India and China, both heirs to ancient civilizations, have emerged today as the two most powerful and influential Asian nations in terms of their economic clout and geopolitical standing in the international arena. The two countries recognize the need to eliminate enduring mistrust between them and have been focusing on building a rational partnership underpinned by China’s pragmatism. However, despite the recognition that cooperation may be in their mutual interest, this will be easier said than done. India-China relations have always been complexing with multifaceted regional and global dimensions, which have complicated their bilateral relationship. Even as India and China have crossed a long road from being friends to adversaries to rational partners, a factor which has been constant in the conduct of their affairs, is the that they are neighbors who have as much to gain from each other as to fear from the other. Both the states clearly understand that cooperation could work to their mutual advantage and benefit. Any conflict between the two countries would not only jeopardize their national security but would also have serious implications for their regional and global security perspectives. Tensions along the India-China border high in the Himalayas have again flared up the situation between both the countries. Thousands of soldiers from both sides have been facing off just a few 100m from each other in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley. China has objected to India building a road through the valley connecting the region to an airstrip, possibly sparking its move to assert control over the territory along the border that is not clearly defined in places. India and China engaged in a similar standoff for 73 days at Dokhlam, at the other end of their disputed border in 2017, when Indian troops were mobilized to counter what was seen as moves by the Chinese side to expand its presence along the border with Bhutan. The situation was later defused through diplomatic channels
In political realism, power is the capability to make another state do something it would not otherwise do and vice versa. What makes a state powerful is its capability to influence the other. The South Asian region is home to one fourth of the world’s population which is the least economically unified regions in the world. Intraregional trade remains well below its potential due to historical political tensions and mistrust because of cross-border conflicts and security concerns. Since the advent of the 21st century, China has been conducting multi-dimensional cooperation with all the South Asian countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). China’s major interests in South Asia include promoting stability in both Pakistan and Afghanistan in order to curb the influence of extremists, to facilitate trade and energy corridors throughout the region that China can access, and to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean Region . India fears that China’s investment in South Asian ports not only serves its commercial interests, but also facilitates China’s military goals. India perceives the Chinese presence in South Asian countries as a design to thwart what was once considered as India’s sphere of influence.
China has so far been successful in influencing South Asia because of many factors. One of the major reasons is that China has managed to project itself as a neighbour that would not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries least of all in the internal affairs of its friends and partners. In the light of its “Good Neighbourhood” policy, China’s increased diplomatic and economic engagements in South Asia are aimed to enhance its strategic influence in the region. China is focusing on construction of a chain of airfields and ports at Gwadar-Pakistan, Hambantota-Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Chittagong-Bangladesh has part of its “String of Pearls” strategy, which also includes China’s influence in South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. India, on the other hand has been trying to consolidate influence over its smaller South Asian neighbours other than Pakistan and holds almost complete sway over the SARRC setup. Defining Indian strategic environment, former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee once stated, “India’s strategic environment extends from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca, across the entire Indian Ocean, including Northwest Central Asia and Afghanistan, East Asia, China and Southeast Asia. Our strategic thinking must be extended to these horizons Line”.
The changing alliances and power equilibrium among the United States, China, India, and Pakistan bear key implications on the inter-state rivalry and the consequent crisis dynamics in South Asia. Since the introduction of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy 2018, mutual suspicion and hostility between India have intensified. There is a shift in the regional dynamics with the United States and India being on one side and Pakistan-China on the other. These changing dynamics will have significant implications for U.S. policy toward South Asia and crisis management down the road. Previously, the US had rendered constructive support in Pakistan-India crisis management. This role was taken up due to US perception of India-Pakistan’s relative power balance. However, US strategic interests in Asia Pacific region. Since Pakistan finds itself unable to serve as China’s balancer against India in the region, the immediate solution in Chinas calculus has been to strengthen Pakistan’s capacity and potential for economic growth and stability through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a fusion of infrastructure projects and funding aimed at reviving Pakistan’s economy. The CPEC will also serve China’s own strategic interest to reach out to the world through the shortest trade corridor offered by Pakistan due to its geopolitical location.
It is widely believed across the Chinese political circles that Indian aggression in the region is generally triggered by China’s support to Pakistan. India’s increasing inclination and reliance on the US has resulted in a heightened aggressive regional outlook of Prime Minister Modi. For instance, India’s revocation of Article 370 followed five months after India-Pakistan- brinkmanship resulting from the Pulwama crisis. The Indian decision to break the occupied state of Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories had directly challenged the territorial claim of Ladakh by China. China’s support to Pakistan is not perceived as China’s good will but as a concession extracted due to India’s might. Therefore, India might make even more encroachments on the LAC if China’s support for Pakistan increases. However, the change in China’s policy orientation regarding South Asia’s crisis management does not suggest that China will actively expedite or facilitate a crisis in the region. Traditionally, China has resorted to mediation for Pakistan-India crises. China can be helpful under a situation when US treats crisis management in the region as a significant priority and Chinese cooperation as an inevitable factor. But Beijing’s relations with Washington have deteriorated in the past few years. Beijing has been seeking to highlight issues of convergence that can lead to cooperation with US to improve bilateral ties. In case the US wishes to mutually manage a crisis in the South Asian region, Beijing might be open to cooperation. However, it is also expected that China might not assist in seeking a solution that would continue to capitalize on US need for cooperation. In the light of the current great power competition between US and China, crisis management in the South Asian region might be another case of collateral damage.
