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Explainer: The fight against money laundering and terrorist financing

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The European Commission put forward a series of measures designed to further strengthen the EU’s framework to fight against money laundering and terrorist financing:

  • An Action Plan for a Comprehensive EU policy on Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing
  • A refined and more transparent methodology to identify high-risk third countries
  • An updated list of high-risk third countries

To ensure inclusive discussions on the development of these policies, the Commission launched a public consultation today on the Action Plan. Authorities, stakeholders and citizens will have until 29 July to provide their feedback.

Action Plan for a Comprehensive EU policy on Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

Why is the Commission adopting this Action Plan now?

While current EU rules are far-reaching, and even go beyond international standards, they are not applied in a fully coherent manner across the EU. This leads to fragmentation between Member States. The challenge lies not only with specific pieces of legislation but with how these rules are implemented effectively across the EU. There is a clear need to tackle this lack of coherence and ensure a more harmonised implementation of the rules across the EU.The recent increase in criminal activities in the context of the Coronavirus pandemic is a reminder that criminals will exploit all possible avenues to pursue their illicit activities to the detriment of society. The EU needs to be equally determined in ensuring that they do not benefit from the proceeds of these crimes.

In July 2019, the Commission adopted an Anti-Money Laundering Communication, which highlighted a number of measures that could be taken to remedy the weaknesses in the EU’s current anti-money laundering rules.

Following this, the European Parliament and the Council invited the Commission to investigate what steps could be taken to achieve a more harmonised set of rules across the EU, including better supervision at an EU level and improved coordination among Member States’ Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).

Today’s Action Plan is the Commission’s reply to these calls and is a first step towards a new, comprehensive framework to fight money laundering and terrorist financing in the EU.

How is the EU going to stop money laundering and terrorist financing?

Money laundering is a difficult crime to detect. Its consequences can have a severe impact on the EU’s economy and on its financial system. Therefore, the EU needs to have a multi-faceted approach to properly tackle money laundering and terrorist financing. Action is needed on several levels.

This is why the Commission has today put forward a series of measures aimed at closing any loopholes or weak links in the EU’s anti-money laundering rules.

Today’s Action Plan is built on six pillars, each of which is aimed at improving the EU’s overall fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as strengthening the EU’s global role in this area. When combined, these six pillars will ensure that EU rules are more harmonised and therefore more effective. The rules will be better supervised and there will be better coordination between Member States’ authorities.

The six pillars are as follows:

Effective application of EU rules: the Commission will continue to monitor closely the implementation of EU rules by Member States to ensure that the national rules are in line with the highest possible standards. In parallel, today’s Action Plan encourages the European Banking Authority (EBA) to make full use of its new powers to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing.

A single EU rulebook: while current EU rules are far-reaching and effective, Member States tend to apply them in a wide variety of different manners. Diverging interpretations of the rules therefore lead to loopholes in our system, which can be exploited by criminals. To combat this, the Commission will propose a more harmonised set of rules in the first quarter of 2021.

EU-level supervision: currently it is up to each Member State to individually supervise EU rules in this area and as a result, gaps can develop in how the rules are supervised. In the first quarter of 2021, the Commission will propose to set up an EU-level supervisor.

A coordination and support mechanism for Member States’ Financial Intelligence Units:Financial Intelligence Units in Member States play a critical role in identifying transactions and activities that could be linked to criminal activities. In the first quarter of 2021, the Commission will propose to establish an EU mechanism to help further coordinate and support the work of these units.

Enforcing EU-level criminal law provisions and information exchange: Judicial and police cooperation, on the basis of EU instruments and institutional arrangements, is essential to ensure the proper exchange of information.The private sector can also play a role in fighting money laundering and terrorist financing. The Commission will issue guidance on the role of public-private partnerships to clarify and enhance data sharing.

The EU’s global role: the EU is actively involved within the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and on the world stage in shaping international standards in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. We are determined to step up our efforts so that we act as a single global actor in this area. In particular, the EU will adjust its approach to third countries with strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing regimes that pose significant threats to our Single Market. The new methodology issued alongside this Action Plan today provides the EU with the necessary tools to do so. Pending the entry into force of this revised methodology, today’s updated EU list ensures better alignment with the latest FATF (Financial Action Task Force) list.

What about the effective implementation of current EU rules?

The Commission closely monitors the implementation of all EU rules in its Member States. For example, infringement proceedings were opened in February 2020 against all those Member States that failed to notify transposition of the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive.

In parallel, we continue to verify that Member States have fully and correctly transposed the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive. The Commission has also started checking how Member States are implementing this Directive in practice. This is done in the context of the European Semester cycle. The Commission has also contracted a study by the Council of Europe, which has extensive experience in such checks. This study will feed into the report on effectiveness that the Commission is required to submit by 2022 under the Anti-Money Laundering Directive.

The Commission expects the European Banking Authority (EBA) to use its new powers to improve the effectiveness of supervisory action in the financial sector by conducting on-site examinations to assess AML framework across the EU.

Will this Action Plan lead to a new Regulation? What rules will be harmonised in the future?

This will be subject to a thorough analysis to ensure that we reach as high a level of harmonisation as possible. Current EU rules do function but Member States tend to apply them in a wide variety of different manners. Diverging interpretations of EU law therefore lead to loopholes in our system, which can be exploited by criminals. To combat this, the Commission will propose a more harmonised set of rules in the first quarter of 2021.

A number of areas where divergence should be minimised were highlighted, namely the list of obliged entities, customer due diligence requirements, internal controls, and reporting obligations.

Is current supervision sufficient or should an Agency at EU level be created?

Following recent EU reforms, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has been empowered to act quickly and decisively in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. It is now equipped with concrete tools to ensure the exchange of information between anti-money laundering and financial supervisors.

The latest amendments of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive also give national authorities more powers to act where banks, or financial and non-financial entities, breach their anti-money laundering obligations. These amendments also improve the exchange of information between authorities.

Nevertheless, as outlined in a Commission Report on the assessment of recent alleged money laundering cases, some structural weaknesses in the EU’s anti-money laundering framework persist, even after all the new measures have been fully implemented.

These weaknesses may endanger the security and reputation of the EU’s financial system. Therefore, it is essential that the EU’s anti-money laundering rules can also be supervised at an EU level.

The role and scope of this EU-level supervision – as well as the supervisory body that should be tasked with carrying out this role – will be proposed following a thorough assessment of all options, also based on the feedback we will receive in the open public consultation launched today.

The EU-level supervisor will be established as part of a comprehensive new policy to fight money laundering and terrorist financing. The Commission has set the political objective to achieve this within this mandate, and we count on the support of the European Parliament and the Council to ensure that the legislative work will progress as swiftly as possible.

Will all operators be supervised by this EU-level supervisor?

This matter will be thoroughly analysed. As the Action Plan notes, there are several options regarding the scope of EU-level supervision, ranging from a narrow to a broad scope. Each of these options has pros and cons, and the Commission’s proposal will be based on a careful assessment of all options, also based on the feedback we will receive in the open public consultation launched today, ensuring that the future supervisory framework is of the highest quality and leaves no weak links nor loopholes in the system.

What about the national Financial Intelligence Units (FIU)?

Financial Intelligence Units(FIUs)in Member States play an important role in identifying transactions and activities that could be linked to criminal activities. However, several technical difficulties in the functioning of the secure communication channels (FIU.net) have created difficulties.

Several Financial Intelligence Units fail to comply with their obligation to exchange information with other Financial Intelligence Units. In addition, some Financial Intelligence Units have not managed to engage in a meaningful dialogue by giving quality feedback to private entities, as required by the Anti-Money laundering Directive. The Action Plan sets the ground for the creation of an EU support and coordination mechanism for these Units.

The aim of this mechanism is to remedy the weaknesses that were identified in how Financial Intelligence Units work. This support and coordination mechanism would support cross-border cooperation and analysis. It would also streamline how information is exchanged between Member States’ FIUs and the FIUs of third countries. Finally, this support mechanism will operate as the host and as a secure communication channel for the FIU.net.

The private sector can play a critical role in fighting money laundering and terrorist financing. What will the Commission do to support its involvement?

Private operators are the gatekeepers of our financial system and our economy. They are the first ones to detect whether a transaction or activity might be suspicious. With their day-to-day experience, they can certainly contribute to fighting money launderers and those who fund terrorist activities.

The Commission fully recognises the benefits of the public and the private sector working together in this area. At the same time, it is important that these partnerships develop in a sound manner. To this end, the Commission will issue guidance, including sharing of good practices, and will consider whether to request the opinion of the European Data Protection Board in this work.

Will the list of private operators subject to anti-money laundering/terrorist financing requirements be expanded?

We will analyse whether the current scope of operators subject to these rules is adequate. Recent reviews of international standards suggest that, as a minimum, virtual asset service providers should be requested to comply withthe relevant rules.

This is also an area where we can learn from Member States’ experiences. Some countries have expanded the list of professionals subject to these rules to include, for example, crowdfunding platforms. All these examples should be analysed, also based on the feedback we will receive in the open public consultation launched today, to arrive at a harmonised list of obliged entities.

New methodology for identifying high-risk third countries

Why do you need a new methodology to identify high-risk third countries?

Identifying and tackling money-laundering activities is a moving target. Criminal techniques develop fast and take into account the latest technological developments. The new methodology aims at tackling these issues and updating our capacity to successfully identify high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing regimes that pose significant threats to our Single Market.

In addition, under the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD), the Commission has a legal obligation to identify high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies in their legal systems regarding money laundering and terrorist financing. This is to ensure that enhanced due diligence measures are applied, for example, by relevant EU businesses when carrying out financial transactions involving those third countries.

The 5th AMLD, adopted in July 2018, further strengthened the criteria for the identification of high-risk third countries, going beyond the criteria of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), in particular as regards beneficial ownership information.

The Council objected to the list presented by the Commission on 13 February 2019. The Commission has worked within that legal framework to address concerns expressed by the Council as regards the transparency of the process and the need to incentivise third countries and respect their right to be heard.

The key new elements of today’s refined methodology for identifying high-risk third countries concern: (i) the interaction between the EU and FATF listing process; (ii) an enhanced engagement with third countries subject to the autonomous assessment; and (iii) reinforced consultation of Member States experts. The European Parliament and the Council will have access to all relevant information at the different stages of the procedures, subject to appropriate handling requirements.

What are the criteria used for listing a third country at EU level?

The 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) sets out the technical criteria for identifying high-risk third countries. These requirements have been revised by the 5th Anti Money Laundering Directive in order to provide even more robust criteria.

Under the AMLD, the Commission takes into account strategic deficiencies of those countries, in particular in relation to the legal and institutional AML/CFT (anti-money laundering / countering the financing of terrorism) framework such as:

o   criminalisation of money laundering and terrorist financing,

o   customer due diligence and record keeping requirements,

o   reporting of suspicious transactions,

o   the availability and exchange of information on beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements;

o   the powers and procedures of competent authorities;

o   their practice in international cooperation;

o   the existence of dissuasive, proportionate and effective sanctions.

As a general requirement, the effectiveness in applying those AML/CFT safeguards will be considered. When carrying out its assessment, the Commission considers relevant evaluations, assessments or reports drawn up by relevant international organisations and standard setters – in particular those issued by FATF – as well as other information sources.

Once the new methodology is in place, who will be consulted?

Member State experts will be consulted at every stage of the process regarding the assessments of third country regimes, the definition of mitigating measures, third countries’ implementation of “EU Benchmarks” and the preparation of the Delegated Regulation. This consultation will include specific Member State competent authorities (law enforcement, intelligence services, Financial Intelligence Units). The European Parliament will be fully involved in those consultations.

The Commission is committed to ensuring appropriate reporting to the European Parliament. Both the European Parliament and the Council will have access to all relevant information at the different stages of the procedures, subject to appropriate handling requirements.

How often will the list be updated?

The EU list will be updated one month following the publication of an updated FATF list, which the Commission considers as a baseline. In addition, the Commission will identify further third countries based on its own autonomous assessment, after having engaged with those countries as set out in the refined methodology published today. The Commission will immediately identify those countries that refuse to take commitments to address their strategic deficiencies (“non-cooperative jurisdictions”) or those third countries that have an overriding level of risk. Third countries taking commitments to address concerns, as part of the Commission’s autonomous assessment, will benefit from a 12-month observation period. In case they do not implement those commitments within the agreed period, the Commission will proceed with a listing.

How does the FATF lists interact with the EU list?

Third countries listed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) will in principle also be listed by the EU. For countries de-listed by FATF, the Commission will assess whether the reasoning for de-listing is also sufficiently comprehensive from the EU’s point of view.

With regard to EU Accession countries, the Commission may develop other mitigating measures in the context of the accession negotiations that address the identified strategic deficiencies. Accession countries could take commitments that go beyond the FATF action plans. This will be closely monitored by the Commission. This option does not apply to third countries that are not in the process of acceding to the EU.

In specific circumstances – for example, if a third country has strategic deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing regime that pose a significant threat to the EU or if certain requirements related to beneficial ownership transparency are in question – certain EU requirements can “top up” the existing FATF Action Plan.

If a third country presents a risk and is not yet subject to the FATF procedure, the Commission or Member States should flag this in FATF before considering adding this country to the EU’s autonomous list.

What is the link between the AML listing process and the EU’s list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions?

The EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions and the EU’s AML lists may overlap on some of the countries they feature, but they have different objectives, criteria, compilation processes and consequences. The EU’s tax list is a Council-led process, whereas the EU’s anti-money laundering (AML) list is established by the Commission based on EU anti-money laundering rules. The high-risk third country (AML) list aims to address risks to the EU’s financial system caused by third countries with deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes. On the basis of this list, banks must apply higher due diligence controls to financial flows involving those high risk third countries. The anti-money laundering list is compiled by the Commission. On the other hand, the common EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions addresses the external risks to Member States’ tax bases, posed by third countries that do not comply with international tax good governance standards. It is managed directly by the Member States, through the Code of Conduct Group, with the support of the Commission. The Code of Conduct Group decides which jurisdictions should be listed and makes a recommendation to EU Finance Ministers, who take the final decision. Nonetheless, the two lists complement each other in ensuring a double protection for the Single Market from external risks.

Why does the Commission not propose a “grey list” of countries being assessed?

Unlike the EU’s list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions, the Anti-Money Laundering Directive only provides for one single list of “high risk third countries” based on identification of strategic deficiencies in the anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing regime in a given country. It does not provide for a “black list” or “grey list.” As a result, the Commission considers that such a “grey list” cannot be issued, as no firm conclusion would be reached on the existence of strategic deficiencies. The Commission will, however, ensure full transparency with the European Parliament and Council throughout the process of engaging, in cooperation with the European External Action Service, with third countries, so that the co-legislators can monitor progress in the implementation of this new methodology, including in the drafting of EU benchmarks and assessing their implementation within the given timeframe.

New EU list of high-risk third countries

Why is the Commission presenting a new list of high-risk third countries?

Criminals and terrorists are not sitting back during the Coronavirus pandemic. Europol has provided a recent assessment of new threats posed by criminal groups trying to take advantage of the pandemic.

The EU is committed to protecting the integrity of its financial system and preventing financial flows involving countries with strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing regimes. In line with the risk-based approach, banks and other obliged entities must apply enhanced due diligence in case of financial flows to/from high-risk third countries identified in the EU list.

As defined under the 4th and 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directives, the EU has to establish a list of high-risk third countries, to make sure that the EU’s financial system is equipped to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.

The Commission issued the first such list in 2016, and updated it subsequently over the past years. Since the adoption of the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the criteria by which a third country is assessed have been extended substantially, thereby requiring the Commission to carry out an autonomous assessment. This required an adaptation of the listing process based on a refined methodology. This also follows calls from the European Parliament to have an autonomous list. Today, the Commission has amended the list of high-risk third countries, via a Delegated Act, in order for it to be better aligned with the lists published by FATF. This update is necessary since the EU list has not reflected the latest FATF lists adopted since October 2018. Further updates will take place once the Commission has engaged with third countries subject to the EU’s autonomous assessments, according to the refined methodology published today.Given the Coronavirus crisis, the date of application of today’s Regulation listing third countries – and therefore applying new protective measures – only applies as of 1 October 2020. This is to ensure that all stakeholders have time to prepare appropriately. The delisting of countries, however, is not affected by this and will enter into force 20 days after publication in the Official Journal.

What countries have been added to the EU list?

The Commission took into account the latest lists issued by FATF. As a consequence, the Commission has listed 12 new countries on the EU list. Based on the FATF “Compliance documents”, the Commission considers that The Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Cambodia, Ghana, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Panama and Zimbabwe meet the criteria set out in article 9(2) of Directive (EU) 2015/849. Those countries have expressed a high-level political commitment to implement an action plan agreed with FATF to address their strategic deficiencies. We welcome those commitments and invite those jurisdictions to implement them swiftly.Given the Coronavirus crisis, the date of application of today’s Regulation listing third countries – and therefore applying new protective measures – only applies as of 1 October 2020.

What countries have been removed from the EU list?

Following progress made, the Commission has removed 6 countries from the EU list. The Commission’s review concluded that Bosnia-Herzegovina, Guyana, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka and Tunisia addressed their strategic deficiencies and should therefore be delisted.This decision will enter into force 20 days after publication in the Official Journal.

What is the situation of other countries recently delisted by FATF?

For those countries delisted by FATF since the adoption of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675, the assessment by the Commission is still ongoing (i.e., Afghanistan, Iraq, Trinidad and Tobago and Vanuatu).

Regarding Iraq and Afghanistan, the available information and the security situation in the countries did not allow the Commission to conclude, at this stage, whether they effectively addressed their strategic deficiencies. This is due in particular to the fact that those countries were delisted by FATF based on a former procedure that did not assess the effective application of AML/CFT measures. Effective application of AML/CFT measures is a criteria explicitly included in the requirements set out in the AML Directive.

Regarding Vanuatu and Trinidad and Tobago, the available information did not allow the Commission to conclude, at this stage, whether they addressed their strategic deficiencies, notably as regards the transparency of beneficial ownership, which is a specific requirement set in the AML Directive.

The Commission will review the anti-money laundering regime of those countries as a matter of priority and will engage with them as appropriate, based on the refined methodology.

What is the situation of Albania with regard to its AML/CFT regime?

The assessment of high-risk third countries is applicable to enlargement countries – which can be listed in case strategic deficiencies are identified. As set out in the methodology, the Commission can also address these issues in the framework of the accession process where the Candidate Countries are requested to fulfil a set of stringent criteria. Therefore, alternative mitigating measures can be put in place in such instances within the framework of other EU policies, as part of the enlargement policy.

In February 2020, Albania made a high-level political commitment to work with FATF and the Council of Europe to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Similarly, the Commission developed additional mitigating measures that were put in place to address key concerns. Albania expressed a high-level political commitment towards the Commission to implement further mitigating measures, notably further aligning with the EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive and putting in place registers of beneficial ownership. These commitments go beyond the action plan agreed with FATF. Therefore those mitigating measures are considered as appropriate to address risks posed to the EU financial system at this stage. This option does not apply to third countries that are not in the process of acceding to the EU.

What are the consequences of the listing for financial institutions?

Under to the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, banks and other financial institutions (“obliged entities”) have to apply extra checks (“enhanced customer due diligence requirements”) for transactions involving high-risk third countries identified on the list.

Customer due diligence corresponds to a series of checks and measures that a bank or an obliged entity has to use in case they have suspicions of high risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. Enhanced due diligence measures include extra checks and monitoring of those transactions by banks and obliged entities in order to prevent, detect and disrupt suspicious transactions.

The Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive clarifies the type of enhanced vigilance to be applied, which includes obtaining additional information on the customer and on the beneficial owner or obtaining the approval of senior management for establishing a business relationship.

The listing does not entail any type of sanctions, restrictions on trade relations or impediment to development aid but requires banks and obliged entities to apply enhanced vigilance measures on transactions involving these countries.

What are the consequences of the listing for the financial system?

According to the 4th AMLD, banks and other obliged entities are required to apply enhanced vigilance in transactions involving high-risk third countries (so called “enhanced customer due diligence requirements”). This is also in line with international obligations, where FATF already calls on its members to apply enhanced due diligence to high-risk jurisdictions. Those enhanced measures will lead to extra checks and monitoring of those transactions by banks and obliged entities in order to prevent, detect and disrupt suspicious transactions.

These measures do not entail any type of sanctions, restrictions trade relations or impediment to development aid but it aims to apply enhanced vigilance measures in those cases. In order to further clarify the type of enhanced vigilance to be applied, the 5th AMLD, adopted in June 2018, harmonises those enhanced measures.

What is the impact of the EU anti-money laundering list on EU-funded financial operations?

The listing process does not affect EU humanitarian assistance, EU development policy or the provision of grants, procurement and budget support.

The use of EU funded financial instruments and budgetary guarantees is subject to stricter provisions in relation to anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing. According to the EU’s Financial Regulation and the European Fund for Sustainable Development Regulation, there is a prohibition against “Implementing Partners” (such as International Financial Institutions or National Promotional and Development Banks) entering into new or renewed operations with entities established in countries on the EU’s list of high risk third countries, when carrying out financial operations supported by the EU budget.

There is however an exemption when the action is physically implemented in the third country in question (subject to the absence of other risk factors). That means that when an action is physically implemented in a listed jurisdiction (i.e. when the financial operation supported by the Union budget is implemented in a listed jurisdiction exclusively for the purpose of financing a project in that same jurisdiction), the Implementing Partner can still carry out financial operations with entities established in that jurisdiction with the support of the EU. Therefore, there should be no adverse effect with regard to actions physically implemented in listed jurisdictions.

Why will the new protective measures only apply as of 1 October 2020?

The very exceptional and unpredictable situation arising from the Coronavirus pandemic has a global impact and is leading to significant disruption for economies and national administrations around the world. Therefore, the date of application of today’s Regulation listing third countries – and therefore applying new protective measures – only applies as of 1 October 2020. This is to ensure that all stakeholders have time to prepare appropriately. The delisting of countries, however, is not affected by this and will enter into force 20 days after publication in the Official Journal.

Will there be any technical assistance available for the countries identified as high-risk third countries?

The EU is committed to providing technical assistance to the countries identified as high-risk third countries. The Commission is one of the world’s leading donors when it comes to providing targeted support to tackle anti-money laundering / countering terrorist financing. The Commission currently has a programme (€20 million) under the Global Facility (AML/CFT) to support countries in the world to monitor, disrupt and deny the financing of terrorism and money-laundering. The Commission aims at supporting more partners to address AML/CFT issues. This process is demand-driven – i.e. countries will have to define their needs and request technical assistance to improve their AML/CFT regimes in the framework of the external aid policy of the Commission.

What are the next steps?

The Delegated Regulation has now been transmitted to the European Parliament and to the Council for a 1-month scrutiny period (extendable by 1 more month). If there is no objection during this period, the Delegated Regulation will be published in the Official Journal in view of its entry into force. The Commission will re-initiate its reviews under the autonomous assessment and come up with, at an appropriate time, a new autonomous list. These assessments will be subject to consultation of Member States’ experts and appropriate engagement with third countries, in cooperation with the European External Action Service (EEAS), as set in the refined methodology. The European Parliament and the Council will have access to all relevant information at the different stages of the procedures, subject to appropriate handling requirements. The Commission will continue to engage in FATF in order to ensure increased synergies between the EU and the FATF listing process.

Finally, as part of the planned review of AML/CFT rules at EU level, the Commission will conduct an impact assessment and propose legislative proposals in early 2021. Input from today’s open public consultation will feed into this impact assessment. The legislative proposals should ensure that risks posed by third countries are appropriately addressed.

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Intelligence

The penetration tactics of the CIA and the Israeli Mossad and the Chinese experience

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What occupied me the most during the last period after the control of the American Central Intelligence Agency and the Israeli Mossad on a number of those around me, including: professors, colleagues and relatives, was to spread the story of my madness everywhere, despite my severe isolation from everyone, due to my strict academic and analytical intelligence nature, which completely compels me to move away about all aspects of luxury or racing to get to know others for purely security reasons, related to my personal safety, for being targeted by the Israeli Mossad and the American Central Intelligence for many years, which made me very sorry, for the decline of morals of some, and their selling of their conscience and morals at any price for a few pounds will end  It is implemented quickly, but it has caused harm to a person who was looking for restoring the dignity and prestige of the Arabs and helping them dismantle all the American and Israeli spy networks in the Middle East and the region, as well as preparing new generations capable of challenging and imposing and dictating their conditions on everyone with strictness and firmness. But, in the midst of this struggle, I was shocked by the morals of many around me, who sold and betrayed at a cheap price.

   Therefore, the previous period was one of the most important periods of my entire life, for my intellectual work and my intelligence analytical efforts as a proactive intelligence analyst, and a future theorist that draws the shape of the foreseeable future and maps of the modern world, and reshapes the alliances of the new world, after the disintegration of the features of American and Israeli hegemony, with the rise of other great, regional and international powers, such as: China and others, to help all Arabs and developing peoples to fully challenge American hegemony, and their constant attempt to impose their conditions on us, and even formal plans to encourage Arabs and the sons of Arab and developing peoples to penetrate the American depth itself, by ending that American hegemony over them, by dismantling all of the American espionage networks in Egypt, the region and even the world, with entering the depth of the American Central Intelligence Agency and wandering in the building of the Israeli Mossad, to obtain all the information we want to know, enabling us to challenge America as a superpower and force it to submit to our conditions and dictate our conditions to it and to the Israelis themselves, after dismantling the Israeli Mossad device itself from the inside after its penetration.

  Through my diligent observations, and my psychological and psychological studies of the mentalities and personalities of a number of American and Israeli diplomats, and my search for any previous recorded conversations of American and Israeli intelligence men, I noticed very carefully the extent of the state of confusion and disrespect for the policies of their countries, and their severe prejudice against them, which caught me in the eye of an intelligence expert examining the entire situation. I came to a genius conclusion, according to which the easiest personalities to recruit at any price are American and Israeli diplomats and their military and general intelligence men, given the nature of the pressures and the enormous suffering they face, as well as their complete dissatisfaction with the policies of their countries and their intelligence services with their current formations. This is perhaps what I played during the last period, by following up on all the activities of the American and Israeli diplomats that I reached, and my strict follow-up to everything that falls under my eyes in terms of conversations by their intelligence men to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of their personalities, and to write and record that on an ongoing basis, to identify the most prominent commonalities between them, tracking and knowing those individual differences, which enabled their intelligence and diplomatic services to seek help from them during previous periods.  It reached a maximum result, which is the possibility of completely subjugating all American and Israeli diplomats and their intelligence men in favor of other intelligence services, who are hostile, proud and admirable at the same time, as they view China and Russia, their archenemy.  Hence, I set out to draw the features of the approach and decipher the symbols and codes of the relationship between them and their current intelligence services, from intermittent communication or complete separation, followed by a defining stage of indifference or ignoring the question.  Because through that particular detail and detail, I can penetrate into their depths intelligence, security and psychologically, and then ensure control over them, just as they do with me and those around me, to ensure control over me, considering that I am one of the most prominent proactive intelligence analytical mindsets in the world, as well as my frightening personality for them  To my closeness to the countries of China and Russia and their friends alike.

 By analogy with the previous point about the possibility of recruiting their intelligence men and diplomats and subjecting them to our conditions – which I tried to draw the attention of the countries of China and Russia to – China has succeeded in achieving an unprecedented penetration of the files of all American and Israeli diplomats and intelligence men alike.  The Chinese helped in this, and their absolute and unparalleled success in penetrating the depth of files belonging to the Israeli Mossad and all its employees or dealers, which led to the disclosure of the data of tens of thousands of Mossad employees, the Shin Bet security service, the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, and the Israeli Institute  For biological research, the Israeli military forces, which include: the names of the most prominent pilots, intelligence personnel, members of the special forces, and nuclear scientists in Israel. Israel fears that many parties will benefit from this information, such as: Iranian intelligence, Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as many other intelligence agencies, which do not maintain friendly relations with Israel.

  The Chinese and Russian intelligence are constantly trying to obtain all the information, documents, documents and speeches delivered at all Israeli conferences, or in which Israel was an original party or a participant.  Where the most serious issue for the Israelis is related to the readiness of the Arab armies and defense ministries at the present time, to form a “joint military defense alliance between Israel and the Arabs to fight Iran”, which I tried to draw the attention of the Chinese to, and resulted in China forming a multilateral action platform to bring about a kind of dialogue and rapprochement between the Arab Gulf and Iran, away from the policies of Israeli and American provocation, and their tireless attempt to ignite and inflame the situation in the region against Iran as an ally of China and Russia, in favor of Israeli rapprochement with the Gulf states and all.

  The Mossad, and other Israeli intelligence and security services, rely on these data, which are owned by the (Israeli Ministry of Interior), in order to recruit new members, whether inside or outside Israel itself.  The Israeli intelligence, especially the Mossad, is also working on using false or pseudonymous identities to carry out all its security operations, whether it is to carry out surveillance and gather information, to infiltrate certain places, or to purchase sensitive equipment.

  The leaking of such information to China or others is disastrous for the Israeli intelligence and the Mossad, because this leads to the possibility of linking it to activities that take place abroad under false Israeli or foreign identities.  It is also possible that the leakage of that sensitive information that China has penetrated may lead to thwarting many Israeli security operations abroad or lead to the arrest of Mossad agents through foreign intelligence agencies. Above all, by verifying these leaked Israeli intelligence data, it is possible to ascertain the living persons and the deceased personalities whose identities are used by the Israeli Mossad in secret missions to conceal the true identity of the Israeli agent entrusted with carrying out a mission.

  What is most important to me is China’s follow-up and targeting of all activities and operations of the Israeli Mossad and its close follow-up of all Arab students studying in the defense and military industries abroad, and its follow-up by the Israeli Mossad elements since their first university studies, until the start of their graduation and the end of their studies and then their travel to their homelands.  This is what China has learned well through many of its collaborators from countries and individuals, to obtain a lot of sensitive information that the Israeli Mossad elements are trying to access and identify, then turn it into several intelligence reports in files, and track Mossad agents responsible for following up on defense industry students and researchers.  And the discussion of their relationship with Mossad officials in several countries other than the Israeli territory itself abroad, and China’s tireless attempt to dismantle all the Israeli encryption programs on the Internet, which Israel uses to communicate with clients, which is shocking to the Israeli Mossad, which is considered an “intelligence earthquake” for Israel.

  The point of intelligence worth mentioning to China and the region remains, which is confirmed by all the intelligence documents recently obtained by China, that there is a clear fluctuation in the positions of the leaders of the Arab armies and defense ministries during their speeches at the joint security and military conferences between them, and within the headquarters of the League of Arab States, on the  Those Arab armies are still far from being ready and ready to fight any war or joint conflict with Israel against Iran.  These analyzes or summaries of closed secret discussions of the leaders of the Arab armies and defense ministries regarding their position on the joint military and defense alliances to confront Tehran’s moves in cooperation with the military leaders in Tel Aviv, are considered the biggest strategic treasure for China, Russia and Iran alike, which is probably what the Mossad leaders realized  The Israelis, who are known to report directly to the Office of the Prime Minister’s Office in person, have provided the high political level in Israel with valuable information about the lack of readiness of the Arab and Gulf armies for a military confrontation with Israel against Iran.                  

  On the other hand, after the success of Chinese intelligence in completely dismantling all American spy networks on Chinese territory, doubt arose about China’s success in recruiting diplomats from the American embassy in Beijing to work for it, and the suspicion of American intelligence appeared in everyone, including the American ambassador at the American embassy in Beijing  same.  Which prompted all American intelligence agencies, to form (special working groups of the elite and elite of American intelligence, the most experienced and the highest ranked, whether within the FBI or the CIA)                               

FBI & CIA

  They assigned this group a very secret headquarters that they chose meticulously in northern Virginia, and assigned it to analyze every operation, and to (study the file of all diplomats working in the American embassy in Beijing very carefully, regardless of their diplomatic ranks, including the American ambassador himself, for fear of  recruiting them for China).                                                          

  This is what Chinese intelligence has succeeded in completely, given the targeting of US and Israeli Foreign Ministry officials by the Chinese, and the most dangerous targeting of China to recruit senior American and Israeli security, military and intelligence ranks and leaders on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of State Security, which is the main intelligence agency for China.  They are assisted by all the vast Chinese spy networks spread around the world, in view of the directives issued by the Chinese President, Comrade Xi Jinping in 2018, and his strict directives to Chinese companies to amend their internal regulations to put the concepts of (loyalty and belonging to the Chinese state above achieving economic profit itself). The largest and most dangerous role remains, represented by the (Chinese Ministry of State Security) in Beijing, through its recruitment of the former officer in the US Central Intelligence Agency “CIA”, named “Jerry Chun Shing”, and through him the Chinese intelligence was able to know and track all the lists of the agents he knows are CIA agents, and the most dangerous is the help of former CIA officer “Jerry Chun Shing” of Chinese intelligence in deciphering the encrypted communications system known as “Quafcom” to set up the entire American spy network in China.                                                                

  The most dangerous Chinese intelligence service is the (Chinese Ministry of State Security), and the Chinese Ministry of State Security begins to monitor and recruit its officers from the first university level, as most of them come from students of the (Beijing University of International Relations), and this is the main difference in the Chinese approach to recruiting intelligence officers. In their first university stages, in order to select the best qualified in a precise and strict manner, and to have better opportunities in examining their backgrounds and their contacts with foreign bodies, and do they have a history of traveling or residing abroad or not?  The Chinese Ministry of State Security also places great emphasis on the proficiency of its employees in foreign languages, and runs an “intensive school for teaching foreign languages ​​for officers”, in addition to placing them for a long time under the supervision of a special department of internal security known as (the Ninth Office), whose main function is (monitoring and following up all  Workers and conscripts within the Chinese Ministry of State Security).                                                                                

                                                                                   It comes at the top of the government agencies that practice intelligence activity informally in China, namely: (The National Defense Administration of Science, Technology and Industry), known in China and internationally as the “Sustained Administration”, and it is very similar to the work of the (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), known as “DARPA” in the United States of America, and we find the role of the Chinese news agency “Xinhua”, which Washington and the West always accuse of working as a cover for Chinese intelligence officers and agents, and which prepares secret summaries for decision-makers in Beijing, and there is also (the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs), which maintains relations with overseas Chinese communities and Chinese expatriates, as well as the role of the (Chinese Ministry of Education), which monitors and communicates with all overseas Chinese students, all of these Chinese bodies, ministries and agencies employ their followers to collect information for the benefit of the Chinese government.                                                       

 The main office responsible for recruiting and screening the handpicked in China for espionage activities is (the Liaison Office of the Ministry of State Security in Fuzhou, China). Whereas its elements are spreading all over the world in a decentralized network run by the principal officers.

 In general and statistically close to accuracy, the number of Chinese elements loyal to the Chinese state security apparatus within the United States of America alone can be estimated at hundreds of thousands of individuals or assets, some of whom work permanently and others temporarily, and there are statistics confirming that there are more than 17 million Americans of assets.  Asian, including four million of Chinese origin, in addition to a huge network of shell companies and front companies, numbering nearly three thousand… All of them are directly affiliated and are under the supervision of the Chinese Ministry of State Security.

  Chinese intelligence methods vary in recruiting these elements, but in the case of precious assets, that is, those that provide intelligence information of high importance to China, many additional temptations and advantages are often added to them, and some of them are called “ocean bottom fish”, a Chinese equivalent term  For the concept of “sleeper cells” in Western intelligence culture, these fish often receive training up to several months or years inside China, and are mainly used in the process of gathering information and filling gaps in communication networks, and sometimes to spread rumors in their host country. The Chinese intelligence has retained its special and distinctive character of the huge number and widespread espionage operations whose effects are felt all over the world.

   Here, we are noticing the extent of the sophistication and advanced of the Chinese intelligence services, which consists of a wide range of intelligence agencies, military departments, corporate offices, party organs, and even research institutions, universities and the media, all of whom are subject to two parallel structures of control, whether by the central government in Beijing, or by  Before the intelligence services of the ruling Communist Party in China, whose institutions hold the actual power in the country at the expense of the government itself, and carry out various operational and administrative tasks.

  And the most dangerous office of the CIA targeted by Chinese intelligence is the (Office of Foreign Broadcasting Information Service), which includes a complete list of sensitive information from the heart of the CIA, which is passed on to Beijing, and perhaps the most important is information related to the plans of the CIA. The White House and its management of rapprochement or conflict with China, plans whose leakage gave Beijing a higher position in any subsequent negotiations with the American side.

 The surprising thing for me, personally, is the prohibition of visiting China for all its recruited agents who are implanted within the American Central Intelligence Agency in particular, since the beginning of their work in the American Central Intelligence Agency, provided that the meetings of Chinese recruits within the American intelligence services take place with the Chinese agents operating them to give them  The orders are in other countries apart from China and Washington, knowing that the duration of those meetings takes only a few minutes at most, due to the difficulty of monitoring and tracking them during those few minutes and seconds, and most importantly, the Chinese intelligence agents follow up with the American agencies their assignments that reach them from China with one Chinese intelligence official that does not change, in the manner that he may remain with his agents for a full 30 years, in order to maintain secure, narrow, and unobservable channels of communication by the Americans except with great difficulty.

  In general, the Ministry of State Security of China, which is the main Chinese intelligence service, was established in 1983, by merging the (Central Investigation Department with the espionage units of the Ministry of Public Security), to eventually turn the ministry into China’s main civil intelligence service, under it, they are organizing all the official and unofficial intelligence structures in the country, with the exception of the army, which maintained its own military intelligence apparatus, which is under the supervision of the Communist Party of China, and not under the direct control of the government.

 The Chinese President, Comrade “Xi Jinping”, directed his intelligence services to stop using embassy employees for espionage purposes, and to rely instead on journalists and businessmen, as part of a grand strategy known as “hide the brightness and feed the mystery”, where “Xi Jinping” wanted to expand the capabilities of his country, however, wanted to keep pace with the West, without engaging in many rhetorical wars and as covertly as possible.

  Here, we find the distinctive nature of the Chinese intelligence work, which depends not only on recruiting influential agents to obtain direct and sensitive information, as much as it depends on flooding the enemy intelligence and counterintelligence services and the enemy with thousands of small-scale and scope espionage operations, many of which seem to be of no value. The final total results of those Chinese slow and complex processes is often  reflect the traditional human traits of the Chinese who are known for their patience, perseverance and hard work.

  We can understand this Chinese way of tiny and small group work to obtain information, in Chinese social norms, and specifically in the well-known Chinese “Guansky” tradition, which means exploiting slow and strong interpersonal networks to influence events, a norm that has been developed and transmitted to Chinese business and economy, and later to the field of intelligence at the structural and technical level, at a time when the intelligence industry and the war of minds and information gathering were at a rapid pace for China, given the density of the intelligence working groups of the Chinese.

  The culture of intelligence and information gathering has gained tremendous importance for the Chinese, and their special approach to obtaining information, which has always been far from the general logic and bearing its own mark, was often done through a combination of (three main ways), which are:

  1. The first way: is what is known as human waves, where they exploit  Beijing has its huge human assets to recruit thousands of Chinese to collect huge amounts of information.
  • The second way: is to recruit and rely on the services of millions of Chinese people in all countries of the world and extract information from them periodically to reach deeper levels of network analysis of the huge data acquired.
  • The third way: It is slowly and patiently cultivating foreign agents in order to conduct active espionage operations in the long term.

  Through my intelligence analysis referred to, we can understand that Chinese espionage operations on the American side have made a great resonance in the American intelligence community, and shed light not only on the continuous rounds of the secret intelligence conflict between China and the United States of America, whose chapters still extend to this day, but also on the unfamiliar traditions and tactics of the Chinese intelligence services, one of the most efficient and complex intelligence services in the world, and perhaps the least known, notorious, knowledgeable and unfamiliar with their complex working methods.                

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Chinese penetration and its destruction of all American spy networks on the Chinese territory

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China’s National Counterintelligence and Surveillance Networks and the China Foreign Counterespionage Bureau have succeeded in dismantling all US spy networks on all Chinese territory.  The amazing thing is that the Chinese surrounded all American CIA officers and informants, who were going to Chinese restaurants to meet their clients, and the network of American spies in China, which turned out to be all under the control of the Chinese secret services. Every restaurant in China, according to what was announced by the secret reports of the American intelligence, and frustrating is the work of these workers in Chinese restaurants, and their possession of different military and security ranks in the (Chinese National Counterintelligence Service).

  Which prompted the Central Intelligence Agency to withdraw and smuggle many agents, informants and spies for America from China since 2010 until now due to its losses there and the vigilance of the Chinese. Which caused the CIA to suffer terrible losses as a result of this great failure it suffered in penetrating deep into the Chinese territory itself.  Perhaps this is what brings me back to the memory of what happened completely similar to it, given what the CIA also incurred in the Soviet Union, after the detection of many American agents inside Soviet lands.  The terrible shock was that the real reason for the detection of American agents on Soviet soil was betrayal from within the CIA itself, as American spies were handed over to their Soviet hunters by the American FBI agent (Robert Hansen), the head of the same counter-intelligence unit in the CIA, whose name is (Aldrich Ames), who were recruited by the Russian Intelligence Agency “KGB”.

 The fearsome Soviet in the seventies and eighties and throughout the Cold War period between the American and Soviet parties.

 Here, the reason for the Chinese intelligence dismantling all American spy networks on Chinese soil is due to the (Chinese anti-espionage service) being able to uncover a modern surveillance system, organized by the (US National Security Agency) “NSA” from Taiwan. At first, CIA agents went to the American student in Shanghai, China, “Glenn Shriver”, who collected American information of a defensive nature for Chinese intelligence in order to earn money to inspire American students studying abroad and motivate their patriotism, the (US Federal Bureau of Investigation) “FBI” issued (A video exposes the betrayal of the American student “Glenn Shriver”).

 And cases of real Chinese hacking of American intelligence were discovered, including what happened in March 2017, when the employee of the US State Department, “Candice Clinburn”, was arrested after discovering that she had secret contacts with Chinese officials, and her bank account revealed the scandal of the flow of money to her from China, in addition to  Chinese officials showered her with precious gifts and drenched her with money, including: an iPhone, a laptop computer, a fully furnished apartment, and many other benefits. But “Clinburn” did not admit her mistake, and no one could prove that she had revealed information about American agents to the Chinese.

  In another discovered case of Chinese spying on Washington, in January 2018, “Jerry Chun Xin Li” 53-year-old, was arrested at New York airport.  We find here that “Jerry Chun Xin Li” is an American citizen of Chinese descent who served in the US armed forces in the 1980s, and since 1994 has worked for the Central Intelligence Agency, where he had access to highly classified documents.  In 2007, he retired and went with his family to “Hong Kong”, and there he worked in an auction house, belonging to a high-ranking official in the Communist Party of China, and he was identified and recruited for China in the face of the CIA.

  In addition, the US secret communications system, used in China, known as:

“Covcom”

  What was used by a network of American agents in China, was very primitive, and the most dangerous was that it was connected via the Internet, and it was very similar to the American intelligence communication system in the Middle East, where the network environment is less dangerous.  It is clear that the American intelligence geniuses did not fully appreciate the capabilities of the Chinese hackers and hackers.  And when the American investigation team conducted tests to track the Chinese intrusion, it found that the American system of communications with the network of agents and spies in China contains a fatal error, as once it is entered, it is easily possible to access a much wider secret communication system, as the CIA was using it and interacting through it with its agents and agents network all over the world.

 More seriously, the CIA was particularly concerned, fearing that Chinese intelligence might have shared this information with its Russian counterpart and informed them of ways to gain access to the “Covcom” system of communications for the US intelligence contacts with its agents on Chinese lands. 

 What increased the fears of the Americans, is the disappearance of a number of American informants and spies, who were already active in Russia, and they stopped communicating with their operators from the American side at the same time that the American intelligence network collapsed in China, which confirms the Chinese handing over the secret communications code of the  Americans spies on the Russian lands as well.

  Because of the abject failure of the American intelligence in the face of Chinese superiority over it, so it tried to respond to the (Chinese National Counterintelligence Service) in November 2021, by convicting the American jury of spying for the Chinese intelligence officer (Yangun Shu), who was deputy director of the department in the (Sixth Office of the Ministry of State Security)  The Chinese officer in Jiangsu Province), which serves as the main intelligence agency of the Communist Party of China, and accused him of working to spy on US and Western military interests in favor of China, to obtain US military secrets and so on, and here the Chinese officer (Yangun Shu) was arrested in Belgium in the year  2018.  Then the final verdict was issued against the Chinese officer (Yangun Shu) on November 5, 2021, convicting the Chinese intelligence officer by a US federal jury of committing the charge of “conspiracy and attempting to commit economic and military espionage and stealing trade and military secrets for China”.

  Here, “Yang Shuo” is considered the first Chinese intelligence officer to be extradited to the United States of America. His case shows how China sought to obtain military-industrial secrets to help it militarily modernize its armed forces, which eventually enabled the People’s Liberation Army to build its vast network of Chinese advanced weaponry very quickly.

  The important thing should be noticed here is that under the (China National Security Law), every Chinese citizen and company is required to cooperate with the CPC and its leaders in matters of national security. This means, in practice, that those Chinese companies that deal with any foreign companies are still required to share any technology or information they obtain with the Chinese military or intelligence services in the Chinese state. Likewise, all Chinese researchers and graduate students working on science, technology, engineering or mathematics projects are expected to share their research with Beijing, for the welfare and development of their country.

   Accordingly, it is clear the extent of the widespread spread of the Chinese in America, Europe and the world, in order to preserve their security and the security of their homeland first, and then to obtain all the advanced technologies that allow them to develop and modernize the industrial and military infrastructure of their country, and this was revealed by “William Ivanina”, the head of the Counterintelligence and National Security Center  The United States, that the Chinese are adept in this field, by following a variety of means, through (the Chinese Ministry of State Security, United Front Action Department, People’s Liberation Army).

  The Chinese are also using a variety of ingenious tactics in this framework, including the latest electronic espionage devices and systems, to access sensitive information remotely, and what is known as “signal intelligence technology” to quickly capture information, as well as electronic intelligence, which enabled it to decipher all  The blades of American spying and wiretapping devices on its soil and abroad. Thus, the vision becomes completely clear to us, about the reasons for the dismantling of all US spy networks by Chinese intelligence on its lands.

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China and the CIA Project of right Judgments of Future Predictors

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The (Project of Sound Judgments of Brilliant Future Predictors), which is funded by the “Advance Intelligence Research Projects Activity” section of the US government and the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is striving to recruit, sort and employ brilliant geniuses who are able to predict the future in an unprecedented and genius way, by discovering new ways in advanced intelligence proactive thinking, which allows predicting the shape of the future and the new world order, and its network of international alliances globally

 Here, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA’s accurate and right Judgments of the Future Predictors Project) believes that there are real geniuses and super-intelligent proactive geniuses globally, who are better than others, and better prepared to predict global future events

 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA’s Good Judgments of the Future Predictors Project) announced that there are few people with exceptional and unique talents and talents to see the future differently. And through their real traitors and agents, it was discovered that I am one of the few geniuses globally, who apply to the world’s most advanced proactive genius to participate in the project of geniuses, who are able to predict the future shape globally in a different, genius and accurate way. They tried to entice me to work with them… However, my love for China as a second true homeland for me, brought up among their children, stood as a barrier between me and the American dream in joining me to work with them, and my refusal to work in (the Central Intelligence Agency’s Project of Good Judgments for the Predictors of the Future)

 Although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA’s Future Predictors of Good Judgments Project) employs more than 2000 geniuses around the world, who are considered among the best brilliant minds in the world, and are able to predict the best ways for the future, assess the probability of certain global events and fabricate others with them. However, the greatest American obsession was to attract me in a specific and accurate way, and to leave my absolute and intense love and devotion to China since my childhood, and my always correspondence with the Chinese to draw the shape of the foreseeable future and predict it with them.

 With my refusal to join this clever geniuses focus group, known in America as: (brilliant geniuses forecasters, of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Project of Good Judgments for Future Predictors), mainly because of their unique predictive personality traits, which allow them to predict and predict things more accurately, compared to  Basically several advanced global intelligence agencies

   After that, a number of my Professors and colleagues who are basically close to the American political and intelligence circles, spread among everyone the topic and story of my madness, as an American attempt to blackmail the United States of America against me, to urge me to leave my homeland and join them in the project of geniuses globally in predicting the future, affiliated with the American Central Intelligence Agency,  It is known as (Project of sound judgments for geniuses who predict the future)… to the point of kidnapping and assaulting me, and the practice of my professors and colleagues to the harshest levels of psychological and physical violence in my confrontation to force me to leave my loyalty and closeness to China, and to consider China as my true homeland, and to submit to those American conditions, and my acceptance to work with the American political and intelligence circles in (the Central Intelligence Agency’s Project of Good Judgments of the Future Predictors)… So that was the result that we are dealing with now, of beating and mutilating me, and attempts to kidnap and assault me ​​cruelly, and the participation of my professors and colleagues in that moral farce to spread the story of my insanity, according to a calculated and deliberate American plan and agenda, to confront me with great care, to enforce me to change my convictions and work with them.

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