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Eastern Europe

Time to re-think about Eastern Partnership?

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Azerbaijan is reluctant to actively participate in the EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative.It is the only country in the South Caucasus region that still engages with the EU through the outdated Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in the late 1990s. Although the parties have been negotiating on a new treaty since 2017, there are still indifferences that hinder the progress. Until recently, the incumbents in Azerbaijan appeared confident about the overall process and chose not to rush to conclude the new agreement before they resolve all controversies.

In his last interview with the local journalists in December 2019, President Aliyev highlighted that the main reason for not signing the agreement is not the EU but Azerbaijan. There he commented on the unresolved issues and emphasized one more time that Azerbaijan is not asking for anything from the EU. On the contrary, Azerbaijan itself is a donor country. Thus,it expects equal partnership, not a unilateral instruction list from the EU. Going further, he criticized the EaP format, saying nothing is uniting EaP members except being post-soviet countries.His final remarks on EaP were more disappointing for the technocrats in Brussels when he said Azerbaijan is not leaving EaP, but it is not a necessary program for us.

When Aliyev gave the interview, he could not foresee that all hell might break loose soon. The indicators that made him confidently downgrade EaP and the EU might suddenly evaporate. Actually, the forecasts by the World Bank and other organizations about the growth of the Azerbaijan economy in 2020 were quite optimistic – around 3.3 %. According to the latest estimates, the number of tourists coming to the country would be at its peak in 2020 thanks to, at the same time, the major international events- Formula 1 and European Football Championship. To facilitate the arrivals of the fans and to attract more tourists, Azerbaijan activated the fifth and seventh freedoms of the air from January 2020. The price of the oil was around 60 dollars per barrel, and the completion of the Southern Gas corridors would bring additional revenues from the gas trade. Besides, after the structural reforms, Azerbaijan was ranked 25th in terms “Ease of Doing Business’ by the World Bank what made the officials optimistic about increased foreign direct investments in upcoming years in different sectors, especially transport and logistics.

And here comes COVID-19. The pandemic hits the entire world and slows down the global economic activities. The demand for oil goes down dramatically. In March,Russian and Saudi Arabian gambling amid OPEC+ talks slumps the oil price further. WTI crude oil futures collapse to negative prices for the first time in history.

Nowadays,the Azerbaijani oil brand – AzerLight is circa $ 20per barrel. According to  Rovshan Agayev,if the average price fluctuates around $25 compared to 2019, Azerbaijan will receive 5 times less revenue from the sale of the oil in 2020. The earnings from tourism and agriculture also will significantly go down. The global recession and so-called de-globalization put Azerbaijan’s heavily invested connectivity projects under the risk.

Taken, the significant portion of Azerbaijan GDP comes from the export of the hydrocarbon resources,as soon as oil prices slumped, panic ensued. Traumatized by the devaluations of 2014 and 2015, people rushed to exchange their savings. As the banks were not able to meet unexpectedly grown demands for foreign currencies, big rows emerged in front of the banks. Although there were strict quarantine measures in Azerbaijan due to COVID-19, since mid-march, the banks are full of people. The recent closure of the four banks proves the panic is not ungrounded.

Currently, Azerbaijan uses its own resources and capacities to handle the situation.  To do so, the government expends the reserves accumulated in the oil fund to keep the national currency – manat stable. Yet, in a worst-case scenario, Azerbaijan also will need assistance from its international partners. But the number of partners, capable of and ready to assist Azerbaijan is limited. Besides, the pandemic puts extra pressure on international financial institutions, as many countries require urgent assistance.

Unusually nowadays, with its flaws and deficiencies, the most active actor in the South Caucasus is the EU. It seems the EU tries to use the momentum to exert its global leadership. Conventionally it takes a lot of time for the EU to agree upon at various institutional levels before taking action. This time the EU’s response was relatively prompt. In late March, the EU pledged about 16-billion-euro assistance in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic and its consequences. Later the “Team Europe” package reached more than 20 billion euros.

The EU has the utmost interest in the resilience of the neighborhood countries, including Azerbaijan. The EU mentions this in all documents addressing neighborhood, such as revised ENP, Global Strategy, and many others. In the recent “Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020” proposal, the EU confirms again that the resilience of EaP countries remains a priority for the EU. According to the proposal, the EU will continue to employ the incentive-based approach – more for more and less for less- to contribute to EaP’s resilience. Put it differently, the degree of the EU’s engagement with EaP countries will contingent on incentives coming from them.

The EU’s emergency support package for Eastern Partnership countries in early April shows the ‘more for more principle’ at work.  The EaP countries having association and enhanced agreements with the EU receivegenerous aid while Azerbaijan gets the smallest portion- 14 million euros. This number is even four times less than the amount given to Belarus. It is a tribute paid to Azerbaijan leadership’s attitude towards the EU and EaP.

To mitigate the negative repercussions of the pandemic, Azerbaijan will need assistance from the EU. Practice shows the EU could mobilize investments and loans when required. In case of an emergency, Azerbaijan might also ask the EU  to do so. Besides, in the long run, the EU’sinstruments and know-how might be helpful for Azerbaijan in its much-needed diversification endeavor and structural reforms.

Taken, the EU recently revised its neighborhood policy, and EaP is much more flexible and tailor-made nowadays, there is a great potential for cooperation, especially in fields of sustainable development, energy, transport, and logistics.  Thus, rather than downgrading the EU and praising Azerbaijan’s strategic partnerships with nine EU members, Azerbaijan should use those countries to improve its collaboration with the EU.

To sum, although Azerbaijan is not happy about it, the technocrats in Brussels are not willing to devise an alternative framework to collaborate with Azerbaijan. Whether Azerbaijan likes it or not, for the EU, Azerbaijan is an Eastern Partnership country. It means the EU will continue to regulate its cooperation with Azerbaijan according to the policy documents designed for EaP and the principles defined in them.Thus, to secure future assistance from the EU to lessen the consequences of the pandemic, Azerbaijan should avoid employing unnecessary rhetoric and accommodate the current EaP framework rather than wasting time to alter it.

More meaningful and reciprocally beneficial cooperation is still possible in the margins of the current EaP. Resolving the indifference sand replacing the outdated PCA with a new agreement in a due time might be the right policy to achieve this.In its turn, the EU should also encourage Azerbaijan to -change its attitude towards EaP through real actions on the ground – by demonstrating objectives defined in EaP documents are not empty promises, and the EU genuinely stands with Azerbaijan.

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Eastern Europe

Thorny path towards peace and reconciliation in Karabakh

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On January 11 the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a deal to develop cross-border transportation routes and boost economic growth to benefit the South Caucasus and the Wider Region. This meeting took place two months after the Moscow-brokered armistice between Armenia and Azerbaijan ended a 44-day war over Nagorno-Karabakh.

This ethno-territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has drawn dividing lines between Armenia and Azerbaijan for almost 30 years. Some estimates put the number of deaths on both sides at 30,000 after the First Karabakh war before a ceasefire was reached in May 1994. As a result of this war, one fifth of the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan was occupied and the entire Azerbaijani population of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) and seven adjacent districts (Lachin, Kalbajar, Agdam, Fizuly, Jabrail, Gubatli and Zangilan) was forcibly expelled by the Armenian armed forces. Incidentally, due to sporadic frontline skirmishes and clashes, both military personnel and civilians have been killed along the Line of Contact, devoid of any peacekeeping force, since 1994.

Over the years, Armenia and the separatist regime that emerged in the occupied Azerbaijani territories refused any final status short of independence for Nagorno-Karabakh and tried to preserve this status quo and achieve international security guarantees on the non-resumption of hostilities while avoiding the withdrawal of its armed forces from the occupied territories and preventing the safe return of expelled Azerbaijani inhabitants to their permanent places of residence. However, such a policy, in its turn, polarized the region and reduced to naught any meaningful regional cooperation between the three South Caucasus states.

The Second Karabakh war, which took place from September 27 to November 9, 2020, and the subsequent Russia-brokered peace deal on November 10, significantly changed the facts on the ground and created a new political reality that replaced the “no war, no peace” situation that had been hanging over the region for almost 30 years. As a result of this war, more than 6,000 soldiers died on both sides in fighting.

This war came to an end because of a clear victory for Azerbaijan, which has restored its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Owing to the humiliating defeat of Armenia,the myth of the invincibility of the Armenian armed forces has been shattered and the Prime Minister of this country has been under continuous pressure from the opposition to step down.

Thus, after the Second Karabakh war, the pendulum has swung from devastating war towards actual peace. The question, is, however, whether the conflicting parties will be able to achieve lasting peace in the coming years: How can a relationship that has been completely destroyed owing to this protracted armed conflict and previous wars be restored?

The fate of all inhabitants of both the highlands and lowlands of Karabakh, irrespective of their ethnic origin, is crucial in this context. Security arrangements for the Armenian minority residing in this area are currently organized through the deployment of 1,960 Russian peacekeepers for at least five years to monitor the implementation of the trilateral statement signed by the heads of state of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Russian Federation on November 10 (hereafter, the trilateral statement). At the same time, the return of the former Azerbaijani inhabitants to their permanent places of residence previously occupied by the Armenian armed forces is envisaged by the trilateral statement and the UNHCR has been assigned to oversee this task.

It is paramount that Azerbaijan has to demonstrate a policy of “strategic patience” in the coming years to entice the Armenians of Karabakh region into closer incorporation through attractive political, economic, social, and other development.

On the other hand, Armenia has to concentrate on its own internationally recognized sovereign territory. Today, it is important that this country changes its external minority policy and withdraws its territorial claims against Azerbaijan. As a next step, both Armenia and Azerbaijan can recognize the territorial integrity of one other.

Such rapprochement can lead to the opening of the borders between Armenia and Turkey and Armenia and Azerbaijan, which would increase economic opportunities for landlocked Armenia. It can thereby contribute to regional stability, development, and trans-regional cooperation among the three South Caucasian states. At the same time, it would create an enabling environment that could be more conducive for future dialogue and interactions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

We must face the fact that a stable equilibrium between these two nations has never previously been achieved. However, despite ups and downs, there was peaceful coexistence between the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in Karabakh as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan’s respective minorities in Azerbaijan and Armenia. This protracted conflict has, however, led Armenians and Azerbaijanis to live in parallel realities for almost 30 years.

In light of the recent past, we cannot soon reconcile our different narratives. It is a long process; however, reconciliation is not only an outcome, it is also a process. Although the gestation period might be long, the process of reconciliation itself can be extremely rewarding.

In fact, the Armenian and Azerbaijani inhabitants of Karabakh have lived together in this region in the past. However, for almost 30 years this was impossible. Will and determination should be put to good use in order to arrive at such a peaceful coexistence once again.

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Eastern Europe

Dawn of great power competition in South Caucasus

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The pace of geopolitical change in the South Caucasus is staggering, with the recent Karabakh war only underlining several major geopolitical trends in the region.

The first noticeable trend being the undercutting of democratic ideals and achievements of the region’s states. Take Armenia, its young democracy had high hopes following the 2018 revolution, but now it will be more even more dependent on Russia.

It is not a matter of whether a democratic model is better or not, the matter lies in the incompatibility of an aspiring democracy with a powerful nondemocracy such as Russia.

The Armenian leadership will now have to make extensive concessions to Moscow to shore up its military, backtracking on its democratic values. Building a fair political system cannot go hand in hand with the Russian political model.

The war also put an end to any hopes of Armenia implementing a multivector foreign policy, an already highly scrutinized issue. Mistakes were made continuously along the way, the biggest being an overreliance on Russia.

In the buildup to 2020, Armenia’s multiaxial foreign policy efforts gradually deteriorated, with the 2016 fighting showing the limits. Armenian politicians attempted to develop ties with other regional powers in the aftermath, but Russian influence had already begun to incrementally increase.

Tipping the scales in a no longer balanced alliance culminated in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan thanks to Yerevan’s maneuvering. More crucially, the war has obliterated Yerevan’s multiaxial policy efforts for years to come.

Now, Armenia’s dependence on Russia would be even more pronounced with no viable geopolitical alternatives.

With no more foreign policy diversification, the three South Caucasus states are divided by larger regional powers, further fracturing the region.

The return of Turkey and the growth of the Russian military could resurrect the great power competition, in which a nation’s military power, infrastructure projects and economic might are directly translated into their geopolitical influence over the region, ultimately deterring long-term conflict resolution.

The Western stance

The Karabakh war highlighted a regression in Western peacekeeping standards. The Western approach to conflict resolution based on equality rather than geopolitical interests has been trumped by the Russian alternative.

Moscow is not looking to resolve the conflict (it never does in territorial conflicts); instead, it is seeking to prolong it under its close watch in a bid to increase its influence.

Looking at the situation from the Russian perspective, it is clear the country will continue to influence Armenia and Azerbaijan, only now to a far greater extent than before.

The West’s inability to accommodate fluid geopolitical realities in the South Caucasus also raises questions about its commitment to resolving the issues at hand. The second Karabakh war was in a way a by-product of the West’s declining engagement in the region over the past several years.

The West can no longer treat the South Caucasus as a monolithic entity, and a diversified foreign policy should be applied in line with realities on the ground.

Policies should reflect each individual state, and the West should, perhaps, be more geopolitical in its approach.

Turkey’s recent suggestion to create a six-nation pact bringing together the South Caucasus states, Russia, Turkey and Iran, shows the regression of Western influence in the region. But the geopolitical vacuum is never empty for long, and Turkey and Russia approach.

Georgia’s position

Georgia could act as the last bastion of dominant Western influence, but even there, the West should be cautious. The country is on the cusp of Europe, making it susceptible to foreign influence.

Bordered by Russia and Turkey, two powers often discerning of Europe, Georgia also feels the pressure to adapt to the changing circumstances on the ground.

The lack of Western resolve in the region and the Black Sea could propel Tbilisi if not toward a total reconsideration of its foreign policy, toward diversifying its foreign ties – one could call a “rebalancing.”

The war also solidified that the Caspian basin and South Caucasus are inextricably linked to the greater Middle East.

Russia and Turkey are basing their strategies in the region on developments in the Middle East and the Black Sea region. Not since the end of the Soviet Union has the South Caucasus been such a critical point for the West, especially the incoming Biden administration.

But time is critical and any further delay in active U.S. policy could spell disaster for Georgia, which serves as a door to the Caspian and on to Central Asia.

The West has been in regression in the region for quite some time now; the Karabakh war only brought it to the light, and it must be proactive if things are to change.

Much will depend on the U.S. and its new administration, but the West will have to come to an understanding with Turkey, even if it be limited, to salvage its deteriorating position in the region.

After all, the South Caucasus has always been the only theater where Turkish and Western interests have always coincided. Considering its limited presence in the region, the West could consider backing Turkey.

Not only would it serve as a reconciliatory gesture pleasing Ankara, but it would also limit Russia’s movement in the region. With the ink about to dry on who will influence the region, the West must immediately adapt its approach if it wishes to have any input in the rapidly changing geopolitics of the South Caucasus.

Author’s note: first published in dailysabah

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Eastern Europe

An Impending Revolution

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Large crowds have demonstrated their anger at the results of the presidential election in Belarus. Photo: Kseniya Halubovich

Even on the end note, the year contains surprises enough to deem it as a year of instability and chaos given every nook and cranny around the globe is riddled with a new crisis every day. Latest down in the tally is the country of Belarus that has hardly streamlined over at least half a decade but now is hosting up as a venue to rippling protests in almost all the districts of its capital, Minsk. The outrage has resulted from the massive rigging imputed on the communist party in ruling for almost three decades since the split of Soviet Union in 1994. With Europe and Russia divided on the front as the protests and violence continue to rage: a revolution is emerging as a possibility.

The historical map of Belarus is nearly as complex as the geographical landscape which might only stand next to Afghanistan in terms of the intricacies faced by a landlocked country as such. Belarus is located in the Eastern European region bordered by Russia to the north-eastern perimeter. Poland borderlines the country to the West while Ukraine shares a border in the South. The NATO members, Lithuania and Latvia, outskirt the borders of Belarus in the Northwest, making the region as a prime buffer between the Russian regime and the western world. As Belarus stands as a junction between the European Union (EU) and Russia, the proximal nature brings about interests of either parties in the internal affairs of Minsk. However, the nature of the bond shared between the trio is by no means a triangle unlike other former soviet nations since Belarus has casted its absolute loyalty to Russia since the split of Soviet Union and ultimate accession to power of president, Alexander Lukashenko, the leader of the Communist Party of Belarus. Along with the alliance, however, came the unwanted dependency since over the 26-year rule of Lukashenko, he crippled the economy and the political writ of Belarus, using every last ounce of authority to subdue the opposition and the democratic mechanism of the country, earning him the nefarious title ‘Europe’s last dictator’.

The outburst of protests today stems from this very problem that is more deep-rooted than what comes across as apparent. The excessive and draconian use of power and autonomy has invalidated the independence of Belarusians and turned them haplessly at the mercy of Russian aid and support while blocking out any western support in the name of guarding national sovereignty. The ongoing surge of dissent was triggered earlier in August when the elections turned about to be absurdly rigged in favour of Alexander Lukashenko, granting him an indelible majority of 80% of the total vote count along with a lifetime of rule over the country despite his blatant unpopularity across the country. The accusations were further solidified when one of the popular opposing candidates, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, casted a complaint with the authorities regarding the falsification of election results. Instead of being appeased, she was detained for 7 straight hours and was even forced to exile to the neighbouring country of Lithuania. This resulted in major tide of riots and protests erupting all across Minsk, preceding over 3000 arrests over the election night.

On the official front, however, an aggressive stance was upheld along with a constant refusal of Lukashenko from stepping down from the long-held office or even considering a review of the polls counted despite exorbitant reports of unfair results. Heavy use of rubber bullets and tear gas was an eccentric protocol adopted by the local police force which instead of placating the rioters, further ignited the protests in more districts of the capital city. The anti-government relies also entitled ‘March of Neighbours’ transitioned into a high scale protest with many of the state employees resigning from their positions to stand upright against the long overdue corrupt regime. With the protests raging over months and the Lukashenko government getting more and more aggressive with their policies, the fear that once sparkled in the eyes of the natives is dwindling exceedingly and is turning into a cry for an outright revolution, which would be a ground-breaking one ever since the revolution of Iran back in 1979.

European counties have taken their conventional passive position in the crisis sinceEU is well aware of the Russian influence in Belarus and does not want to interfere with a probability of a direct conflict with Russia. However, they did call out their protest over the rigged elections, slapping sanctions over Belarus yet have not accused Lukashenko directly but instead have proposed a thorough international dialogue. Russia, on the other hand, faces a complex position since the dependence of Belarus bought Moscow a base against the West along with other regional rogues like Ukraine. However, high scale protests and rising chances of a full-blown revolution is hardly the choice Russian intends to opt. As the situation continues to unfold, economic reforms, as promised by Lukashenko, appears to be the only option that both EU and Russia could encourage as a bipartisan plan. Despite that, with six months of protests erupting as an outrage over a tyranny of 26 years, the reform-offering might be a bit late an offer since its no more about the country anymore, it’s about a struggle between a liberal or a communist Belarus.

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