In 2019, the book «India’s strategic options in a changing cyberspace» written by Cherian Samuel and Munich Charma was published. (New Delhi, Pentagon Press LLP in association with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2019). In their work, the authors examine the general concept of cyberspace, while extrapolating it to India’s cyberspace dimension.
Cybersecurity problems are tightly included in the new agenda of international relations, which stresses the importance of their comprehensive study, now more relevant than ever. The work raises several issues that appear to be important for a modern understanding of cyberspace. Among the issues raised, we find cyber deterrence, the regulatory framework for cyberspace, the protection of the critical state infrastructure, Active Cyber Defense knowledge, and its attendant legal and ethical issues.
To begin with, the authors illustrate the reasons why the decided to start the book. Firstly, due to the constant change in threats and actors, cyber policy is said to be a moving target. The second problematic lies on the fact that the development of adequate measures becomes difficult for governments, especially international organizations.
The first problem identified by the authors refers to an instrumental nature — namely a lack of technical knowledge, a sophisticated conceptual framework. Trying to analyze the meaning of cyberspace, cybersecurity, cyber warfare, cyber weapons, deterrence in cyberspace, and critical information infrastructure, the authors conclude that each actor understands them in their own way. For example, the concept of “Cybersecurity” is developed in the West. It focuses mainly on the technical side of security. Conversely, the “International Information Security” concept is widespread in China and the CIS and focuses on its political and instrumental use, as well as the compromise “Security in the field of information and security, communication technologies and their use.”
The second problem refers to the lack of access to source data, the presence of conflicting versions of events. According to the authors, the problem would arise due to the lack of the ability to formulate a full-fledged unambiguous conclusion based on the available data. Cyberspace often becomes part of military strategies and doctrines of states. The authors tried to provide the reader with a complete picture of the different countries’ and organizations’ versions, having worked out each of them qualitatively.
The third problem relates to the high politicization of the topic. In the beginning, cyberspace was characterized as common property; its regulation was possible within the framework of international institutions and forums established over the years. Among the more prominent ones we list the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Examples of NGOs’ participation and think tanks are the Global Conference on Cyber Space (GCCS), the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, and the World Internet Conference.
Over time, however, the tendency to diversify measures to regulate cyberspace has emerged. Only the general trend developed by the Western community remained — to keep cyberspace “open, secure, stable and free.” By declaring Western centricity, the authors refer to the fact that the development and implementation of the latest infrastructure took place from the global West to the East. If the issue of development and implementation has long ceased to be exclusively Western and acquired the outlines of a network structure, now the politicization of the topic lies in ideologically loaded terms. This is expressed in well-established clichés according to which the best hackers who can influence the election results are Russians or Chinese.
Issue number four refers to the fact that the topic of cyberspace is very voluminous. It includes the aspect of global governance in cyberspace, the level of militarization, the legal obligations of each of the parties, and the right to self-defense of the country and the individual. In their book, authors focused on specific areas of cyberspace, like for instance the concept of Active Cyber Defense. After analyzing the approaches of different countries, the authors conclude that the strategy is moving from offensive to defensive, a tendency that intensified after the World War II. Nation-states trying to protect their interests, undertake actions that need to be declared. Any response thereafter is made in accordance with calculations of political benefit, economic leverage, or purely self-defense. In this regard, the authors compared the development of concepts for nuclear weapons and cyber weapons. The development of atomic weapons after the Second World War and artificial intelligence and quantum calculus today depends entirely on the development of technology. Despite some similarities, cyberspace appear to be more complicated due to the inability to establish the source of the attack and the consequences of asymmetrical response.
And, finally, the fifth identified problem is the lack of a clear international legal framework. The author highlights the concepts of different states, from the USA to China and from Russia to the UK. There are two block approaches to the regulation of cyberspace. The first — tentatively referred to as “Western” — assume that in general, the existing body of international law, humanitarian law in particular, already covers cyberspace. It can be applied to issues related to emerging information technology. This approach was most clearly developed in the Tallinn Guidelines for Cyber Warfare and Cyber Operations (developed in two points by the NATO Joint Center for Excellence in Cyber Defense).
The second approach, the Russian one, suggests that although relevant international law applies to cyberspace, the formation of an additional base of legally binding documents is necessary. The Russian approach focuses more on how to prevent information wars, while the Tallinn leadership regulates the rules of war itself. Therefore, the domestic approach does not accept the method of the North Atlantic Alliance, perceiving it as already de facto legalizing cyber warfare. The key document refers to the 2011 Convention on International Information Security, which aims to prevent the misuse of information and communication technologies for political, military, terrorist, and criminal purposes.
Furthermore, the authors devote special attention to a very crucial document, now taken as a kind of consensus between the two designated approaches — the Report of the UN Group of Government Experts (UN GGE) 2015, stating that:
- States will not attack each other’s critical infrastructure
- they will no longer insert malicious “bookmarks” into their IT products.
- refrain from indiscriminately accusing each other of cyber attacks.
- make efforts in the fight against hackers carrying out computer sabotage from or through their territory.
Per contra, cyber-norms have already dramatically influenced social norms. The role of « norm entrepreneurs » consists in persuasion through the organizational platform.
Going forward, while many States still perceive the evolving norms with a sense of unity, the focus seems to have shifted from negotiations norms among adversaries to shaping patterns with like-minded countries, setting the norm of competition in cyberspace.
At the level of national states, the confidentiality issue arises due to mass surveillance, that is when a democratic state enters a polemic with civil society over the legality of access to encrypted data (for example, a terrorist). Beyond the identity, attribution also extends to figuring out the motivations and intentions of the attacker, and whether he/she is acting alone or on behalf of a state or an entity. The vulnerability of critical infrastructure further exacerbates the situation. Cyberattacks are the equivalent of natural disasters. And to eliminate these disasters and preventive responses, cyberspace offers unprecedented opportunities for public-private partnerships. This would ideally be achieved through more cooperation between government outsourcing their responsibility of being overarching security provider to private companies or acquiescing to private sector demands. Nevertheless, the approaches and laws for data protection have subjective applicability and relevance, like the requirements, digitization, and technology maturity vary across every nation-state.
In the ratio of information security and communication in cyberspace, the author calls encryption a possible key to solving the problem.
Having made cybersecurity one of the priority areas of action, India appears as a flagship cybersecurity country. Critical infrastructure is now much more dependent on cyberspace, and trade-offs can be detrimental. Higher confidence in attribution can justify punishment and strengthen deterrent capability by setting a precedence that threat actors, including nation-states, will have to pay as a response for any hostility. Cybersecurity, as a non-traditional security domain, would require a non-traditional approach to problem-solving and public-private partnerships. Something that, in this case, could help provide solutions to many problems.
If we trace the logic of the authors’ thoughts, we can see that the line moves from the level of international organizations to the individual level, which is of interest. Cyberspace, like nothing else, shows the entry into the world stage of new actors. These actors appear due to objective necessity. States are no longer the only guarantors of personal security. The network system of interaction of actors partly erases state borders. However, boundaries appear as soon as the actor crosses the established red line, the permitted boundary of actions. At the same time, for each actor, this red line remains individual. The combination of the tangible physical world of the infrastructural and virtual world remains too voluminous for operationalization. However, the apparent shrink of the cyber universe is observed.
Dr. Cherian Samuel is Research Fellow in the Strategic Technologies Centre at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. He has written on various cybersecurity issues, including critical infrastructure protection, cyber resilience, cybercrime, and internet governance. Munish Sharma is a Consultant in the Strategic Technologies Centre at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. His research interests include cybersecurity, critical information infrastructure protection, space security, and geopolitical aspects of emerging technologies.
From our partner RIAC
Interesting archaeological discovery in Israel
An ancient scarab from three thousand years ago was surprisingly discovered during a school trip to Azor, near Tel Aviv, Israel. The scene depicted on the scarab probably represents the conferral of legitimate power and authority on a local ruler.
“We were wandering around, when I saw something that looked like a small toy on the ground,” told Gilad Stern of the Education Centre of the Israeli Antiquities Authorityntre, who was leading the school trip. “An inner voice told me: ‘Pick it up and turn it over.’ I was amazed: it was a scarab with a clearly engraved scene, the dream of every amateur archaeologist. The pupils were really enthusiastic!”.
The visit of the Rabin Middle School eight graders took place as part of a tour guide course organised by the Education Centre of the Israel Antiquities Authority for the third consecutive year. The course enables students to teach the residents of Azor about the local archaeological heritage.
The scarab was designed in the shape of the common dung beetle. The ancient Egyptians saw in the gesture of the tiny scarab, which rolls a ball of dung twice its size where it stores its future offspring, the embodiment of creation and regeneration, similar to the gesture of the Creator God.
According to Dr. Amir Golani, an expert of the Israeli Antiquities Authority specialized in the Bronze Age period, “the scarab was used as a seal and was a symbol of power and status. It could be inserted into a necklace or a ring. It is made of silicate earthenware covered with a bluish-green glaze. It could have fallen from the hands of an important and influential personage passing through the area, or it could have been deliberately buried in the ground with other objects and after thousands of years returned to the surface. It is difficult to determine the precise original context.”
The lower, flat part of the scarab seal depicts a figure seated on a chair in front of a standing figure, whose arm is raised above that of the seated person. The standing figure has an elongated head, which seems to represent the crown of an Egyptian pharaoh. It is possible that we are seeing here a snapshot of a scene in which the Egyptian pharaoh confers power and authority on a local Canaanite.
“This scene fundamentally reflects the geopolitical reality that prevailed in the Land of Canaan during the Late Bronze Age (approx. 1500-1000 BC), when local Canaanite rulers lived under Egypt’s political and cultural hegemony (and sometimes rebelled against it)” – said Dr. Golani. “It is therefore very likely that the seal dates back to the Late Bronze Age, when the local Canaanites were ruled by the Egyptian Empire”.
Scarab seals are indeed distinctly Egyptian, but their widespread use extended beyond the borders of ancient Egypt. Hundreds of scarabs were discovered in the Land of ancient Israel, mostly in tombs, but also in settlement layers. Some of them were imported from Egypt, many others were imitated in ancient Israel by local craftsmen under Egyptian influence. The level of workmanship of the particular scarab found is not typical of Egypt and may be a product of local craftsmen.
Towards Efficient Matrix Multiplication
Algorithms have, over the years, helped mathematicians/scientists solve numerous fundamental operations. From the early use of simple algorithms by Egyptian, Greek, and Persian mathematicians to the shift towards more robust AI-enabled algorithms, their evolution has manifested incredible progress in the technological realm. While Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) are extending their reach and contributions in various military and civilian domains, it is interesting to witness the application of the technology on itself, i.e., using ML to improve the effectiveness of its underlying algorithms.
Despite the increased familiarisation with algorithms over time, it remains fairly strenuous to find new algorithms that can prove reliable and accurate. Interestingly, ‘Discovering faster matrix multiplication algorithms with reinforcement learning,’ a recent study by DeepMind, a British AI subsidiary in London, published in Nature, has demonstrated some interesting findings in this regard. It revealed new shortcuts simulated by AI for faster mathematical calculations vis-à-vis matrix multiplication.
DeepMind developed an AI system called ‘AlphaTensor’, to expedite matrix multiplication. Matrix multiplication – which uses two grids of numbers multiplied together – is a simple algebraic expression often taught in high school. However, its ubiquitous use in the digital world and computing has considerable influence.
‘AlphaTensor’ was tasked with creating novel, correct, and efficient algorithms to carry out matrix multiplication with the least number of steps possible. The algorithm discovery process was treated as a single-player game. It used AlphaZero – the same AI agent which gained global traction when it displayed extraordinary intelligence in board games like Chess and Go.
AlphaTensor conceptualised the board into a 3-D array of numbers which, through a limited number of moves, tried to find the correct multiplication algorithms. It uses reinforcement learning, where the neural networks interact with the environment toward a specific goal. If the results are favourable, the internal parameters are updated. It also uses Tree Search, in which the ML explores the results of branching possibilities to choose the next action. It seeks to identify the most promising action at each step. The outcomes are used to sharpen neural networks, further helping the tree search, and providing more successes to learn from.
As per the paper’s findings, AlphaTensor discovered thousands of algorithms for various sizes for multiplication matrices, some of which were able to break decades-long computational efficiency records of the previously existing algorithms. They overshadowed the towering complexity of the best-known Strassen’s two-level algorithm for multiplying matrix. For example, AlphaTensor found an algorithm for solving a 4 x 4 matrice in 47 steps overperforming the Strassen algorithm, which used 49 steps for the same operation. Similarly, if a set of matrices was solved using 80 multiplication steps, AlphaTensor reduced it to only 76 steps. This development has caused quite a stir in the tech world as it is being claimed that a fifty-year old record has been broken in Computer Science.
However, the episode underlines some important implications. Given that matrix multiplication is a core component of the digital world, companies around the world have invested considerable time and resources in computer hardware for matrix multiplication. Since it is used across a wide range of domains, including computing, processing images, generating graphics, running simulations, digital communication, and neural networks etc. – to name a few, even minor improvements in matrix multiplication’s efficiency could have a notable and widespread impact in the concerned fields.
The findings manifest the potential of ML to solve even more complicated mathematical problems. The automatic discovery of algorithms via ML offers new capacities to surpass the existing best human-designed algorithms. It introduces new ML techniques, which have the potential to increase computing speed by 20 percent leading to much more feasible timelines. It is pertinent to mention that a lesser number of operations lead to not only lesser time but also less amount of energy spent.
The finding has presented a model to gamify ML to solve mathematical operations. It exhibited that AlphaZero is a potent algorithm that could be used beyond winning traditional games and be applied to solving complex mathematical operations/tasks.
This DeepMind discovery can pave the way for future research on understanding matrix multiplication algorithms and be an inspiration to use AI for algorithm discovery for other computing tasks and set the stage for a possible breakthrough in the field.
The increased efficiency of matrix multiplication has once again brought into light the ever-expanding potential of AI. To be fair, such developments do not infer that human programmers would be out of the job soon; rather, at least for now, it should be seen as an addition of an optimisation tool in the coder’s arsenal, which could lead to more innovative discoveries in the future with remarkable implications for the world.
Kissinger and the current situation considering the development of Artificial Intelligence and the Ukrainian crisis
Kissinger has recently published some reflections on the course of world politics in recent decades, with references to the return of the 20th century conflicts brought to light by the development of new weaponry and strategic scenarios mediated by Artificial Intelligence. Kissinger has also referred to the situation in Ukraine and the equilibria between the United States, Russia and China.
Kissinger has stated that instant communication and the technological revolution have combined to provide new meaning and urgency to two crucial issues that leaders must address:
1) what is essential for national security?
2) what is necessary for peaceful international coexistence?
Although a plethora of empires existed, aspirations for world order were confined by geography and technology to specific regions. This was also true for the Roman and Chinese empires, which encompassed a wide range of societies and cultures. These were regional orders that co-evolved as world orders.
From the 16th century onwards, the development of technology, medicine and economic and political organisation expanded Europe’s ability to project its power and government systems around the world. From the mid-17th century, the Westphalian system was based on respect for sovereignty and international law. Later that system took root throughout the world and, after the end of traditional colonialism, it led to the emergence of States which – largely formally abandoned by the former motherlands – insisted on defining, and even defying, the rules of the established world order – at least the countries that really got rid of imperialistic domination, such as the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, etc.
Since the end of World War II, mankind has lived in a delicate balance between relative security and legitimacy. In no previous period of history would the consequences of an error in this balance have been more severe or catastrophic. The contemporary age has introduced a level of destructiveness that potentially enables mankind to self-destruct. Advanced systems of mutual destruction were aimed at pursuing not ultimate victory but rather at preventing others’ attack.
This is the reason why shortly after the Japanese nuclear tragedy of 1945, the deployment of nuclear weapons began to become incalculable, unconstrained by consequences and based on the certainty of security systems.
For seventy-six years (1946-2022) while advanced weapons grew in power, complexity and accuracy, no country was convinced to actually use them, even in conflict with non-nuclear countries. Both the United States of America and the Soviet Union that accepted defeat at the hands of non-nuclear countries without resorting to their own most lethal weapons: as in the case of the Korean War, Vietnam, Afghanistan (both the Soviets and the Americans in that case).
To this day, such nuclear dilemmas have not disappeared, but have instead changed as more States have developed more refined weapons than the “nuclear bomb” and the essentially bipolar distribution of destructive capabilities of the former Cold War has been replaced by very high-tech options – a topic addressed in my various articles.
Cyber weapons and artificial intelligence applications (such as autonomous weapon systems) greatly complicate the current dangerous war prospects. Unlike nuclear weapons, cyber weapons and artificial intelligence are ubiquitous, relatively inexpensive to develop and easy to use.
Cyber weapons combine the capacity for massive impact with the ability to obscure the attribution of attacks, which is crucial when the attacker is no longer a precise reference but becomes a “quiz”.
As we have often pointed out, artificial intelligence can also overcome the need for human operators, and enable weapons to launch themselves based on their own calculations and their ability to choose targets with almost absolute precision and accuracy.
Because the threshold for their use is so low and their destructive ability so great, the use of such weapons – or even their mere threat – can turn a crisis into a war or turn a limited war into a nuclear war through unintentional or uncontrollable escalation. To put it in simple terms, there will no longer be the need to drop the “bomb” first, as it would be downgraded to a weapon of retaliation against possible and not certain enemies. On the contrary, with the help of artificial intelligence, third parties could make sure that the first cyber-attack is attributed to those who have never attacked.
The impact of this technology makes its application a cataclysm, thus making its use so limited that it becomes unmanageable.
No diplomacy has yet been invented to explicitly threaten its use without the risk of an anticipated response. So much so that arms control Summits seem to have been played down by these uncontrollable novelties, ranging from unmarked drone attacks to cyberattacks from the depths of the Net.
Technological developments are currently accompanied by a political transformation. Today we are witnessing the resurgence of rivalry between the great powers, amplified by the spread and advancement of surprising technologies. When in the early 1970s the People’s Republic of China embarked on its re-entry into the international diplomatic system at the initiative of Zhou Enlai and, at the end of that decade, on its full re-entry into the international arena thanks to Deng Xiaoping, its human and economic potential was vast, but its technology and actual power were relatively limited.
Meanwhile, China’s growing economic and strategic capabilities have forced the United States of America to confront –
for the first time in its history – a geopolitical competitor whose resources are potentially comparable to its own.
Each side sees itself as a unicum, but in a different way. The United States of America acts on the assumption that its values are universally applicable and will eventually be adopted everywhere. The People’s Republic of China, instead, expects that the uniqueness of its ultra-millennial civilisation and the impressive economic leap forward will inspire other countries to emulate it to break free from imperialist domination and show respect for Chinese priorities.
Both the US “manifest destiny” missionary impulse and the Chinese sense of grandeur and cultural eminence – of China as such, including Taiwan – imply a kind of subordination-fear of each other. Due to the nature of their economies and high technology, each country is affecting what the other has so far considered its core interests.
In the 21st century China seems to have embarked on playing an international role to which it considers itself entitled by its achievements over the millennia. The United States of America, on the other hand, is taking action to project power, purpose, and diplomacy around the world to maintain a global equilibrium established in its post-war experience, responding to tangible and imagined challenges to this world order.
For the leadership on both sides, these security requirements seem self-evident. They are supported by their respective citizens. Yet security is only part of the wide picture. The fundamental issue for the planet’s existence is whether the two giants can learn to combine the inevitable strategic rivalry with a concept and practice of coexistence.
Russia – unlike the United States of America and China – lacks the market power, demographic clout and diversified industrial base.
Spanning eleven time zones and enjoying few natural defensive demarcations, Russia has acted according to its own geographical and historical imperatives. Russia’s foreign policy represents a mystical patriotism in a Third Rome-style imperial law, with a lingering perception of insecurity essentially stemming from the country’s long-standing vulnerability to invasion across the plains of Eastern Europe.
For centuries, its leaders from Peter the Great to Stalin – who, by the way, was not even Russian, but felt he was so in the internationalist spirit that led to the creation of the USSR on 30 December 1922 – have sought to isolate Russia’s vast territory with a safety belt imposed around its diffuse border. Today Kissinger tells us that the same priority is manifested once again in the attack on Ukraine – and we add that few people understand and many others pretend not to understand this.
The mutual impact of these societies has been shaped by their strategic assessments, which stem from their history. The Ukrainian conflict is a case in point. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the turning of its Member States (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, Hungary) into “Western” countries, the whole territory – from the security line established in central Europe up to Russia’s national border – has opened up to a new strategic design. Stability depended on the fact that the Warsaw Pact in itself – especially after the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in Helsinki in 1975 – allayed Europe’s traditional fears of Russian domination (indeed, Soviet domination, at the time), and assuaged Russia’s traditional concerns about Western offensives – from the Swedes to Napoleon until Hitler. Hence, the strategic geography of Ukraine embodies these concerns emerging again in Russia. If Ukraine were to join NATO, the security line between Russia and the West would be placed within just over 500 kilometres of Moscow, actually eliminating the traditional buffer that saved Russia when Sweden, France and Germany tried to occupy it in previous centuries.
If the security border were to be established on the Western side of Ukraine, Russian forces would be within easy reach of Budapest and Warsaw. The February 2022 invasion of Ukraine is a flagrant violation of the international law mentioned above, and is thus largely a consequence of a failed or otherwise inadequately undertaken strategic dialogue. The experience of two nuclear entities confronting each other militarily – although not resorting to their destructive weapons – underlines the urgency of the fundamental problem, as Ukraine is only a tool of the West. Dario Fo once said that China was an invention of Albania to scare the Soviet Union. We can say that Ukraine is currently an invention of the West to scare Russia – and this is not a joke. An invention for which Ukrainians and Russians are paying with their blood.
Hence the triangular relationship between the United States of America, the People’s Republic of China, and the Russian Federation will eventually resume, even if Russia will be weakened by the demonstration of its intended military limitations in Ukraine, the widespread rejection of its conduct, and the scope and impact of sanctions against it. But it will retain nuclear and cyber capabilities for doomsday scenarios.
In the US-Chinese relationship, instead, the conundrum is whether two different concepts of national greatness can learn to peacefully coexist side by side and how. In the case of Russia, the challenge is whether the country can reconcile its vision of itself with the self-determination and security of the countries in what it has long called its “near abroad” (mainly Central Asia and Eastern Europe), and do so as part of an international system rather than through domination.
It now seems possible that an order based on universal rules, however worthy in its conception, will be replaced in practice, for an indefinite period of time, by an at least partially decoupled world. Such a division encourages a search at its margins for spheres of influence. In such a case, how will countries that do not agree on global rules of conduct be able to operate within an agreed equilibrium design? Will the quest for domination overwhelm the analysis of coexistence?
In a world of increasingly formidable technology that can either elevate or dismantle human civilisation, there is no definitive solution to the competition between great powers, let alone a military one. An unbridled technological race, justified by the foreign policy ideology in which each side is convinced of the other’s malicious intent, risks creating a catastrophic cycle of mutual suspicion like the one that triggered World War I, but with incomparably greater consequences.
All sides are therefore now obliged to re-examine their first principles of international behaviour and relate them to the possibilities of coexistence. For the leaders of high-tech companies, there is a moral and strategic imperative to pursue – both within their own countries and with potential adversary countries – an ongoing discussion on the implications of technology and how its military applications could be limited.
The topic is too important to be neglected until crises arise. The arms control dialogues that helped toning down and showing restraint during the nuclear age, as well as the high-level research on the consequences of emerging technologies, could prompt reflection and promote habits of mutual strategic self-restraint.
An irony of the current world is that one of its glories – the revolutionary explosion of technology – has emerged so quickly, and with such optimism, that it has outgrown its dangers, and inadequate systematic efforts have been made to understand its capabilities.
Technologists develop amazing devices, but have had few opportunities to explore and evaluate their comparative implications within a historical framework. As I pointed out in a previous article, political leaders too often lack adequate understanding of the strategic and philosophical implications of the machines and algorithms available to them. At the same time, the technological revolution is eroding human consciousness and perceptions of the nature of reality. The last great transformation – the Enlightenment – replaced the age of faith with repeatable experiments and logical deductions. Now it is supplanted by dependence on algorithms, which work in the opposite direction, offering results in search of an explanation. Exploring these new frontiers will require considerable efforts on the part of national leaders to reduce, and ideally bridge, the gaps between the worlds of technology, politics, history and philosophy.
The leaders of current great powers need not immediately develop a detailed vision of how to solve the dilemmas described here. Kissinger warns that, however, they must be clear about what is to be avoided and what cannot be tolerated. The wise must anticipate challenges before they manifest themselves as crises. Lacking a moral and strategic vision, the current era is unbridled. The extent of our future still defies understanding not so much of what will happen but of what has already happened.
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