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Russia’s geopolitics and strategy in the future

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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Russia’s military doctrine is clearly closely related to European security – which is obvious even after the Cold War– and is in any case completely independent of the internal political configuration of the Russian regime.

 Therefore, studying the evolution of Russia’s military doctrine means predicting, a contrario, much of the strategic future of Europe and obviously of NATO as well.

 A strategic future that is still tied to the USA’s – and not only within the Atlantic Alliance – but which experiences situations that would have been unimaginable during the Cold War: the destabilization of the Mediterranean; the jihad; the Iranian-Saudi tension; the new role played by Israel; the more or less artificial “Arab springs”, the new immigration from sub-Saharan Africa and, finally, China’s New Silk Road.

All possible sub-military threats – obviously except for Israel’s role – which, however, multiply the hotbeds of tension, while NATO is focusing again on the East-West confrontation, thus providing to the East a wide range of possible instruments which are automatically taken away from the West.

 The last complete Russian military doctrine, however, was made public on December 25, 2015.

Before Russia’s participation in the war in Syria and hence even before the new projection of Russian power onto the Mediterranean, partly resulting from Russia’s relative success in Syria. In essence, Russia’s last doctrine was conceived in a very different phase of the East-West confrontation.

We should not even forget – as happened in the West in 2018 and afterwards – the Russian development of advanced medium-long range weapons, capable – at least according to the Russian technical experts – of hitting the Atlantic Alliance and the United States with the maximum speed and effectiveness without warning and without triggering nuclear-type equilibria.

In this case, we are talking about as many as seven strategic weapons programmes, most of which are already known.

Furthermore the United States have put the INF aside, as well as the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The new Strategic Reduction Treaty (START) is currently far from being defined and the rhetoric of the clash between the two former military empires seems to have reached its apex, now placed between rhetoric and reality.

 Two cycles of sanctions for Syria and Ukraine have already been decided by Trump’s Administration, both in relation to the poisoning of the former FSB agent Skripal, occurred in Great Britain in 2018, and to the use of the nerve agent  Novichok, also in other situations.

We are obviously not in a position to ascertain whether these accusations are grounded, but it is interesting to note how these two sanction phases have been originated by a probable or alleged attack by the Russian Intelligence Services (not Armed Forces) against some of their former agents.

 In any case, 2020 is always an end point for Russian military planners. Many things will be decided in the relations between East and West, based on the military doctrine developed this year.

 Previously, with the start of the Serdyukov-Makarov military reform, 1.35 million military had as many as 52,000 elements dealing only with command and control activities, albeit of the traditional and bureaucratic type.

However, the real power and quantity of truly combat-ready Russian forces did not exceed 100,000 units.

Hence, on average, only 13% of the forces were combat-ready. In the Army the average rate was 17%, while it was 7% in the Air Force and 70% in the Navy.

 In the Space and Strategic Missile Forces, however, 100% of units were combat-ready.

However, 55% of weapons were obsolete, at various levels. After that reform, however, Russia’s geopolitical and strategic ideas are still the same: NATO’s containment can be achieved only with the deterrence ensured by nuclear weapons; the doctrineis evolving towards the US-style network-centric warfare and finally the future of the Russian Forces will be based on their specialization in the counter-guerrilla warfare and the technological and operational organization of small units.

Moreover, the operations of the future are not designed to eliminate the enemy only physically, but also psychologically, culturally and in its stable relations with the civilian population. This is a typically “hybrid” factor.

According to Russia’s current planners, in the hierarchy of threats there arethe clashes in the Post-Soviet Space.

Furthermore, Russia is particularly interested in the stability of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian planners also imagine a “Falklands scenario” for the Kuril Islands, put in place by Japan.

Not to mention even an explicit “containment” of China which, obviously, cannot be achieved by connecting it to a nuclear threat.

 The two external scenarios of primary interest for the Russian military planners are the Democratic Republic of Korea and the tension in Iran.

These are two possible points of entry into a narrow Russian strategic area, in which Russia’s response would be immediate, probably even nuclear and direct.

Still today, other potential threats are operations such as those which were carried out by NATO in the two Balkan wars, as well as the French-Italian-British presence in Libya, and some Western direct operations towards Belarus and the Russian borders, especially in the old area between NATO and the Russian terrestrial area.

 Despite this historical tension, which is now well-known, Russia does not believe there is any acceptable probability of clash between NATO and the Russian Federation, since Russia still thinks that nuclear deterrence is more than sufficient in this case.

 Therefore, the other strategic goals of the reform started in 2008 were the reduction of the available Forces to only 1 million military; the elimination of the low usable Forces; the reduction in the number of officers and a new command and control chain.

Certainly there were also the goals of reaching a 100% rate of combat ready forces, as well as increasing the outsourcing of materials and non-essential activities to civilian structures, and defining a new weapons program for 2020 designed to update 70% of material. Now we are already in 2020.

It should be clearly underlined that- to a large extent – these reforms implemented since 2008 have been successful.

 Therefore, also some non-negligible aspects of the Russian strategic doctrine are changing.

In particular, Russia thinks that the U.S. and NATO attitude has radicalized.

Above all with the “enhanced” use of sanctions, as well as with the spreading of the so-called “colour revolutions” in the post-Soviet area -which the Kremlin interprets just as if it were the “hybrid warfare” of the Westerners – and finally the increase of inter-State conflicts in the disputed areas between Central Asia and the borders of Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus.

 In fact, some military groups, especially in the United States, have explicitly stated they want to “intimidate” the Russian Federation again, and later contain it according to the tradition of the Cold War and of the old “Telegram” sent by “X”, alias George Kennan, in 1947.

 Russian distrust towards the West which, however, Russia has already widely shown both in the military doctrines of 2015 (the year of its engagement in Syria) and in the subsequent “Concept of Foreign Policy” of 2006.

Here the small changes in terminology and doctrine are always decisive.

As early as 2015, the above stated General Gerasimov’s doctrine underlined that “the use of non-military measures for the whole range of new conflicts is increasing”.

 That was, in fact, the mechanism used by Russia in Syria, at first, then in the Ukraine and, probably, also in Venezuela and in other countries of the world.

 Hence, an “integrated defence” strategy, which combines political and not directly military actions with conventional operations or even visible or invisible advanced psywar or commando actions.

General Gerasimov defined it “a strategy which proactively weakens and defuses the threats to State security”.

Hence we find here a strengthening of territorial defence, besides the coordination of the actions made by various State agencies, halfway between intelligence services and the organizations of the so-called “civil society”.

 In this sense, it was also referred to as the “strategy of restrained action”.

It is a term that was originally used to define precisely the Russian operations in Syria. It means to wage and fight a war always with limited goals, using only a part of the military potential and only certain groups of the Armed Forces, as well as selectively hitting only some enemy’s targets and groups which, however, are not necessarily military ones.

These are always joint operations, also with the use of nuclear weapons, which must be employed at such a level as not to trigger the enemy’s equalizing countermove.

Moreover, the Russian doctrine of 2014 mentioned, for the first time, also private military companies, generically defined as “a characteristic of modern conflicts”.

As General Gerasimov always maintain, private companies will be “a component of the increasing number of military players on the field”.

 Like the guerrilla groups, the “quasi-States”, the various countries’ Armed Forces. All operators on the battlefield at the same level as the “classic” ones.

In this context, Russia will increasingly use private military companies, which enable the Kremlin’s planners to avoid being directly responsible for the operations and particularly to have the possibility of attributing important tactical operations to the sole willingness of their private “collaborators”.

For Russia, the primary point between propaganda and strategy is the U.S. abandonment of the INF Treaty.

 With the next doctrine, Russia will reaffirm its interest in resuming a complete START-type Treaty with the United States. With specific reference to the nuclear issue, however, the criterion is the classic one: “the launch, immediately after an attack,” of a nuclear strike or of a conventional operation putting the Russian State in crisis.

Here the role played by the new weapons will be decisive anyway. Russia has the new Khinzal missile available, i.e. a ballistic air-to-ground or air-to-air, self-propelled, hypersonic and high-precision missile.

Russia has also the Avangard, previously known as Objekt 42020, available, i.e. a hypersonic glide vehicle that can be carried by continental ballistic missiles. The Burevestnik, previously known as Novator 9M730, a nuclear-powered surface-to-surface missile, is still operational, but there are some other weapons in advanced testing phase.

 There are also significant evolutions in military robotics, in supercomputers and in semi-automated decision-making systems. This is another face of the future war, i.e. the use of “high-precision weapons and robotic instruments” – just to quote again General Gerasimov.

 It is the technological face of hybrid warfare.

 On the other side, in a mix of old and new theories, the U.S. strategists argue that “whoever controls Russia, rules the world” – a new version of Mackinder’s old formula of power.

In the next Russian doctrine there will probably be no reference to NATO or the United States as “military threats on Russian borders”, but both Western strategic entities will be regarded as mere “dangers”.

The next Russian military doctrine will also deal with non-military instruments, which will probably be coordinated by an ad hoc structure combining traditional military commands and intelligence, as well as – most likely – an integrated command for psyops operations of a political nature.

In particular, the new hypersonic and high-technology weapons will be used for “sub-optimal” threats towards the enemies, without having to resort to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or small or large nuclear weapons, and to change not only the military and strategic space, but above all the political complexion of the enemy forces on the ground.

 We will have a theory of the strategic threat and political hegemony of the military spectrum, which will imply a set of instruments, organizations, and operations that is currently even hard to imagine.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Eight Principles of the “Greater Eurasian Partnership”

Dr. Andrey KORTUNOV

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Image source: kremlin.ru

It is common knowledge that Eurasia is the largest continent on Earth, spanning over one-third of the planet’s total area. It is also the most populous, with over two-thirds of the global population calling the continent home. Eurasia has tremendous natural resources, from oil and gas to freshwater and fertile lands. The peoples of Eurasia can be rightfully proud of the fact that it was here that the oldest human civilizations first appeared, that they have managed to settle in both scorching deserts and freezing tundra, built huge cities and wonderful architectural monuments, laid extensive networks of railways and motorways, and made an invaluable contribution to human culture in all its aspects.

It would only be natural for the sprawling spaces of Eurasia to become united in a single system, where different geographic components would organically complement each other. It would be natural for customs tariffs and visa restrictions dividing our countries to become a thing of the past, for mutual suspicions, long-standing grievances and endless disputes to give way to mutual understanding, a multilateral balance of interests, and an awareness of our common historical destiny. Such a union would primarily benefit the peoples of the Eurasian continent, who would be able to expand their horizons, shed their old fears and biases, and gain radically new opportunities for economic, social and spiritual prosperity. Eurasian unification would also benefit the rest of the world, which would be the beneficiary of a powerful development engine ready to pull other continents along with it and make a decisive contribution to resolving the global problems facing humanity.

Sadly, the Eurasian continent continues to be disjointed or, rather, split into a host of large and small fragments. This applies to Eurasian security, the Eurasian political space, the Eurasian economy, and science and culture. Right now, the concept of “Eurasian identity” does not even exist, and the numerous attempts to construct one have not brought anything particularly promising.

The current lack of unity in Eurasia can be put down to a number of factors – the continent’s trying history, the tragic mistakes of national leaders, the nefarious activities of external forces, and so on. However, whatever the reasons for the current circumstances might be, it is crystal clear that radically changing the situation will take both strong political will and a generous helping of perseverance, patience and flexibility, as well as a readiness to deal with unexpected failures, irritating reversals of fortune and temporary setbacks. What is more, Eurasia will never be unified if it is something the continent’s inhabitants do not seek. And right now, it is something that only the leaders of certain Eurasian states want. Success here also depends on selecting the right sequence of practical steps that would lead to a single Eurasian space.

The “Greater Eurasian Partnership Concept” first introduced by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin in late 2015 proceeds from the premise that the first steps in this direction should be taken in the economic architecture of the Eurasian continent, rather than in the political or military spheres. The economy forms the base of modern society, even though politics frequently gain the upper hand over economics in terms of imposing priorities and precepts on states. Yet, ultimately, no one can ignore their economic interests. As a rule, these interests are more stable, more rational and less subject to the influence of subjective factors than political precepts. Comparing the two most memorable attempts to unite Eurasia in the past – one by force (the Mongol Empire) and one through trade (the Great Silk Road), we cannot but conclude that trade ties generally proved a more reliable unification tool than armed violence.

Consequently, Eurasian unification today should start with the economy. The Partnership envisions consistent progress towards a network of free trade areas and inter-regional trade and economic alliances, and connecting integration projects throughout the vast Eurasian space. It is crucial that the practice of politicizing economic ties be eliminated and unilateral economic sanctions or other forms of economic pressure as a foreign policy instrument be abandoned.

We are clearly talking about an extremely ambitious project here that will take decades to implement, at the very least. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the economic consolidation of Eurasia would be the most ambitious integration project of the 21st century. Nevertheless, we can already identify several basic principles that underlie this initiative and set it apart from other plans of Eurasian unification. Let us list of the most important of these principles.

First, the Partnership is not viewed as a potential competitor for regional integration structures (ASEAN, EAEU, RCEP) or trans-border economic projects (BRI) or organizations (the SCO, APEC, ASEM). On the contrary, all of those structures, projects and organizations are seen as nodes and individual parts of the future single Eurasian economic mechanism. The objective of the Partnership is to assemble these parts and nodes together without detriment to those elements that have already demonstrated their efficiency.

Second, the Partnership is not a union of the Eurasian East against the European West. Ultimately, Europe is a large peninsula in the north-west of the Eurasian continent, and it should not be opposed to Eurasia – rather, it should become an integral part of it. Therefore, the Partnership remains open for the European Union, which could join the activities of the Partnership in the forms and to the extent that it deems appropriate.

Third, when building the Partnership, the parties need to proceed from the understanding that significant differences will remain in the models of their social, political and even economic development. Eurasia has socialist states and liberal democracies, market and planned economies. The Partnership does not set itself the task of eliminating political plurality and imposing some common denominator or a single set of values. The activities of the Partnership should be based on universally recognized norms of international law and offer the best level of comfort for all participants. Equally, the Partnership should not have leaders and outsiders, “pilots” and “wingmen,” a “central nucleus” and a “periphery,” as is the case with many integration projects.

Fourth, unlike the rigid integration structures like the European Union, the Partnership envisages highly flexible forms of involving individual states or their regional groups in its activities. As they are ready, these countries may join individual dimensions of the Partnership (trade, finance, infrastructure, visa, etc.) with due account of their current needs and capabilities.

Fifth, even though the Partnership is focused on the economic unification of the Eurasian continent, the expansion of economic interaction will inevitably influence other areas of cooperation, such as science and education, culture and humanitarian contacts. Eurasian integration will fail if it is reduced to increasing trade and investment. Social interaction between the peoples of Eurasia and the economic cooperation between Eurasian states should supplement and stimulate each other.

Sixth, it is impossible to develop economic integration projects in Eurasia without simultaneously creating a parallel process of bolstering continental security and resolving problems inherited from the 20th century and earlier. These problems include territorial disputes, separatism, the “divided peoples” phenomenon, the arms race, the danger of WMD proliferation, international terrorism and religious extremism. Consequently, the building of the Partnership should go hand in hand with developing mechanisms for military and political cooperation on the continent, such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA).

Seventh, implementing the Partnership project should never mean “Eurasian isolationism,” i.e. closing Eurasian states off from partners in other regions, be it Africa, or North or South America. On the contrary, migration within the Eurasian space should serve as a powerful incentive for further developing economic ties in the basins of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian oceans, and for achieving progress in resolving such universal human problems as climate change, combating pandemics, ensuring food and energy security, and managing migration.

Eighth, the building of the “Greater Eurasian Partnership” should proceed from the ground up, and not top-down, that is, it should be based on specific, even if very modest agreements between regional integration unions and individual states. Concluding the work on connecting the EAEU and the BRI should be the crucial first stage in building the Partnership. Creating independent Eurasian payment systems and rating agencies, decreasing dependence on the U.S. Dollar, establishing a Eurasian economic information centre like the OECD, etc., are other promising areas of activity.

Even though the idea of the “Greater Eurasian Partnership” was first put forward about five years ago, we are still in the very beginning of a lengthy historical project. At the moment, we can only talk about some very preliminary pencil sketches of the very complex Eurasian structure of the future. These sketches contain more questions about the future of our continent than they do answers. This is why broad international expert interaction to work out individual elements of the future roadmap for this colossal continental project is particularly important today. Bilateral cooperation between Russian and Chinese experts in international relations, economics, sociology and security could play a very important role in this process.

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Development of human capital is the key goal of BRICS: The outcomes of BRICS Civil Forum 2020

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On September 23-25, the international multimedia press center of Russia hosted an online conference in Moscow, focusing on the results of the BRICS Civil Forum 2020.

Speakers listed the cases and measures pertaining to their implementation as part of previous groups, and announced the topics of their upcoming meetings.

Victoria Panova, co-chair of the BRICS Civil Forum and Managing Director of the National Committee on BRICS Research, said that a total of eight working groups were present at the forum, including dedicated groups on ecology, digital economy, culture, science and education. Panova pointed to the development of human capital as the primary goal of the forum.

“We all remember how, during a meeting by world leaders in Brazil, Vladimir Putin laid out measures aimed at boosting the living standards and quality of life of the peoples of the five BRICS countries as the main goal of this organization,” she emphasized.

Each year, the BRICS organization is becoming more independent and cohesive across the board, including through the use of digital technologies.

Victoria Panova also enumerated the main recommendations and measures based on the results of the work done by some groups. For example, recommendations made by the Healthcare group in 2015 on measures to handle a global pandemic have been supplemented. As part of the Education and Science group, the BRICS Network University and the BRICS University League have been created and now start working together. The group on ecology, which faces a host of paramount and urgent tasks, deserved a special mention.

Oleg Zhiganov, co-chairman of the BRICS Civil Forum’s Information Strategies and Society working group, said that they would concentrate on the issue of post-truth in the modern-day media of the BRICS countries.

“During this event, we agreed with our colleagues that we will speak the truth and nothing but the truth,” Zhiganov said, having in mind critical approach and fact-checking in a rapidly developing information society.

“The main thing that we are going to discuss is providing support for educational projects in universities and schools in order to instill a sense of critical thinking in young people and the ability to assess the objectivity of certain facts,” Zhiganov noted.

Natalia Tsaizer, co-chair of the BRICS Civil Forum’s Women and Girls working group, shared the results of her group’s meetings, highlighting the current issue of gender equality in the BRICS countries. She noted that her working group is out to eliminate gender imbalance and equalize men and women when it comes to career growth and their role in decision-making structures, including in the military.

“There are a huge number of areas in the economy, politics, and the social sphere, where women are underestimated in terms of their involvement in the processes, not only as observers, performers and ‘beautifiers’ of the working process, but as actors ready to make decisions, set goals and implement them,” Tsaizer said.

The issue of gender equality is extremely relevant not only in the BRICS countries, but elsewhere in the world. However, while it is imperative to provide equal opportunities for men and women to be involved in various organizations, Natalia Tsaizer still warned against sliding into what she described as “militant feminism.” The participants in the working group’s meeting proposed involving women in the decision-making process in various areas, and setting up anti-crisis committees within BRICS where women would make up at least 50 percent of their membership. 

“On the one hand, this is quotas, but on the other, this is something we just can’t do without because we need to regulate our presence that we could rely on,” Tsaizer argued. She also noted that right now the working group consists of women only, since men are not very actively involved in tackling such issues, even though achieving gender balance is high on the agenda of the Women and Girls group.

Stepan Kanakin, the coordinator of the BRICS Civil Forum, answered questions regarding the technical aspects of organizing the forum in conditions of a pandemic.

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Did Russia-China Relations Successfully Pass the “COVID,” “Hong Kong,” “India” and “Belarus” Tests?

Danil Bochkov

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image credit: kremlin.ru

Russia-China relations have been steadily improving since at least 2013, when the leaders of both countries presented a joint statement calling for deepening bilateral relations of “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination.” This formula has been modified with an addition of the “new era,” signifying both countries recognising new global challenges and the changing geopolitical environment. COVID-19 has largely contributed to the intensification of certain trends, including antagonism with the U.S. and the pursuit of more robust bilateral ties.

If before both countries would challenge and combat U.S. hostility (economic sanctions, political pressure, adversary rhetoric, etc.) mainly on their own, they are now more inclined to align and coordinate actions to elaborate more coherent voices towards the West. In late July, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that the U.S. could not drive a wedge between Russia and China by expecting Moscow to join its anti-China alliance. Rather, Russia views further improvement of relations with China as a major factor that will contribute to stability in global politics.

In May, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that, amid the virus outbreak, bilateral support between Russia and China became a safe fortress for “political viruses.” During a telephone conversation in July, Putin and Xi stressed that the agenda for the strategic partnership in Russia-China relations was materialised during the pandemic in the form of mutual help provided at a critical moment.

China and Russia have recently demonstrated the historical legacy of their close relations through the publication of a co-authored report by Russian and Chinese ambassadors to the U.S. The report unambiguously states that all countries must combine their efforts to tackle pressing issues such as climate change, terrorism, world pandemics, economic downturns, etc. These concerns are all focal points in which Russia and China have achieved mutual understanding.

Notably, even during the very vague political gridlock of the Belarusian leadership in the aftermath of the August presidential elections, China and Russia immediately demonstrated their support to the re-elected president Lukashenko. While President Putin congratulated the Belarusian president with a telegram, President Xi-Jinping opted for a personal phone call, during which he reassured Mr Lukashenko of China’s strong commitment to “push forward Chinese-Belarusian comprehensive strategic partnership.” Such profound political signals did not go unnoticed in Minsk, which has expressed gratitude to Russia and China for their support during these challenging times. China’s position on Belarus is important for Russia, as Moscow regards Belarus as its closest and most faithful ally. Belarus is now moving towards a higher level of political and economic integration with Russia, becoming a “Union State.”

As a signal of recognition and respect for Chinese core interests, Russia extended its support to China over Hong Kong, which came under the global spotlight following the introduction of the National Security Law in June. In a very crucial moment for China, when it received widespread criticism from all other major powers, Russia bluntly stressed that “the situation in Hong Kong as a purely internal matter of China,” thus fending off all speculation on the city’s juridical status.

China and Russia have recently vowed to strengthen their coordination on international platforms, which was seen in early July in the UN during their opposition to the extension of cross-border aid in Syria. The opposition to the U.S. initiative in June within the UN Security Council to reimpose an arms embargo on Iran following the break-up of the 2015 nuclear deal was another display of harmonised action. Multiple international issues were touched upon during the meeting between the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers on September 11. Both countries reaffirmed the “closeness of their views on effective solutions to them,” and stressed that “the destructive character of Washington’s actions undermines global strategic stability.” Overall, the meeting once again confirmed the shared views of Russia and China in both the multilateral and bilateral dimensions.

The Russia-India-China format has made significant progress after a period of relatively little activity. The latest gathering of the RIC group took place in June. At that time, Moscow highlighted that India-China border conflicts were to be solved based on bilateral agreements only. Recently, Moscow has initiated negotiations between the defence ministers of India and China in order to find conflict mitigation solutions. As a result, Chinese and Indian officials met for the first time since the border dispute in May.

By organising peace talks involving China and India, Russia is playing a critical role in regional affairs. The upcoming meeting of the respective ministers of foreign affairs reinforces this statement. Meanwhile, the U.S. has repeatedly pitched its own candidacy as an intermediary, with the most recent attempt in early September. Russian media positioned the Moscow-hosted China-India meeting on September 10 as a rare foreign policy success. During their “frank and constructive” discussion in Moscow, India and China reached an important agreement to deescalate border tensions which are not in “the interest of either side.”

Economically, Sino-Russian cooperation experienced a COVID-19 blow, with trade volume falling by 5,6 per cent in June, amounting to USD 50 billion. Although it may have a tangible impact on the annual statistics, moving the 2019-set milestone for 2024 away from the predicted USD 200 billion in trade follows the global trend of economic contraction, with consumer demand in free fall. For example, the overall volume of Chinese foreign trade from January to June dropped by 6,6 per cent. However, this trade contraction reflects more about global trade dynamics at the moment than changes in Russia-China relations.

As a recent sign of combined efforts to contain U.S. global ambitions, Russia and China were able to decrease U.S. dollar transaction for trade to its historical minimum – from 51 per cent in 2019 to 46 per cent in 2020. The same trend for intensified bilateral cooperation can also be seen in the energy sphere. Following the successful launch of “Power of Siberia” last December, the Russian state energy giant “Gazprom” is embracing a new audacious initiative, the “Power of Siberia-2” gas pipeline. The project will connect Russia, China and Mongolia. On behalf of the President of Russia, Gazprom started the design and survey work on the project in May.

Energy cooperation remains a crucial element of bilateral relations. Fresh statistics show that in July, Russia once again secured its position as the largest importer of oil to China, with a 30 per cent spike. This amounted to 7.38 million tons (compared to 2019). In April, Russia took over Saudi Arabia as the biggest crude oil supplier, delivering 7.2 million tons. This is 18 per cent more than in 2019.

Russia-China relations represent a “strategic partnership,” which means that the two countries view themselves as partners on strategic issues. Indeed, on a majority of topics, be it global governance, world economic structure, geopolitics or security, Russia and China are on the same page. Many of them are of strategic significance pertaining to both sides. Both countries enjoy fruitful cooperation on multilateral platforms such as BRICS, SCO and the UN.

Nevertheless, despite their flawless facade, Russia-China relations have a weak spot – their difference in strategic and national interests. This is normal for global powers. For example, Beijing can never compromise its core national interests such as the South China Sea (SCS), Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Tibet, even to please its tried and tested partner, Moscow. This explains why China has repeatedly pressured Vietnam to halt all oil extraction activities in the SCS over the last two years. This has resulted in Vietnam suspending business cooperation in the SCS with the Russian state oil giant, Rosneft. On the other hand, Russia will never put its core interests at risk (especially concerning territorial integrity), irrespective of Beijing’s rhetoric concerning Russian Far East territories.

As long as Russia and China base their partnership on coinciding strategic interests and avoid any ubiquitous and provocative moves – their relations are likely to remain in the current burgeoning state or under the best circumstances can even be elevated to a higher level. Overall, during the first half of the year, relations between China and Russia were challenged several times. Despite some small cracks, like decreasing trade and frictions regarding energy projects in the South China Sea, their flawless mutual propaganda remains untarnished. As long as they can maintain a close and mutually beneficial bilateral tie, they should be able to endure any future challenges with ease.

From our partner RIAC

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