Authors: Prof. Dr. Tedo Dundua, Dr. Emil Avdaliani
If you cross the state borders freely, seeing all the cargos moving without delay, money standard and the name being identical everywhere, that means you are in Eurozone. The reality has its remote pattern, Athenian (Attic) case with Colchis (Western Georgia) being involved. If Colchis was in “Attic standard zone”, why to deny Eurozone to Georgia? Below Athenian and modern European cases are discussed.
“If anyone mints silver coins in the cities and does not use Athenian coins or weights or measures, but foreign coins, weights and measures, I shall punish him and fine him according to the previous decree which Klearchos proposed” (A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. To the End of the Fifth c. B.C. Edited by R. Meiggs and D. Lewis. Oxford. 1969. Printed to the University 1971, p. 113; Chr. Howgego. Ancient History from Coins. London and New York. 1995, p. 44). This is what a secretary of the Athenian Council (Boule) had to add to the Bouleatic oath from the famous Athenian decree enforcing to use the Athenian coins, weights and measures within the Athenian Alliance. The Athenian officials in the cities were responsible to carry out the decree, and the local officials too (A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. To the End of the Fifth c. B.C. Edited by R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, p. 113). The date of this decree is problematic, but still between 450 and 414 B.C. (A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. To the End of the Fifth c. B.C. Edited by R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, pp. 114-115; C. G. Starr. Athenian Coinage. Oxford. 1970, p. 68 n. 15; Chr. Howgego. Ancient History from Coins, p. 44).The text was carved on stelai and set up at Athens and the other cities – members of the League. Seven fragments of this text have been already discovered in various places (A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. To the End of the Fifth c. B.C. Edited by R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, p. 111; “Athenian coinage decree”. J. M. Jones. A Dictionary of Ancient Greek Coins. London. First Published in 1986). There are several attempts to interpret the decree. One thing is clear – this decree is imperialistic in tone, and if some of the cities within the Athenian “Empire” were still supposed to issue own money, only Attic weight coins had to be used. Electrum staters remained popular (A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. To the End of the Fifth c. B.C. Edited by R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, p. 113). Later this decree is parodied in the “Birds” of Aristophanes (C. M. Kraay. Coins of Ancient Athens. Newcastle upon Tyne. 1968, p. 5).
The decree seems to be very comfortable for trade and taxation – indeed, Athenians were scrupulous while collecting taxes within the League.
The whole story about the Greeks shaping Europe has been already told. Macedonia contributed much as a recruitment area, but earlier Athens had been thought to be a leader. It was merely a frustration – indeed, if the best city had to be stripped from a population, nothing would be created at all. While the Greeks still in this mistake, Athenians made a good deal – seizing the markets and imposing taxes.
Athenians cared much for the Black Sea areas; and Pericles even launched a special expedition (Plut. Pericl. 20). Then the numismatic visage of Colchis (Western Georgia) was changed as Athenian tetradrachms came in sight together with the Attic ceramics (G. Doundoua, T. Doundoua. Les Relations Économiques de la Colchide aux Époques Archaïque et Classique d’après le Matériel Numismatique. La Mer Noire. Zone de Contacts. Actes du VIIe Symposium de Vani. Paris. 1999, p. 111 №23; Очерки истории Грузии. т. I. ред. Г. А. Меликишвили, О. Д. Лордкипанидзе. Тбилиси. 1989, p. 228). Moreover, Milesian, Aeginetan and Persian standards used for the autonomous coin issues of Phasis (modern Photi, Western Georgia) now disappear and Attic standard becomes unique.
Dioscurias (Modern Sokhumi, Western Georgia) was a splendid Greek city dominated by a mercantile oligarchy, a foundation of Miletus, sometimes – being troubled by the natives from the hinterland. Then it seems to be completely assimilated. History of Dioscurias is full of tremendous events and clashes. And the clashes were back again in the summer of 1993 as the civil war broke out in Abkhazia. Still one missile was especially lucky as it buried itself deep in the earth and showed a coin-shaped white metal. The description is as follows: weight – 300.37 gr. d=70 mm. Head of Athena wearing a crested helmet (the fashion is that of “old-style” coinage)/Owl. Obviously Athenian weight, it was offered for sale to Simon Janashia State Museum of Georgia.
The greatest number of the marked weights found in the Agora are small roughly square lead plaques. Sometimes these official weights are marked with the same symbols as the coins – head of Athena/owl (The Athenian Agora. v. X. Weights, Measures and Tokens by M. Lang and M. Crosby. Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. Part I. Weights and Measures by M. Lang. Princeton. New Jersey. 1964, p. 6). Large circular stamp with helmeted head of Athena appears on the lead weight of the Roman time (The Athenian Agora. v. X. Weights, Measures and Tokens by M. Lang and M. Crosby, p. 31 pl. 9 LW (lead weight) 66). Bronze weight too of some 69.9 gr. has an owl incised. This seems to be a coin weight, 1/6 of mina (The Athenian Agora. v. X. Weights, Measures and Tokens by M. Lang and M. Crosby, p. 26 pl. 1 BW (Bronze weight) 5). Even countermarks for the weights represent double-bodied owl and helmeted head (The Athenian Agora. v. X. Weights, Measures and Tokens by M. Lang and M. Crosby, p. 28 pl. 6 LW 26, p. 30, pl. 8 LW 46). The dry measure also has two stamps: the double-bodied owl and helmeted head of Athena (The Athenian Agora. v. X. Weights, Measures and Tokens by M. Lang and M. Crosby, pl. 14 DM (dry measure) 44, 45; pl. 18 DM 44, 45).
The Athenian coin mina, consisting of 100 drachms, weighted approximately 436.6 gr. There was also another mina, used for weighting market produce, equal to 138 coin drachms, or 602 gr. (“Mina”, “Attic weight standard”. J. M. Jones. A Dictionary of Ancient Greek Coins).
So, the piece from Dioscurias should be considered as Athenian trade-weight – half mina.
What conclusions are we to draw from all this?
1) Dioscurias had to receive or was glad to receive the official Athenian weights as the city became a subject of the Alliance.
2) And Phasis should have accepted even a coin mina and Attic standard too while already in the Alliance. Was there any legislation in favour of democracy; what does a maintenance of “Archaic smile” on the Athenian (“Old Style” coinage) and Phasian coins mean? We shall never know.
3) One thing is clear – Attic standard was installed in Colchis between 450 and 414 B.C. And the effect was similar to the modern introduction of euro across much of the European Union.
From Ancient Period to Modern Europe
Creating a common economic space was a recurring ambition throughout European history. The above-discussed “Attic standard zone” was one of the pertinent examples from Ancient history. From modern period the best example perhaps is the European Union (EU) which from the late 1960s aimed at coordinating economic and fiscal policies. It also included the establishment of a common monetary policy as well as the introduction of a common currency. The principal arguments in favor of its adoption were economic stability and unencumbered cross-border trade.
In 1979 the European Monetary System (EMS) was launched. Later on during the European Council session in Maastricht, 1991, the Treaty on European Union, which contained various provisions necessary for successful implementation of the monetary union, was agreed upon (https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/euro/history-and-purpose-euro_en).
Then came the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) which aimed at step-by-step economic integration of a number of countries. EMU was designed to support sustainable economic growth and a high level of employment. This specifically comprised three main fields: 1. implementing a monetary policy that pursues the main objective of price stability; 2. avoiding possible negative spillover effects due to unsustainable government finance, preventing the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances within Member States, and coordinating to a certain degree the economic policies of the Member States; 3. ensuring the smooth operation of the single market (https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/economic-and-monetary-union/what-economic-and-monetary-union-emu_en).
It was not however until 1999 that a common currency – the euro – appeared with 11 countries – Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain – fixing their exchange rates and creating a new currency with monetary policy passed to the European Central Bank.
For the first three years euro did not exist as it essentially was an “invisible” currency. It was used mainly for accounting purposes. In 2002, however, first euro coins and banknotes were introduced in 12 EU countries thus ushering in, arguably, the biggest cash changeover in history. Nowadays, the euro is in circulation in 19 EU member states. There are a number of advantages attached to the use of the euro: low costs of financial transactions, easy travel, increased economic and political role of Europe on the international arena (https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/euro/which-countries-use-euro_en).
Parallel to the creation of the unified economic space ran the establishment institutionalized freedom of movement within most of the European states. The treaty came to be known as the Schengen Agreement signed on June 14, 1985, which led most of the European countries towards the abolishment of their national borders. The concept for free movement between the European countries is very old and it can be found through the Middle Ages (https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/eu-countries/).
As was the case with the “Attic standard zone” modern Georgia aspires to become an economic part of Europe, its monetary system, unified currency – euro. Major steps have been made to this end since the break-up of the Soviet Union. The current EU-Georgia close relationship is based on the EU-Georgia Association Agreement. More importantly, the latter involves a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which came into force in mid-2016 and along with closer political ties aims to achieve deeper economic integration between Tbilisi and the EU (https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/georgia/).
Simultaneously with Georgia’s slow and steady economic integration into the EU economy, the country has also started to enjoy the benefits of institutionalized free movement of citizens across much of the European continent.
Thus there is a long history of Georgian economic and territorial integration into the European models of unified economic spaces. The above examples of the “Attic standard zone” as well as the modern European Union prove this point.
Author’s note: first published in Georgia Today
Prospects of Armenia-Turkey Rapprochement
Potential Armenia-Turkey rapprochement could have a major influence on South Caucasus geopolitics. The opening of the border would allow Turkey to have a better connection with Azerbaijan beyond the link it already has with the Nakhchivan exclave. Moscow will not be entirely happy with the development as it would allow Yerevan to diversify its foreign policy and decrease dependence on Russia in economy. The process nevertheless is fraught with troubles as mutual distrust and the influence of the third parties could complicate the nascent rapprochement.
Over the past month Armenian and Turkish officials exchanged positive statements which signaled potential rapprochement between the two historical foes. For instance, the Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan said that he was ready for reconciliation with Turkey “without preconditions.” “Getting back to the agenda of establishing peace in the region, I must say that we have received some positive public signals from Turkey. We will assess these signals, and we will respond to positive signals with positive signals,” the PM stated. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Ankara could work towards gradual normalization if Yerevan “declared its readiness to move in this direction.”
On a more concrete level Armenia has recently allowed Turkish Airlines to fly to Baku directly over Armenia. More significantly, Armenia’s recently unveiled five-year government action plan, approved by Armenia’s legislature, states that “Armenia is ready to make efforts to normalize relations with Turkey.” Normalization, if implemented in full, would probably take the form of establishing full-scale diplomatic relations. More importantly, the five-year plan stresses that Armenia will approach the normalization process “without preconditions” and says that establishing relations with Turkey is in “the interests of stability, security, and the economic development of the region.”
So far it has been just an exchange of positive statements, but the frequency nevertheless indicates that a certain trend is emerging. This could lead to intensive talks and possibly to improvement of bilateral ties. The timing is interesting. The results of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war served as a catalyzer. Though heavily defeated by Azerbaijan, Armenia sees the need to act beyond the historical grievances it holds against Turkey and be generally more pragmatic in foreign ties. In Yerevan’s calculation, the improvement of relations with Ankara could deprive Baku of some advantages. Surely, Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance will remain untouched, but the momentum behind it could decrease if Armenia establishes better relations with Turkey. The latter might not be as strongly inclined to push against Armenia as it has done so far, and specifically during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The willingness to improve the bilateral relations has been persistently expressed by Ankara over the past years. Perhaps the biggest effort was made in 2009 when the Zurich Protocols were signed leading to a brief thaw in bilateral relations. Though eventually unsuccessful (on March 1, 2018, Armenia announced the cancellation of the protocols), Ankara has often stressed the need of improvement of ties with Yerevan without demanding preconditions.
Beyond the potential establishment of diplomatic relations, the reopening of the two countries’ border, closed from early 1990s because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Turkey’s solidarity with and military and economic support for Azerbaijan, could also be a part of the arrangement. The opening of the 300 km border running along the Armenian regions of Shirak, Aragatsotn, Armavir, and Ararat could be a game-changer. The opening up of the border is essentially an opening of the entire South Caucasus region. The move would provide Armenia with a new market for its products and businesses. In the longer term it would allow the country to diversify its economy, lessen dependence on Russia and the fragile route which goes through Georgia. The reliance on the Georgian territory could be partially substituted by Azerbaijan-Armenia-Turkey route, though it should be also stressed that the Armenia transit would need considerable time to become fully operational.
Economic and connectivity diversification equals the diminution of Russian influence in the South Caucasus. In other words, the closed borders have always constituted the basis of Russian power in the region as most roads and railways have a northward direction. For Turkey an open border with Armenia is also beneficial as it would allow a freer connection with Azerbaijan. Improving the regional links is a cornerstone of Turkey’s position in the South Caucasus. In a way, the country has acted as a major disruptor. Through its military and active economic presence Turkey opens new railways and roads, thus steadily decreasing Russian geopolitical leverage over the South Caucasus.
As mentioned, both Ankara and Yerevan will benefit from potential rapprochement. It is natural to suggest that the potential improvement between Turkey and Armenia, Russia’s trustful ally, would not be possible without Moscow’s blessing. Russia expressed readiness to help Armenia and Turkey normalize their relations, saying that would boost peace and stability in the region. “Now too we are ready to assist in a rapprochement between the two neighboring states based on mutual respect and consideration of each other’s interests,” the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, said. Yet, it is not entirely clear how the normalization would suit Russia’s interests. One possibility is that the Armenia-Turkey connection would allow Russia to have a direct land link with Turkey via Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, here too the benefits are doubtful. The route is long and will likely remain unreliable. For Russia trade with Turkey via the Black Sea will remain a primary route.
Presenting a positive picture in the South Caucasus could however be a misrepresentation of real developments on the ground. The Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is far from being guaranteed because of ingrained distrust between the two sides. Moreover, there is also the Azerbaijani factor. Baku will try to influence Ankara’s thinking lest the rapprochement goes against Azerbaijan’s interests. Moreover, as argued above, Russia too might not be entirely interested in the border opening. This makes the potential process of normalization fraught with numerous problems which could continuously undermine rapport improvement.
Thus, realism drives Turkish policy toward Armenia. Ankara needs better connections to the South Caucasus. Reliance on the Georgian transit route is critical, but diversification is no less important. The results of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war present Turkey and Armenia with an opportunity to pursue the improvement of bilateral ties. Yet, the normalization could be under pressure from external players and deep running mutual distrust. Moreover, the two sides will need to walk a tightrope as a potential blowback from nationalist forces in Turkey and Armenia can complicate the process.
Author’s note: first published in caucasuswatch
Tighter Ties with China Signal Ukraine’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy
Ukraine is eager to cut deals with China as it confronts the West’s moves to allay Russian concerns. Whether Kyiv’s moves are a sign of a larger foreign policy adjustment or just a bluff aimed to mitigate faltering ties with the EU and the US, they could beget big consequences.
On June 30, Ukraine touted an agreement with China, which proposes revamping the country’s decrepit infrastructure. The decision comes following a US-German resolution to finish the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, despite longstanding concerns of Kyiv and other CEE nations. Yet, perhaps the biggest motivation was the growing unwillingness in the West to advance Ukraine’s NATO/EU aspirations.
The current state of affairs pushes Ukraine to find alternatives in foreign policy. China, with plenty of cash and political clout, comes as an obvious choice resulting in the signing of the bilateral agreement in June. The document outlines China’s willingness to invest in railways, airports, and ports, as well as telecommunications infrastructure across Ukraine. But otherwise, the agreement details few specifics.
The available details from the deal fit comfortably into the pattern China has been following across Eurasia. For example, China signed similar deals with Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia among others, demonstrating its willingness to penetrate those states’ vital infrastructure. Still, the documents can be also characterized as an umbrella agreement that serves as a roadmap rather than an accord listing concrete details and commitments.
The China-Ukraine agreement is all the more surprising as Kyiv rebuffed earlier this year a Chinese proposal to buy a Ukrainian aerospace company, Motor Sich.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons behind the rapprochement. First and foremost, it is about Ukraine adjusting its foreign policy stance to the state of economic relations. China is now Ukraine’s biggest single-country trade partner outstripping Russia and having a 14.4 percent share of the country’s imports and 15.3 percent of its exports. Perhaps fearful of possible Chinese countermeasures over the Motor Sich decision, Kyiv has been open to mending ties with Beijing with the June agreement.
Secondly, it paves the way for a more active role in China’s near-trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims at connecting China with the European market across the heart of Eurasia. Ukraine was among the first to endorse the initiative but has avoided signing memorandums on cooperation similar to what China has done with many others.
More immediately, the tilt toward China follows Kyiv’s decision to remove its name from an international statement about human rights abuses in China’s Xinjiang. While Ukraine initially joined the initiative, together with 40 other states, Kyiv abruptly changed its mind on June 24. It has been confirmed that the withdrawal followed Chinese threats to limit trade and deny access to COVID-19 vaccines for which Ukraine had already paid.
Some larger geopolitical dynamics are also at play, such as Kyiv’s attempt to acclimate to the changing world order and the growing global competition between Beijing and Washington. In this environment, Ukraine might want to carve out an equidistant place between the two powers so as to avoid possible backlash from siding clearly with either of them.
As such, Ukraine appears to be embarking on a multi-vector foreign policy. It would allow Kyiv to alleviate its dependence on the West and seek lucrative economic and political ties with large Eurasian states. Put simply, relations with the West did not deliver on the expected benefits. The country was not offered NATO or EU accession, while the collective West’s consistent concessions to Russia undermine Ukraine’s interests. Ukraine has also often tended to look at China and other Eurasian powers from the ‘Western perspective’, which limited its options.
In Kyiv’s understanding, elimination of this obstructive dependence would enable it to find new partners able to bring in investments and ideally political support in multilateral organizations. China undoubtedly can be such a partner.
Kyiv’s calculations are more understandable when taken in view of its larger diplomatic readjustment in the region. For example, Ukraine recently began building closer relations with another Eurasian power in Turkey. When Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky visited Istanbul in April 2021, nascent bilateral military ties were seen as a new chapter in the countries’ relations. Most indicative of this shift, a memorandum was signed on the creation of joint defense-industrial projects, which includes joint development of unmanned aerial vehicles in Ukraine.
The story of Turkey could serve as a microcosm, whereby Kyiv displayed that it is more interested in balancing the pressure from Russia and mitigating the failures in its pro-Western foreign policy course. Ukraine thus foreshadowed its increasingly multi-vector foreign policy as a solution to its geopolitical problems. In Kyiv’s understanding, rapprochement with China and Turkey could mitigate threats emanating from Russia as both Beijing and Ankara enjoy closer ties with Moscow, but nonetheless consider it a competitor.
The multi-vector foreign policy for Ukraine however does not mean abandoning its pro-Western cause. It rather involves seeing its NATO/EU aspirations as complementary with the closer economic ties with China and others. It will require an agile foreign policy and leveraging the country’s geopolitical assets.
New Type of Bilateral Relations
Ukraine’s behavior might herald the birth of what could be characterized as a Eurasian model of bilateral relations. Across the continent, the notion of traditional alliances is being gradually replaced by partnerships. Devoid of formal obligations, China, Iran, Turkey and Russia find more space for interaction and see a larger pool of opportunities across the vastness of the supercontinent. Bigger maneuverability makes their foreign policy more agile in finding a common ground for cooperation.
The Eurasian model is a byproduct of an evolving global order in which each state with geopolitical influence recalibrates its foreign ties to fit into the post-unipolar world. Russia and China officially refuse to have an alliance – indeed, they claim an alliance would undermine their purportedly benevolent intentions toward one another. More specifically, the concept relates to how China sees the future world order. It opposes alliances – the ‘relic’ from the Cold War era.
Thus, the shift in Kyiv’s foreign policy could be part of this Eurasian trend where Ukraine seeks to construct its Asia policy which would better correspond to the unfolding China-US competition, Asia’s economic rise, and most of all, the failure to become a NATO or EU member state.
However, closer ties with China and most of all the dependence on Beijing’s investments also involves risks. China’s infrastructure projects are mostly financed through loans, which poorer and weaker countries are unable to repay. Often, ownership of the sites ends up in Chinese hands.
Chinese involvement in Ukraine’s critical infrastructure could also risk giving control over strategic technologies to Beijing, which would be channeled to China and successfully used to advance Chinese interests.
For Kyiv, dependence on Beijing also involves risks because of China’s close partnership with Russia. Dangers could be manifested in a concerted pressure on Ukraine in international organizations, or even China heeding Russian fears and abandoning infrastructure projects which would harm Russian interests.
The June agreement is an umbrella deal that lays out the foundation for deeper cooperation, but in no way guarantees its fulfillment. This could mean that Ukraine only sought to restore worsening bilateral relations with China following the Motor Sich saga. Alternatively, Kyiv might merely be trying to raise stakes in its stagnated relations with the West and hold Washington to account, signaling that it can successfully navigate between geopolitical poles if need be.
Author’s note: first published at chinaobservers
Ukraine’s independence: Shaping new political narratives through art
Ukraine’s 30th Independence Anniversary brings forth a discussion on forming a modern cultural identity in the wake of political instability.
Despite gaining independence 30 years ago, Ukraine is still facing consistent attacks on its sovereignty, both political and cultural. From the ongoing war with Russia in Eastern Ukraine, where 10,000 people have lost their lives since 2014, down to the root of oversimplification of Ukrainian issues in the media, Ukraine’s story is often being told by opponents attempting to distort the modern Ukrainian cultural identity.
My first-hand experience working with kids at the Ukrainian warzone has taught me a deep appreciation for cultural independence. For five years together with youngsters I wrote, directed and staged a performance piece titled ‘Contact Line’ about life at the warzone and personally witnessed the huge impact of arts and culture on the kids’ lives. This experience demonstrated that for too long Ukraine has let someone else present its identity to its youth, citizens and the world.
Shaking away the Soviet legacy
There’s no denying that the Soviet Union left a lasting legacy on Ukraine. The culture of Ukraine is to this day tainted by lingering ghosts of the Soviet past. Soviet authorities vigorously supressed the development of independent cultural identities in all the member states. In Ukraine’s case, simplistic rural folklore was imposed on society as a primary culture and was a means of suppressing creative or progressive thought. National collectives and one-dimensional traditional themes were presented as the essence of Ukrainian culture throughout the 20th century. Anyone who didn’t fit the Soviet mould was eliminated. A specific term, Executed Renaissance, is used to define a generation of Ukrainian artists who were repressed by the Soviet regime for their artistic non-conformism.
It has taken decades for Ukraine to regain its cultural voice and iron out its Soviet imprint. A key concept of postcolonial theory examines the creative resistance to the colonizers’ culture and the fraught slow development of a postcolonial identity. Ukraine has been struggling through this process for 30 years. However, since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity the country has been reimagining its culture, exploring its history and reconnecting with its identity. Ukraine is now striving to be on par with Western culture by ridding itself of remaining Soviet influences. Cultural institutions previously under government control or censorship are finding an independent voice and the population is discovering that authentic artistic expression is providing hope in difficult times.
Looking at the future
Over the past 10 years, Ukraine has witnessed a robust change in the arts sector. The cultural scene has made a significant move away from a conservative ethos to a more contemporary one. Visual arts are the most progressive form of expression in Ukraine, with cinema rapidly catching up. Ukrainian filmmakers are winning awards at the Cannes Film Festival and Ukrainian artists are receiving praise at La Biennale di Venezia. The expectation is that this trend will not only magnify in the coming years, but also position Ukrainian artists as global creative trailblazers.
Despite ballet being an extremely politicised art form during the Soviet period, it is now going through a revival and modernisation. The Ukrainain school of ballet is gaining recognition as one of the world’s best and Ukrainian ballet dancers are headlining the top ballet companies across the globe, showcasing their immense talent and training. British audiences will have an opportunity to watch the best Ukrainian ballet dancers from the world’s top theatres come together for a one-off unique performance at Sadler’s Wells Theatre in London on September 7th.
Georgian-American ballet choreographer George Balanchine famously said, “Ballet will speak for itself,” and the artform remains a true demonstration of the universal language of dance. The Ukrainian Ballet Gala will be a showcase of the innovation and traditions of the contemporary Ukrainian ballet school.
Global cultural promotion
In a globalised world it’s the wish of every country to promote and engage in cultural exchanges, and Ukraine is very much part of this movement. Ukraine wants to be an active player on the world stage, both politically and culturally, and to be a dynamic culture creator, particularly in Europe. Trust in soft diplomacy is growing and Ukraine’s international relations and diplomacy are benefiting from this trend.
As a Ukrainian-born and British-educated theatre producer and director I appreciate the importance of bringing the best of Ukrainian culture to the world not just for Ukraine’s benefit, but to enrich global culture and share experiences through creative means. It is the job of people like me and my colleagues to tell Ukraine’s story through art and, thus, shape new political narratives about Ukraine internationally. We want to share our rich culture with the world and events, such as the Ukrainian Ballet Gala, are key to achieving this.
Ukrainians are now left with no choice but to stride forward – no outside force should ever again control the vibrant culture of Ukraine.
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