Connect with us

Middle East

Syria lures but will China bite?

Published

on

China looms large as a potentially key player alongside Russia and Iran in President Bashas al-Assad’s post-war Syria. With Russia and Iran lacking the financial muscle and the United States and Europe refusing to  engage with the Al-Assad regime, China is from Syria’s perspective the shining knight on a white horse. Syria could become a key node in China’s infrastructure, telecommunications and energy-driven Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Syria could also bring it closer to being sucked into the Middle East’s multiple conflicts.

China’s economic interests in Syria

Mohammed Jarah and Ahmad Bustati’s warehouse in Damascus symbolized China’s emergence as the largest supplier of industrial and consumer goods to Syria on the eve of the Syrian civil war. The dilapidated warehouse was stocked with everything from Chinese laser cutting machines to plastic toys for children.

A decade of fighting dashed the two Syrian entrepreneurs’ hopes. However, things seem to be looking up for businessmen like Mr. Jarah and Mr. Bustati with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad having gained the upper hand in the war with Russian and Iranian assistance and China seeing longer-term economic potential in Syria as a regional node of what BRI will look like irrespective of the coronavirus pandemic and its devastating economic consequences.

Syrian officials have sought to drive home China’s competitive advantages and perceived interest in taking a lead in the reconstruction of their country. “The Silk Road is not a silk road if it does not pass through Syria, Iraq and Iran,” said Buthina Shaaban, Bashar al-Assad’s media advisor, referring to the BRI.

Chinese access to the Syrian Mediterranean Sea ports of Tartus and Latakia is an attractive prospect for China’s multi-billion-dollar infrastructure, telecommunications and energy-driven initiative that seeks to link Eurasia to the People’s Republic. It would complement Beijing’s footholds in Greece’s Piraeus and the Israeli harbours of Haifa and Ashdod and echo Syria’s key position on the ancient Silk Road.

Closely connected to Chinese interest in Syrian ports is the exploration by China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd (CHEC) of the possible upgrading of the deep seaport of Tripoli, Lebanon to allow it to accommodate larger vessels. In contrast to Syrian ports, Tripoli would grant China greater freedom of action because it would not have to share control with Russia. Together with Syrian ports, Tripoli would serve as an alternative to passage through the Suez Canal.

Russia appeared to be anticipating potential Chinese moves when it last year negotiated with the Assad government an extension of its access to military bases including what it describes as a “logistics support facility of the Russian navy” in Tartus.

In the absence of making the agreement public, it remained unclear what Russian intentions are. However, modernization of Tartus for military purposes that would guarantee Russia a role in control of the Eastern Mediterranean would have to involve upgrading it to be able to accommodate all types of vessels, including aircraft carriers.

In a further move, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his foreign and defence ministries in May to reach agreement with Syria on an additional expansion of a 2015 accord that governs Russia’s naval presence in Tartus and allows the Russian navy to base up to 11 ships in the port for 49 years. Mr. Putin wants the life of the agreement to be extended by an additional 25 years.

“From the coast of Syria, there is an opportunity to control not only the eastern part, but the entire Mediterranean Sea,” said Captain 1st Rank Anatoly Ivanov, a Moscow-based naval expert. “The United States has in the Mediterranean Sea not only the ships of its Sixth Fleet, but also an extensive ship repair base and training centres of the Navy. For Russia, the Mediterranean Sea is much closer not only geographically, but also geopolitically. Therefore, to use the opportunity to establish (itself) more densely in Syria seems to be a reasonable measure”

Qingdao Haixi Heavy-Duty Machinery Co. has already sold Tripoli port two 28-storey container cranes capable of lifting and transporting more than 700 containers a day, while a container vessel belonging to China’s state-owned COSCO Shipping Lines docked in Tripoli in December 2018, inaugurating a new maritime route between China and the Mediterranean.

Major Chinese construction companies are also looking at building a railroad that would connect Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon to Homs and Aleppo in Syria. China has suggested that Tripoli could become a special economic zone within the  BRI and serve as an important trans-shipment point between the People’s Republic and Europe.

Adding to China’s expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean, COSCO acquired in 2015 a 65 percent stake in Turkey’s  Kumport Terminal on the Ambarli coast of Istanbul. To round off the circle, Egypt’s navy last year signed an agreement with China’s Hutchinson Ports to build a terminal in Abu Qir, a port 23 kilometres northeast of Alexandria.  Chinese companies already operate Alexandria’s own port as well as that of El Dekheila, ten kilometres west of the city.

Chinese influence in at least ten ports in six countries bordering the Eastern Mediterranean – Israel, Greece, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, and Syria – could complicate US and NATO’s ability to manoeuvre in the region.

This was one reason that the Trump administration has warned Israel that Chinese involvement in Haifa, where the Chinese have built their own pier, could jeopardize continued use of the port by the US sixth fleet.

Informing US thinking is China’s Military Strategy white paper, published in 2015, that emphasises the “strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open seas.” It raises the spectre of Chinese-managed or owned ports in the Eastern Mediterranean serving the People’s Republic’s economic and commercial, as well as military interests.

The Chinese sway over multiple ports in the Eastern Mediterranean could also  encourage  Turkey to bolster its grip on the  energy-rich waters in violation of international law. Turkish military support for the internationally recognised Libyan Government of National Accord produced a maritime agreement between the two entities that created an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean favouring expansive Turkish claims.

China’s interest in Mediterranean ports is part of a larger effort to integrate the Middle East into the maritime leg of the Belt and Road that also includes the Gulf, the Arabian Sea with the Pakistani port of Gwadar as its focal point, and the Red Sea with the establishment of the People’s Republic’s first military outpost in Djibouti.

The integration is further advanced by Chinese investment in ports and logistics facilities in among others Dubai and Oman as well as industrial parks linked to maritime infrastructure. China’s moves have been embraced by Gulf states, several of which have incorporated them in long-term plans to diversify and streamline their economies.

Qi Qianjin, China’s ambassador in Damascus, spelled out China’s interest in Syria when he stressed in 2018, in a statement in 2018 to the People’s Republic’s state-run news agency Xinhua as well as in a letter, his country’s intent to expand its economic, political, and military footprint in  the.

“I think it’s about time to focus all efforts on the development and reconstruction of Syria, and I think China will play a bigger role in this process by providing more aid to the Syrian people and the Syrian government,” Mr. Qi said during a visit to a hospital in the Syrian capital.

Donations in recent years of at least US$44 million to Syria for humanitarian purposes back up Mr. Qi’s statements.

In  a letter written in August 2019, the ambassador focussed among other things, on the development of Syrian railways and seaports. The letter was published a month after Chinese President Xi Jinping promised to lend  $20 billion to Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Jordan for reconstruction and economic development.

Few doubt that China, even prior to the coronavirus pandemic and its devastating economic fallout, is best positioned to be a key, if not the key player, in post-war reconstruction of Syria, estimated to require between  $250 and $400 billion in investment.

This is even more the case as other potential funders, the United States, Europe, Russia and the  Gulf Cooperation Council states, will either refuse to work with the government of Mr. Al-Assad or be consumed with fighting a domestic and global recession and substantial loss of revenues in the wake of the pandemic. 

Moreover, in opposition to Western states, China on six occasions, backed Russian vetoes in the United Nations Security Council that blocked condemnations of the  Syrian government and its backers, Russian and Iran; calls for ceasefires; and sanctioning of alleged war criminals.

One  of China’s comparative advantages in heavily sanctioned Syria is the experience it garnered  in circumventing US and United Nations sanctions imposed on  Iran and North Korea. 

China further benefits from  alternative institutions that it built like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that it either controls or in which it has considerable influence.

That has not stopped the US Justice Department from accusing Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei of operating in Syria in violation of US sanctions. The department is seeking the extradition from Canada of Meng Wanzhou, the company’s chief financial officer and daughter of its founder. Ms. Meng was detained in Canada at the request of the United States.

Seemingly oblivious to the risk of being targeted by the long arm of US justice, some 200 Chinese companies in 2018 and 58 in 2019, active in sectors such as telecommunications, oil and gas, and transportation, attended the Damascus International Fair where they discussed deals ranging from car manufacturing to development of mobile hospitals.

The participation of China National Heavy Duty Truck Company highlighted Chinese interest in the Syrian automotive sector. Syria could also prove to be a lucrative market for Chinese military exports. Mr. Al-Assad could well see Chinese interest as a way of loosening Moscow and Tehran’s grip on his country despite Russian and Iranian effort to reap the benefits of their boots-on-the-ground support for his government by winning lucrative reconstruction contracts.

China has so far refrained from responding in any real way to Syrian urging to kickstart reconstruction of critical national infrastructure even before remaining rebel strongholds in the country are reconquered. It has however exploited commercial opportunity.

The vast majority of Syrian exports go to China and Chinese goods are ubiquitous in Syrian markets. Hama, Syria’s most important industrial region after the collapse of manufacturing in Aleppo and Damascus as a result of the war, is awash with Chinese-made car parts, machine tools and equipment for the automobile, motorcycle, and shoe industry.

Multiple delegations of Chinese investors and businessmen have visited Syria in recent years. In 2018, China hosted its First Trade Fair on Syrian Reconstruction Projects with some 1,000 Chinese companies in attendance and pledged $2 billion for the construction of industrial parks.

China’s security concerns from Syria

Mr. Al-Assad’s ability to regain control of most Syria, with the exception of the rebel-held northern region of Idlib, created not only economic opportunity but also heightened already existing Chinese security concerns.

As  Syrian government forces rolled back rebel fighters, China feared that their battle-hardened Uyghur and Central Asian contingent would gravitate towards Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan from where it would be easier to target China.

The presence of Uyghur fighters in Syria was one driver for a brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims in China’s troubled north-western province of Xinjiang. It also persuaded China to step up border security cooperation with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, where militants of the Uyghur jihadist Turkistan Islamic Party, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, allegedly fight alongside the Taliban.

The Uyghur presence in Syria prompted China to consider sending Chinese troops to join the fight for Idlib in violation of its foreign and defense policy principles. China ultimately dropped the idea, which would have amounted to the People’s Republic’s first military intervention in recent memory beyond its borders.

Repeated unconfirmed media reports have, however, suggested that China has been sharing intelligence with Syria and has been sending military advisors for the past four years to help in the fight against Uyghur militants.

The discussion about an intervention followed a pledge in 2016 by Rear Admiral Guan Youfei of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to increase military cooperation with the  Syrian government.

Two years later, a Syrian state-controlled newspaper, Al Watan, Mr. Qi, the Chinese ambassador, and China’s military attaché, Wong Roy Chang, as saying that China wanted to contribute “in some way” to Syrian military campaign against the rebels in Idlib. The PLAN took nine days to deny Chinese interest in getting involved in the fighting, calling the report a “misunderstanding.”

Meanwhile, while supportive of efforts to negotiate an end to the Syrian war, China has studiously avoided taking a leading role. Its sole initiative to shape the outcome of the conflict was a four-point plan that never gained significant traction.

China’s dilemma in Idlib lies partially  in sensitivity to Turkish opposition to an all-out assault on Idlib. Turkey fears that it would likely spark a renewed refugee exodus and concern that Chinese involvement in an assault could whip up pro-Uyghur sentiments in Turkey despite growing anti-refugee sentiment in the country.

Turkey has long supported Uyghur rights and has frequently turned a blind eye to Uyghur militants.

An Uighur dressed in a Turkish military uniform and sporting an automatic weapon, claiming in a video clip posted on Twitter that he was fighting in the northern Syrian district of Afrin alongside Turkish-backed rebels, advised Han Chinese residents of China’s troubled north-western province of Xinjiang to leave the area. “Listen you dog bastards, do you see this? We will triumph! We will kill you all. Listen up Chinese civilians, get out of our East Turkestan. I am warning you. We shall return, and we will be victorious,” the Uyghur said.

Syria in the wider Chinese Middle East  policy

Beyond its hesitancy of becoming embroiled in the Syrian war, China, despite its consistent backing of the Syrian government as a secular bulwark against Islamic extremism, feared that greater involvement in Syria could jeopardise its successful efforts to remain aloof in the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran that influenced multiple disputes in the Middle East.

That fear has receded with states in the GCC ending their long-standing support for anti-Assad rebels and cosying up to the Syrian leader in an effort to counter Iranian and Turkish influence.

Chinese aloofness also shielded it from entering into direct competition with Russia and Iran in the post-war reconstruction phase. Deepening Chinese-Russian ties in the wake of the pandemic and perceived greater Iranian dependence on China may allow for a divvying up of the pie in ways that turn Syria into an important Belt and Road node

Author’s note: The original version of this article was published by the Geneva Center for Security Policy

Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title, Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, co-authored with Dr. Teresita Cruz-Del Rosario and three forthcoming books, Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africaas well as Creating Frankenstein: The Saudi Export of Ultra-conservatism and China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom.

Continue Reading
Comments

Middle East

China-Arab Relations: From Silk to Friendship

Published

on

China and the Arabs have a long and rich economic and cultural history, and this distinguished relationship still exists today, with a promising future. This bilateral relationship between the two nations is based on the principles of respect and non-interference in internal affairs or foreign policies. Therefore, China’s relationship with the Arabs as well as with other nations is unique and a model to be followed. If you meet a Chinese person, the first phrase will be “Alabo” or an Arab in Mandarin, and he/she will welcome you. The Chinese state’s dealings with its counterparts can be measured based on the model of this Chinese citizen. China deals with the Arabs on the basis of friendship and historical ties.

The history of Sino-Arab relations goes back to the Tang Dynasty, and these relations developed with the flourishing of trade between the two nations. Since China was famous for its high quality silk, this trade route was called the “Silk Road”. Baron Ferdinand Freiherr von Richthofen, better known in English as Baron von Richthofen, was a German traveller, geographer, and scientist. He is noted for coining the terms “Seidenstraße” and “Seidenstraßen” = “Silk Road” or “Silk Route” in 1877.

Chinese-Arab relations have developed in contemporary history. In 1930, China established official relations with the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A library in China was named the “Fouad Islamic Library”, after the late Egyptian king, “Fuad the First”. In 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser cut ties with China and established relations with the Communist People’s Republic of China and inaugurated an embassy in Egypt. In the same year, the Arab League established relations with the People’s Republic of China. By the year 1990, all Arab countries cut their relations with the Republic of China and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

In 2004, the China-Arab Cooperation Forum was established, and today it is considered a milestone for the Sino-Arab relationship. At its inauguration, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing delivered a speech stating:“The Arab world is an important force on the international scene, and that China and the Arab countries have enjoyed a long friendship. Our similar history, our common goals and our broad interests have been credited with enhancing cooperation between the two sides; no matter how the international situation changes, China has always been the sincere friend of the Arab world”. The China-Arab Cooperation Forum was officially established during the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to the headquarters of the League of Arab States in January of 2004.

Hu Jintao indicated at that time that the formation of the forum is a continuation of the traditional friendship between China and the Arab world. The Chinese president said at the time, “The establishment of the forum is conducive to expanding mutual cooperation in a variety of fields. He added that China had made four proposals; First, maintaining mutual respect, fair treatment and sincere cooperation at the political level. Second, strengthening economic and trade relations through cooperation in the fields of investment and trade, contracted projects, labor services, energy, transportation, communications, agriculture, environmental protection and information. Third, expand cultural exchanges. Finally, conducting training for the employees.”

During the second session of the forum in Beijing in 2006, China showed its sympathy for the issues of the Arab world and its interest in the peace process between Palestine and Israel, since China is a peace-loving country; it presented the idea of “a nuclear-free Middle East”. China is the best friend of the Arab countries today. Although some Arab countries have strong relations with the West whose policy does not match the Chinese policy, but all Arab countries agree on friendly and good relations with the People’s Republic of China.

The Arab citizen is not interested today in the foreign policy of the US, the deadly weapons of the US and Russia, or European culture, but rather the livelihood and economy, and this is what China provides through its wise economic policy. In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative, or New Silk Road, which will restore glow to China-Arab relations; as the Arab world is in a strategic location on the initiative map. Thus, the Arab countries are an important partner for China in the initiative. Although the volume of trade exchanges between China and the Arab countries exceeded 200 billion US dollars, which increased 10 times over the past decade, there was no commercial and institutional arrangement to facilitate trade between the two sides.

China, as a peaceful and non-invasive country, aims to promote economic cooperation with Arab region on an equal basis because it considers the Arab world a historic partner. The historical experience of the Arabs with the Chinese through the Silk Road has confirmed that China differs from the nations of colonialism and imperialism, which consider the Arab region a place rich in natural resources only. In his historic speech at the Arab League, Chinese President Xi stressed that China will not seek to extend influence and search for proxies in the Middle East. The Chinese initiatives will contribute to establishing security and stability through economic development and improving the people’s livelihood, in line with the post-2015 development agenda and the aspirations of the Arab people for a better life, as the Chinese experience proves that development is the key to digging out the roots of conflicts and extremism in all its forms.

China is a neutral country and does not favor the use of violence. During the Syrian crisis, for example, the Chinese envoy to the Security Council raised his hand three times, meaning that China, with its wise diplomacy, supported the Syrian regime without entering the military war. During the recent Chinese military parade, Chinese President Xi Jinping revealed some Chinese military capabilities and thus sent a message to the enemies that China will always be ready if a war is imposed on it, and a message of support to China’s allies. The Arab region today needs a real partner who possesses economic and military power and international political influence, such as China; to ensure the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, and to consolidate the China-Arab relations and raise it to the level of a strategic alliance.

Continue Reading

Middle East

The analysis of developments in relations between Turkey and Israel

Published

on

The fear of Biden’s Administration, the concern over the Abraham Accords (see below), the positioning of the geopolitical status in the Middle East, and the safeguarding of interests in Israel are the main factors through which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seeks to improve relations with Israel which, however, he connects to the Palestinians.

The statements made by Turkish President Erdoğan’s on developments in relations with Israel have confirmed media reports of his repeated attempts to reach an understanding on several controversial issues, as well as paving the way for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. The statements made by President Erdoğan, as well as other Turkish officials, have stressed the connection between the change in Turkish-Israeli relations and Israel’s policy towards the Palestinian issue.

The “linking principle” connecting the two issues has been a key factor in Turkish foreign policy since the 1950s, and it operates in the range between words and deeds, which at times have also led to severe crises in the relations between the two countries.

At the time Turkey opposed the partition plan, but recognised Israel and maintained diplomatic relations with it. Relations were suspended after the second Arab-Israeli war in 1956, when Turkey recalled its diplomatic representative from Tel Aviv, announcing he would not return there “until a just solution to the Palestinian issue was found in accordance with UN Resolutions”.

After rising to power, President Erdoğan has developed the aforementioned “linking principle”. Against the backdrop of Israel’s actions with the Palestinians, Turkey has increased its political and economic support for its Muslim brethren and caused crises.

President Erdoğan’s recent statements have been made against the backdrop of this policy: on the one hand, the Turkish President has expressed his country’s desire to improve relations with Israel and continue intelligence cooperation; on the other hand, he has maintained that Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians is “unacceptable”.

It is important to note that Turkey will not relinquish the “linking principle”, which differs from the principle of the new Arab normalisation, based on the separation between the Palestinian issue and relations with Israel. The so-called Abraham Accords, such as the recognition of the State of Israel by the United Arab Emirates in September last year: the third Arab country to formally recognise Israel, after Egypt and Jordan; the fourth one if we considers Mauritania’s “frozen” recognition.

The policy implemented by President Erdoğan is not only shaped by foreign relations, but is also a Turkish internal issue in which public opinion plays a key role. It seems that until elections are held in Turkey (scheduled for June 25, 2023), there will be no complete normalisation with Israel. The majority of the Turkish population supports the Palestinians and their rights, feels full solidarity for them and opposes the Israeli presence.

Moreover, President Erdoğan regards the Palestinian issue as an important factor in building a renewed Turkish Muslim national identity. These stances increase his popularity and strengthen people’s support for him and his party, as well as his authority and prestige in the Muslim world.

At the same time, however, this policy also has pragmatic implications: President Erdoğan is not severing ties with Israel, but merely creating actions that lead to symptoms of “diplomatic” crises.

Despite this wait-and-see attitude, economic ties between Turkey and Israel are flourishing. According to official data, in 2018 exports from Turkey to Israel were worth 6.5 billion dollars and imports 1.9 billion dollars (excluding diamond trade and tourism).

Following the crisis in relations and the expulsion of the Israeli Ambassador from Turkey (May 2018), exports had fallen to 4 billion dollars in 2019 and imports to 1.7 billion dollars. Although declining, there are still deep economic ties.

Trade relations, however, are not the decisive factor in determining the nature of Turkey-Israel relations. There are four issues that are believed to have led Turkey to review its relations with Israel:

1. Turkey has welcome the new U.S. President, Joe Biden, with caution and fear that he will oppose Turkish activities in the region. The U.S. leader may also be very tough on security, armaments and minority rights in Turkey. Some believe that improved relations with Israel will calm down the situation with President Biden, and the U.S. Congress and the Zionist lobby will be able to contribute to this result. It is not known, however, whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be as good a mediator with Biden as he was with Donald Trump.

2. Turkey is seeking to remove the isolation imposed on it due to the distribution of marine economic zones in the Eastern Mediterranean area, and is trying to bring Israel on its side to develop a joint stance and oppose such subdivisions. According to Israeli sources, Turkey has made Israel a generous offer to expand its area of control over the marine economic zones, in exchange for Turkey’ siding with Greece, Cyprus and Egypt. Israel has reacted cautiously, both because it much weighs President Erdoğan’s intentions and because it is actually interested in strengthening its relations with the above stated countries.

3. Turkey is worried about the Abraham Accords for normalisation with Israel, particularly the aforementioned one with the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey aims at limiting their influence and status as a further “undertaking” of Arab rivals. Turkey endeavours to dismantle a rising alliance between the Arab countries and Israel. After all, we wonder why Turkey is not instead trying to improve its ties with Arab countries to achieve the same goal. Could it still be because of history and traditional mutual dislike?

4. Turkey is trying to relieve the pressure on its activities in Israel and Palestine as a result of the possible improvement in relations with Israel. Turkey funds important projects in Jerusalem and Israel is trying to contain and restrain it. Conversely, an improvement in Israeli-Turkish relations could release the Israeli brake.

To date, no official Israeli response has been provided to Turkish statements. Israel’s media speak of suspicion and coldness in response to the Turkish rapprochement, with fears that President Erdoğan is preparing a ploy, a trick aimed not at improving his relations with Israel, but at sabotaging Israel’s relations and contacts with other countries.

However, leaks from senior Israeli officials indicate that their country has set conditions for restoring relations, which include ending Turkey’s ties with Hamas and transferring Turkish projects to Jerusalem through Israeli channels, as well as abstaining from voting against Israel in international organisations and adopting a balanced position between Israel and the Palestinians.

It is not yet clear what the fate of Turkey-Israel relations will be in the coming months, with President Biden in the White House and after the Israeli elections held on March 23, 2021. It is important to note, however, that Turkey will not give up the “linking principle”, which differs from the new principle of Arab normalisation, based on the separation between the Palestinian issue and relations with Israel.

The Turkish “linking principle” is a real need for Turkey- hence the Palestinian leadership must work with Turkey to maximise common goals, especially with regard to Jerusalem, the Al-Aqsa Mosque and Gaza.

Not easy steps to make, but not impossible either.

Continue Reading

Middle East

The Exceptionality of the Hashemite Rule in Jordan

Published

on

In the tumultuous politics of the Middle East, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has traditionally steered a cautious and successful course in international relations. This course largely relies on a multidimensional foreign policy and the cementing of relations with regional and western countries. Jordan is a valuable strategic partner of the United States and the European Union in the heart of the Middle East. Amman’s strategic role is reflected in the military cooperation and joint global counterterrorism operations including as a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS and in meeting the overwhelming humanitarian needs of more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees.

Jordan is also a pragmatic neighbor of Israel. The 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty has enabled water sharing arrangements between the two countries, security cooperation, Jordanian overflight of Israeli territory, and the conduct of joint Israel-Jordan exercises to respond to natural disasters. A representative case was the 2004 joint exercise to counter environmental effects of pollution in the Red Sea. The peace treaty has notably provided the context for enhanced economic, trade and tourism ties.

The kingdom has also served as honest broker in Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts in support of the two-state solution, always abiding with the late King Hussein’s principle that “Jordan should not be, cannot be, will not be a substitute for the Palestinians themselves as the major aggrieved party on the Arab side in a process that leads to peace”. Amman has served as credible intermediary for Israel and the Palestinians to suspend tensions at multiple occasions like for example in the old city of Jerusalem, particularly at the Temple Mount/Haram Al-Sharif where the kingdom pursues a successful administration of religious funded schools favoring moderate religious education and religious tourism. Jordanian moderation guarantees co-existence of the three monotheistic religions in Jerusalem at a time when on the contrary, counties like Turkey funnel millions of dollars in charity projects in Jerusalem promoting extreme Islamic ideologies.

Reform Programs and Initiatives

Jordan’s moderation stems from the Hashemite rule that has confronted internal and external challenges maintaining stability that is conducive to national, and western interests for the region. The exceptionality and uniqueness of the Hashemite rule derives from its historical legacy, modernity, direct descendant of Prophet Mohammed and its posture as vanguard of reforms. Among significant reform initiatives was the “Jordan First-Al Urdun Awlan” campaign of 2002-2003, that articulated a comprehensive vision of economic and political reforms. The initiative provided the formation of a national committee to deal with different economic and political issues that ultimately led to the introduction of a parliamentary quota for women and the enactment of anti-corruption measures.

A blueprint for political, economic, and social reforms was provided by the 2005 Jordanian National Agenda that approached the reform process in a holistic, rather than a piecemeal, way. Its findings produced the “We Are All Jordan-Kulna al Urdun” document. The document was a clear attempt at political reform and selected a list of fifteen priorities that paved the way for significant legislative initiatives. A prominent initiative was the enactment of an anti-corruption law that established an anti-corruption committee with broad powers and included in its definition of corruption actions related to nepotism (wasta).

An additional reform program is the Jordan 2025 National Vision and Strategy” launched in 2014that provides for economic reforms through policies and measures that aim at sustainable economic growth, support of small and medium-sized businesses, women’s participation in the labour market, financing mechanisms for public projects (PPP partnerships) and public investments on health, education and food security, digital economy, and green infrastructure. The coronavirus pandemic however has hit hard the kingdom’s economy to such an extent that economic reform initiatives are expected to bear fruits at a later stage taking into consideration the current global economic downturn considered to be the worst since the Great Depression. Jordan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contracted in 2020 by 2.3 percent after growing 2 percent in 2019 due to losses in state revenues because of fewer remittances and a weakened tourism market.

To cope with the direct negative effects of the pandemic on its state budget, Jordan received $396 million from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in May 2020 in the form ofemergency assistance. The amount of finance was specifically funneled to address the kingdom’s balance of payments needs and allow for higher spending on healthcare, and assistance to households and companies most affected by the pandemic. Despite that the IMF provided in March 2020 another multi-year $1.3 billion loan package to Jordan, the pandemic has caused at least a $1.5 billion shortfall in its balance of payments.

Modernization and Democratization

The Hashemite exceptionality legitimizes and ensures viability of rule over Jordan that constitutes a model of a modern Arab democratic country.The Jordanian leadership has taken over the last decade practical steps to unleash a deep political reform process to reflect Jordan’s vision of comprehensive reform, modernization, and development. Chief among reform measures was the introduction of a new constitution that came into force in 2011 and included amendments to 42 constitutional articles. Most prominent was the establishment of a constitutional court and an independent elections oversight commission, and the provision that the dissolution of the parliament entails the dissolution of the government. A major concession was also the curtailing of some of the King’s powers with most representative, the revoke of his power to cancel parliamentary elections. It is also noteworthy that the Jordanian leadership initiated in 2013 the Democratic Empowerment Programme called “Demoqrati” under the umbrella of the King Abdullah II Fund for Development, with the aim to instil the principles of active citizenship and empower individuals and democratic institutions.

In practical terms, the kingdom has demonstrated effectiveness and respect of democratic processes when, despite the pandemic, Amman proceeded with holding parliamentary elections in 2020. A recent poll conducted by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University for Jordan in mid-March 2021 showed that 36% of Jordanians trust the current parliament, and 38% trust their electoral district parliament representatives, which constitutes the highest percentage of trust given to the parliament since 2014. The election of 100 new parliament members in the current House of Representatives guarantees renewal of political representation that is one of the main pillars of democracy. Elections were held in Jordan in a timely manner enhancing democratic governance and institutions. Jordanian elections were held in accordance with constitutional provisions when on the contrary at least 41 countries and territories around the world postponed national elections and referendums using the pandemic as a pretext according to data released by the Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Overall, Jordan’s Hashemite leadership has unleashed a multidimensional reform process throughout the years that reflects the kingdom’s vision of comprehensive modernization and development in a way that can be translated into realities on the ground and provide a blueprint for a better future, not only for Jordanians, but for the people of the region.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Trending