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China and Covid-19

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On December 31, 2019 the Chinese office of the World Health Organization officially informed of the existence of some cases of pneumonia of unknown aetiology in Wuhan, Hebei.

 Subsequently, the Chinese authorities identified a new coronavirus for these pneumonias of unknown aetiology, which was isolated on January 7, 2020.

 On January 30, the WHO declared a global public health emergency. In fact, on February 16, as many as 51,857 cases of coronavirus were confirmed in China and 25 countries were already affected by the virus at the time.

 In those days, there were 1,666 deaths in China and only 3 outside the country.

 At the beginning of the pandemic, marked by the WHO statement, the UN agency experts in China and in the rest of the world officially declared that neither the direction, nor the duration, purpose and extent of the pandemic itself could be predicted at that juncture.

 What is certain is that almost all recent pandemics originated in China: suffice to recall SARS in 2002-2003, MERS-Cov (in 2012 and still weakly spread), as well as A/H1N1 between 2009 and 2010 and finally Ebola from 2013 to 2016.

 Also in the case of SARS, harsh criticism was levelled at the Chinese government, because the first case was recorded on November 16, 2002, and the WHO was informed only on February 14, 2003.

 It was precisely SARS that triggered a radical change of the Chinese ruling classes, not only in the health sector.

 What is certain is that currently the economic extent and the interaction between China and the other developed economies is much greater than we could study at the time of SARS.

As is well known, currently China is the second largest economy and the second largest importer of goods in the world, with a total of 1,674 trillion U.S. dollars in 2019. It accounts for 13.7% of global exports.

The restrictions resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic mainly concerned the province of Hebei, while 26 of the 31 Chinese regions announced a prolonged lockdown for non-essential industries.

 Covid-19 will mainly show its impact in the economic data for the first quarter of 2020, but also the second quarter may be clearly affected if the coronavirus lasts until May 2020, as was the case also with SARS.

Certainly China’s GDP of the first quarter of 2020 has fallen by 6.8%, which is a significant percentage.

 The fall in economic activities has therefore been severe and substantial. It affects one of the primary assets of the Chinese regime: the citizens of the Celestial Empire are ensured ongoing and stable GDP and previously unimaginable consumption levels and standard of living, but they must recognize the political system and its hierarchy. They cannot call them into question. That is not up for debate.

 However, how will the Chinese economy react to Covid-19, based on what we can currently perceive?

 A first effect has been the very net increase in digitalization.

 Another effect, which will be recorded ever more also in Western economies, will be the decrease in external projection and hence the increase in the economic and political importance of internal markets, finance and technology.

Moreover, China has never completely abandoned its internal markets to their fate, unlike what many increasingly passive export-led Western economies have done.

Nevertheless, the “re-nationalisation” process of the economy will be clearly visible both in China and in the Western countries, such as Italy, which have blocked their domestic markets to embark on the export adventure all the way. This will happen if there is a ruling class in Italy, which can by no means be taken for granted.

Competitive intensity, which is the pressure of competition between industries in the same sector, will also increase in China.

 Consumption will also change, both in China and in the rest of the world, and will be more focused on health and quality and less connected to “image” and glamour. In the near future the successful industries will be ever more no frills, essential-oriented and sensitive to their impact on health.

Probably, it will also saturate needs that nowadays we would still call “post-modern”.

The importance of the private and of the non-profit sectors, however, will increase also in China.

As said above, in China and in the rest of the world the pandemic has strongly accelerated digitalization in the B2C segment (business to consumer), but also in physical transactions (ever less frequent, given the pandemic) and in the B2B segment (business to business).

In China 55% of consumers will keep on buying food and everyday goods online even after the pandemic has ended, but China had already begun to reduce its exposure to world economies long before the outbreak of Covid-19.

Hence reallocation of parts of the supply chain to other economic and political areas and return to the Chinese territory or to the neighbouring countries by many of the sectors which, in the first phase of Chinese globalization, had been projected abroad. This is therefore the end of a project that, until the Covid-19 pandemic, was typical of Chinese politics.

 The use of globalization as passive Revolution, just to put it in Antonio Gramsci’s words.

 This means China’s imitation of the Western globalization-Americanization models so as to redevelop them with hegemonic aims.

Hence, according to the latest projects developed by their think tanks, it is a real decoupling for China and also for the European Union, i.e. the beginning of a great phase of industrial diversification and new global specialization among productive areas and among nations.

 With an “industrial sequence”, however, which is much shorter than the very long “value chains” that have so far characterized the American-led globalization and the structure of world trade.

With specific reference to industrial diversification, it should be noted that in China the highest decile of companies currently captures over 90% of profits, while the average is 70% in the rest of the world.

This maximum verticalization in China is matched by a particular relationship- although less obvious than we can imagine – between the economy and political direction and leadership.

 This system will certainly change and many new companies will enter the top ten list of profits, with an internal transformation of the productive systems, many of which are already mature, as well as the entry of new activities in the top companies, such as digital systems, work-replacing technologies, large distribution, entertainment.

Just as the great U.S. crisis in the 1930s –  which was overcome only by means of the war spending of World War II – created the great mass and already globalized cinema, currently the pandemic crisis will create a new big market for specialized TV, streaming movies and the Internet.

Furthermore, as shown in a very recent analysis by McKinsey in China, 70% of consumers will look ever more for healthy food, as well as eco-friendly and high-quality products for personal care. Another historic paradigm shift in consumption.

 Moreover, at the time of the SARS epidemic, it was China and its state-owned companies that started again economic expansion quickly and with large investment, while nowadays the Chinese private sector is worth 90% of new jobs and two thirds of economic growth.

Hence currently the relationship between politics and economy is changing in China and the impact of the coronavirus pandemic is stepping up the privatization of the Chinese economy and the new relationship between the political Centre and the economic decision-making process.

On the political and, above all, strategic levels, the quick containment of the coronavirus pandemic in China, even after the initial difficulties, doubts and slow paces, has triggered – also in the West – a new debate on possibly simplistic, but clear political concepts such as authoritarianism, populism and liberalism, albeit in the classic criteria of these political traditions in the West.

There is a new fact, however, in global politics, i.e. a new correlation between different geopolitical models and geopolitical competition.

 The Chinese model emerges as the leading reference point in the vastarea we could call “anti-liberal” or “anti-liberalist”, with China promoting its specific “victory against the virus” to defend and, for the first time, propagandize its specific political system.

 No longer the imitation, possibly with “Chinese criteria and characteristics”, of North American and European globalization, but the claiming of a centralist, authoritarian, nationalist and Confucian criterion for the victory against Covid-19.

 Moreover, the coronavirus pandemic shows that nowadays, irrespective of our ideology of reference, borders are much vaguer and more porous than we imagined.

Hence we are dealing with a new cold war, albeit with unimaginable limits, while the struggle between political and economic systems becomes a “war of the worlds”, just to borrow from the title of an old science-fiction masterpiece.

 Moreover, think what you like, in the United States there is an evident deficit of political leadership, with a U.S. President – the last true modern sovereign – who is wildly unpopular even with his deep state and with a good part of his own ruling classes.

From this viewpoint, China’s ideological and cultural war attack on the United States is technically correct and rational, especially if we look at the clash on duties and tariffs.

 The E.U. is undergoing a deep and possibly definitive crisis and certainly nobody outside Europe thinks of the E.U. model as an example.

 Moreover, considering South Korea, Japan, China, Singapore and Taiwan, Asia has shown it has tackled the pandemic better than many Western countries.

Hence China wants to maintain, first of all, the shift to Asia, but with a different production formula that the coronavirus pandemic will bring out: more privatizations, different products from those of the old globalization and often better ones, a different distribution network and less productive verticalization.

Hence what will be the future scenarios, in the phase of control and stabilization of Covid-19?

a) The first assumption is the return to the past, i.e. the classic clash between the United States and China to limit each other, while the above described processes are going on with their long time schedules. In the West as in the East, the share of public spending on health will increase and the structure of health protection will change in “liberal and liberalist” countries which, like the United States, spend even more than Italy on healthcare. The hospital system will change also in China and the same holds true particularly for the health early warning system, which has been the real weakness of all the Western and Eastern healthcare networks.

b) We can also imagine maintaining stable Chinese growth under new conditions. The success resulting from the quick containment of the contagion could catalyze a new vast group of sympathizers and supporters vis-à-vis China. There is also the election year in the United States, which would probably witness the shift from President Trump, who has clearly organized his campaign focusing on “China’s faults”, to a more moderate Joe Biden.

c) If this happens, the United Sates will once again have a network of international institutions from which to exercise its hegemony, while maintaining a clear contrast with China in terms of hard power and trade relations.

c) The E.U. could even be part of the game if it succeeds in convincing the United States to distribute the strategic effort more widely than currently, but I do not believe that, apart from a few isolated European leaders, the E.U. can go that far. The E.U. strategic thinking is minimised. The (bad) accountants have won.

Certainly the fight against coronavirus will at first reduce the U.S. military potential in the Pacific and, pending the economic therapy against the Covid-19 crisis, the E.U. will have its economic and strategic survival test. The Maghreb region is now floundering in a definitive crisis and I fear that the pandemic has destabilised the whole region. It is currently hard to predict what the E.U. blind kitten will be able to do in the tense, migration, economic, military and oil situation prevailing in the Maghreb region. But it will always be too little, that is for sure.

 Even the major OPEC countries are undergoing a very critical phase, while Russia is carefully controlling its pandemic, which is probably greater than we know. Closure of the oil channels for the E.U., pending the fall in oil barrel prices? Europe would not survive.

Hence the coronavirus is a very quick game changer for the whole world.

Whoever will have greater information and psywar projection power than the others will create a “storytelling” that will be focused both on laying the blame and shame upon the enemy of the moment and on the relative success recorded in the fight against coronavirus precisely by the country that develops the “storytelling”.

 Currently, we do not know that the E.U. and, in some ways, the United States have created a narrative suitable for this new viral psywar.

 What we can see on the American side is the adaptation of old models previously implemented with Japan, in the early 1990s, or in the propaganda against the “rogue” States in the Middle East or Latin America. The pattern has always been the same: a) you are anti-democratic; b) you have committed a series of offences and crimes, in the private law sense of the term; c) you are a “liar”. The U.S. psywar is subjectivist.

Today President Trump talks about “Chinese virus” and has organized actions against China in international legal fora, but this does not seem to be fully effective at the moment.

In the psywar of “storytelling”, the winner is whoever tells the most fascinating and credible story, which does not mean it is true at all, while whoever files lawsuits, is too aggressive or formally accuses a hypothetical or real enemy, never wins.

 Moreover, the issue of Wuhan’s laboratory is more complex than we might think.

 Barack Obama had placed a four-year moratorium on the results of the tests in Wuhan, while for years both the United States and France funded the Hebei laboratory, specialized in research on animal viruses, possibly the research that their laboratories could not or did not want to carry out.

 In fact, in 2004 France began to build a top security laboratory in Wuhan for research on animal viruses.

The laboratory was inaugurated in 2017, but China kept out the 50 French researchers who had to have access to it anyway.

 The Americans took over immediately. It was precisely Anthony Fauci, the Head of the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), who replaced France in funding – with 3.7 million U.S. dollars – a fully Chinese project on viruses.

 In previous years, 7.4 million U.S. dollars had been provided to Wuhan.

 These are the facts, as far as we can establish them. But certainly the safety and security issue was primary even for China, after the outbreak of the pandemic.

Pending the ongoing clash between China and the United States, the first geopolitical and strategic scenario developed by the former is that of a limited war between the two superpowers in the South China Sea.

The is also inland China that has long been sending no reassuring signs. There are signs of social destabilization, which do not result into riots, but are well analysed by the Communist Party of China.

Currently China is endeavouring to restore “social peace”, also with ad hoc government structures.

In the minds of the Chinese decision-makers, nothing prevents opposing countries from operating in this context, also with distant operational means and support.

Since the outbreak of the epidemic, President Xi Jinping has spoken of a “people’s war” against the virus.

 For the time being, the paradigm of Chinese propaganda is that of efficiency: we do not know where the virus originated, but we were certainly quick to contain the pandemic.

 Initially China also left some psywar controls open, because it was believed that, immediately after the pandemic started, people needed some outlets and relief valves.

Nevertheless, the image of efficiency of the Chinese regime was certainly successfully managed abroad, but had some flaws and shortcomings at domestic level.

These flaws and shortcoming come from afar: at the beginning of globalization, the Chinese regime offered Western employers low wages, low unionisation, low levels of environmental protection and a friendly relationship with the regime leaders.

 Now that mechanism has inevitably broken down.

 The delay in curbing the pandemic did not prevent it from being finally effective, but now the inevitable economic crisis is biting, despite China’s rapidity in responding to it.

 The “social credit”, which is the synthesis of every individual’s city and social life, is now in crisis.

Created in 2014, it is a traditional or advanced surveillance system that leads citizens to adopt a better and more “social” behaviour.

For example, the system monitors and punishes citizens’ membership in associations not approved by the Government, delayed debt payment, excessive dependence on video games, poor cleanliness or even lack of kindness towards other citizens.

 Obviously, low scoring prevents those who record it from enjoying a whole series of advantages, permits and opportunities.

Incidentally the system had to be definitively perfected in 2020 and also affect companies.

Nevertheless, the U.S. psywar against China, with specific reference to coronavirus, concerns these basic assumption: a) China always has something to hide, which is certainly very severe, although we do not yet know it completely; b) we (the USA) throw many and varied accusations, but China responds only to those that it is interested in refuting everyone has something against China, hence it will necessarily have done something.

China responds with a series of psywar counter-arguments: a) a whole “story” is immediately created which, being complete, tends to ridicule the U.S. attempts. The whole story always insists on rhapsodic allusions. Furthermore, b) the demonstration that also others are upset with China and therefore our (U.S.) accusations against China are founded. But it also demonstrates that there is a conspiracy against China.

 A trivial and sometimes rough war of OSINT information.

 Then, multiple messages and subliminal messages from both countries.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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East Asia

U.S.- China Strategic Competition in The East Asia

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East Asia has been the most dynamic region where development has been internationally recognized. The regional politics of the region has developed a paradox that has flamed up the economic environment of the region. The trends have shown the increased intensifying security issues along with the strategic completion that has spread the security and economic tensions across the East Asian Region. In a global circle, China is known as the revisionist state. The historical manners suggest the reclaim of East Asia by the Chinese. This claim has intensified the relations between the US and China in East Asian Region.  The main challenge for China is to shift the US intervention from the East Asian region for the balanced equation at the strategic level. This might provoke the US and its allies in East Asia such as Japan that will help the US to jeopardize the Chinese rule from the region. The challenge for the US and its allies in the East Asian Region is more complicated because of the economic stability of China at the International Level. This might be a proxy war for both the superpowers in the East Asian region where the conflict may rise compromising the strategic stability of the region. The strategic location of the US lies in the actual form of ability and project power over great sustainable intervals. The strategic behavior increases the policies and shapes the allies.

One prevalent belief in the United States about China’s long-term policy goals in Asia is that Beijing aspires to be the regional hegemon and wants to restore a Sino-centric order in the region.

First, Beijing favors unipolar ties at both the global and regional levels and believes that with ongoing economic growth, this trend will continue intra-regional political consultation in Asia, influence on regional affairs is going to be more diversified and more evenly distributed. Secondly, although China expects some relative increase in its influence in Asia, it understands that thanks to the boundaries of its hard power and particularly its soft power, China can never achieve a grip cherish its role within the ancient past or to the U.S. role within the region at the present.

Beijing’s perspective:

From Beijing’s perspective, the US is an East Asia power, although not an Asian power, and its political, economic, and security interests within the region are deep-rooted, as are its commitments to regional stability and prosperity. Beijing has always welcomed a constructive U.S. role in regional affairs. At the identical time, however, Beijing also feels uneasy with certain aspects of U.S. policy. As a superpower, The US has been too dominant and intrusive in managing regional affairs. It fails to pay due regard to the voices of other regional players and sometimes gets too involved within the internal affairs of other states, lacking an understanding of their culture, history, and values.

The US and European aspects towards the South China Sea and East Asia should involve long-term perspectives of engaging ASEAN states. Such impacts will create room for the US to tackle China in the East Asian region. The development of any comprehensive strategic security policy is the need of the hour that assures one’s interest in the region. Both the states perceive a threat from each other and try to further advance their capabilities for the sake of safety and security. The US is not in a position to deal with the other power far away from its homeland, sustaining its military and protecting allies. Aggressive behavior in strategic competition can lead to unwanted results. The US would have to accept the strategic realities of China to normalize the relations. China on the other hand should rethink its policies in East Asia and Indo Pacific. However, as yet, deterrence has played its part by keeping states from a large-scale action. States running in the race of acquiring arms conventionally due to uprising strategic competitions are worsening any likely condition of conflict.

Key points for US:

In terms of identifying specific actions for a U.S. strategy for competing strategically with China in East Asia, a key element would be to possess a transparent understanding of which actions are intended to support which U.S. goals, and to take care of an alignment of actions with policy goals. Cost-imposing actions are actions intended to impose political/reputational, institutional, economic, or other costs on China for conducting certain activities within the East Asian Region, with the aim of persuading China to prevent or reverse those activities. Such cost-imposing actions need not be limited to the East Asian Region only. 

Conclusion:

The development of any comprehensive strategic security policy is the need of the hour that should involve joint military maritime exercises. The US and China have set their limits in coordinating military to military joint cooperation due to their desired interests and competition. Both the states perceive a threat from each other and try to further advance their capabilities for the sake of safety and security.  

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Summit for Democracy Attempts to Turn Multicolor Modern World into Black and White Divisions

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One of the most important takeaways from the recent sixth plenary session of 19th CPC Central Committee is that Beijing flatly rejects Westernization as the path to modernize the Chinese society and the national economy. Instead, as it was underscored in the plenary Communiqué, the country will continue to stick to “socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era.” The leadership will preserve and further develop the system that served the people so well over last more than 70 years.

This statement did not come as a surprise to numerous China watchers all over the world. In fact, the critical choice between socialism and Western-type liberalism was not made in November of 2021, but decades ago.

One can argue that the outcomes of the sixth plenary session are yet another manifestation of a more general global trend: The world has been and will continue to be very diverse in terms of political systems, social models and economic patterns of individual nation states. Moreover, the odds are that this diversity will increase further literally in front of our eyes. Instead of the “end of history,” we will observe more intense multifaceted competition between different types of social development.

One way to react to this emerging reality is to accept it as a positive trend that enhances the overall stability of the global social system. The more diverse and complex the system is, the more resistant it is to various shocks and disturbances. To make a rough analogy with biology, a natural forest, which is a very diverse and complex ecosystem, is much more resistant to whims of the weather and natural disasters than a man-cultivated monocultural field. Accepting the trend, we should focus on how to manage competition within the increasingly diverse and complex world so that this competition will ultimately benefit all of us.

The other way to deal with this reality would be to start fighting against social, political and economic diversity by trying to advance one single model over all others. This is exactly what the Joe Biden administration is committed to doing by launching an ideological crusade against China, Russia and other nations that dare to deviate from the fundamentals of the Western development model. To make its case, the White House has announced a virtual Summit for Democracy to be hosted by the US on December 9–10 with the goal “to renew democracy at home and confront autocracies abroad.”

This vision reduces the multi-color palette of the modern world to a minimalist black and white graphics of a global fight between “democracies” and “autocracies.” It divides the international system into “us” and “them,” into “good” and “bad,” into “legitimate” and “illegitimate.” Such a reductionist system, if constructed, cannot be stable and shock-resistant by definition: Any major international crisis or a regional conflict could spark high risks of implosion.

It goes without saying that the nations of the world should firmly oppose corruption, abuses of power by state authorities and gross violations of human rights. If the goal of the Summit for Democracy were to confront these evils on a global scale, there would be no need to make the event exclusive by inviting mostly US friends and allies. If the goal is to advertise the US political, social and economic model, Washington should probably delay the summit and put its house in order first. If the goal is to isolate Beijing and Moscow in the world of politics, this is not likely to work well for the US.

Nations of the world have a right and even a duty to experiment with their political and social development paths. This experimenting contributes to the overall social experience of the humankind. Only history is in a position to judge what models turn out to be efficient, productive and fair and what models will find their place at the dump of human delusions. And history has a lot of means at its disposal to punish leaders, who believe that they possess a “one size fits all” model, which could successfully replace the existing diversity with an imposed universalism.

From our partner RIAC

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The Chinese diplomatic force in the IAEA to confront Western leadership

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At the level of international relations, through China’s presence in all the relevant international organizations, and its membership in all of the United Nations organizations, specifically in the International Atomic Energy Agency “IAEA”, China aims to play the role of the (international balancer),  in light of its quest to maintain a certain level of competition with the United States of America politically and economically, this is in line with its desires to constantly play the role of the pole calling for (multipolarity and multilateral international pluralism through the Chinese political speeches of Chinese President “Xi Jinping”), in order to oppose American hegemony over the world and Washington’s policies to maintain its position as a single pole in the international community. China’s increase in its foreign investments, in order to enhance its economic hegemony over the world through its political and diplomatic tools with countries that have equal economic power with it in a number of (trade, scientific and technological issues, in addition to military and intelligence tools, as a reference for China’s new foreign political center).

  We note that the patterns of Chinese foreign policy is (the pattern of dependence, which is based on the high level of foreign participation in all current global issues), to restrict the attempts of the United States of America to pass its decisions internationally, and therefore China is trying to enter the membership of all international organizations so that China’s foreign policies remain more comprehensive, broader and more effective in the global change, and to change all directions of these issues and control them in the United States, and this is one of its new political tools that serve its global expansion through the (Chinese Belt and Road Initiative).

   In the same context, China focuses its external and competitive strength on its presence in effective international organizations, and rapprochement with the European Union, especially (France, Germany), despite not denying their relations with Washington, because of their strong influence in the global economy.  In addition to China’s reliance on the plan of foreign and foreign investments in countries that influence American influence through the Belt and Road projects, as well as China’s resort to the import policy of many resources necessary to develop its economic capabilities from certain European countries to open influential relations with them, leading to (the Chinese strategy to obtain  political support through the policies of alliances, consulates, representations, and its membership of international organizations), with the aim of influencing countries’ policies economically to pass important international decisions regarding the US challenge to China, such as: (the Iranian nuclear file, North Korea, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Syria, Venezuela, etc.), to increase with this  The level of external penetration of China economically and politically).

    China is mainly aiming to increase its membership in international organizations and the International Atomic Energy Agency, to (create a new balance of power and get rid of unipolarity restrictions through the medium powers and small states that the international system prevails with real pluralism, instead of the current state of American unipolarity).

   In my personal opinion, the countries of the Middle East may find in the rise of China and Russia, and perhaps other international powers to re-compete the United States,  as a (real opportunity to advance the effects of the pluralism of the international system at the regional level, and this would create more space for movement and opposition or bargaining and flexibility of movement for all to confront the policies of American hegemony, according to Chinese planning with Russia), and this also works to alleviate those restrictions and American dictates, and perhaps the sanctions and pressures it imposes on opponents of its approach internationally.

  The strategy of competition between China and the United States has become China’s long-term strategy, which is based on (the necessity of a heavy Chinese presence in all international organizations and forums, which allows China to communicate with various global powers and balance its relations with them compared to Washington), as well as diversifying the People’s Republic of China for its relations and distribution of its power among the competing countries, which allows China to show wide options on all important issues, and the most dangerous is that this Chinese presence, which (allows Beijing to prejudice the foundations of its relationship with the United States of America and the other various powers around the world).

  China and Russia also aim to form an alliance into all international and regional organizations to change the current provocative approach of the American policies in their confrontation, especially those related to mobilization policies and American alliances against them around the world. The Chinese alliance with Russia was so clear with the (Russian Foreign Minister “Sergey Lavrov’s visit” to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, while on the other hand, both Kuwait and Qatar have received a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the CPC Central Committee “Yang Jiechi”).

    On the other hand, China is among the Security Council countries that have the largest number of (Chinese peacekeeping forces around the world), and China is at the forefront of the (most contributing countries to the international peacekeeping budget, in addition to sending naval fleets to carry out maritime guard missions according to according to the UN Security Council resolutions), and therefore China may play an important role in establishing security in many countries in the world, and this is perhaps what China plans to ensure its use, in the event of a decline in American interest in the security of many regions in the world, within the framework of (the strategy of pressure of the American expenditures, retreat and withdrawal from many places around the world and devote its concern to the American interior issues and its worsening economic crises).

  The point is worthy to be considered here, is the report issued in July 2021 by the (International Atomic Energy Agency), entitled “Nuclear reactors around the world”, in which he analyzed China’s plan to (establish the dream of nuclear sovereignty around the world by starting to build and establish about 11 reactors). There are other Chinese nuclear reactors under construction, as well as the (new Chinese planning to build other 29 nuclear reactors), while the International Atomic Energy Agency’s work report on the other hand indicated that the known total number of reactors that are actually in service, other than those planned for construction, and other reactors under construction, is up to  About 50 Chinese nuclear reactors, a step that confirms that “China is clearly shifting towards nuclear energy in the production of electricity, and depends on it directly in its industrial renaissance during the coming period, especially as it is the number one country in the world that is expanding in the establishment of nuclear plants, followed by Russia, which plans to build other 20 new nuclear reactors, while it has 38 nuclear reactors in active service”. Some leaks indicate the presence of Chinese nuclear reactors, exercises and tests in the “Doklam Desert” region on the borders of “Xinjiang” province in northwest China.

   It also notes that, from the reality of the report issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency “IAEA”, its confirmation regarding (Chinese planning to become the first country in the world in the production of nuclear energy during the next ten years, in return for the decline in the share of the United States of America in nuclear reactors, which continues to the continuous decrease with the exit of new American numbers of reactors annually), as the future plan of the United States of America does not include the establishment of new reactors, which indicates that (the expansion of this type of energy tends towards China and Russia during the coming period, and these countries will have accumulated experiences, enabling them to dominate and control this new nuclear industry in various countries of the world, and this is what is actually common happening in the region).  Knowing that its uses will be mainly peaceful and to serve the interests of peoples and countries, so we may witness the coming period intensifying the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in many files around the world to study them, inspect different regions and various other areas to ensure (their peaceful uses of nuclear energy in many development projects around the world).

   Hence, we almost understand (the importance of the Chinese presence and presence and its membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency in the first place), given that it actually owns 50 nuclear reactors in service, and its contribution to the production of electricity and providing energy to one and a half billion citizens, and China also has new nuclear reactors under construction, so (China seeks to be near the International Atomic Energy Agency, to embarrass, restrict and limit the American influence on the one hand against Beijing’s allies, led by Iran and then North Korea. Therefore, China has developed a strategic plan in the coming years, which is based on the intensity of the Chinese international presence and passing its foreign policies and decisions with the help of its Russian ally internationally).

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The idea of promoting the human rights agenda in the image and likeness of the Western countries’ principles – as...

Eastern Europe19 hours ago

Lithuania: pensioners get ready for death

Main attention of the Lithuanian media has been focused on migrant crises and security issues for several weeks. This problem...

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