Let us see how oil barrel prices have really fluctuated in recent weeks: in April, in fact, the European and Asian Brent benchmark, in parallel with the US West Texas Intermediate (WTI), decreased by about 1 U.S. dollar per barrel a day.
The WTI, however, is a mixture of different light and sweet American crude oil and is refined especially in the Midwest and on the Gulf Coast.
The benchmark known as Brent, instead, is oil extracted in the North Sea and it has greater and faster access to large markets. It is therefore used as a common benchmark for the broader oil market, while the WTI is now used above all as a reference for the American market.
It should be noted, however, that in the previous month of March, the two benchmarks had fallen by 26.5 U.S. dollars per barrel and 24 U.S. dollars per barrel respectively.
In short, the imbalance in the oil market fully affected the March futures prices in particular, while the April fluctuations were mainly due to the OPEC plus agreement reached on April 2, setting the price at 26.03 U.S. dollars per barrel.
The breakdown in negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Russia led to a Saudi super-production – at first of 10 million barrels a day and then immediately of 12 million barrels a day – with a subsequent choice by OPEC to agree on a “fall” in the oil barrel price at 60 U.S. dollars, given the Covid-19 pandemic crisis.
A mistake, but probably a too classically macroeconomic forecast that does not consider strategic and internal competition assessments within OPEC, which are often essential to set prices.
Later the oil barrel price increased immediately to 34.44 U.S. dollars per barrel on April 9, then to 16.04 U.S. dollars per barrel on April 22 and finally closed at 25.04 U.S. dollars per barrel.
In mid-April the WTI opened at 20.48 U.S. dollars per barrel, then reached 28.26 U.S. dollars and finally closed at 19.29 U.S. dollars, after having also reached the negative and paradoxical price of -37.63 U.S. dollars per barrel on April 20, 2020.
Moreover, on April 14, the International Monetary Fund published a forecast from which it could be inferred that the world GDP would decrease by 3% in the remaining period of 2020, while on April 15 the International Energy Agency published its own analysis which estimated a reduction ofthe oil demand by 9,300,000 barrels per day by the end of 2020.
Hence the WTI futures for May delivery, immediately collapsed to -37.63 U.S. dollars per barrel. Here, however, the real problem is storage.
Short-term contracts do not envisage it at all.
In fact, as many industry analysts maintain, this caused the fall in prices.
It is no coincidence, in fact, that U.S. commercial oil stocks have risen significantly, from 469,193,000 barrels on March 27 to 527,631,000 barrels on May 24. Hence, in all likelihood, the U.S. ETF Oil Fund – which plunged by 15% in the April 27 session alone, after the announcement of major changes in the composition of its portfolio – has fallen due to unexpected overstocking.
In other words, the U.S. Fund has stated it plans to remove all WTI contracts expiring in June from its portfolio and replace them with longer-term contracts, with obvious immediate losses.
Therefore,the US Oil Fund will be broken down as follows: 30% of the portfolio will be WTI contracts expiring in July; 15% of the portfolio will be WTI contracts expiring in August; then contracts expiring in the following month up to the remaining 10% expiring in June 2021.
The losses of the U.S. Fund are now -87% since the beginning of this year.
The U.S. Fund has an estimated value of 3 billion U.S. dollars. A financial phenomenon that has made it similar to other funds specializing in oil futures.
It is clear that this behaviour has contributed to the bearish trend of recent months and this has certainly not favoured Donald J. Trump’s election campaign.
Furthermore, the WTI decline can also be explained by the structural logistical shortcomings that characterize the oil transport system within the United States.
Nevertheless, based on the ideas of the current Algerian Chairman-in-office, OPEC predicts that the oil barrel price will be equal to 40 U.S. dollars at the beginning of the third quarter of 2020 and that, in any case, the oil market will return to balance before the end of this year. A very unlikely hope.
The new OPEC plus plus agreement, however, entered into force on May 1, 2020.
The first phase of the agreement signed on April 12, 2020envisaged that all OPEC members plus the others would reduce production by 9,700,000 barrels a day until June 30, 2020.
At the beginning of May, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia brought their production to 8,750,000 barrels a day (with a decrease of 2 million barrels per day), with the further intention of bringing their output to the limit of 8,500,000 barrels a day.
The first phase of the bilateral agreement signed on April 12 also envisaged that the producers nor belonging directly to OPEC would “voluntarily” cut production by at least 5,000,000 barrels a day over the same period of time.
It should be recalled that these important non-OPEC producers include Norway, Canada, Brazil and, obviously, the United States.
Nevertheless, the non-OPEC total cuts have reached – with some difficulty – just 4,100,000 barrels a day.
Indeed, according to Standard & Poor’s calculations, the United States decreased production by as many as 11,600,000 barrels a day and only for the week which ended on May 8.
Hence a decrease of 1.5 million barrels a day, compared to the level of 13,100,000 barrels a day reached on March 13, 2020.
Therefore, for the first time since February 2019 the U.S. production has fallen below 12,000,000 barrels a day.
Moreover, on April 30, 2020, the U.S. strategic oil reserves reached 636 million oil barrels, compared to a total maximum capacity of 714 million barrels.
According to the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, however, global oil demand will decrease by as many as 11,400,000 barrels a day throughout 2020, before slightly increasing by 10,600,000 barrels a day in 2021.
Despite all possible statistical tricks, however, the unemployment rate has currently reached 14.7% in the United States and it is rising quickly.
This leads to a fall of about 30% in U.S. oil consumption, but the Russian Federation records a 4-6% GDP drop at least until the end of 2020.
Moreover, on April 24, the Russian Central Bank cut rates by 50 basis points to 5.5%, while the Russian inflation rate is expected to rise by 4.8% until the end of this year.
According to data of April 30 last, China shows an increase in the composite index (manufacturing + services) from 53 to 53.4, while the index of services alone has grown from 52.3 to 53.2.
However, the index of Chinese purchases in the manufacturing sector alone has decreased by two points, while the CAXIN index – which measures Chinese private SMEs – points to a small recession.
Chinese oil imports in April, in fact – driven only by public enterprises – increased by 4.5% year over year.
Chinese imports from Saudi Arabia, however, decreased by 90,000 barrels a day while, despite U.S. sanctions, Chinese purchases of Iranian oil rose by 11.3% as against the previous year.
Therefore, we are faced with a new distribution of geopolitical and oil control areas.
The alternative for China is between Iran, the core of the new Silk Road, and Venezuela, although both Russia and China have agreed to give Russia a primary role in Venezuela.
Hence the global geopolitical games are postponed to the return of a robust oil demand after the Covid-19 crisis, which will end only with a vaccine or a universally accepted therapy. On a geopolitical level, however, it will probably concern a new agreement between China, the United States and the Russian Federation.
An agreement that this time could see a real role of mediator for Italy, involving both ENI and governmental and private technical structures.
There are many issues to be considered in the relations between the United States, China and Russia: Russia’s alleged penetration into the North American electoral and political machinery and apparata; the commercial negotiations between the United States and China which, coincidentally, exacerbated during the oil price crisis; finally, the infra-US conflict regarding the reduction of local oil production.
It has to be said that if there is a recovery of the oil market, demand could reach 90-95 million barrels a day, but the country recording the greatest loss of production will certainly be the United States, which has the highest cost of oil barrel production.
Meanwhile, in its anti-coronavirus aid programme of April 30 last, the Federal Reserve envisaged direct support to U.S. oil and gas companies.
As many analysts maintain, however, several companies of the shale sector, which live only on high prices, would go bankrupt by the end of 2020.
In terms of global assessments, however, world oil demand is estimated to fall by 19,000,000 barrels a day during this quarter of 2020 and by 8,600,000 barrels a day throughout 2021.
Global oil supply is expected to decrease by 12,000,000 barrels a day since May to 88,000,000 next year.
OECD stocks have increased by 68,200,000 barrels a day to a total of 2,961,000,000, well over 46,000,000 barrels a day above the average of the last five years – a quantity worth 90 days of average demand.
Non-conventional crude oil production in the U.S., however, declined by 183,000 barrels a day with a peak until March 13, before falling by approximately 12,000,000 barrels a day on May 8.
There are currently 374 drills operating in the United States, of which 292 oil and 80 gas ones, plus 2 mixed ones.
They are 228 fewer than those recorded on April 9, 2020, the minimum level since 1940.
In short, the Covid-19 pandemic is redesigning all geopolitical scenarios, through oil, above all, but not only through it. Here not only energy counts, but rather the whole economic system which, however, is still currently oil-dependent.
The G20 has already put forward international cooperation proposals to cancel the debt of some of the poorest countries and for a coordinated response against the pandemic by the most technologically advanced countries.
Hence any radical transformation of energy systems entails a paradigm shift at geopolitical level.
According to the International Monetary Fund, no oil-producing country can make money with an oil barrel price at 40 U.S. dollars. Only Qatar barely can, but every country in the Middle East needs prices of at least 60 U.S. dollars per barrel.
However, there is more than the tax or productive breakeven point: the producing countries’ economic diversification is essential.
From this viewpoint, only Mexico, the Russian Federation and the United Arab Emirates could survive, while some others with less differentiated economies can still ask for loans or temporarily stop public spending.
Nevertheless, this depends not only on macroeconomic evaluations, but above all on political and structural issues: the presence of foreign manpower that can be easily sent away (Saudi Arabia); the possibility of using other forms of energy (Morocco) or the negative impact of some old Welfare State on the oil price (Algeria).
Other countries are, instead, particularly vulnerable: Iraq, which is currently also one of Italy’s main suppliers; Oman, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, Angola, Surinam, not to mention Iran and Venezuela, where the oil issue is part of a severe international political crisis.All these countries can shortly fail or fall into an indefinite crisis, with unpaid salaries in the public sector and primary services largely reduced, as well as military crises and great political instability.
In some cases, this may lead to the expansion of “terrorism”, more exactly of the “sword jihad”, which can drive a wedge within the hotbeds of crisis and rule the States or the areas left by the old legitimate governments. It may also lead to the uncontrolled expansion of the great international crime, which can turn the failed States into bases to attack the still relatively healthy economies of some Western countries, and to connect the areas of illegality one another and hence turn the crime territories into a new great geopolitical player.
A further possibility – not to be ruled out at all – concerns the mounting of regional tensions, which could become a not entirely irrational option, at least for some producing countries.
Just think of the oil barrel price crisis triggering a final showdown between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
There will also be Asian or African countries that will benefit from the vertical fall in prices.
It should be recalled, however, that on April 20 last, the West Texas Crude contract expiring in May fell to -40.32 U.S. dollars.
The countries which will benefit – to a certain extent – from the fall in prices include Argentina -which is currently already prey to yet another default, but which will pay much less for energy imports- as well as the Philippines, India, Turkey and South Africa.
These countries will no longer be burdened by the cost of oil imports, but will also attract less investment from producing countries, whose availability of capital will collapse quickly.
Previously oil prices had fallen due to the expansion of the shale market in the United States, to lower global growth and to the slow, but stable shift to renewable energy in most consumer countries.
Then the Covid-19 pandemic broke out, which accelerated all these factors and, in fact, blocked the economy and saturated oil inventories and warehouses.
The world economy will not “recover” soon or, more exactly, will no longer be as it was before the pandemic.
Global Value Chains will become much shorter and many mature, but essential productions will go back to the countries which, in the times of rampant globalization, moved everything – except for high technology and finance – to countries with low labour costs and low taxes.
The producing countries’ adaptation to the new context will certainly be slower than needed.
The large solar energy basin planned by Mohammed Bin Salman’s Vision 2030 was stopped indefinitely last November, while the privatization of Saudi Aramco has now proved to be a failure.
Once the profitability of the Saudi oil has ended – and hence the special relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, as well as the U.S. penetration in the Middle East -currently a phase of great instability in the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran is beginning, in which Iran could play other cards besides the purely military ones.
However, the Iranian oil extraction cost is higher than the Saudi one.
The Russian Federation “falls” at an oil barrel price of 40 U.S. dollars and, if it cannot control its internal areas and the border with China and the Caucasus, it is very easy to imagine what could happen.
Even the United States is not in a better situation.
Shale oil is the biggest source of employment in Michigan, Arkansas and Ohio. These are essential States for the re-election of Donald J. Trump and surely the President will do everything to support the workers-voters and these States.
The end of the oil economy is near – or probably it has already arrived – and no one can imagine what will happen to energy markets and to our economies in the near future.
Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline – An ‘apple of discord’ between Azerbaijan and Russia?
A broad range of strategic, economic and cultural ties between Azerbaijan and Russia create an illusion of quite stable bilateral relations between the states. Nevertheless, considering the recent geopolitical developments in the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh war and the growing role of Azerbaijan as both producer and transit hub for natural resources, one can assume that there is a prospect of growing uncertainties that may or already generate tensions. These tensions can be observed in the context of energy diplomacy, used as a strategic tool by both states to gain access to, and consolidate within external markets. This article summarizes the potential and existential rivalry perspectives between Azerbaijan and Russia in terms of integration to the EU energy market via their gas pipelines, particularly cleavages over the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline.
European Energy Union: Tendencies in the gas market
The concept of the ‘energy union’ has been developed during the presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker and extends to five dimensions. The following two dimensions are relevant in the context of relations with external markets: 1. Security, solidarity and trust; and 2. Energy efficiency. The former promotes cooperation between EU member states implying energy security and diversification of the energy sources. The latter, on the other hand, emphasizes the need to reduce dependency on imports and stimulate local growth in energy sectors. Both strategies consider a long-term perspective aimed at creating an independent and self-sufficient energy market within the framework of environmental standards. To determine whether these strategies managed to diversify and simultaneously ensure independence from external actors in the European gas market, let us recall the statistical data of imports and local gas production in the EU over the last years.
Tendencies in the EU energy market over the last couple of years, particularly in the sector of gas, reveal its high dependence on imports from abroad. Although the net gas imports fell by 7 per cent in 2020 amounting to 81 bcm, the overall EU production of gas fell by almost 23 per cent (16 bcm). According to the Quarterly Report of the Union, the local gas production in the first quarter of 2021 reached the second-lowest production rate over the last decade, falling by 11 per cent respectively. In this regard, the European internal energy market needs a sustainable supply of natural gas resources, mostly, for residential heating needs. Currently, about 44% of extra EU net gas imports are piped via Russian pipelines, 12% through Algeria, and 1,2% through TAP pipeline. Although import indicators suggest that Russia holds the dominant position in supplying the EU energy needs, the ever-growing gas supplies from Azerbaijan cause concerns on the part of Russian stakeholders. Accordingly, in 2020, Gazprom’s supplies to the Turkish market decreased by 72% compared to March 2019, the Russian RBK reports. Could the further steps of the official Baku on the European energy front challenge positions of the Russian energy giant Gazprom? To answer this question, it is necessary to briefly present the already launched and planned projects in which Azerbaijan is directly involved.
Azerbaijan’s ‘energy diplomacy’ and Russia’s counterstrategy
In 2020 South Gas Corridor (SGC) project officially started operating, connecting three sub-pipeline routes: South Caucasus Pipeline Expansion (SCPX), the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The project aims to ensure commercial gas delivery from Shah Deniz field to Turkey, continuing to European markets and finally landing in Southern Italy (Melendugno). The initiative was supported by numerous financial institutions and stakeholders from Asia and Europe such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). According to the estimates, the current gas supply via the corridor is amounting to 10 billion bcm.
At the 7th Ministerial Meeting of the SGC Advisory Council, the president of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev noted the necessity of strengthening bilateral as well as multilateral energy relations and mentioned the Memorandum of understanding between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan: “[…] That will also be very helpful for future energy cooperation in the Caspian Sea and beyond”. President Aliyev has also emphasized that Azerbaijan already has become a reliable transit of energy resources from the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea. In this regard, the recent intensification of talks upon the realization of the Trans-Caspian Gas pipeline project is not surprising.
Within the framework of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project, natural gas will be delivered from the port of Turkmenbashi via the pipeline to the Sangachal terminal through the Caspian Sea with an annual capacity of 32 billion bcm. However, despite numerous attempts to bring the issue to the agenda both by the Western partners (EU and the United States) and Azerbaijan, there have been no significant steps towards the implementation of the project. The reason for the constant extension of negotiations over the last two decades may be both the reliability of the capabilities of the Turkmen natural gas resource pool, and external intervention in the negotiation process and attempts to discredit it by Russia and Iran.
Firstly, the credibility of the Turkmen gas supply capacity is quite questionable. After the Central Asia-China gas pipeline opened in December 2009, Turkmenistan has gradually become the biggest gas supplier to the Chinese energy market in Central Asia. Currently, Turkmenistan covers nearly 60% of China’s pipeline gas imports, whereas over 90% of Turkmenistan’s overall exports are gas exports to the Chinese energy market. Therefore the sufficiency of Turkmenistan’s gas reserves for the Trans-Caspian pipeline is still a matter of discussion. The official Ashgabat in the meantime refrains from specifying details on its capabilities.
Another challenge is posed by the joint attempts of Russia and Iran, circumvented by the pipelines, to prevent the realization of the initiative, to protect their local energy markets. Additionally, the Kremlin needs to eliminate any potential external supplier of natural pipeline gas to the EU, to sustain the status quo. Turkmenistan has already become the biggest gas supply hub in Central Asia and the prospect of its expansion towards Europe poses a strategic challenge to Russia.
“Along with the new Iranian gas pipeline, the Chinese export route gave Turkmenistan strong leverage that strengthened its ability to bargain with Russia. However, these export routes do not hurt Russian interests that much, since Moscow’s main objective at the moment is to keep Turkmen gas away from the lucrative European energy market”. (Vasánczki 2011).
Both Russia and Iran refer to environmental damage the pipeline could cause in the Caspian Sea, and recall the so-called Tehran Convention (the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea). However, the experience with the SGC and other pipeline projects in the region suggest no environmental crisis to be expected. On the other hand, there are allegations regarding the long-disputed Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. Moscow and Tehran are aligned in their concerns about the extraction and transportation of energy resources and believe that such issues should be resolved within the framework of five Caspian states.
According to Marco Marsili, the Russian energy strategy is inclined in a “Grand Strategy” aimed at re-establishing a sphere of influence in the area previously controlled by the USSR. As he further notes in his article: “If the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline comes to fruition, then it will also further enhance Azerbaijan’s status as both a producer and transit hub. Additionally, the pipeline will diminish Moscow’s influence in the region and circumvent both Russia and Iran. This is why Moscow is heavily opposing the project.”
When it comes to the European front Russian strategy faces various burdens. On the eve of the opening of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, Russian-European relations are in a state of long-term crisis. The persecution and assassinations of political dissidents, the imprisonment of the head of the opposition movement Alexei Navalny, support for the authoritarian regimes of Lukashenko and Assad, as well as multiple attempts to interfere in elections within the EU, reduce the level of trust between the Kremlin and the West on energy security too. Furthermore, gas supply issues between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 that caused the European energy crisis, exacerbated the situation and gave a signal to the EU to diversify its gas supplies.
Nord Stream 2 is a controversial 9.5 billion euros worth gas pipeline that will annually supply the EU with 55 bcm. According to sceptics, the new pipeline not only endangers the energy security of the EU, putting it in a dependent position from Gazprom but also causes dissatisfaction in Eastern European countries (in particular Ukraine). Germany and the US have already issued a joint statement in July to support Ukraine, European energy security and climate protection. Azerbaijan, in turn, is ready to provide the diversification tool needed and security of natural gas delivery to the European market without polarizing the European community on geopolitical issues.
Opportunities for Azerbaijan in the new era in South Caucasus geopolitics
After the second Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the power constellations in South Caucasus have drastically changed in almost 44 days. Azerbaijan has restored its territorial integrity and opened up new opportunities for economic growth, and increased mobility via the development of transport hubs and infrastructure rehabilitation projects. At the same time, Russia has deployed its peacekeeping contingent in the region, ‘formally’ securing its status as a regional power. Despite this, Azerbaijan, after almost three decades being focused on resolution of devastating conflict, can now set new forign policy priorities to provide energy security and strengthen its cooperation with the EU.
With the EU Strategy on Central Asia adopted in May 2019 and the intensification of negotiations between the Central Asian countries with the EU and with the Western hemisphere as a whole, there is a need for such projects as the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. In these circumstances, Azerbaijan can play the role of a mediator both in the negotiation process and directly participate in the implementation of the project. Taking this into account, Russia fears the loss of its role as a hegemon both in its relations with Central Asia and within the South Caucasus. Also economically, it is in Russia’s interests to keep the monopoly in the hands of its state-owned companies to strengthen the leverage on the EU in cases of geopolitical collisions.
In any case, the growing competition on the EU energy market between the two former Soviet states could significantly diminish the sense of mutual reliability between them.
China’s Unorthodox Intervention in the Global Oil Market
Apparently, China has been the talk of the town for quite some time. While the entire yesteryear passed in a flurry of blame game over the pandemic, this year has been nothing short of a blessing for Xi’s regime. However, while China rapidly compensated for the drastic slump last year, the bustling economy has now cooled down – though a bit prematurely. Due to the expansive outbreak of the delta variant, China – like most countries around the world – now faces surging inflation and a crippling shortage of raw materials. However, while one might get a bolder vibe from China’s recent crackdown on industrial giants, the supposed ‘Second Cultural Revolution’ seems on a divergent path from the government’s latest aspirations for the domestic industry.
China seems to be on a path to harness growth that appears to be slowing down as the global economy battles uncertainty. However, while many expected China to take orthodox measures to prolong growth, hardly anyone expected a drastic change of strategy: intervening in a close-knitted global market like never before.
China recently posted its most robust trade surplus in history, with a record rise in exports jumping 25.6% from last year to stand at $294.3; $10 billion more than any previous month. However, while the glowing figures imply sturdiness, the underlying fragility of the Chinese economy is not disguised. In the past few months, China’s production engine has taken a toll as surging energy costs have inhibited production capacity. The factory-gate inflation stands at a 13-year-high which has forced factories to cut output. Amid declining domestic demand due to covid restrictions, manufacturing surveys show that China’s export orders are eroding as supply bottlenecks coupled with energy costs have weighed heavily on the production function. To counter the problem, China recently supplied its reserves into the domestic market; undercutting the surging global price tag dictated by the petroleum giants.
Last Thursday, China’s National Food and Strategic Reserves Administrator made a press release, confirming that the world’s second-largest economy tapped into its crude reserves – estimated at 220 million barrels – to “ease the pressure of rising raw material prices.” While China is known to intervene in commodity markets by using its strategic reserves, for example, Copper, Aluminium, or even grains.
Recently, China tapped into its national reserves to intervene in the global commodity market of industrial metals for the first time since 2010. The intervention was situated as a release to normalize surging metal prices and retain domestic manufacturers’ margins. However, it is a novelty that a national agency confirmed an active supply of petroleum buffer via an official press conference. And while no additional details were offered, it is presumed by global strategists that the press release referred to the 20-30 million barrels allegedly poured into the domestic industry around mid-July: when Xi’s government offered to supply crude to the OPEC.
Furthermore, China’s Stockpile Agency claimed that through open auctions, China’s reserve crude was intended to “better stabilize the domestic demand and supply.” It was apparent that as China ventured through a supply crunch when Brent Crude – Global Crude Index/Benchmark – breached the $76 bpd mark, the country instead resorted to utilizing its own stockpile instead of relying on expensive imported petroleum. Thus, it shapes a clear picture of how China managed to clock a phenomenal trade surplus despite not importing its usual crude quota.
While it is common knowledge that economies like the US and Europe maintain strategic petroleum reserves, the buffers held by China were utilized to actively manipulate the price in a ‘normalized’ oil market instead of their designated usage in supply crunches or wars. The situation today is anything but critical for the oil market to warrant such an intervention. As OPEC+ has boosted its output by 400,000 bpd starting August, output has bloomed beyond its peak since the price war back in April 2020. While the oil market is still well below the output capacity, mutually curbed by the OPEC+ alliance, the demand is still shaky and an equilibrium seems set. Yet, when we observe China – the world’s largest oil importer – we extricate reason that despite a growing economy, China continues to experience massive shortages: primarily in terms of oil, gas, coal, and electricity.
Furthermore, with the ensue of Hurricane Ida, massive US crude reserves have been wiped which has majorly impacted China as well. The US and China rarely stand on the same page on any front. However, even the White House recently asked OPEC to pump more crude into the market due to the rising gasoline prices in America. The same scenario is panning in China as energy shortages have led to surging costs while domestic demand is diminishing. The brunt is thus falling on the national exchequer: something China is not willing to haggle. While it is highly unorthodox of China to explicitly announce its intervention, many economists believe that it was a deliberate move on part of China’s communist brass to amplify the impact on the market. The plan seemingly worked as Brent fell by $1.36 to stand at $71.24 on Thursday.
If China’s commitment to normalize domestic energy prices is this significant, it is highly likely that another intervention could be pegged later in the fourth quarter. Primarily to counteract the contraction in export orders by cutting imports further to maintain a healthy trade surplus. In my opinion, it is clear that both the US and China are not willing to let Brent (and WTI) breach the $70-$75 bracket as key industries are at stake. However, while one takes a passive approach, the other is touted to go as far as pouring another 10-15 million barrels of crude by the end of 2021. Yet revered global commodity strategists believe that the downturn in prices is “short-lived” just like any other Chinese intervention in a variety of other commodity markets globally. And thus, experts believe that the pump is simply “not enough physical supply” to quite strike a permanent dent in an inherently flawed market mechanism.
Energy Forum Seeks To Analyze Africa’s Energy Potentials And Utilization
African Energy Week (AEW) 2021 in Cape Town, fully endorsed by the Government of South Africa, is committed to accelerating Africa’s energy growth with the aim of establishing a secure and sustainable energy future for every individual on the continent. Accordingly, AEW 2021 firmly believes in the role that oil and gas will continue to play in Africa and will emphasise the continent’s upstream market through a collaborative, International Oil Company (IOC) forum. Led by IOC executives, as well as government representatives from notable energy markets in Africa, the IOC forum aims to address the upstream challenges faced in Africa, providing solutions and strategies to drive exploration and make Africa more competitive for investment.
With the discovery of sizeable oil and gas reserves across the continent in recent years, regional and international explorers are turning an eye to the world’s final frontier market – Africa. Nigeria’s 200 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of gas reserves and 37.2 billion barrels of oil (bbl); Mozambique’s 11 tcf of gas; Senegal’s 450 billion cubic meters of gas; Libya’s 48 billion bbl and 53.1 tcf; and Egypt’s 77.2 tcf of gas have all made Africa the ideal destination for hydrocarbon exploration. What’s more, with many African countries making significant steps to enhance their regulatory environments, implementing legislation to create an enabling environment for investment, the continent has become a highly competitive market for exploration and production. Nigeria’s recently implemented Petroleum Industry Bill, Gabon’s new Hydrocarbon Code, and Angola’s inclusive petroleum regulation, to name a few, have all ensured a competitive and highly attractive market.
With the world’s six oil ‘supermajors’ – BP, Chevron, Eni, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell and TotalEnergies – all actively present in mature and emerging markets across Africa, the continent has become an upstream hotspot. AEW 2021 aims to accelerate this trend, promoting new upstream opportunities and ensuring both National Oil Companies (NOC) and IOCs drive the continent into a new era of energy and economic success. Accordingly, Africa’s premier energy event will host an upstream-dedicated IOC forum in Cape Town, led by IOC executives and government representatives. The IOC forum aims to address key challenges in Africa’s upstream market, whereby the diverse speaker panel will offer up solutions to expand exploration and production, while ensuring the continent remains competitive for investment in a post-COVID-19, energy transition era.
In addition to the discussion on upstream activities, the forum aims to highlight the role of IOCs in enhancing capacity building, whereby emphasis will be placed on IOC-NOC collaboration. IOCs have a critical role to play in Africa, not only regarding resource development, but human capital and local business development. In order for the continent to become truly sustainable and competitive, NOCs require support from IOCs. Accordingly, the forum aims to identify strategies to enhance cooperation and partnerships, with IOCs taking the lead in Africa’s energy development.
“AEW 2021 in Cape Town will offer a real discussion on Africa. Oil and gas are critical in Africa’s development and the African Energy Chamber (AEC) will not succumb to the misguided narrative that Africa should abandon its potential. The IOCs in Africa have demonstrated the continent’s potential, and by sharing strategies to enhance growth, address challenges, and accelerate upstream activities, they will be key drivers in Africa’s energy future. The IOC forum will not only offer a description of African reserves, but will provide clear, attainable solutions to exploitation, exploration and production with the aim of using energy to enact stronger economic growth. By coming to Cape Town, attending the IOC forum, and interacting with African ministers from across the continent, you will be able to be a part of Africa’s energy transformation,” stated NJ Ayuk, Executive Chairman of the AEC.
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