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A comparison of strategic doctrines

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In principle it is not political choices that generate strategic doctrines. The opposite is true, if anything.

 In the case of China, for example, it is very useful to study the evolution of recent strategic assumption and the most current military doctrines so as to later analyse political and even ideological changes.

Hence, which are China’s future and preferential battlefields? Which are the threats that the Chinese decision-makers regard as primary and what is their origin? What wars will China wage and fight? Indeed, inter alia, a strategic doctrine also answers these questions.

First and foremost, China’s military leadership has shifted the centre of gravity of its defence activities from the terrestrial centre of the country to the peripheries, hence mainly to the coasts and, ultimately, to China’s regional seas.

 During the Cold War, China had adopted a defensive “all-out war”.

Currently the Chinese doctrine mainly concerns regional and limited wars, restrained both in time and space and in the use of force.

 This means that currently China has not yet vast global interests to defend with a war. It will soon have them, however.

 Moreover, currently the Chinese political and military decision-makers do not believe that – in the not too distant future – China will be involved in a global sea or territorial war.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a full monopoly of force in China.

  Moreover, the PLA does not depend directly on the Ministry of Defence, but only on the Communist Party of China (CPC).

 The PLA’s high-ranking officers report directly to the CPC’s Central Military Commission and not to other entities. Hence they take orders only from it. The PLA’s Commander-in-Chief is the General Secretary of the CPC; the Defence Minister reports only to the State Council and the Central Military Commission is only a very powerful body of the CPC.

With specific reference to military spending, the latest data reports a PLA’s annual cost of 250 billion U.S. dollars while, for example, the U.S. military budget amounts to 649 billion U.S. dollars, again based on the latest data available.

 The Chinese ground forces consist of 975,000 units, while the Navy of 240,000 and the Air Force of 395,000 units. The Strategic Missile Force uses 100,000 units, while the Strategic Support Force finally operates with 175,000 soldiers.

 Other unspecified tasks and functions are performed by 150,000 soldiers and officers.

As to materials used and weapons – which are a strategic indication and not just a mere information item – the PLA has 70 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 162 bombers; 3,860 armoured combat vehicles for infantry; 6,740 tanks and 13,420 artillery pieces; 57 missiles for submarine launch; 1 aircraft carrier, as well as 82 frigates and cruisers; 4 amphibious ships; 1,966 tactical aircraft; 246 attack helicopters and, finally, 77 military satellites.

So far the PLA has deeply studied the example of the U.S. war in Iraq and hence of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

This means a war fought above all with advanced technologies, communication networks and particularly with the highest-precision weapons and information technology.

 Until the RMA adoption, China relied above all on the clear numerical superiority of its ground forces.

 In other words, the Chinese military doctrine was based on the fight against a land invasion or an occupation but, after the Gulf War and the Iraqi war waged and led by the United States, China began to reduce the size of its ground forces so as to focus on more technologically advanced and better trained Forces.

 Another key factor of Chinese military modernization has been Taiwan’s political status.

During the 1997 crisis, in fact, China did not succeed in discovering the way and extent of U.S. military engagement in the region.

 It was after this failure that China began to produce anti-ship missiles, medium range ballistic missiles, A2 anti-ship missiles and other anti-access-area denial weapons, as well as cyber- and anti-satellite weapons.

As a whole, the People’s Republic of China has developed four military doctrines since 1949.

 The doctrines developed before 1993, however, were all centred on the Maoist concept of “People’s War”, i.e. the “long-term People’s War”.

It was mainly based on maintaining the support of civilian population for the Armed Forces and on combining the efforts of the working class and of the “Red Army” led by the CPC.

 The strategic goal of the “People’s War”was to force enemies to enter China’s large central area, where they would be besieged and then defeated, again by the combined effect of the working class and the Red Army.

 In essence, the People’s War was aimed at being prolonged as much as possible and hence wearing and tearing the attackers.

Moreover, again according to Mao Zedong, the “long-term war” was based on three phases: strategic retreat, strategic stalemate and strategic counter-offensive.

With a view to completing these three phases, three types of Forces were needed: the regular army, the local forces and the guerrilla warfare forces.

 However, there is no theory of political warfare – also outside Marxism – which does not envisage guerrilla warfare.

 Towards the end of the Cold War, in 1980 China adopted the concept of the “People’s War under Modern Conditions”.

Again with the label of the Maoist “People’s War”, a war of defence was envisaged at various levels, which were already active at the borders, as well as far more offensive operations than those envisaged by the old “People’s War”.

 In 1993 – almost at the end of the Cold War, in which Mao Zedong never believed – China adopted a new doctrine, called “Winning Local Wars under High-Tech Conditions”.

While initially thePLA was thinking about a war of defence against a land invasion, in the case of that doctrine the Chinese decision-makers imagined a peripheral war in high-tech conditions.

 In other words, a defensive war against an attack by Taiwan, Japan, the United States or their regional allies.

 And by the Russian Federation, as well. The Chinese doctrine was no longer defensive, as it even suggested a first strike, including a nuclear one, to immediately provide China with an advantage over the attacker.

 The key concepts of the 1993 doctrine were the following: the “strategic frontier”, i.e. the limit beyond which you react, even with a nuclear salvo; “strategic deterrence”, which occurs when the enemy knows how China will react; “victory achieved through elite troops”, well beyond the old link between workers and the Red Army; “taking the initiative by striking first”; “victory over inferiority through superiority” – obviously of forces –  and finally “quick battles to force quick resolution”.

 A huge anthropological and cultural transformation, compared to the CPC’s political and military tradition.

 No longer war of attrition, but quick war not designed to annihilate the enemy. Then strategic deterrence is considered, i.e. the use of nuclear weapons, as well as the new role – certainly scarcely “Maoist” and scarcely “people-based” – of the elite troops.

 For Mao Zedong, at the core there was the “human sea” of his “People’s War”, not certainly the inequality between special forces and the rest of troops.

Moreover, there was another innovative aspect in the 1993 doctrine: the importance attached by China’s military decision-makers to the joint operations in its peripheries.

Reading between the lines, the CPC’s message was that, with the 1993 doctrine, China could solve the conflicts with its neighbouring countries by force.

 The 2004 doctrine was called “Winning Local Wars with Informatised Warfare”.

The core of the issue was “IT and computerization”, which replaced the more generic term used in the 1993 doctrine of “High-Tech Conditions”.

Besides underlining again the importance of joint operations, as in 1993, the 2004 doctrine highlighted the consistent, orderly and stable flow of information between the various command and control centres and the military operating on the battlefield.

 Therefore, since 2004 the core of the Chinese military reform has become the creation of a powerful command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and surveillance network (C4ISR).

The scenarios envisaged for the future war included, above all, the assault on the islands and the blockade of the islands, as well as counter-attack campaigns in border areas.

 Finally, there is also a new Chinese military doctrine, which is largely still operational.

 Released in 2014, it is called “Winning the Informatised Local Wars”.

The new Chinese “active defence” is based on it.

Although not radically changing the previous theories, the 2014 doctrine underlines the fundamental role of flexibility, mobility, joint operations, information dominance and precision raids.

 The strategic direction remains the usual one: South-East Asia and Taiwan, i.e. China, tell us – between the lines – that a future and probable conflict for Taiwan will also involve the United States.

Furthermore, the 2014 doctrine carefully sets the issue of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTV), such as rescue operations; counter-terrorism; maintaining political and social stability; protection of rights and interests; peacekeeping activities and international humanitarian assistance.

 The Chinese PLA also distinguishes between MOOTW and Preparation for Military Struggle (PMS).

Therefore, incidentally, the primary goal is the war for conquering Taiwan, but the PLA is also preparing for regional wars in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia, while the current doctrine, from 2014 onwards, is a military theory linked to the solution of a “high-intensity conflict”.

 The Chinese planners’ idea is a “war for the destruction of systems”, as was the case during the Gulf War in 1991 or the Kosovo one in 1999.

 China currently implements the Effect Based Operation (EBO) criterion that the United States began to use in the mid-1990s.

The “war of systems” means that whoever wins paralyzes the enemies’  “system of systems”.

However, what would the United States do if it waged war against China? Most likely, it would start with operations on the Southern coast, with a view to decimating the Chinese Navy.

 This would be followed by a U.S. attack against the Chinese command and control networks to prevent the PLA from striking back immediately.

In all likelihood, China would respond by using its artificial islands in the South China Sea and initially relying on information superiority, which would be followed by a joint operation against the U.S. fleet and later by a joint attack on one or many U.S. bases in the South China Sea.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Escalating Big Power Contestation on Taiwan: Can It Lead to War?

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Xi Jinping is seeking to hide his humiliation over US Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. His premature and unjustifiable warning to the US about the visit caused him embarrassment, and Pelosi’s purposeful visit after the warning not only hyped it, but humiliated him. China is using its Three Warfare Concept  which entails public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare along with aggressive military posturing, air violations, firepower power exhibition and some symbolic economic boycott of Taiwan, thus creating  heightened tension around Taiwan as a face saving exercise to amuse its domestic constituency. China is attempting to turn it as an opportunity to stoke national sentiments in favour of Xi Jinping on ‘Anti America’ theme highlighting Chinese mutilated version of his heroics to ensure that he doesn’t lose out on his third term in the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) later this year.

The US side has likewise been under similar pressures. Following the announcement of Pelosi’s visit and the contentious debate between President Xi Jinping and Joe Biden, the US found itself in a difficult situation. The USA was unable to cancel the trip in response to Xi’s warning because doing so would have indicated that Joe Biden was caving in to Chinese pressure. This would have been catastrophic for the Biden Administration, which is already struggling to recover from the disaster in Afghanistan and the difficulties brought on by the Russia-Ukraine War. Although the visit was a risky move, it is still unclear whether the US will follow it up by replacing strategic ambiguity with strategic clarity to support Taiwan in any prospective Chinese attack or not.

Can it Lead to War?

With unprecedented military posturing by China, live missile fire  East of Taiwan close to its coastline, and US aircraft carrier and maritime forces located not too far, the situation is tense and prone to accidental trigger causing escalation. It does not make any strategic sense for China to invade Taiwan, as it has all the negatives except false bravado, with bright chances of loss of face globally and domestically, in case the operations fail; hence, likely to contend with activities short of war.

Chinese strategist Qiao Liang, a retired PLA Air Force Major General, has warned that taking Taiwan by force is ‘Too Costly’. Chinese redline of “Taiwan going nuclear/declaring independence” has not been crossed as yet, giving no justification for China to cross US red line of ‘Changing status Quo by Force’. Xi Jinping may find it too costly to take such a risk before sealing his third term. The military drills near Taiwan have been conducted by Taiwan and US also in past and  the much publicised blockade of Taiwan through military drills, if prolonged may invite similar military drills by US and other democracies in Malacca Strait too, to block Chinese Sea Lines of Communication, beyond the realm of optics of the current Chinese aggressive posture, and it is well aware of this vulnerability.    

Taiwanese President Tsai has bravely given bold statements during visit of Speaker Pelosi and earlier to take on Chinese aggression. Taiwan with its national spirit, modern arsenal from US, determined armed forces and US backing is unlikely to give a walkover, although the first onslaught of potential offensive will have to be borne by it, till global response gets activated. Comparisons are being made with Hong Kong, but the major differences is that leadership, hierarchy in Hong Kong and police was manipulated by CCP, whereas  the leadership in Taiwan is strong and resolute refusing to give in to Chinese coercion. The need for amphibious assault due to terrain friction makes Chinese misadventure in Taiwan more difficult than Hong Kong.

Chinese amphibious capabilities to capture Taiwan are suspect, more so if US warships like the USS Ronald Reagan are around. China has enough missile arsenals to destroy Taiwan, but such a massive destruction of Han Chinese (95 percent of Taiwanese population is Han), who have relations, investments and inseparable linkages with their relatives in mainland and vice versa will not go well with domestic population of mainland. Over two million Taiwanese live in China, mostly in Coastal areas, and over 20 per cent have married there.

This will also destroy Chinese and Taiwanese economy, which does not suit Chinese leadership struggling to revive its economy marred by trade war, failing BRI and COVID effect. China is top destination for Taiwanese export accounting for approximately 40% of total exports, with Taiwan having  overall trade surplus of US$104.7 billion in 2021 with China.

A public opinion poll in Taiwan in 2020 indicated 73 percent people identified themselves as Taiwanese, who were against China, and 77 percent  supported democratic movement in Hongkong and this figure has increased in last two years. Getting Taiwanese under its wings will also bring a fresh democratic wave in China, which CCP may not be used to handle. Taiwanese people do not want to sacrifice their democratic freedom and prosperity, which is the main reason for success of President Tsai. The conflict if imposed by China will be deadly and Chinese, who want to win without fighting are not known for their appetite to accept body bags of Han Chinese, for a cause which doesn’t give them economic benefit but takes it away its dream of national rejuvenation, as indicated by General Qiao. 

Why Taiwan is a US-China Issue?

PRC may keep claiming Taiwan to be its domestic issue, but it has much greater external dimensions. Diplomatically US may claim to follow ‘One China Policy’ but it treats Taiwan no less than an ally. The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, effective from March 26, 2020 is an indication. The Taiwan Relation Act,1973, Taiwan Travel Act signed 2019, and National Defence Authorisation Act signed earlier this year to facilitate sale of state of the art weaponry and joint exercises justify the statement. US will always like to trade and strategically partner with democratic Taiwan outside Beijing’s influence, and not Taiwan under CCP.

In any potential invasion of Taiwan, the spill over of the battle space to Japan is obvious due to geographic proximity, an ally which US is obligated to protect. Chinese initial offensive can be on Taiwan, but US could join forces with its allies in the region to use their sea and air advantages to cut off Beijing’s maritime lifeline in and outside South China Sea. Chinese supply lines outside Nine dash line are still vulnerable to choking, and it will draw out PLA to get into war outside its comfort Zone. Taking Taiwan by force, therefore involves mobilisation of all its combat resources, expecting an escalation from limited war to an all-out war, as the operation amounts to crossing US redline of “No Change in Status Quo of Taiwan”. Economically Chinese heavy reliance on the US dollar is far from over, and such a war over Taiwan would be a massive economic blow to China, that would see capital flooding out, and companies moving of the country, much sooner than it thought.

Way Ahead

If Chinese aggressive posturing, air incursions and military drills announced for four days end as scheduled without escalation, may be that situation may still remain under control, as US and Taiwan have also done military drills in that region earlier. If it escalates into an attempt to unite Taiwan by force, it will certainly up the ante with US, prove China as irresponsible bully, may lead to loss of life of Han Chinese both ways, lead to economic destruction of its one of the largest investors and jeopardise China’s goal of national rejuvenation. Internationally, China may have miscalculated US resolve and Taiwan’s resistance and all may not go their way. If Chinese ambitions grow beyond global tolerance, it has bright chances to bring rest of the world against China. While the visit of Nancy Pelosi may have given a strong message to China, but the US resolve is still under test, because Taiwan can’t be expected to handle Chinese aggression alone, more so if it has been hyped by super power contestation. US therefore must consider starting similar military exercise in Malacca Strait with other navies to remind China of its vulnerable SLOC before it starts blocking Taiwanese shipping.

The aggressive posturing in Taiwan Strait, South and East China Sea will continue, even if the current crisis slows down. PRC’s aim is to pressurise President Tsai Not to declare independence, keep pressure on, hope DPP loses next election and work out favourable arrangements with opposition likely to be favourable to China. Neither China nor US want war, but none wants to give walkover as well, hence this strategic gaming and posturing is on and will continue.

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Why would a peaceful country join NATO?

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Image source: war.ukraine.ua

NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is a security alliance between Europe and North America.  It was established in the 1949 having goals of protecting democratic freedom but its sole purpose was to counter any future aggression from the Soviet Union and hence this organization was anti-Soviet accord that established the balance of power in Europe. Under the Article 5 of NATO it obliges all member states to protect each other in state of war, this allowed the NATO member states to share their military capabilities and pool their resources in time of attack or invasion. Besides having collective security goals and containing USSR, NATO served as an engine to democratization.  NATO clearly was a threat to the sovereignty of USSR and to counter Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact, Moscow had all the reasons to justify formation of this pact. After the Berlin wall fell and Soviet Union disintegrated, Germany was faced by a serious question of whether to join NATO or the Warsaw pact.  The US President made an offer to Russian President, suggesting that if Germany joined NATO, NATO would stop its expansion.  Moscow bought this offer and demolished the Warsaw pact hoping that the west would follow suit that NATO too would dissolve.  NATO continued its expansionist process and included ex-Soviet republics as well. The Russian President Putin on many instances asked NATO that against whom this expansion intended to. An organization initially targeted towards countering a country is now getting so close to them that there intensions can even be sniffed from the border, is causing a security dilemma.  The war in Ukraine is the living example that US did not do as promise, a stab in the back of Russia. This act is clearly a proactive one and number of US’s political analyst opposed this step.

Ukraine being a sovereign country and knowing its history with Russia still wants to join and the question rises, why? Well Ukraine has become a country just like Afghanistan or Vietnam where the two world powers can have their proxy wars. Former Ukrainian presidents either supported to join NATO or opposed it under the influence of these foreign powers. Joining NATO means taking side with the western power and this would seriously be taken as a treat by Russia, as NATO is an organization that talks about collective security with the help of its military alliance. Why Ukraine wants it? Was Ukraine threatened by the Russians of any invasion or were they forced by the western powers to join? What benefits Ukraine would have after joining NATO?

To answer the above questions one must first understand that situation of security dilemma exits between Ukraine and Russia and to assure its security Ukraine needed backup in the form of NATO. Moscow has adopted a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus throughout Putin’s term in power based on the presumption that each former Soviet country’s national identities are artificial and thus brittle. Vladimir Putin frequently exhibits what historians refer to as the “politics of eternity,” in order to restore the lost essence of the Soviet Empire. One of the reasons why Ukraine needed security assurance. This was only possible if a state stronger than Russia supported and formed alliance with Ukraine, hence Ukraine turned towards joining NATO.

Now that Russia has annexed Ukraine, it clearly depicts the Russian insecurity as well in context with the Western imperialist nature. The people of Ukrainian are still in state of shock as to why Ukraine, a peace loving country wants to join an organization that is more in to waging war rather than building cooperation and peace.  The Ukrainian President, Zelensky, recently posed for a Vogue magazine depicting in the background the war torn Ukraine, receiving a major backlash questioning whether all this is just a good background for a cover magazine.

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The Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022: Outcomes and the Future

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US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin meets with Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Wei Fenghe at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, June 10, 2022. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense)

The Shangri-La Dialogue, is a forum for discussion among government ministers and senior officials, as well as business leaders and security experts, on Asia’s evolving security challenges. The setting for the 19th Shangri-La Dialogue was held amid the geopolitical rivalry between the US and China. The SLD was based on the Munich Conference on Security Policy, with the point of divergence being the establishment of a Track One organization. Initially, invitations were extended to ASEAN members in order to serve as a regional security system.

After two years of hiatus caused by the coronavirus pandemic, the discussion was restarted in Singapore in 2022 and attracted more than 500 official representatives from 59 nations. The Shangri-La Dialogue 2022 (SLD22organization) was a success in and of itself since it showed how confident and determined the area was to resume business following a two-year break caused by Covid-19. Many Asian thinkers extrapolated the summit as the struggle between the “rule of law” and the “right of might” because of its resumed under the specter of War in Ukraine. The debates indicated that the outcome of the geopolitical battle between the United States and China will have a significant impact on Asia’s future by offering a much-needed sketch and update on the military dynamics in the area. Preserving the rules-based order, China’s interests, and the future of Asia and regional cooperation have emerged as the dialogue’s three key issues.

Rebalancing Asia and America

Pandemic, climate change, nuclear threats from North Korea, coercion by stronger governments against their smaller neighbors, and brutality and murder from the junta in Myanmar are just a few of the problems the area is facing. The platform could be the best platform for mitigating the USA and China’s conflictual points by bringing the two countries’ defense leaders, diplomats, strategic thinkers, journalists, and business leaders for examination of the most pressing challenges to regional security and prosperity. But the dialogue has seen the competitive mind of the two countries’ delegates. It has also seen a strong division between the USA alliance-  Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and China. The idea of the Indo-Pacific has been discussed mostly in the dialogue. During the first plenary session, the Secretary of Defense of the United States delivered his speech on ‘Next Steps for the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy’. In his remark, he has clearly mentioned how the United States has provided support to the region after the Covid-19 pandemic and Asian partners’ commitment to ‘free and inclusive and rule-based Indo-Pacific’. The Secretary of Defense has highlighted the largest budget of 2023 for the region under the Biden administration. And almost 300,000 USA military personnel are stationed in the region and USA’s Pacific Deterrence Initiative costs almost $6.1 billion for strengthening multilateral information sharing and support training and experimentation with the regional partners.

On the other side, in the fifth plenary session, the State Councilor and Defense Minister of the People’s Republic of China, Wei Fenghe delivered his speech on ‘China’s Vision For Regional Order’. He mentioned the four points of China’s vision on its belief in a multipolar region system. One, the countries should strengthen solidarity and coordination and oppose confrontation and division. Second, Instead of being controlled by a single nation or a small number of nations, world affairs should be managed through consultation among all interested parties. Third, the states should uphold sovereign equality of all nations and say no to bullying and might makes right. Fourth, states should promote exchanges and mutual learning and oppose the practice of closing the door and excluding others.

We all know the powerful countries are engaged in a geostrategic competition over Asia. During the dialogue, the United States and its SLD22 partners, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, blamed China for “unilateral attempts to change the status quo” and its “more coercive and aggressive approach to its territorial claims.” China’s defense minister accused the US of attempting to “hijack” the support of Asia-Pacific countries in order to turn them against Beijing, claiming that Washington is seeking to advance its own interests “under the guise of multilateralism.”

Developing New Ideas for Regional Security

The Shangri-La Dialogue serves a useful purpose of getting Asia-Pacific leaders to talk to each other and establish the kind of personal links that could help to counter regional hostility and dialogue helps to find a better idea for regional security. In the interconnected world, the tension between Russia and the West over the Ukraine issue has directly impacted Asia’s regional security. Many state leaders perceive the conflict as a new cold war and a fight between two ideologies. From that point, the speakers of the dialogue vividly pointed out a few key points.

Firstly, Asia is a diverse and pluralistic region, and a battle would be unlikely to attract many participants. Asia has its own disputes which are different from the West as disagreements in the East and South China seas, cross-strait tensions, instability on the Korean Peninsula and clashes in the Sino-Indian and India–Pakistan borders. There is no clash based on ideologies; autocracy versus democracy. Secondly, the multilateral liberal internationalist system proudly embraced collective security, economic openness, and social progress after the Second World War. But now the region is facing common and trans-boundary threats, which demands a new idea of regional security along with cooperating multilateral system through ASEAN, UN, BIMSTEC, and APEC.  During the speech of the Malaysian delegate, he rightfully mentioned the new idea of giving priority to small countries and small groups. He shared the example of the Trilateral Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which was established by Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines in response to a wave of kidnappings and terrorist attacks by militant organizations in the middle of 2016. A crucial component of a defense strategy is security reform and cooperation. From that point of view, the benefit of small grouping contributes to the understanding of the significance of the great-power system in matters of international security.

Military Modernization and New Defense Capabilities

The security situation on a global and regional scale is becoming more unstable, unclear, complex, and ambiguous. As a result, defense and security institutions are compelled to keep up with global trends as reflected in the dynamics of their security environment, such as in the Pacific region. Asia is currently involved in arms race, and at the summit, the build-up and tightening of alliances were hardly hidden. In the region, though China’s budget for arms and military is seen other countries of the region are also expanding for military and defense. Though modernizing the military and defense system is costly for the region, modernization is taking place in a more specific environment in the Asia-Pacific region where key powers are engaged in geopolitical conflict with one another. South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup stated at the Singapore meeting that his country would strengthen its defense capabilities and collaborate closely with the US and Japan to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. With modernizing technologies and sharing information and intelligence among the countries, the idea of mutual respect, non-interference, harmony, and solidarity should also promote for maintaining regional peace, stability, and prosperity.

Concerns That Should Be Addressed

The Ukraine war has changed Asia’s political atmosphere. Politically, the Ukraine war has already caused a rift in Asia. Japan and Korea are concerned about China and, as might be expected, have joined the United States in condemning Russia. Japan collaborated with the United States and the G-7 to impose sanctions on Russian financial institutions. In addition to a $300 million financial and humanitarian help package, Japan has given Ukraine drones, bulletproof clothing, helmets, and other defensive supplies. On the other side, North Korea recognized the independence of both the DPR and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), another pro-Russian separatist territory in Ukraine’s Donbas region on July 13, 2022. To counter China, the USA will try to strengthen its engagement in Asia through the ASEAN, QUAD, and IPEF. In 2020, the US government approved the potential sale to Taiwan of 100 Boeing-built Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems, three weapons systems comprised of missiles, sensors, and artillery, and four sophisticated aerial drones.

In the SLD-2022, we have seen a straight division of the world leaders. The balance of economic power is shifting inexorably towards the Asia Pacific which is the 60 percent of people’s living place. The Asia-Pacific region faces the same security challenges as other regions. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has highlighted several challenges it shares with Europe in particular, ranging from managing regional security flashpoints to maintaining a rules-based order. The annual meeting in Singapore, which was held for the first time since 2019 due to the pandemic, was usually dominated by US-China relations, but this year, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was in the spotlight. The SLD is also called Asia’s security dialogue. The dialogue presents an open platform for discussing the government’s policy which will usher the ray of integration between Asia and the west.

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