The presence of foreign forces in the Persian Gulf has caused regional security efforts to secure the interests of these powers.
The security policy of countries stems from how their ruling elites understand the concepts of “threats” and “security issues” and “how to deal with threats”.
The security policy in the Persian Gulf has not gone its natural course throughout history and due to the presence of foreign countries in the region, the balance of natural forces has not been formed.
Former CIA agent Graham E, Fuller has confirmed this in his book “The Center of the Universe.”
This has made regional struggles to be based on the interests of foreign countries. Suppose, for example, that Iran and Saudi Arabia decide to normalize relations tomorrow, will regional powers allow Riyadh to do so? On the other hand, does Saudi Arabia’s understanding of Iran as a threat merely serve Riyadh’s interests or Washington’s?
This example illustrates how the presence of foreign powers in the region is effective and fundamental in how the regional actors perceive the concept of threat and the ways to deal with it.
To understand this issue better, we take a look at the common categories in security theories that fall into two sections.
The first one is based on a realistic approach that offers a narrow interpretation of security. In other words, in this approach, the issue of security is considered a “military” concept which means that the definition of security is based on “military threats.”
In the realist approach, in addition to the narrow definition of security in the subject area, we see a limited interpretation of the purpose of the security reference. According to this view, “government” is the only source of security. Under the realistic approach, the three approaches of “collective defense” manifested in NATO, “collective security” manifested in the United Nations, “Concert Security” manifested in the nineteenth-century European concert can be identified.
Other categories of regional security approaches that have a broader view of security include the three general approaches of “shared security”, “comprehensive or all-encompassing security”, and “cooperation-based security.” This category has a broad view of security, and non-governmental actors are targeted by the security authorities and on the other hand, security is not purely military.
The model pursued by the Arab Gulf states is based on a realistic approach to security, which is a narrow interpretation of it.
In this model, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf are focused on “external balancing” and mainly have security agreements with countries such as the United States, France, Britain, and Turkey, and have recognized NATO’s presence on the basis of the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative”.
Needless to say, the plan relies on foreign powers on the one hand and military and government-centered understanding of security on the other. That is, while arms purchases provide advanced military equipment to these countries, they misunderstand the concept of real security that should protect people.
In other words, when the military expenditures of these countries are compared with the level of their economic and political development, we see a kind of imbalance. This issue is noted in the United Nations Human Development Report on Arab countries.
Based on this, it can be seen that regional security campaigns, do not protect people and just provide artificial stability by providing security for the ruling elites.
Meanwhile, Iran has presented various security plans. The “Regional Dialogue Forum” and the “Non-Aggression Pact” are among the security plans for the Persian Gulf region, which have been elaborated in detail by the government of Hassan Rouhani and the Iranian Foreign Minister Dr. Zarif.
Following these plans, Iran presented the “Hormuz Peace Endeavour (HOPE)” to the United Nations, which has theoretically distanced itself from the idealism of past plans and has moved towards a kind of realism based on regional relations.
Iran has repeatedly stated that regional security should only be provided by regional countries and that extra-regional powers should leave the region, however, The Islamic Republic defines a mechanism for this issue based on the “Hurmoz Peace Endeavour (HOPE).”
It should be noted that security plans should take into account the realities and concerns of all countries, and there should be a serious effort to make them operational.
Therefore, relying on projects that do not include the interests of all the regional countries is purely useless and will increase mistrust.
Although the Hormuz Peace Endeavour (HOPE) is based on regional reality, it has not yet been accepted by key actors in the region, including Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
In contrast, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates have increased insecurity in the region by participating in the US-European coalition. This complexity further serves the interests of extra-regional powers, and the countries of the region will not benefit from it in the long run.
Accordingly, Iran has always stated that foreign countries should leave the region, and the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced on Wednesday that “the United States should know this Gulf is called the Persian Gulf and not the Gulf of New York or Washington.”
How the regional countries can withdraw from military and security agreements with foreign powers when they mistrust each other? The answer is that they should create an atmosphere of mutual trust in the region and do not consider one other as a threat.
But what is the mechanism for this?
The Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) model, proposed before the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), could be a good model.
In fact, the 1975 Helsinki Accords led to the formation of the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and later the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
The Helsinki Accord was the beginning of a process in which NATO members and Warsaw, along with neutral European countries, could sit together without preconditions and discuss their security concerns.
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe is based on principles such as respect for sovereignty, avoiding the use of force, respect for borders and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes and avoiding interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It allowed members to sit around a table and discuss security concerns and find the necessary solutions.
If we want to adopt the CSCE model, we need to hold a number of meetings in which all the parties can discuss their security issues as well as their solutions.
Finally, some measures must be taken in order to build trust between the members such as holding meetings or establishing organizations to find solutions for the regional disputes. Ultimately, when mutual trust is built, a mechanism can be used to sign arms control agreements. This will fundamentally help the security and stability of the region.
The result of this action can be a temporary process or a permanent organization that has specific agendas and there is frequent contact between the members.
Members of this security framework must first ensure that issues are not resolved through war and that they must not interfere in each other’s internal affairs. The security framework should be based on the “Security Complex” model proposed by Barry Buzan, which focuses solely on the security of the Persian Gulf and members will not apply it for other security issues.
Following this mechanism could, in the long run, put an end to the presence of foreign countries in the regional security and defeat projects such as Iranophobia that aims at plundering the region’s resources. Mutual perception of threats and a common approach to how to deal with them is one of the main prerequisites for this mechanism.
From our partner Tehran Times
Qatar punctures FIFA’s political fantasy
If the Qatar World Cup proved anything, it’s that sports and politics are inseparable Siamese twins joined at the hip.
Politics popped up at every twist of the World Cup’s road, whether related to the right of freedom of expression of players, sports commentators and fans; anti-government protests in Iran; anti-Israeli sentiment among Qataris and Arabs; a backlash against Western, particularly German, critics of Qatar; or ultra-conservative religious rejection of soccer as a sport.
Qatari efforts to stage manage the intrusion of regional politics ranged from picking and choosing which protests fit its foreign policy agenda to seeking to ensure, where possible, that events elsewhere in the region would not overshadow or inflame passions during the World Cup.
Palestine is a case in point.
Amid escalating violence between Israelis and Palestinians, Mohammad al-Emadi, the Qatari official handling Hamas, the Islamist group that controls the Gaza Strip, travelled to the region to ensure that it and Islamic Jihad, another Gaza-based organization, would not respond with rockets to Israeli use of lethal force against Palestinian militants on the West Bank.
Qatar feared that a response to last week’s killing of an Islamic Jihad commander on the West Bank and near-nightly Israeli raids could spark a renewed Israeli intervention in Gaza, already crippled by a 15-year-long Israeli-Egyptian blockade.
The Qatari pressure puts in a different perspective the Gulf state’s endorsement of expressions of support for the Palestinians during the World Cup in the form of pro-Palestinian flags and T-shirts and a refusal by Qatari and Arab fans to engage with Israeli reporters covering the tournament.
Despite refusing to follow in the footsteps of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan in recognizing Israel without a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Qatar has a long-standing working relationship with the Jewish state that serves the interests of both countries.
The Gulf state, often at Israel’s request, has pumped millions of dollars into paying government salaries in Gaza, providing aid to thousands of families affected by past wars, and funding fuel for the Strip’s power plant as well as infrastructure projects.
Moreover, Qatar became the first Gulf state to put money into Israel when it funded in 2006 a six-million-dollar stadium in the predominantly Israeli Palestinian town of Sakhnin, an investment long before the UAE-led Arab recognition of the Jewish state 14 years later.
Sakhnin and the Doha Stadium are home to Bnei Sakhnin, Israel’s most successful Israeli-Palestinian club.
As a result, allowing expressions of pro-Palestinian sentiment during the World Cup served multiple Qatari purposes.
It gave a release valve to Qataris, a minority in their own country, who were concerned about the impact on their society of the government’s live-and-let-live approach towards soccer fans with very different cultural values visiting their country during the World Cup.
Preventing fans from taking pro-LGBT paraphernalia such as One Love and rainbow-coloured armbands and shirts into stadiums served a similar purpose.
It also allowed Qataris to vent their frustration at perceived double standards in European and American criticism of Qatar’s rejection of LGBT rights, particularly after the German team’s hands-over-mouth gesture in protest against FIFA’s denial of their right to wear pro-LGBT armbands.
In one instance, Qataris wore pro-Palestinian armbands of their own to a match as a protest against the donning of a pro-LGBT One Love band by German Interior Minister Nancy Faeser, who attended the game.
Expressions of pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli sentiment also suggested that Qatar’s refusal to recognise Israel was more in line with Arab public opinion than efforts to project the UAE-led recognition of the Jewish state as genuinely popular and indicative of a drop in support for the Palestinian cause.
If anything, recent polls show that public support for establishing diplomatic relations with Israel had fallen across the Arab and Muslim world, including in countries that normalized their ties to the Jewish state.
In Bahrain, 20 per cent of the population supports the accords, compared with 45 per cent in 2020, according to a Washington Institute for Near East Policy poll in July. Support in Saudi Arabia fell from 41 to 19 per cent. Even in the UAE, where normalisation had the greatest impact, support dropped to 25 per cent this year from 47 per cent in 2020.
For Qatari World Cup managers, Palestine was low-hanging fruit. Protest against the government in Tehran was a far trickier challenge.
A regional behemoth, Iran is a partner as well as a potential threat with which Qatar shares the world’s largest offshore gas field.
Maintaining relations with Iran has allowed Qatar, at times, to be a background mediator with the United States on issues like the moribund talks to revive the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement.
Qatar feared that allowing stadiums to become venues of confrontation between opponents and supporters of the Iranian government could have persuaded Iran to rank the Gulf state, alongside Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States, as an instigator of sustained anti-government protests in which security forces have killed hundreds.
As a result, Qatar sought to prevent anti-government banners, T-shirts, and pre-revolution flags from entering stadia. The problem resolved itself when Iran was knocked out of the World Cup in the group stage.
Yet, the larger issue remains. The Qatar World Cup demonstrates that FIFA’s insistence that sports and politics can be separated amounts to a political fantasy.
More concerning than that, it enables FIFA and autocratic World Cup hosts like Qatar to decide what are convenient and inconvenient expressions of politics. That hardly makes for a level playing field, the starting point for any sport.
The challenges lie ahead Ankara’s decision to normalize relations with Cairo and Damascus
Although Egypt and Syria are at the bottom of the list of states with which Turkey intends to reconcile, the 10-year conflict with the two mentioned countries, which is accompanied by conflict and bloodshed in Syria, is on the verge of ending, and Turkey’s relations with Egypt and Syria are returning to normal.
Of course, the recent progress is due to the efforts of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey; Especially after the negotiators failed to close the last case of incompatibility between the two sides. The process of reconciliation began in 2021, in the city of Al-Ala in Saudi Arabia, and since then, Cairo and Ankara continued to strive and innovate in order to achieve reconciliation and compromise, and finally achieved positive and significant results.
However, the reconciliation between the two states was not at the leadership level; Until Qatar provided the ground for the meeting of Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi and Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Doha during the opening ceremony of the World Cup. The sitting of the Secretary General of the United Nations between the presidents of the two countries was not aimed at keeping them away from each other, and it seems that the Egyptians and the Turks had prepared for this occasion a few weeks ago, and the opening ceremony of the World Cup was held as a tribute to the mediation of Qatar, as the appointment was selected.
Regardless of political compliments, the reconciliation of Egypt and Turkey is very important; Because the continuation of tension between the two countries can lead to many risky developments. Relations between Egypt and Turkey became strained after the overthrow of the government of Mohamed Morsi in 2013. At that time, it became clear to political observers that this inconsistency will last for a long time and will not end soon; Especially since the late president of Egypt tried to run his country with the mentality of a one party rule. For this reason, the solidarity of the angry protesters with the security institutions played a central role in changing the situation in this state and marked the end of the Muslim Brotherhood government. Then, the Muslim Brotherhood made Istanbul its alternative capital and began its plans and efforts to return to power from there. This caused a crisis in the relations between Egypt and Turkey, and with the passage of time, the incompatibility between the two states increased.
However, in the past year and a half, the governments of Turkey and Egypt have held several meetings in order to resolve the dispute and end the disputed cases, and they were able to achieve significant successes in terms of security and media. Ankara more or less stopped the activity of the Egyptian opposition in Turkish territory, but the reconciliation between the two sides was not complete and the disagreement over how to manage the Libyan war crisis and the dispute over territorial waters in the Mediterranean remained unresolved.
In the case of Libya, Turkey supports one side of the conflict and Egypt supports the other side. Libya plays a vital role for Egypt in terms of security, and it is an important market for Turkey in terms of economy. In addition, Libya has many debts to pay to Turkey since the Gaddafi government.
On the other hand, after the discovery of gas fields in the Mediterranean waters, which are believed to contain a large amount of energy, there was a dispute between Egypt, Turkey and Greece over territorial waters in the Mediterranean, and the aforementioned states have not been able to find a solution to overcome this challenge.
The issue of ending the tension between Egypt and Turkey is very important, because achieving this goal may help end the war in Libya, and this in itself is reason enough to be optimistic about the current efforts for reconciliation between the two states. However, the price of this reconciliation will be paid by the opposition affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood outside of Egypt.
Of course, the path of reconciliation between Damascus and Ankara is extremely chaotic and risky. It is so difficult to reach the stage of reconciliation between the two states that, according to Erdogan, if he himself goes to Damascus, he will not be able to find a quick solution to end this complex crisis. Turkey and Syria have been fighting indirectly for more than 10 years. In addition, several military powers, including the forces of the Islamic Republic, Russia, the United States, foreign militias, the remnants of ISIS and Al-Qaeda, the separatist Kurds of Turkey, and the Syrian armed opposition continue to invade Syria.
Meanwhile, the inability of Damascus to control parts of the Syrian territory has created a power vacuum in different parts of the country. Millions of Syrian refugees live abroad; In addition, millions of other citizens who have been forced to leave their homes have sought refuge in areas far from the war and are still displaced.
Therefore, any solution that is presented to end the crisis should consider the above points. Currently, all sides want the war in Syria to end, but the path to achieving this goal remains elusive.
Protest emerges as a mixed blessing for World Cup host Qatar
Protest on the soccer pitch has proven to be a mixed blessing for World Cup host Qatar, exposing double standards in the Gulf state’s position as well as that of its critics.
Qatar embraced protest when it supported Qatari policies, such as the Gulf state’s increasingly assertive denunciation of double standards in Western criticism of discrimination against LGBT people or its refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Israel in the absence of a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
However, protesters and foreign media quickly encountered the limits of Qatari tolerance and notions of freedom of expression when they touched on politically sensitive issues, ranging from support for LGBT rights to solidarity with demonstrators in Iran, who have defied a brutal crackdown by security forces in more than two months of anti-government manifestations.
As a result, the debate on double standards at times amounted to the kettle calling the pot black.
That is not to question the legitimacy of criticism levelled by Qatar and its critics at each other. However, it is to note that both parties’ credibility is in question because of their inconsistencies and failures to put their own houses in order.
“On one level, the World Cup is unfolding smoothly. On another, we go from crisis to crisis,” said a journalist covering the tournament for a major Western news organisation.
Photographers were often on the frontline as Qatari authorities stopped them from snapping pictures of security forces preventing fans from wearing clothing to matches or taking into stadiums paraphernalia that signalled support for Iranian protesters or LGBT rights.
‘The real test case will be when the United States plays Iran. That could be the crescendo in the clash over what protesters and media can and cannot do,” said another journalist.
The November 29 match is likely the World Cup’s most politically charged game, with talks to revive the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic republic’s nuclear programme all but dead and Iraq-mediated negotiations with archrival Saudi Arabia suspended.
Iran accuses the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel of inciting the sustained anti-government protests.
The US Soccer Federation joined the fray with Iran ahead of the two nations’ World Cup match when it briefly displayed Iran’s national flag on social media without the emblem of the Islamic Republic, saying the move was in support of protesters in Iran.
Iran accused the federation of removing the name of God from their national flag and said it would complain to FIFA. However, US Soccer later restored the Islamic republic’s flag on social media.
Meanwhile, Qatari nationals, intending to protest against Western double standards in criticism of the Gulf state, didn’t encounter problems entering the stadium to watch Germany’s group stage match against Spain.
During the game, Qataris displayed pictures of former German national team player Mesut Özil, a German-born descendant of Turkish immigrants, while covering their mouths in protest against German double standards.
Mr. Özil quit the German team after becoming a target of racist abuse and a scapegoat for Germany’s early World Cup exit in 2018.
The Qatari demonstration was in response to Germany’s team covering their mouths at a group photo in advance of an earlier match against Japan in protest against FIFA president Gianni Infantino’s banning players from wearing One Love bands during games.
In the same vein, prominent Qataris wore pro-Palestinian armbands to the Germany Japan match to counter the pro-LGBT One Love band sported by German Interior Minister Nancy Faeser during the game.
Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, signalled the Gulf state’s greater assertiveness in countering criticism when he lamented some three weeks before the kickoff of the World Cup that Qatar had been “subjected to an unprecedented campaign,” scrutiny, and scorn “that no host country has faced.”
In an indication that human rights, labour, and LGBT groups may be losing leverage, the emir said that “we initially dealt with the matter in good faith, and even considered some of criticism as positive and useful… (But) it soon became clear that the campaign tends to continue and expand to include fabrications and double standards that were so ferocious that it has unfortunately prompted many people to question real reasons and motives behind this campaign.”
The critics’ problem is their past failure to tackle with equal ferocity issues of human rights, prejudice, and bigotry in the run-up to the 2018 Russian World Cup, as well as to separate the wheat from the chafe by distancing themselves from criticism of Qatar that was laced with bias and racism.
In doing so, critics are as much their own worst enemy as they have been drivers of social change in Qatar.
By allowing Qatar to deflect criticism by calling into question critics’ credibility, activists have enabled the Gulf state to take its counteroffensive to the next level.
A week into the World Cup, Qatar was reviewing, according to the Financial Times, its substantial investments in London after the city’s transport authority suspended advertising from the Gulf state because of the controversies over worker and LGBT rights.
Qatari investments include London’s landmark Harrods department store; The Shard, an iconic 72-storey skyscraper; and Canary Wharf, part of the city’s central business district. Qatar also owns Chelsea Barracks, the Savoy and Grosvenor House hotels, 22 per cent of Sainsbury’s supermarkets, six per cent of Barclays bank, and 20 per cent of Heathrow airport.
“Countries like…Qatar…view their investments as strategic bribes to mute criticism and resist reforms,” said Radha Stirling, a London-based lawyer who represents expatriates in the Gulf who run into legal difficult
To be fair, Qatar was one of 11 countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia that were banned in 2019 from advertising by Transport for London on the grounds of human rights violations. Nevertheless, the agency allowed some Qatari advertising promoting the Gulf state as a tourist destination until last week’s World Cup kickoff, when it decided to implement the ban fully.
Even so, the list reinforced the notion of double standards by failing to include China at the height of its brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims in the northwestern province of Xinjiang; Russia that was annexing Ukrainian territory, repressing LGBT people, and attempting to assassinate its critics at home and abroad; and Israel with its increasingly racial policies towards Palestinians.
Qatar is likely to be the first of numerous rights-focussed Middle Eastern battlegrounds, with countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt hosting or preparing bids to host multiple major sporting events, including Asian Cup competitions, the 2030 World Cup, and the 2036 Summer Olympics.
The bids constitute a rich and legitimate hunting ground for human, worker, and LBGT rights activists. However, their effectiveness will, to a significant extent, depend on their ability to put their own house in order.
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