped with 16 SLBMs.

 All the Delta IV submarines are part of the Northern Fleet, based in Gazhyevo on the Kola Peninsula.

 The Delta missiles will be entirely replaced by the Borei, each carrying 16 SS-N-32 missiles with six warheads each.

With specific reference to air nuclear warheads, Russia uses two types of bombers: the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-95 M5 Bear.

The total number of these aircrafts is 70 and both of them can carry the A-15 Kent and the AS-23B missiles.

 Each TU-160 can carry 40,000 kilos of weaponry, including the 12 AS-15B missiles, with a total of 700 nuclear bombs transported that can be dropped from the aircraft.

Hence Russia foresees – and Russian decision-makers always attach great importance also to non-nuclear weapons -a nuclear force which can quickly transfer as much damage as possible to any attacker, with a combination of Land, Sea and Sky forces capable of inflicting “unbearable damage” even to the current superpowers.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

Continue Reading
Comments

Defense

Japan’s Security Environment in Asia Pacific: A Tragic or Misery

Published

on

Authors: Mehtab Ali Bhatti and Kainat Akram*

The security threats can be to a great extent partitioned into two groups; traditional and non-traditional security threats. One’s focus would mainly be on the traditional security challenges of Japan. Tokyo deliberately perplexed the world. It emerged as non-western power but no one could expect about its dexterity, and it was serious trouble to Western and Asian powers because they were dependent on its impressive economy. Tokyo’s trade surpluses were, $44 billion in 1984, $56 billion in 1985 and $93 billion in 1986, which shows Japanese rulers’ strategies, growing technology, education system, and people’s countless struggle towards their homeland.[1]But during WWII, they lost their formidable economy as well as some of their major cities like Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Aftermath, Japan experienced a tremendous financial crisis like debt. Ironically, Japan is one of the biggest debtor countries with the highest debt to GDP ratio of 222.2% in the world[2], which is a major threat for Japanese people.

Currently, Japan’s security environment is getting significantly severer with the sensational move in the global force balance, the development of new threats, for example, psychological oppression and cyberattacks, and the serious security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. Such threats effectively cross-national borders. In the Asia Pacific region, regardless of the centralization of countries that have enormous scope military ability including atomic weapons states, regional collaboration structures on security are not adequately regulated. North Korea’s proceeded with the advancement of atomic weapons and ballistic rocket programs just as its provocative conduct is compromising for Tokyo. China’s headway of its military capacity without straightforwardness and its further exercises in the ocean and air space are a danger for Tokyo. In addition, move in the global force parity and fast advancement of mechanical development, multiplication of weapons of mass annihilation, and the rise of threats that cross national borders, remembering international psychological oppression and dangers for the ocean, space, and cyberspace are additionally unavoidable threats to Japan’s security. In addition, issues identified with “human security,”[3] including destitution and advancement difficulties, and developing dangers to the global economy.

In this fast-moving world and cut-throat political competition era, the political dynamics of Asia Pacific region is changing with changing strategic environment, due to the geo-strategic consolidation among different countries, the focus of the entire world is tilted towards China’s owing to rapid development in terms of economic, political and military means. The ongoing protracted South-China Sea conflict of China with many ASEAN countries who are claimant of the cited territory and aggressive posture of nuclear power North Korea has made the region more prone to conflicts as well as an arms race in the region has frayed nerves, further, escalated the tensions. In this tense environment, Japan has been facing a potential threat from the opposite bloc to its very sovereignty and territorial integrity.

According to Tokyo, following countries have posed an aggressive posture in the Asia-pacific, which is worrisome for Japan:

China

China-Japan Relations

In the Asia-Pacific region tensions are being seen worrisome as China is becoming more energetic about its claims over the South China Sea, its tactical and evident actions have spotted other surrounding countries and external interested countries like the United States. China and Japan both have flourished and innate abhorrence since 19th century and America is owing more hatred and tensions in the Asia-Pacific region.[4]It might be called upon that there is nothing invaluable in the East Asia-Pacific but historically it is all about pride and honor, and serious issue of Senkaku Island for Japan. And their tensions ousted from the first Sino Japanese war, then islands were given to Taiwan, and due to victory in WWII, these islands were recovered by China after surrendering of Japan. The aftermath of a new threat established from communist country China; US and Japan signed an agreement of San Francisco Peace Conference by allowing Japan to patrol in the island regions, and America provided types of equipment and economically supported Japan to counter rising power China in the Asia Pacific region and tensions rampantly encouraging until today.

In the 21st century, the ascent of Asia has drawn the consideration of the United States to concentrate particularly on the Asia-Pacific region. Because of its geostrategic significance and going to be an economic hub of the world, the development of Asia can be identified with the expanding economic exercises in which rising forces China, India, and Indonesia are assuming their crucial role. The major economic activities happen in the Asia Pacific, for instance, the main trade routes pass through the Asia Pacific, and the Indian Ocean where strait of malacca is a gateway to major economies like China, Japan, and South Korea. Particularly, in the Asia Pacific region, the US has its economic, strategic, and security interests. It includes the economic network all through the region, support of peace and soundness, and making sure about its allies particularly Japan and South Korea, and ensuring the claimants of the South China Sea to resolve their issues peacefully.

China’s Response towards American Pivot and Indo-Pacific Strategy

China’s rise as a great power in this changing dynamics of world politics does not lag behind and it is important to understand Sino-US relations in the purview of America’s past Asia Pivot strategy[5] and Trump’s Indo-pacific strategy.[6]There are multiple significant events by which it can be speculated that People’s Republic of China (PRC) is emerging as a great player, for instance, it has resisted western intervention three times in collaboration with Russia over the Syrian civil war in the Middle East; it also bring-up with the idea of making BRICS and establishing AIIB which is considered as the counterweight to America’s World Bank; through SCO, China has also influenced her role in the international politics; most significantly, it has come up with a ‘Belt and Road initiative’’ with CPEC which shows China’s soft power in the world. However, with this dynamic strategic architecture in the Asia Pacific, two contours are important – what made the US come up with a rebalancing strategy and how China responds to it.

According to official reports, China has responded to the Indo-Pacific policy of America in two levels. Firstly, Chinese authorities have firmly denounced this US expressed policy and that they are mindful that US diplomatic moves would bolster its allies regarding the sea and territorial debates with China. Secondly, Chinese non-official media has harshly castigated US rebalancing strategy towards Asia. Some view this strategy as Cold-war like containment of China which was based solely against China because China’s ascent is representing a possible danger to America’s authority and its allies. “China in countering Pivot’s response has come up with ‘Marching West’ strategy, which aims at focusing China’s diplomatic and economic relations with the Eurasian countries,” according to Aaron Jed Rabena.[7] She is also of the view that China’s ascent is representing a likely threat to America’s hegemony.

Moreover, China’s reaction to the Asia-Pivot policy in past and current procedure of Trump can be shown by means of diplomatic and economic activities, for example, Belt and Road activity, Asian framework venture bank and reinforcing respective relations. The OBOR activity of China will fill two needs. Right off the bat, it will merge China’s delicate power, and besides, enhance economic collaboration with in excess of 60 nations. The Chinese reaction and its military modernization have made a serious mix and unsafe circumstance to the US Indo-Pacific technique with pervasive interests in the Asia-Pacific region. In this universe of complex association, war is certifiably not an attainable choice. America will never do battle with China since China is the second the biggest exchanging accomplice of America. Additionally, the Chinese reaction to this US procedure has been delicate as is obvious from March West methodology, OBOR, and AIIB activities. These steps are the projection of Chinese Soft power response to Obama’s rebalancing and Trump’s Indo-pacific strategy towards Asia.

North Korea

Rivalry is not Old-fashioned

Korean Peninsula has been remained a play chess match for foreign powers like Japan, the US, Soviet Union, and China—in 1910 Korean Peninsula was occupied by the Japanese empire but after the demise of Japan in 1945 and WWII, Korean Peninsula was partitioned into two South and North. Whereas, the North was occupied by the Soviet Union and the South was occupied by the United States. In 1948, re-unification negotiations were failed and two governments were stimulated; the Socialist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North and the Capitalist Republic of Korea (RK) in the South. In addition, the Korean War occurred in 1950’s, initiated by North Korea for invasion and the ceasefire occurred but peace treaty was not endorsed.[8]

In the contemporary era, the security environment of North Korea is very complex and instrumental. North Korea has one of the world’s biggest regular military powers, which, joined with its rocket and atomic tests. North Korea spends almost a fourth of its total national output (GDP) on its military, as indicated by U.S. State Department gauges.[9] Its brinkmanship will keep on testing regional and international associations planned for protecting stability and security.

However, North Korea has remained a part of Communist bloc, where Russia and China have been the back supporters. In the realist paradigm, ‘enemy of an enemy is friend,’ likely in this case, Russia supports North Korea and the US supports South Korea economically, politically, and militarily. Therefore, in the North Korean nuclearization, the role of China and Russia is very evident. On the other hand, in the economic advancement of South Korea, the American role is not far-seeing as evident.

North Korean Nuclearization a Dwelling Threat for Japan

North Korea’s quest for atomic weapons is a sensible procedure given that the system’s greatest security probability from international intercession. Additionally, for the North Korean system, atomic weapons have three strategic capacities, and with everyone, the US is directly in the middle. After that, they fill in as impediments; also, an instrument of international strategy; and thirdly, they are an instrument of residential legislative issues. The atomic weapons have given influence and a negotiating concession diplomatically associating with all the more impressive and increasingly effective on-screen characters, similar to the US and its partner South Korea and Japan.

North Korea’s nuclear missile testing has raised tensions in the Asia-Pacific region and created a global threat. It is an imminent threat to Japan as an ally of the US. Since 2006 North Korea has conducted 6 nuclear ballistic missile tests and one of them flew over Japan in 2017.[10]Due to nuclear tests, 15 members have voted against North Korea to the Security Council with US-drafted resolution, and new sanctions of North Korea’s textile exports have been alleged. In the reaction, North Korea had shown the backing of veto powers like China and Russia and aggressively indicated to devastate the US, Japan, and South Korea.

According to South Korean President Moon, they were against nuclear weapons in their state and they had withdrawn their nuclear weapons in the 1990s, “Nuclear weapons could not prolong the peace in the region,” said Moon, “They have provided $8 million through the United Nations to North Korean citizens for women pregnancy and to aid the poor and infants.[11]In the words of war, North Korea called South Korea as “traitors and dogs” of America and “dancing tune” to Japan and alleged that the US has troops in South Korea to destroy the North and its Asia- Pacific allies. Because of nuclear capability and conflict of the 1950s, in which America and South Korea were allied and had an aim to force North Korea for peace treaty but it rejected. North Korea continued to develop a ballistic missile program (Hwasong-14 with the range of 10,000 and Hwasong-15 with the range of 13,000 KM) which has been an impendent threat to Japan, South Korea as well as America. By measuring, America has put North Korea at the top list of terrorism promoter and designed unravished sanctions on North Korea.

De-nuclearization Fiasco

Tokyo is currently carefully watching the process of dialogue moving toward a U.S.- North Korea exchange and is worried that dealings on denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula may reject Japan’s unsafe perspectives. A senior authority of the Japan Ministry of Defence concerning the highest point among Trump and Kim Jong-un of 2018 stated, “We ought not to have an idealistic view that North Korea will relinquish the atomic weapons which it has at long last obtained.”[12] Therefore, to adapt to the North Korea emergency, Abe regularly underscores the significance of the U.S.- Japan partnership. There is no uncertainty that security ties among Japan and the U.S. have fortified further under the Abe administration.

Other Global Threats to Japan

According to the realist school of thought in international relations, global world order is anarchic, and power centric; its effects are, no trust in Anarchy, constant competition for power, zero-sum game, and relative gains. Further two types, 1. Defensive realism (states are security maximizers and seek survival, status quo, and states are not inherently aggressive) and 2. Offensive realism (States are power maximizers, in the absence of complete hegemony states act offensively and use its power as any can i.e. the US invasion of Iraq 2003).

The rapid progress of technology and shift in the global power is a major threat for all states but Japan has regular emerging threats like in the Asia-Pacific region. The proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons is increasing which indicates threats at large, besides this, global terrorism, maritime risks, and cyberspace are disparate challenges to Japan. Japan is actively seeking an active role of self-defence and peacekeeping and increasing its technology to combat in the Korean Peninsula and to counter China’s growing power in the Asia-Pacific as well as in the World. State sovereignty is absolute, particularly which showed Japan through its heavy Defence budget and its measures taken in the Senkaku island, recently fiscal defence budget in 2016-17 was nearly $42 billion.[13]It was a non-western state which defeated Russia and attacked the US and its economy was second largest in the world. No doubt, Japan is the most industrialized and thick technological country that emerged again after World War II.  

Concluding Remarks

The dynamics of the international geostrategic environment in which the world politics is transforming from unipolarity to multipolarity with China emerging as a great power due to its military modernization, advanced technology, and growing economy and commercial connectivity in the entire Asia, which is alarming for the US but regionally it is an irked threat for American allies particularly Japan and South Korea.

By witnessing China as emerging power, American Asia pivot/rebalancing strategy and Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy towards Asia in order to counter the growing influence of China. America and its allies should not perceive Chinese rise in terms of military and economy as a threat to world peace and aggressor because PRC has always been peaceful in dealing the problems of the world and the norms of non-interference are prevailing but no compromise on territorial claims—have been immersed in the Chinese foreign policy.

The United States’ concern over denuclearization of North Korean nuclear assets is not acceptable to Kim’s regime due to the prestige and status quo of the state but has vague threats from the US forces in South Korea. Even after the President Trump’s summit with Kim Jong Un in 2018, the US ally Japan is claiming that North Korean regime poses a genuine and inescapable danger to their security regardless of bringing down of regional pressures following the summit.

China has reacted to America through the procedure of ‘Looking West and Marching West’. A few researchers are of the view that the opposition between two significant forces depicts another virus war, however, I differ that since China won’t utilize its military alternative, China wants to grow economically and it wants to have an influence on the world through soft power. In a nutshell, I would say that the US must integrate with China rather than to contain it and appreciate its emergence as a responsible stakeholder.

Nonetheless, Japan’s reaction should comprise of two distinct methodologies: the anticipation of decay and the improvement of its security environment the essential reaction will be the discouragement of heightening through the improvement of Japan’s safeguard capacity and the upgrade of the Japan-US collusion. It is additionally significant for Japan to acquire and fortify international comprehension and backing for its position through protection discretion remembering that for multilateral exchanges. International help can upgrade Japan’s situation in managing the difficulties, and yet, the effect would stay roundabout. Japan can’t depend on unrealistic reasoning and ought to investigate other options too.

* Kainat Akram did Bachelor of Arts from Government College University Faisalabad. She also did Masters in Science (M.Sc) in Gender and Women Studies from Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad.


[1] Robert C. Christopher, “Don`t Blame The Japanese,” The New York Times Magazine, Oct. 19, 1986 (https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/19/magazine/don-t-blame-the-japanese.html), accessed on July 20, 2020.

[2]H. Plecher, “Japan: National debt from 2014 to 2024,” Statista, May 6, 2020 (https://www.statista.com/statistics/270121/national-debt-of-japan/), accessed on July 18, 2020.

[3] Catia Gregoratti, “Human Security,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, Dec. 14, 2018 (https://www.britannica.com/topic/human-security), accessed on July 20, 2020.

[4] Kerry Brown, “The Most Dangerous Problem in Asia: China-Japan Relations,” The Diplomat, Aug. 31, 2016 (https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/the-most-dangerous-problem-in-asia-china-japan-relations/), accessed on July 19, 2020.

[5] Matt Schiavenza, “What Exactly Does It Mean That the U.S. Is Pivoting to Asia?” The Atlantic, April 15, 2013 (https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/what-exactly-does-it-mean-that-the-us-is-pivoting-to-asia/274936/), accessed on July 18, 2020.

[6] Sun Chenghao, “What is the prospect of the U.S. Indo- Pacific strategy?” News CGTN, Nov. 07, 2019 (https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-11-07/What-is-the-prospect-of-the-U-S-Indo-Pacific-strategy–LqCA9M3YKA/index.html), accessed on July 18, 2020.

[7] Niklas Swanstrom and Par Nyren, “China’s March West: Pitfalls and Chalenges in Greater Central Asia,” Institute for Security & Development Policy, Jan. 10, 2017 (https://www.isdp.eu/publication/chinas-pitfalls-challenges-gca/), accessed on July 20, 2020.

[8] Liam Stack, “Korean War, a ‘Forgotten’ Conflict That Shaped the Modern World,” The New York Times, Jan. 02, 2018 (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/world/asia/korean-war-history.html), accessed on July 21, 2020.

[9] Eleanor Albert, “North Korea’s Military Capabilities,” Council on Foreign Relations, Dec. 20, 2019(https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-military-capabilities), accessed on July 17, 2020.

[10] David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-Han, “North Korean Nuclear Test Drawn U.S. Warning of ‘Massive Military Response,’ The New York Times, Sept. 02, 2017 (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/03/world/asia/north-korea-tremor-possible-6th-nuclear-test.html), accessed on July 19, 2020.

[11] Choe Sang-Hun, “Kims Says He’d End North Korea Nuclear Pursuit for U.S. Truce,” The New York Times, April 29, 2018 (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/29/world/asia/north-korea-trump-nuclear.html), accessed on July 20, 2020.

[12] Koji Sonoda, ”Japan’s Security Alliance Dilemma,” The Diplomat, March 24, 2018 (https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/japans-security-alliance-dilemma/), accessed on July 21, 2020.

[13] Japan-Defence Budget, Global Security.org, 2015 (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/budget.htm), accessed on July 21, 2020.

Continue Reading

Defense

The Credibility of Deterrence is Indispensable

Adeela Ahmed

Published

on

In India and Pakistan’s Strategic affairs, the key challenge to Deterrence Stability is India’s inexorable strategic aims. That negates the fragile stable situation and thus motivated Pakistan to modernize its Strategic Doctrine into the Full Spectrum Deterrence (Credible Minimum Deterrence) and successfully counter Indian threats from all the domains. India’s move from No-First Use to War-fighting strategy (Indian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine-2017 and Indian Land Warfare Doctrine-2018) is a signal to accomplish its strategic ambitions for regional domination that resultantly destabilizes the strategic environment of South Asia. So, there is a need to evaluate which are the key factors that are undermining the ‘Credibility of Deterrence’ and that can deter India from taking hostile action against Pakistan. 

The ‘Credibility of Deterrence’ is a noteworthy component as Thomas Schelling, a leading advocate of nuclear deterrence, maintains that the maneuvering of ‘Credibility’ can influence another state’s behaviour not to take any hostile political, and military action. David Robertson, in the Dictionary of Modern Defence and Strategy, described that “Deterrence works with the capability, credibility and will”. Thus the Credibility of Deterrence is the crux of deterrence stability that works effectively with the ‘Capability and ‘Political Will’. 

It is virtually observed in the recent Pulwama Crises (2019) when Pakistan’s decision-makers ‘Political Will’ along with Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) conventional capability enabled Pakistan to respond with a calculated approach against India military misadventure. Pakistan’s military and civil establishments have so far proved that India cannot influence Pakistan with its assertive and offensive policies; and that Pakistan has the will-power to deter Indian aggressive and its so-called surgical strikes. But the important point is that the threat of escalation remains eminent in Pulwama crises. 

The key reason behind such India military adventure is the ‘Political Will of India influenced by RSS philosophy that is contradictory with the obligation of deterrence stability. Therefore, a significant question arises that how the Credibility of deterrence can work in future affairs? It is hard to assess the Credibility of ‘political will’ rather than technical capability; the technical capability of a state can be analyzed however the political will can change with the leadership’s thought process. The political-will is reliant on the nature and a behavior of individuals and systems and in India’s case, Pakistan is dealing with the Ideology of Right-wing Extremism practiced by behind the Indian different political parties (BJP, Congress) India Foreign and Defence establishment. The fuel adds to fire when India gets discriminatory support of the US that gives them the political privilege to compel Pakistan. 

The statements of India high-officials expressed their ‘Will’ in 2019 Pulwama Crises. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi called Pakistan nuclear arsenal bluff and cleared that our weapons are not for Diwali and then talked about “Qatal Ki Rat”. He further stressed that “Pakistan used to threaten us; it used to say we have a nuclear bomb and we will press the button. I want to say we have double the nuclear capacity. I say (to Pakistan), do whatever you can.” Without realizing the consequences of nuclear war how can be a rational political leader can deliver such speeches. Hence, all these kinds of crude signals emanating from India are a threat to the Credibility of deterrence. Indian Home Minister in the Indian Parliament after the revocation of the Article 370 and 35A in Indian occupied Kashmir has said that the Pakistani part of Jammu and Kashmir is Indian Territory, and we will take it back even if we must sacrifice our lives. Such statements make political and diplomatic environment tensed under the nuclear umbrella and no room vacant for any crises prevention or management.

Along with that the Credibility of deterrence also depends on the fact of how much public opinion supports or opposes the use of nuclear weapons, how they respond in peace and wartime with regards to the employment of atomic weapons. It will influence the strategic thinking of the civil-military leadership. The more the public opinion not in favour of using nuclear weapons, the higher will be the Credibility of nuclear deterrence. But unfortunately, in India Pakistan crises, Indian public media messages, especially in the form of public statements, has remained very unpolished and immature. The trends on twitter and News Channels so-called “raged breaking news” issued without any understanding of the policy impact the stability of the entire region. Such patterns and trajectories on which Indian leadership is moving is a grave threat to regional security. 

Theoretically, the reason behind their irrationality can be i) – the lack of information on which they make irrational judgments, ii) – states fail to communicate threats effectively, iii) – any information gap which leads towards irrational behavior. Unfortunately, irrationality in India originates from their strategic culture. India is in the delusion that she is a regional power state and can influence their dominancy. The way Indian strategic thought is leading the region and altering the dynamics of the Credibility of deterrence is irreversible. The unstable strategic environment of South Asia under the enlightened leadership of India must sense the catastrophe of nuclear war beyond hegemonic ambitions. 

Continue Reading

Defense

China’s Effect: A Global NATO

Emil Avdaliani

Published

on

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg welcomes Zhang Ming, Ambassador of China to the European Union, 2019, photo via NATO Flickr CC

A shift is taking place in global military thinking. NATO, arguably the most successful military alliance in history, is slowly but steadily edging toward casting China as an outright military competitor. Previously, the collective West avoided involving NATO in the context of the rising China.

Much changed with the advent of Donald Trump. NATO has been undergoing a profound evolution in which it is recalibrating its priorities. We are gradually moving toward a more global NATO with interests that spread beyond its classical zone—Europe—and into the Indo-Pacific region.

Many would argue that the foundation for a global NATO was established long ago. Indeed, for more than a decade, the alliance has been operating in Afghanistan, where it led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). NATO naval forces were among the first to fight off pirates via the OCEAN SHIELD operation along the east African coast in 2008.

Military training missions have been a common element of NATO involvement in the Middle East. The alliance also responds to terrorism, cyber-threats, and disinformation. Moreover, it enjoys special partnerships (consultative in nature) with Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, and Mongolia.

However, China’s military and economic rise, ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and growing appetite in the Indian and Pacific Oceans in the last decade have brought it into sharp opposition with the US. The latter now sees NATO playing a bigger role in Eurasian affairs, which means taking a tougher stance toward Beijing through the development of a new vision for its outdated Euro-Atlantic-centric model.

This evolution in thinking is reflected in statements by NATO officials. Last December, at the NATO summit, China was declared a concern in a document that said: “[W]e [NATO] recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.”

The reasons for this shift are fundamental in nature. It has been argued that China’s official $260 billion defense budget could mask far greater purchasing power, potentially reaching up to 70% of the US defense budget. China’s military cooperation with Russia continues to grow and now covers Central Asia, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and even the Baltic Sea. Moreover, Beijing’s expanding supply of nuclear weapons can now reach Europe, which, in NATO’s thinking, requires a rethinking of its approach to the Asian giant.

More painful for the alliance is the realization that China has made significant inroads into the European defense market. Recently, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic announced his country’s purchase of six Chinese-built CH-92A combat drones (UCAVs). This will make the Serbian army the first European military to use Chinese combat drones. Economically, too, China’s rise in Europe is visible in its BRI-related cooperation with Italy, purchase of ports in Greece, extensive relations with Turkey, and establishment of the 17+1 mechanism, which involves Central and Eastern European states.

It can be argued that it is China that came to NATO and not the other way around. China could, indeed, serve as a driver for cohesion within the alliance, which over the past few years has seen internal strife among its member states. NATO was created to counter the Soviet Union on the European mainland, but it must now rise to the new “China reality.” It will have to change its geographical scope and methods of activities.

Though that shift in thinking is taking place within NATO, the alliance remains attached to its vision and wishes to avoid casting China as an outright military enemy. It leaves open the possibility for cooperation, as statements by NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg attest. In recent interviews, Stoltenberg said, “[NATO] does not see China as the new enemy,” “This is not about moving NATO into the South China Sea,” and “It’s about taking into account that China is coming closer to us—in the Arctic, in Africa, investing heavily in our infrastructure in Europe, in cyberspace.”

China does not pose a direct military threat right now, and that is unlikely to change any time soon. But there is an inescapable geopolitical dimension in which China becomes more active in the Arctic, the African continent, and the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, Beijing is negotiating a mammoth trade and economic cooperation treaty with Tehran that will give China the ability to position itself in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea—a major artery for its oil supplies. All of this will require greater coordination and cohesion within NATO.

Critical changes to elements of NATO’s vision could be forthcoming. As China’s power grows, there will be a greater need for the establishment of a NATO-China Council, similar to what the alliance has had with Russia since 1997.

Perhaps deeper engagement with its Pacific partners—Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Mongolia—will become a necessity. Even a permanent military presence could be negotiated.

Some elements of this future strategy are already here. Stoltenberg raised the need for the alliance to take on a greater political role in world affairs and even to help nations of the Indo-Pacific compete with China’s rise. “As we look to 2030, we need to work even more closely with like-minded countries like Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and [South] Korea to defend the global rules and institutions that have kept us safe for decades, to set norms and standards in space and cyberspace, on new technologies and global arms control,” Stoltenberg said.

We are witnessing a trend toward a more global NATO in which the alliance’s security agenda is no longer Europe- and North America-centric. This will take at least a decade. A shift in NATO’s vision will also mean that Moscow and its activities in Eurasia will be deemed to be at a lower level of threat.

NATO will have to move eastward. This does not necessarily mean stationing permanent military installations or personnel across Asia, but the alliance will have to pay more attention to Chinese activities. Doing so will draw it closer to Asia and the Indo-Pacific in particular.

Author’s note: first published at BESA Center

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Middle East29 mins ago

Whither the Arab and the Muslim world?

An agreement to establish diplomatic relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel and a Saudi-Pakistani spat over Kashmir coupled...

EU Politics2 hours ago

Coronavirus: Commission reaches first agreement on a potential vaccine

Today, the European Commission has reached a first agreement with the pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca to purchase a potential vaccine against...

Human Rights4 hours ago

Millions ‘on the edge’ in DR Congo, now in even greater danger of tipping over

Millions of lives could be lost to hunger in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), amid escalating conflict and...

Africa6 hours ago

Nile water is indivisible

On August 6, the international news agency Rossiya Segodnya held an online roundtable “Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan: how to share the...

Newsdesk9 hours ago

Coronavirus and schools: Access to handwashing facilities key for safe reopening

Nearly 820 million children worldwide do not have basic handwashing facilities at school, putting them at increased risk of COVID-19...

Reports10 hours ago

CEOs: Post-Covid changes are permanent and there are more to come

The need for business leaders and policy makers to fundamentally rethink the way they plan, invest and operate in the...

Reports12 hours ago

COVID-19 disrupts education of more than 70 per cent of youth

The COVID-19 crisis  is having a devastating effect on the education and training of young people. Since the outset of...

Trending