China adopted economic policies in regards to the crisis with internal as well as external implications. The external aspects which this study is focusing on include new policy drives and visions that are unprecedented in history adopted by a Chinese government. From the present research it is visible that China has a broad vision to create its own Bretton Woods system. The 2008 global financial crisis made it clear to the new ruling elite how vulnerable it is to global imbalances, and that the classical approach of hoarding US dollar reserves served no more its economic and political interests. As a result of the crisis and due to the fact of holding huge US dollar reserves, China incurred big losses with the dollar loosing value in the aftermath of the crisis thereby melting the dollar stock it had accumulated for decades. China has come to realize that a pragmatic policy approach is in its interest when competing with the US. Hence the new policy drives towards a framework resembling that of Bretton Woods.
The Bretton Woods system was a major tool for the US in shaping and dominating the international financial system. Its purpose was to govern and shape the international monetary relations of states. Although the so called Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971, the institutions it created survived and to this day are the main pillars of the international financial system. China seems to establish a similar system, when looking at the policies adopted. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, New Development Bank, the ‘one belt one road’ initiative, the Silk Fund, and the Internationalization of the RMB. China seems to follow the same path such as the US half a century ago by establishing very similar institutions to that of the Bretton Woods.
Thus the outcome of the Bretton Woods system catapulted the US into a hegemon of the global economic world order. The question to be asked now is whether China is about to follow the US footsteps and create a ‘Bretton Woods’ on its own, by cooperating with other states?
This paper is organized in the following structure. Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3 presents the road to the Chinese Bretton Woods system, Section 4 describes the internationalization of the RMB, Section 5 provides for a conclusion.
Since the developments are very new, and the mentioned institutions and policy drives by China are a recent phenomenon, the literature is very limited on the subject. Duggan (2013) focuses more on the international clearing union (ICU) and the effects it would have on Sino-US relations. According to the empirical results an ICU would have prevented de-industrialization in the US and allowed for Chinese export led growth (Duggan, 2013). Hence there would be no need for the Chinese to seek for alternative initiatives. There are related studies on the Bretton Woods system and China, Dooley (et al. 2003) review the Bretton Woods System, and Dooley (et al., 2011) come up with the notion of Bretton Woods II, and argue that it still rules the international monetary system. Furthermore Eichengreen (2011) elaborates on the possibility of the internationalization of the Chinese renminbi and the subsequent challenge to the US dollar. However to the best of the author’s knowledge, there is so far not a study that is directly assessing the establishment of a pseudo Chinese Bretton Woods system.
The Pseudo Chinese Bretton Woods System
As far as China is concerned one can indeed see a policy shift that is more proactive in international relations. Thus looking at the policies adopted and the active foreign policy drive one can indeed argue that China aims to create its own unique form: a ‘Bretton Woods’ system with Chinese characteristics. Of course the conditions and international situation at the time the Bretton Woods was adopted were completely different to the conditions states’ face nowadays. However, the term ‘Chinese Bretton Woods’ seems to be appropriate when looking at the Chinese policies, they resemble the creation of similar institutions and regimes like that of the Bretton Woods system. Below are the main policy moves that arguably justify this view:
-New (BRICS) Development Bank based in Shanghai -similar to the IMF
-Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) –similar to the World Bank
-One Belt One Road/Silk Fund- A Chinese Marshal Plan
-Internationalization of the RMB: Currency swap Agreements and China International Payment System-
Indeed when looking at these newly established institutions one can see the vision behind these policy drives. Similar to the USA in being the major force behind creating the intuitions of the Bretton Woods system, China also seems to follow a similar strategy by creating institutions and regimes that are vital to broaden its own international sphere of influence with the aim of eventually taking the lead. Now let’s have a closer look at these institutions.
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
By many seen as a rival to the World Bank and IMF, its main aim is to provide for infrastructure development in the Asia-Pacific region. The blueprints of the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank surged in October 2013, mainly due to the frustrations by the Chinese government with the current international intuitions such as the IMF and World Bank, with little or no room for reforms that would enable greater Chinese input into the respective organizations (Braningen, 2015). Despite major critics by the US that the creation of a new international investment bank is unnecessary, many states and major international institutions disagree. Head of the International Monetary Fund Christine Lagarde as well offered support for the Chinese-led multilateral lender; Lagarde and her counterpart from the Asian Development Bank said at a conference in Beijing that they were in talks with the AIIB for cooperation (Miller and Goh, 2015).
It is obvious that the US is opposing the AIIB initiative on political grounds since it poses a challenge to the US led international economic system that it created decades ago, and with the rise of China as another main actor in the global economy that has a vested interest in pursuing its own developmental goals, we will see such initiatives in the future more.
Thus notably one has to remark that in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, it was relatively easy for the US to create its own international economic order, since all the major economies of the period were ravaged by war and indebted themselves to the US. The situation is different for China today, basically because the terms and conditions are not the same as faced by the US in the post-World War II period. There is already a global hegemonic order in place through which the US and other major powers are operating and cooperating. Examples include the IMF, World Bank, OECD, OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), the Asian Development Bank, ASEAN, G7, G20 etc. Furthermore the global economic system is so interdependent and integrated nowadays, that it is not easy establishing new international regimes. Thus China will face a challenge in its endeavor for creating its own ‘Made in China’ Bretton Woods system, but the developments of the AIIB so far show a very positive outcome for China.
The countries joining the AIIB are not just usual countries, on the contrary they are major allies of the US, especially the United Kingdom, the founding member and a country that had such a great impact on building the Bretton Woods system now joins an initiative that is seen by many as an act to counterbalance the role of the IMF and the World Bank. Perhaps the most interesting move besides initial UK membership comes from Israel, a staunch ally of America heavily depending on it for security, economic and regional issues, Israel too applied for membership (Reuters, 2015). A country heavily depending on the US for its security, economy and international support against sanctions from the UN, is bidding to join the Chinese led AIIB despite US opposition marks indeed a shift in the global economic policies of nation states.
The Obama administration made from the beginning its position vis-a-vis the AIIB clear, it is vehemently opposing the establishment of the AIIB initiated by China on the grounds that there is no need for a further lending institution since there is the IMF and the Asian Development Bank and that it has concerns over transparency, procurement practices and environmental safeguards and concerns over lending practices alike (Northam, 2015). Nevertheless, according to Bergsten from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, there is a very big demand for infrastructure projects in most parts of Asia, since the lack of vital infrastructure such as roads, airports and power facilities constitute a big barrier to Asian development. His estimation is that in the coming decade about 8 trillion US dollars are needed for infrastructure projects in Asia, and he argues that the AIIB can fill that gap (Bergsten, 2015). It is projected that China is prepared to provide for half of the initial 100 billion US Dollar Budget. Thus it is seen by many as a move by China to compete for global, economic, and political leadership (Northam, 2015).
These developments indicate that the new policy drive of China after the Global Financial crisis that resemble that of the US leading to the establishment of the Bretton Woods system may not be a far reached goal after all, but a deliberated policy action as a result of the effects that the global financial crisis brought with it along the way. These actions can be seen as a policy response to the crisis, like every country, China suffered from the crisis, and not satisfied with the current international financial system, that led to incur China big losses, it is in the trial of making and developing new structures and institutions, attracting prospective members. This major shift in the Chinese policy drive can be seen as a move by China to develop its own ‘Bretton Woods’ system just like the USA did in the post-World War II period.
Since the creation of the World Bank and IMF in the 1940s the US has dominated these institutions and the major European countries seem to look for a change and position themselves stronger within global finance and trade by joining this new initiative led by China (Mason, 2015).
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in an interview that China is trying to foster a “new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation […]” (CCTV, 2015).
The move by China to tunnel its massive currency reserves into infrastructure investments in Asia has led to a lot of debate, long had Western countries asked China to use its trade surplus in the development of transport, energy and telecommunication in developing countries, only they expected it to be done through US dominated institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (Taylor and James, 2015), an alternative model, i.e. the AIIB prevailed at the end detrimental to the US and Japan. Conversely one has to acknowledge the US share in the lead to the establishment of the AIIB.
The fact that Congress did not ratify in 2010 an agreement that would increase the voting rights of China and other emerging economies within the IMF literally pushed China and alikes to seek for alternatives. Members of Congress openly started to acknowledge this situation. However the United States is not watching bluntly to the current events that put a drift between itself and major traditional allies, as a counter movement the US initiated the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact with eleven Asia-Pacific states excluding China (Taylor and James, 2015). It aims to boost US export to the region, but also to help gain the US a foothold in the Asian markets, but mainly it’s a move to limit growing Chinese influence in the region. President Obama made this clear in his address to Congress; he stated that without the active involvement of America, “China will be free to ‘write the rules of trade in the 21st century’ ” (Brodbeck, 2015).
For sure we will see a steady competition among the two major global players on the international economic system, the former the hegemon the latter posing serious challenges to the status-quo.
For instance this cleavage became visible as soon as China announced its plan for the creation of the AIIB. The US response was prompt warning its allies and any potential member states that there is no need for another multilateral lending institution, expressing concerns over the transparency of the Bank, good governance, and concerns over corruption and abiding to environmental standards among other things. Although the IMF generated much criticisms with its structural adjustment programs, as well as the World Bank with some major projects conceived environmentally questionable, with more and more public scrutiny in the last decade minor reforms were undertaken to satisfy public concerns as well, which led to some best practice operational conduct in the mentioned institutions, but still many scholars find these steps not far reaching enough.
Thus indeed the strategic policy move of China establishing the AIIB, upset many decision makes and led to new formations and the adaptation of positions by major players of the international financial system such as Europe and some Asian countries. It led to the shift away between the US and its traditional allies such as the UK, Germany, France and Italy and even Israel. It seems the European countries want back the ‘golden age’ period of the early Bretton Woods system and join a similar initiative that has the prospect to deliver on those promises.
The developments are stunning on the one hand the hegemon (America) tries to undermine the participation of other states in the Chinese-led AIIB, and on the other hand we have witnessed unexpected moves by Western powers belonging so far to the US-led international economic order. It becomes visible that the 2008 global financial crisis shook all the existing relationship between states, since like China, the European countries are also not contend anymore with the status-quo of the system and aspire change. The AIIB could be regarded as being one of the main pillars of the new policy drive initiated by China to create its own Bretton Woods system, thus the success of this institution will play a major role for the other mentioned pillars.
The membership looks promising, with 4 of the 5 permanent UN Security Council members aboard, 17 out of the 34 OECD members, and all ten countries of the ASEAN. The only major global economies abstaining from joining the AIIB are the USA and Japan (Olsen, 2015).These developments already indicate that the new policy initiatives by China managed to attract attention around the globe, and pave the way ahead for the establishment of a pseudo Chinese Bretton Woods.
Abstention by both countries comes to no surprise, since the US views the AIIB as a challenger to the US dominated Bretton Woods institutions and has possible fears over a spill over that gradually a rising China might challenge its dominant position in the global system. For Japan under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe the reasons are similar, it fears that the AIIB will be a competitor to the Japanese dominated Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the region and undermine Japanese economic interests in Asia.
As opposed to the other traditional US allies Japan does not want to jeopardize its relations with the US, especially not in times when it has disputes with China over some islands in the Pacific Ocean, and the fact that Japan leads the ADB is another vital factor for its abstention. Its customary that the Manila based ADB is led by a former senior official from the Bank of Japan or the Japanese Finance Ministry (Kajimoto, 2015).
Although the AIIB is an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, its reach is indeed global as seen by its membership, it managed to attract members from diverse regions of the world reaching as far West as Latin America and North as Sweden or Denmark, per capita rich countries such as Switzerland and poor ones such as Nepal, all are on board. Moreover it has shown the increasing rift between the US and its traditional allies, perhaps it is unprecedented in the post-World War II period where the US was not able to convince or force its allies from a policy move that it vehemently disapproves of. Major staunch allies that have been so reliable in the past such as the United Kingdom and even Israel did turn its back on the US. For the first time in the century was the USA so alone on its position, leaving it isolated from a major global initiative.
For example in the follow up of British negotiations to join the Bank, the White House has accused Great Britain from constantly accommodating China, showing its disapproval and posing as threat to other potential candidates.
Besides the voiced critics to the AIIB related to transparency, environmental standards, good governance and so on; there is the concern that China does not have enough experience to lead a multilateral infrastructure investment bank due to its lack of experience and it would be advised to seek help from peer institutions, i.e. the institutions of the Bretton Woods: the IMF and World Bank, or Asian Development Bank or Western member states that have the necessary know-how. However, the critics seem to fail to mention the China Exim Bank; which is already operating for almost more than a decade in these regions, already undertaking infrastructure projects not only limited to public sector projects but also the private sector. Former Chairman of the China Exim Bank Li Ruogu highlighted in an interview that they have been doing projects such as city rail systems, ports, railway systems, and power facilities among other things on the ‘belt way’ for decades and to his accords countries in the region started to favor the China Exim Bank over the competitors of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (Li Ruogu, 2015). That indicates that China not only has the financial resources in place to pursue the creation of its own brand of the Bretton Woods system, but also the required international experience in gradually getting closer step by step to its envisioned grand strategy of the creation of the ‘Chinese Bretton Woods’ system. One has to understand that this is a long term project; China does not have the luxury the US enjoyed in the 1940s when it emerged after the War as a Superpower, which enabled it to act fast and impose its will relatively easy creating the Bretton Woods. Since we live in a different world than in the late 1940s, with different conditions and different global power structures, China’s choice is to adopt a gradual long term approach in getting there. It seems to have found its way, since it is not taking the classical confrontational way that the former colonial powers as well as the US did in the past, but it’s taking the way of diplomatic conduct.
New Development Bank
Also called BRICS Development Bank is one of China’s latest initiatives on the way to establish its own version of the Bretton Woods. Like the AIIB the New Development Bank (NDB) is also a multilateral development Bank, only limited in its membership compared to the AIIB. It was set up with the aim to foster greater financial and development cooperation among the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). This is another important step, a milestone in development since the original BRIC states excluding South Africa together comprise more than 3 billion people; 41.4 % of the world population, cover about a quarter of the world’s land area spread over 3 continents, and account for about 25 % of global GDP as of 2014 (NDB, 2015). One can easily see why it is of such high importance.
It’s headquartered in Shanghai, and as opposed to the World Bank and for the matter the IMF, where votes are based on capital share, in the New Development Bank each participating state has one vote and there is no veto power in its structure (NDB, 2015). The mere fact that member states have equal voting rights regardless of capital share and no veto power is an indication that the emerging economies of the BRICS countries want to go a different way than the orthodox international financial institutions of the IMF and the World Bank of which most participating states are voicing their complaints about. In a way it’s a show off of the soft power China projects in the 21st century, since in this establishment it’s the biggest economy.
Like its counterpart the AIIB, the NDB is also focusing on infrastructure projects, with authorization of up to $34 billion annually. The initial founding members agreed that any member cannot increase its share of capital without the agreement by the other 4 founding members, the Bank also allows for new members to join but the BRICS capital share cannot fall below the threshold of 55 percent (NDB, 2015). Again this arrangement does not allow the institution to be dominated by one member country. Perhaps the reason why many see the NDB as a competitor to the IMF lies in the major detail, that this new initiative also has a ‘Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).
The CRA was designed with the intent to support countries with liquidity in response to actual or potential short term balance of payments pressures. Thus the mentioned reserve has the objective to protect states against global liquidity pressures, including cases of member countries where national currencies are being negatively affected by global financial pressures or in times of crises. Due to the exit by the US from its expansionary monetary policy the Bank also aims to provide for assistance to other states as well(NDB, 2015).Thus the NDB is another vital pillar of the Chinese response to the 2008 crisis and its drive in creating a Chinese Bretton Woods system.
Rapoza points out that in most emerging economies the private sector has grown rapidly with the public sector lagging behind to provide the necessary infrastructure projects, emphasizing that regulatory measures by Western governments have made it very difficult for institutional investors to provide enough funding. Furthermore he stresses the fact that it will be in Chinas interest to provide for infrastructure developments since it needs the infrastructure to place its goods in the market and expand its export base (Rapoza, 2015).
Moreover Totten points out to the fact that with the so needed IMF reforms desired by most of the nations, especially the BRICS, it is no surprise that after the devastating global financial crisis of 2008, the BRICS patience would come to an end especially when the US Congress vetoed any new reforms to the IMF. Thus like Keynesianism was the outcome of the Great Depression, so could the global financial crisis lead to the establishment of a “paralleling international financial system” as pursued as a long term goal by Beijing. A very important aspect one shall emphasize is that the paid in capital and reserves are planned to be denominated in the national currencies of the member states of the Bank (Totten, 2014). This is a very important fact one cannot neglect, this means a shift away from the traditional dollar and the US dominated global economic order.
Thus so far the emerging economies of the BRICS nations followed the line and pursued undisrupted economic growth under the current traditional global financial system with future prospects of playing a larger role in those institutions when time is due, and they played along. However, the 2008 global financial crisis led to unforeseen events that upset the whole current system of global financial governance and a major cleavage emerged over the say in the future decision making structure of the global financial system and the respective institutions, in which the current power holders were not ready to share their power in those institutions. Add to that the IMF reform bill was rejected by the US, it practically disillusioned the BRICS among other countries, which saw that it is very hard and difficult to put though their concerns and active participation in those institutions controlling the major global economic order.
It should come to no surprise to anyone that there would be a challenger seeking better terms to the current global financial system.
Just like the US challenged the British gold standard system earlier this century even leading to war among them. So it is the course of history that a country acquiring a major power status in the international system, which China did by becoming the number two of the world economy,will instigate new policies and initiatives different from the current global financial system that led to the illusion of not only the emerging countries but also many other states. This is not the only example, there are many states eager to see a change to the current hegemonic structure established and dominated by the USA over many decades. One has to acknowledge that change does not come overnight, these new initiatives established by China are laying down the ground framework and paving down the way for structures that have the potential to the create a new ‘Chinese Bretton Woods’ system or a ‘parallel global financial/economic order’. The key concept one has to understand is that this shift will come gradually over time, and will be perhaps less painful than the one we have seen during the events that led to the two World Wars.
One has also to see the development in light of the South-South economic cooperation, thus instead of competing with each other the BRICS realized a coordinated effort in place is much more valuable to them, and the New Development Bank just serves well this purpose. Comparatively speaking the value of South to South trade exceeds North to South trade by approximately $2.2 trillion, which is over 1/4 of global trade. There is also the surge in South to South foreign aid, with countries like China, Brazil and India increasing their share in foreign aid. Another important fact to notice is that China became Africa’s most important trading partner and Brazil for example has more embassies there than the former colonial giant Great Britain (Desai and Vreeland, 2014). All this necessitates a coordinated approach within the BRICS, since each country on their own competing against the former colonial powers and another BRICS member would definitely be to the disadvantage of the latter. With a structure such as the New Development Bank in place, this coordination and cooperation among the BRICS will ease the entry to new markets.
This new initiative will enable the BRICS to play a greater role in the world economy than is the case under the current system. The group of the BRICS comprises one fifth of the global economy, but have only 11 percent of votes in the IMF. With all reform attempts to increase the share of the BRICS in the IMF stalling, mainly due to US but also to some smaller European states concerned not to lose voting shares to others, the establishment of the NDB was almost inescapable. We have seen a forerunner to the NDB in Latin America for example, with frustrations from the World Bank and the IMF a regional ‘Development Bank of Latin America’ the CorporacionAndina de Fomento (CAF) was developed to bypass the strict infrastructure rules of the World Bank. The CAF funds more infrastructure projects in Latin America than the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank combined. According to Desai and Veerland the NDB has the same potential and its loans could surpass that of the World Bank (Desai and Veerland, 2014).
Moreover, as mentioned throughout the research, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis has upset all the current balances of the global financial order and led to major cleavages especially between China and the US, the number two and number one economies of the world, respectively. Before the crisis China was financing the US debt by buying US Treasury Bills, which the US used to import goods from China. As a result China was accumulating huge US Dollar reserves, earning interest on them as well, but with the global crisis, this option became no more in the economic interests of China, since it incurred big losses due to the dollar loosing value. Sitting on $4 trillion in foreign currency reserves and the rate of return of US Treasuries not anymore promising, something needed to be done with the vast reserves (Bloomberg, 2015). Thus with considering the Obama administrations ‘pivot to Asia’ making China uneasy it has no options but to look to alternatives. Bearing in mind also that we are still in the aftermath of the crisis which disillusioned and affected many states negatively, including major US allies, the time seemed to be ripe for the fomenting of a parallel international economic order, or simply balancing US domination of the world economy by establishing alternative economic policies that might look uncorrelated at the first glance, but are all inter-related in creating a Chinese Bretton Woods system; the AIIB, NDB, One Road One Belt, and the Currency swap Agreements and China International Payment System. Connected together under one roof they constitute the main pillars of the Chinese Bretton Woods.
The AIIB initiative just serves well in demonstrating the new role played by China and its capacity for providing for an alternative gravitational point in the world economy that has the potential ultimately to lead to a Bretton Woods made in China. Seeing this as an opportunity the powerful economies of Europe joined the Chinese led initiative of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, despite heavy opposition from the US.
After having discussed the two key pillars of the new initiative that paves the way down for a new global economic order, now let’s focus perhaps on the most important pillar that complements all these combined efforts in the making of the ‘Made in China” Bretton Woods system, the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative. Not only a grand economic policy but also a geopolitical maneuver that will have a huge impact once completed not only to all the states involved but also to the different geographical regions of Europe and Asia as a whole, changing the economic and political landscape by bridging continents together.
One Belt One Road
The ‘one belt one road’ program initiated by President Xi Jingpin is perhaps an unprecedented bold move in Chinese foreign and economic policy since the days of Deng Xiaoping. It covers and combines so many inter-related issues such as economic development, export promotion, FDI, and new investment opportunities for Chinese companies when looking solely from the economic perspective but it is for sure not only limited of being a tool to fomenting a new economic order which has huge potential to bring development to the states in question as well, that is not dictated by World Bank and IMF adjustment or structural programs.
The ‘one belt one road’ initiative was first announced by Xi Jingping in October 2013, it’s a policy that constitutes two complimentary projects connected together to one another, on the one hand to review the historical Silk Road between Europe and Asia, there is the ‘New Silk Road’ initiative and on the other hand to connect China to the markets of Southeast Asian countries, Europe and Africa throughout the sea, or the so called ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’. So on the one hand a Maritime network and on the other hand a land based road-train network that will serve China to further assert itself into the world economy and increase its economic and political influence further in the global arena eventually perpetuating a Chinese Bretton Woods system. President Xi is attaching a great importance to the project, since he allocated a budget of $40 billion to a newly created Silk Road Fund, intended to improve trade and transport routes in Asia. He stressed that the purpose of the Fund is to support the ‘one belt one road’ project’, i.e. the New Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk road (Caixin, 2014).
On November 2014 giving a speech to the APEC Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs, President Xi stressed on the urgency of the construction of the ‘one road one belt’ initiative. Thus the timing of the announcement of the Silk Fund Road was interesting, at the signing of the memorandum of understanding establishing the AIIB, he announced the creation also of the Silk Road Fund, stating that the former and latter are complementary in nature rather than being a substitute to other institutional development banks (Chen, 2014). As mentioned earlier the AIIB, the NDB, and the Silk Road Fund are all a well calculated and executed policy strategies in the road towards fomenting the Chinese Bretton Woods system and serve for that purpose. Under the new leadership of President Xi, China has found a creative way to use its huge currency reserves for lessening its dependency on the US led global financial system that is prone to incur China big losses and at the same time to use these reserves for a grand policy strategy that will lead to the creation of its own economic gravity area, or sphere of influence that will help maintain the much needed economic growth figures in the future years ahead.
The ‘one belt one road’ initiative is also called China’s Marshall Plan, referring to the US development and reconstruction plan of post-World War II Europe, and integrating its markets thereby establishing a grip over the postwar European economic order. Now if we compare the ‘one belt one road’ initiative to that of the Marshall plan one can indeed see some similarities, since the ‘belt and road’ projects were envisioned to serve China’s increasing needs, be it economic expansion or creating alternative secure routes to its markets beyond its borders.
Like the Marshall Plan, the ‘one belt one road’ policy is aiming to cement the framework for the export sector of China in those states. However, here one has to look to the role China has played so far in the region and in the regional institutions such as the ASEAN. China promises a win-win cooperation system where both the investor as well as the host country will gain; this is visible in the stance it takes in those institutions, by setting up a relatively fairer operating system and giving space to its partners, like forgoing of the veto power in the NDB although it’s the biggest contributor by far. Moreover as opposed to the Marshall Plan it’s all encompassing by welcoming new members, the Marshall Plan was limited only to Western Europe. Furthermore due to its vast scope it faces bigger challenges by competitors, such as roadblocks by US like the TPP initiative etc. However, its impact will be huge to the region and the global economic system, and since all the countries involved have a high stake in this project as well, it has a promising outlook (Dingding, 2014).
Thus the aim of the ‘one belt and one road’ projects incorporates the development strategies of participating states into regional cooperation thereby linking those states’ economies with the Asia-Pacific, European and African area. Thus China is well suited to lead this initiative, with being the largest trading partner of more than 120 states, engaging in different types of partnerships with 67 countries and five regional organizations. More importantly the developing world as well as economic powers and staunch allies of the USA don’t shy away anymore entering into initiatives led by China; more than 60 states have expressed willingness and interest in the ‘one belt one road’ initiative (Zhang, 2015).With the implementation of the ‘one belt one road’ policy Xi aims to double the 2010 GDP per capita and build a prosperous China by 2021, thus connecting China and Europe by both land and sea. These new initiatives are by no means to be compared with traditional foreign policy or economic development policies adopted by states’.
Just to highlight and understand the scope and pace of the ‘one belt one road’ initiative one simply needs to look at its routes; the sea route or Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is set to start from Fuzhou in Southeast China and glide south through the ASEAN states, crossing the Strait of Malacca turning west to countries along the Indian Ocean till reaching the land based Silk Road in Venice via the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Moreover under the structure of the MSR China has plans to broaden this initiative and build hard and soft infrastructure projects form the Indo-Pacific area to Africa (Deepak, 2014).
The mentioned design of a ‘one belt one road’ policy looks promising; however one cannot also deny the geopolitical competition that has roots in the formation of such a policy. China is highly energy dependent and imports most of its energy from abroad. To keep a balance in its energy supply new projects such as the Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CAGP) were established, including the Central Asian nations of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and the Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan line that roughly supply half of Chinas gas imports. However gas has only a 4 % share in Chinas total energy consumption, oil accounting to 20 % that is mainly coming from the Middle East (Qureshi, 2015).
For about 40 % of its oil supply China relies on the Straits of Malacca also in the Maritime Silk Road, the Malacca Strait is the key gate to the West. However the strong presence of the US Navy in the Strait of Malacca and the threat of piracy stipulate for the search of alternative routes as well, this is where the New Silk Road comes in as a complementary measure. China has no option but to diversify its supply routes, the Trans-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines just come as another lucrative option for securing oil and gas resources (Qureshi, 2015).
Source: Qureshi; 2015
As one can see the ‘one belt one road’ option not only provides China with an increased role in the global economy, but at the same time it serves its economic interests in diversifying the supply routes for its energy needs. In the North-West it has set up land based pipelines with the Central Asian Nations, in the South-West it has set up pipelines reaching Kunming that provides for an energy corridor giving it direct access to the Bay of Bengal. These initiatives are still regional in nature. However the pearl of the ‘one belt one road’ project connecting China to the far West by land is indisputably the New Silk Road railway project starting from Yiwu crossing the heartlands of Asia and Europe finally reaching Madrid. This railway network connecting dozens of states and creating a direct line from the East Coast of China to the far West up to Madrid not only serves the purpose of fomenting China further into the global market, increasing its role, and providing a cornerstone for the ultimate goal of a Chinese Bretton Woods system. This project is of major strategic value to China since it helps circumvent US naval superiority and strives for greater business efficiency between Europe and Asia, thus bridging the continents. It’s a win-win scenario since the countries along the belt would get the necessary infrastructure investment and benefit from this route (Qureshi, 2015).
Source: Qureshi; 2015.
Perhaps the ‘one belt one road’ initiative is one of the biggest economic and political endeavors of the 21st Century, thus its success along with the other Chinese initiatives resembling the Bretton Woods would change the outlook of the global economic order and create a different ‘parallel economic and political order’ that can pose as a major challenge to the US led system.
One has to understand that in this one China does not go it alone, it would be too costly, open to sabotage of the project by competitors and other difficulties such as coordination issues since it is encompassing such a diverse region and different countries with different backgrounds, add to that the financial burden solely placed on China, opening the success of the project to more vulnerabilities. But it’s not only the Chinese policy makers who grasp the importance of this unique project and the incorporated win-win option for all participating states makes it lucrative to join; it will benefit them in multiple ways, not to mention better infrastructure, easier and broader access to markets due to deepening integration etc.
It should be for that reason that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) declared it will combine its development plans with the ‘one belt one road’ policy initiation, thus giving it more cloud and international leeway in its course of actions. The Secretary General of the SCO, Dimitry Mezentsev gave in an interview on CCTV more insights and details on the shape of such cooperation between the SCO and the ‘Silk Road’ project. The SCO prepares a draft of cooperation plan between itself and the ‘one belt one road’ initiative to be handed over to member states for review and ratification. The focus is on mutual benefits on the area of politics, economy and culture; in addition all observer states as well will be invited to join the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative (Mezentsev, 2015).
Not only brings the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative states closer to each other by means of providing them with a common economic interest where all sides win, but also fosters stability and decreases the chances for conflict in the region, since with the deepening integration the costs of conflict becomes much higher than cooperation. So states are much more likely inclined to cooperate out of sheer self-economic and political interest rather than choose the path of conflict. Add to that the increasing role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has a huge potential not only as mentioned above in fostering and developing ‘political, economic, and cultural’ traits but also providing states with a forum to litigate their differences and promote harmonious relations among them by taking a leading role in this new initiative, and the fact that the SCO has by now longstanding professional operational structure where states are already engaging each other for quite some time now. Hence it has a good reputation among the member states, thus making it a viable organizational tool for the smooth functioning of the New Silk Road Economic Belt.
The importance of this initiative lies not only in providing for infrastructure investments, such as ports, railways, and power facilities and a network of connecting geographical regions, but also the additional benefit of generating economic growth.
According to a study conducted by Minsheng Securities the ‘one belt one road’ initiative will have an impact on 4.4 billion people in 26 countries and regions whereby the economic effect is estimated at about $21 trillion. Furthermore, on the one hand the investments are expected to include domestic provincial infrastructure investments in China, in areas like railway, highway and airport construction totaling $ 1.04 trillion. On the other hand, international projects are expected to be $ 52.47 billion in areas of Central and South Asia, with highway, railway, and of course energy projects. The funding for these projects comes from the ‘custom made’ Silk Road Fund consisting of $ 40 billion. Thus China started already in funding some projects that are in line with the Silk Road Economic Belts philosophy (Wang, 2015).
In light of these developments one can see, how important the ‘one belt one road’ policy is to China, since it is not only a vital pillar of an economic strategy to gradually foster the Chinese Bretton Woods system, but also an economic policy tool to stimulate economic growth at home at times of downward economic pressures. Thus summing up the ‘one belt one road’ initiative by China, it is an ambitious project that has the potential to change the outlook of the current global economic order. As discussed in the section above, it has many sides; economic, political, geo-politics, as well as cultural aspects that provides for the further integration of the region of Asia that will according to analysts foster regional peace. Moreover it’s not only bound to bridge the continents of Asia and Europe, but reach out to the entire world. The reason why so many countries embrace the ‘belt and road’ project cannot only be explained by economic motives and gains of the countries encompassing it, another reason includes the fact that it is built on a win-win concept as opposed to the Bretton Woods system that is criticized of being mainly Western dominated.
In order to accomplish this goal, many Chinese Scholars for example refer to the “three no” notion, i.e.: non-interference into domestic affairs of other states, not to create a sphere of influence, and lastly not to seek for hegemony (Deepak, 2014). Thus one thing is for sure, there is a big need in the development of the infrastructure of Asia, which the AIIB has the potential to fill in the gaps, and other initiatives such as the ‘one belt one road’ provide even a bigger potential in integrating continents. However all these pillars of the Chinese Bretton Woods system mentioned so far are not complete without the internationalization of the RMB.
The Internationalization of the RMB
Already being traded in currency markets in London, Singapore and elsewhere the RMB is on its way to full internationalization. Many Asian central banks and some non-Asian states have also RMB reserves. Furthermore China has currency swap agreements with almost all states in the Pacific region, many in Europe, and beyond to enable for direct trade in the Chinese Yuan, circumventing the long established passage through US dollars (Smith, 2015). Though one has to note the internationalization of the RMB does not mean that it will at the outset replace the dollar; it means that like the Euro it will become another powerful reserve currency and be dealt in with international transactions.
Barry Eichengreen (2011) for example elaborates on how long it will take for the Chinese renminbi to attain international currency status. By referring to the historical analogy of the US dollar that managed to gain international currency status from 1914 to 1924; only in a decade did the US Dollar surpass the British Sterling and became by 1924 the leading international and reserve currency (Eichengreen, 2011). Moreover he points out to the fact that the internationalization of the RMB does not need to come at the demise of the US Dollar or the Euro for that matter, according to Eichengreen: “it is possible to complete the internationalization process quickly if the authorities set their minds to it.”
For sure it seems that China set its mind to make the RMB an international currency when one looks at the policies adopted, like the currency swap agreements between major trading partners and also other states and moves such as the China International Payment System (CIPS) and applying to the IMF for the placing of its currency in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket of currencies in the IMF. Since the monetary pillar of the Chinese Bretton Woods system requires the internationalization of the RMB, these policy moves show a willing Chinese government to enter the international stage and play a bigger role.
Coming back to Eichengreen’s historical analogy of the British Sterling and the US Dollar, there are challenges to the internationalization of the RMB but also advantages in going ahead with the policy. Just like the USA today with the Bretton Woods institutions and its major global financial status, so was London an established center for global trade and the international financial market. It had the entire infrastructure needed with sets ranging from specialized investment banks to foreign branches and institutional and individual investors. Like the US Treasury market nowadays, London was the single most liquid market in the world (Eichengreen, 2011). Just like New York had to face this situation a century ago and compete for its position, so does China face similar challenges that New York faced when jockeying for the number one position in global finance.
Eichengreen (2011) argues that there are sequencing stages in order to internationalize a currency: first the use of the RMB in invoicing and settling trade; second promoting its use in private financial transactions; third encouraging the RMB to be held as foreign reserves by central banks and governments. Thus China has to provide for greater exchange rate flexibility to accompany the transition to capital account convertibility and allow a higher amount of capital flows. The Chinese policy authorities seem to follow the lines as argued; they have begun promoting the use of RMB for trade transactions, initially at the infant stage the authorities permitted the RMB to be used by special eligible companies in cross border trade with neighboring states such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Mongolia, Nepal and North Korea and the special administrative zones of Hong Kong and Macao. In addition to this it set currency swap agreements in 2010, starting with Brazil to allow the two countries’ currencies to be used in bilateral trade settlements (Eichengreen, 2011).
Moreover in the same year of 2010 the Monetary Authority of Hong Kong got the approval from Beijing to liberalize supervisory regulations about the RMB denominated business in the region, granting the right to any company in the world to open a RMB denominated account. This basically unleashed the way of open trade in RMB denominated transactions in Hong Kong. The conventional finance packages started to be provided in RMB’s. A year later in January 2011 the Bank of China was authorized by the government to provide for RMB based deposit accounts in New York. Thus as opposed to critics, the internationalization of the RMB will be a positive development for the global financial system as Eichengreen (2010) puts it; the existence of alternative international reserve currencies to the US dollar such as the Euro and the RMB will be an improvement for the smooth functioning of the international monetary system, since countries will not be forced to accumulate hoards of dollars. Thus: “No one reserve-currency country will be able to finance its current account deficit as freely as did the United States in the years leading up to the recent financial crisis” (Eichengreen, 2010). The competitive nature of the international monetary system will provide for an auto balance system that prevents irresponsible financial behavior as showcased by the United States during the 2008 crisis.
Regarding the internationalization of the Chinese renminbi, it will come sooner than expected by many; the China International Payment System is a vital move in that direction. It will not elevate the RMB to the level and status the US Dollar shares on the international arena, but will pave the way for future developments. Obviously it’s questionable whether the Chinese renminbi will manage to surpass the US dollar within a decade as the US currency did a century ago vis-à-vis the Sterling. However Eichengreen (2011) points out to the possibility of this, by outlining the major sequences that need to be done if Shanghai wants to surpass New York as the international center of finance.
When one looks to the different policy initiatives of China such as the establishment of the AIIB or the New Development Bank, one belt one road policy or financial instruments such as the CIPS and currency swap agreements on their own then these developments might not show us the grand strategy that lies behind these initiatives. However, analyzing those major moves in combination as part of a bigger strategy one can indeed see a move towards the establishment of a Chinese Bretton Woods system, a mechanism ultimately leading to the challenge of the status quo that is dominated mainly by the US. Thus this analysis has tried to shed light on the Chinese policy drives that have the potential to challenge the current world economic order in the future by the emergence of a new economic as well as political gravitational point that will be possible with the creation of a Bretton Woods system made in China.
A New Horizon for Kazakhstan’s Economy
On September 1, President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev delivered an address that outlined the nation’s priority areas for development. Primarily focusing on Kazakhstan’s economic trajectory, the President’s remarks have a significant impact on the activities and initiatives of public authorities, including quasi-public sector companies like Samruk-Kazyna, a sovereign wealth fund of Kazakhstan, which owns several major companies in the country.
Rethinking Tariff Policy
President Tokayev emphasized the necessity of reforming the tariff policy and introducing adequate market tariffs for entities subject to natural monopolies. This marks an important shift from the existing approach, which has reached its limits. Adopting a cost-plus principle for tariffs will enable us to discontinue subsidies to the economy. This, in turn, will facilitate timely preventive maintenance, thereby reducing the risk of industrial disasters. This policy overhaul will ensure break-even in the areas of activity, bolster the investment attractiveness of our companies and a number of industries, and ultimately lead to increased dividends and social payments. We have already been collaborating with the Government to systematically increase tariffs, taking into account the 10-12% inflation corridor set by regulators to ensure social stability.
Focusing on Exploration
Tau-Ken Samruk, our national mining company, is currently engaged in exploration projects with leading international companies like RioTinto, Fortescue Metals Group, and others. With Kazgeology joining the structure of Tau-Ken Samruk this year, the number of exploration projects has increased from 15 to 45, expanding the exploration area from 1887.7 km² to 13,609 km². Notably, we are focusing on copper, gold, lead, and zinc, as well as rare metals like tungsten, molybdenum, and yttrium. Joint ventures registered in Kazakhstan will own the extraction rights to these minerals if confirmed. Geological exploration work will be carried out not only by Tau-Ken Samruk, but also by the world’s largest uranium producer Kazatomprom, national oil and gas companies KazMunayGaz and QazaqGaz in their areas of activity.
Energy Goals for the Next Five Years
The President has set a goal to commission 14 GW of new energy capacity over the next five years. This includes the Samruk-Kazyna projects aimed at restoring the first unit of Ekibastuz GRES-1, a coal-fired thermal power station, expanding GRES-2, and constructing GRES-3. These initiatives focus on traditional coal energy.
In addition, the Fund’s portfolio features gas generation projects, the largest of which involve the reconstruction of Almaty CHPP-2 and CHPP-3, as well as the construction of a combined cycle power plant in the Turkestan region.
Special emphasis is being placed on the development of renewable energy sources, particularly hydroelectric power plants. Plans include constructing wind farms with a capacity of up to 5 GW in collaboration with foreign partners such as Total Eren, Acwa Power, Power China, Masdar, and China Power International Holding. The projects also encompass the construction of counter-regulators for Kapshagai HPP and Shulba HPP.
According to forecasted data, a capacity increase of approximately 9 GW is expected by the end of 2028.
Transport and Logistics
Strategic upgrades are in progress to improve our existing transport infrastructure and eliminate bottlenecks. Several significant infrastructure projects are currently underway, including the construction of second lines on the Dostyk–Moiynty section, and the development of new railway lines: Bakhty–Ayagoz, Darbaza–Maktaaral, as well as a bypass line around Almaty.
Alongside the widespread modernization of railway infrastructure across the country, the North–South transport corridor stands out as a promising focus area. Plans are in place to upgrade railway sections leading to the Bolashak station, which is located at the border with Turkmenistan.
Simultaneously, initiatives to boost terminal capacity are in the works both within Kazakhstan and abroad. Noteworthy projects include establishing a container hub in Aktau, constructing a terminal at Xi’an port in China, and creating a dry port at Bakhty station, among others. Kuryk port is receiving special focus; the construction of its ferry complex is nearly complete, and activity along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route is ramping up.
The expected economic impact of these initiatives is substantial, with freight traffic projected to increase by an estimated 50 million tons annually. These efforts aim to transform Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, Kazakhstan’s national railway company, into a comprehensive transport and logistics enterprise.
Top of Form
Economic development on horizon
Kazakhstan is at a historically significant crossroads. The President’s address underlines a multitude of opportunities that we are keen to seize. For decades, Samruk-Kazyna has collaborated with international entities, and we firmly believe that collective business efforts are the most effective approach for the 21st century.
To attract major long-term investors, stability and clear profit plans are essential. In line with the President’s recommendations, we are refining our tax policy to make it more investor-friendly, among other initiatives. These comprehensive efforts not only offer us a robust toolkit for economic development but are already yielding tangible results. I have immense faith in Kazakhstan’s economic potential and am confident that the global business community will recognize and appreciate the favorable conditions being nurtured in our nation.
The High Percentage of Informal Employment in Indonesia: Causes and Implications
In most developing countries, the informal economy accounts for a large portion of the national economy and it often has a negative connotation because of inferior working conditions, low-productivity firms, and disrespect for the rule of law. The firms and workers as well as their output and production activities that are unregistered and do not pay taxes account for a significant and growing share of total economic activity. In Indonesia, BPS-Statistics Indonesia (BPS-Statistic Indonesia, 2022) records that the informal sector reaches 59.31% with more informal economy workers in rural areas. It captures three provinces including Papua (84,11%), West Sulawesi (77,25%), and West Nusa Tenggara (75,36%), with the highest percentage. The informal sector – where most MSMEs operate – employs more than 61 percent of Indonesia’s total workforce (The World Bank, 2010). From a government or formal perspective, the large participation in the informal sector becomes an issue that must be resolved because restricts the government’s ability to provide support for public goods and services (tax issue) and hinders economic growth.
In addition, policy-makers assume that their status (as companies and informal workers) would put them at a disadvantage relative to formal firms because they may not be able to legally obtain credit from formal financial sources, access government programs or facilities, or export products. The fact that is not surprising anymore is, even though actors in the informal sector know those losses mentioned by the government, most of them remain in their position. This phenomenon is interesting to examine because it has a lot to do with economic growth, social welfare, human capital, institutional issue, to development in various sectors. Therefore, this paper will analyze why the percentage of informal employment remains high in Indonesia despite many efforts by institutions and state agencies.
The Informal Sector: Exclusion & Exit Theory
Informal employment is a phenomenon in which firms and workers are unregistered with social security administrations, meaning their work activity and income are outside the tax control of the state and of the legal provisions in labor matters – most of them are small firms. Some literature analyzes the reasons firms or workers choose to remain in the informal sector on the one hand and the reasons other companies register their firms (and workers) and pay taxes. Perry et al. (2007) highlight informality through two lenses, exclusion & rational exit. The exclusion theory argues that the informal sector exists because workers could not find jobs in the formal sector, more precisely they are excluded from critical state benefits or modern economic circuits. Those exclusions include segmentation in the labor market, burdensome entry regulations that prohibit small firms shift to formality and growth, and informality as a defensive measure toward excessive tax and regulatory burdens. Therefore, the rational exit theory states that the net benefits of joining the formal sector are negative. Firms and workers choose to engage with formal institutions based on cost-benefit analysis, depending on their assessment of the net benefits associated with formality and the state’s enforcement effort and capability. This view suggests that high informality results from a massive choice to leave formal institutions by firms and individuals. It implies societal demand on the quality of the state’s service provision and enforcement capability.
They also argue that formality increases rapidly with firm size and productivity. So, formality can be seen as an input in the production process that is not really needed by small firms. However, most micro firms remain too small to benefit sufficiently from formality to overcome their various costs (a survey of informal Mexican micro firms). Other reasons are the high costs and time required to register or the high costs of operating as a registered business. In their research, the degree of formality increases as the firm grows larger and their demand for formalization increases, as does the probability of detection by authorities. Firms choosing to register do have better performance or, the firms that started operations being registered exhibit higher levels (on average) of labor productivity than their equivalent unregistered peers (survey in Latin America). However, there is evidence that, in some cases, informality reflects defensive evasion of possibly excessive regulation. In short, firms not only consider the cost and benefit of formality but their environment that does not demonstrate demand for its expected benefits also influences their decision. For the last, even if the government reduced registration costs, it would not lead to formalization. In other cases, such as unskilled workers – with lower formal wages, they may find that paying social protection and expected returns from a formal job do not exceed their consumption or greater flexibility and income they can get as informal workers. Especially when they have social protection alternatives from private or noncontributory programs (Perry et al., 2007). However, informality is a multidimensional phenomenon in which exclusion and exit mechanisms depend on each country based on its institutions, historical background, and legal frameworks.
The analyses highlight the characteristics of informal workers, their motivations, and their preference for the benefits and non-monetary characteristics of jobs such as flexibility, autonomy, stability, and mobility. Most of these informal workers seem to choose their jobs according to their individual needs, particularly their desire for flexibility and autonomy, and their abilities (comparative advantage). Either independent workers (firm owner and self-employment) or informal salaried workers are related to the exclusion and exit model. Most independent workers choose their jobs voluntarily, exit the formal social protection system, and underline the non-monetary of self-employment. In contrast, most informal salaried workers are excluded from more desirable jobs, either as formal workers or self-employed. They also choose not to contribute to social security and health insurance plans (exit) mainly because of low incomes and their employer’s decision not to offer benefits. Based on Perry’s research in Latin America, most of the self-employed do not appear to be excluded from the formal sector but they choose to exit (rationally, cost-benefit) of formality. They considered their minimal human capital, access to other assets, and low aggregate productivity in the economy. Informal employment then becomes a better option than suitable jobs in formal ones.
The dualism of the Informal Sector
Furthermore, Rizki, Suryadarma, & Suryahadi (2020) used dual economic theory in their research on informal workers in Indonesia in the 1996-2014 period. The dual economy theory argues that the informal and formal sectors co-exist, and are fundamentally different. They produce different products, with different labor, capital, and technological inputs that automatically have different productivity levels, and also pay different levels of wages and serve different consumers. This theory assumes that changes in registration costs will have no impact on the size of the informal sector in the dual economy model. Only economic growth could solve this issue because it will reduce the size of the informal sector while encouraging the formation and expansion of formal firms (Rafael La Porta & Andrei Shleifer, 2014).
Based on Rizki et al. research, Indonesia with its large informal sector in which 57 percent of the 125 million working population are informal workers (50% in the non-agriculture sectors since 2000), the transition from informal to formal jobs is very gradual and can be rapidly overturned by an economic crisis. Although, indeed, between 1996 and 2014, they found evidence that the informal sector seemed to shrink along with economic growth, however, it took a very long time. The results from the first job trend examination show individuals whose first job was as a low-tier informal (LTI) worker, almost half remained in that position through the next 8 to 19 years, and another 45 percent became low-tier formal (LTF) workers for at least one year. Their findings emphasize that the dual economy is divided between low-tier and high-tier employment, rather than informal and formal employment. Even if they shift, they are still at a low-level of employment. However, they have a relatively good chance of switching to LTF work because of the earnings premium that LTI could gain is large and statistically significant (42%). Hence, the research recommends, instead of creating policies that try to encourage low-level informal sector workers to become high-tier informal sector workers – as most policymakers in developing countries desire, the government should be advised to create jobs, even if low-tier ones, that LTI can apply for.
Another research from William, Horodnic, & Windebank (2017) on the dual informal labor market with a case study in the European Union. They see the informal economy both as the ‘exclusion’ and ‘out’, and as internal dualism of it. The evaluation was carried out on a dual informal labor market composed of an exit-driven ‘upper tier’ and exclusion-driven ‘lower tier’ of informal workers. Their analysis resulted in the finding that 24% of participants did so for pure exclusion reasons, 45% for pure exit reasons, and 31% for a mixture of both exclusion and exit rationales. So, it is not purely for exit or exclusion rationales, instead, there is an internal dualism of the informal sector, with some involved in the informal sector being exit, others exclusion, and yet others driven by a mixture of both motives. However, the weight given to exit and exclusion is not uniform across the European Union. Exclusion is more common in Southern Europe and East-Central Europe but less in Nordic nations and Western Europe. Based on their analysis, the exclusion-driven ‘lower tier’ was identified as more likely to be populated by the unemployed and those living in East-Central Europe, and the exit-driven ‘upper tier’ by those with fewer financial difficulties and who live in the Nordic countries. In sum, the informal sector is not purely a necessity-driven realm for excluded populations or purely a result of a desire to exit a burdensome and over-regulated formal sector, it is a mixture of both exclusion and exit rationales.
In addition to examining the phenomenon of the high percentage of informal employment in developing countries through the perspective of economic literature, the author will also look at it from an institutional perspective. Williams & Harodnic (2015), through the lens of institutional theory, reveal that there is a strong relationship between tax morale and participation in the informal economy. The lower the level of tax morale, the higher the level of participation in the informal economy. They mention that not only formal institutions (codified laws & regulations) – government morality – define institutional strength (non-compliance; enforcement) but also informal institutions (societal morality) such as norms, values, and principles. So, in the case of the informal economy, they argue that there is an asymmetry between government morality and societal morality, thereby resulting in a large percentage of the informal economy. The finding (case: the UK population) is people who participate in the informal economy have significantly lower tax morale than those in formal ones.
Indonesia’s Informal Employment
Based on the literature reviews and theories above, the author observes that in the Indonesian case, the exclusion theory is not really relevant (directly) as a reason for the high percentage of the informal sector, especially since the period 2018-after the pandemic COVID-19 until now. During that period, the government amended and passed regulations that ease and facilitate access for MSMEs and workers to enter the formal economy. For instance, the central government has also reduced registration fees (Directorate General of Intellectual Property, Trademark) and business taxes (1% to 0.5%) (Directorate General of Taxes) which have been implemented since 2018, but participation in the informal economy is still large. There are still many informal economy actors who are reluctant to transform into the formal sector. They still assume that the procedure for formalizing (registration) their business is too complicated – and expensive, although the government has reduced and simplified registration. Even the registration of the Taxpayer Identification Number (Nomor Pokok Wajib Pajak/NPWP) – as a requirement for access to capital loans at the Bank, paying taxes, and reporting the Annual Tax Return (Surat Pemberitahuan Tahunan/SPT) can be done at the tax office or through the online site at pajak.go.id which incidentally makes it easier for the community (theoretically). On the other hand, the formation of the Job Creation Law No. 11/2020 (widely known as the “Omnibus Law”) should also support informal workers and MSMEs to shift, but this is not the case.
The high informal sector in Indonesia is more relevant viewed through a rational exit lens in which MSMEs (and workers) choose to be informal because the costs of formality are greater than its benefits. They assume that formalizing their enterprises (mostly small one) are costly and not worth the benefits they get. They have to pay business taxes (Article 2 (5) Law No. 36/2008 on Income Tax; Government Regulation (PP) No. 23/2018 on Income Tax) and have to deal with regulations related to employment (the Job Creation Law No. 11/2020), product certification, and they have to pay business taxes (Article 2 (5) Law No. 36/2008 on Income Tax; Government Regulation (PP) No. 23/2018 on Income Tax) and have to deal with regulations related to employment (the Job Creation Law No. 11/2020) and product certification, and procedures they find complicated and time-consuming to perform. Most of the MSMEs in Indonesia are small – and mostly run by the lower middle class. Lower middle-class informal actors prefer to remain in the informal sector because they enjoy benefits such as not having to pay taxes – but enjoy tax advantages, wage rates that are not limited by labor regulations, not spending time with registration and administration processes that they consider complicated, and other advantages of not following the rules.
So, the author sees this as more of a human capital and societal morality issue. Small businesses and workers in the informal sector are constrained to meet standards in the formal sector due to their low capacities, such as inadequate skills, low education, and lack of knowledge about technology-digitization, which indeed affects their mentality and performance (productivity, efficiency, marketing, management). This fact is in line with the dual economy theory of informality. Furthermore, from an institutional perspective, the informal sector is a matter of enforcement and societal resistance which requires changing the values and beliefs of the population by trying to harmonize regulations and soft policies, so that trust, self-regulation, and high commitment can grow. Hence, in its implementation, the government must have clear indicators for MSME development. MSME development programs must be synergized so that they do not run separately in each ministry/institution. It is necessary to map and differentiate in handling problems based on the size of MSMEs, worker skills, and class so that empowerment is carried out on target. In conclusion, besides the significance of the institution, meaningful enforcement effort and capacity from above and societal cooperation from below, are very important indicators to create a strong institution. Lack of enforcement capacity relative to societal resistance becomes one of the causes of the high percentage of the Indonesian informal economy. It is also important to pay attention to increasing skills in line with the needs of the labor market. It seems that what is important is no longer whether they become informal (which always has a negative connotation) or formal (good one), but how to empower those at the middle and lower levels so that their capacity and morale support economic growth and prosperity economically and socially.
CBDC vs Cryptocurrency: The Future of Global Financial Order
In the rapidly evolving digital era, the global financial landscape is undergoing profound transformation. At the heart of the debate on the future of digital currency, two concepts dominate the discussion: Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) and cryptocurrency. While both offer distinct visions for the future of global finance, there are strong indications that CBDCs hold greater potential to be adopted as a global standard.
A study by the Atlantic Council, a US-based think tank, reveals that 130 countries, representing 98% of the global economy, are currently exploring digital versions of their currencies. Nearly half of these are in advanced stages of development, testing, or launch. All G20 nations, except Argentina, are in these advanced stages. Eleven countries, including some in the Caribbean and Nigeria, have launched their CBDCs. Meanwhile, China has tested its CBDC with 260 million people across 200 different scenarios. However, despite the global push for CBDCs, countries like Nigeria have seen disappointing adoption, while Senegal and Ecuador have halted their developments. Here are some fundamental reasons why CBDCs hold more promise than Cryptocurrencies in setting global financial standards:
1. Authority and Regulation
One of the primary advantages of CBDCs is the oversight and regulation by central banks. With a central authority controlling its circulation and use, CBDCs offer a higher level of trust and security for users and other stakeholders. CBDCs, supervised by central banks, are deemed safer due to a centralized authority ensuring consistent policy and regulation application. The ability to track and monitor transactions to prevent illegal activities, value stability, advanced security infrastructure, legal protection, and monetary control by central banks enhance user trust and security. Moreover, with central bank backing, CBDCs have backup and recovery mechanisms ensuring the digital currency’s integrity and availability.
2. Stability and Sustainability
Cryptocurrencies often face high price volatility, hindering their acceptance as a stable medium of exchange. In contrast, CBDCs, backed by central banks, are expected to offer more consistent value stability. Cryptocurrency price volatility is often driven by speculation, low liquidity, news and regulatory responses, and market immaturity. The nascent crypto market, dominated by retail investors, tends to move based on emotions like fear or greed rather than fundamental analysis. On the other hand, CBDCs, regulated by central banks, are designed for stability, expected to provide more consistent value stability than decentralized cryptocurrencies.
3. Financial System Integration
CBDCs, issued and overseen by central banks, offer easier integration into existing financial infrastructure. With full backing from central banks and existing legal and regulatory frameworks, CBDCs can seamlessly integrate into traditional banking and financial systems, facilitating cross-border transactions and exchanges with traditional currencies. For instance, Swift, a financial messaging service provider, is focusing on CBDC interoperability. They’ve initiated beta testing with several central banks and over 30 financial institutions to ensure new digital currencies operate smoothly alongside current fiat currencies. This aim seeks to address potential global fragmentation in CBDC development.
In contrast, cryptocurrencies, with their decentralized nature, might face challenges integrating with existing financial infrastructure due to the absence of a central authority and regulatory challenges, as well as acceptance by financial institutions.
4. Global Acceptance
As an official currency issued by central banks, CBDCs have the potential for widespread acceptance among nations, becoming an integral part of the global financial order. CBDCs, being official currencies issued by central banks, enjoy the trust and credibility of a nation’s monetary authority, facilitating their acceptance among the public. For instance, China’s Digital Yuan, backed by the People’s Bank of China, has seen extensive domestic acceptance. Moreover, CBDCs are designed to integrate with existing payment systems, as seen with the Sand Dollar project in the Bahamas that enables transactions via smartphones. On an international level, CBDCs can facilitate cross-border monetary cooperation, with countries like ASEAN members considering the interoperability of their CBDCs to ease trade and investment.
5. Transparency and Accountability
The ability to track CBDC transactions provides governments with an effective tool to enhance financial oversight and tax compliance. The transparency offered by CBDCs facilitates the identification of potentially unreported transactions and the detection of suspicious transaction patterns related to money laundering or terrorist financing. Additionally, with real-time monitoring, governments can promptly detect and respond to illegal activities, such as fraud, ensuring the integrity and security of their financial systems remain intact.
6. Promoting Financial Inclusion
CBDCs can play a pivotal role in promoting financial inclusion, providing access to financial services for those previously marginalized from traditional banking systems. CBDCs hold immense potential to boost financial inclusion, especially for those marginalized from traditional banking systems. With easy access via mobile devices and low transaction costs, CBDCs make financial services more accessible, especially in rural or remote areas.
Furthermore, the ease of account opening and cross-border transactions at more efficient costs supports migrant workers and those previously challenged by conventional banking services. For example, the Sand Dollar project in the Bahamas has showcased how CBDCs can expand access to financial services across the islands, allowing residents on remote islands to transact using just a mobile phone. Such initiatives demonstrate how CBDCs can be a crucial tool in promoting financial inclusion globally.
7. Monetary Policy Control
With CBDCs, central banks have an additional tool to implement monetary policy, allowing for more timely and effective interventions in the face of economic crises. CBDCs grant central banks enhanced capabilities to implement monetary policies. With better liquidity control and the ability to apply negative interest rates, central banks can respond more quickly and accurately to economic condition shifts.
Moreover, CBDCs allow for faster monetary policy transmission, such as direct stimulus provision to public accounts, and provide access to real-time transaction data. This capability is crucial as it allows for quicker responses to potential crises, maintaining economic and price stability. Additionally, swift and accurate actions from central banks in crisis situations can boost public trust in financial institutions and the government. Thus, CBDCs can be a vital tool in a central bank’s monetary policy toolkit, reinforcing their role in safeguarding a nation’s economic well-being.
While cryptocurrencies offer benefits like decentralization and privacy, the lack of consistent regulation and high volatility make them less ideal as a global financial standard. On the other hand, CBDCs, with the backing and regulation of central banks, promise a new era in a more stable, transparent, and inclusive global financial landscape.
In the context of modern diplomacy, the acceptance of CBDCs as a global standard can facilitate cross-border economic cooperation, strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships, and advance sustainable development agendas. As a step towards a more integrated and harmonious future, CBDCs might be the key to transforming the global financial order.
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