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The Battle of “Coronavirus Narratives”: Three Lines of Defence Against China

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The COVID-19 pandemic is far from over, but the battle for “coronavirus narratives” is already in full swing. The front lines are the pages of newspapers and magazines, televisions screens and computer monitors, virtual seats at international organizations and online university lecture halls. Who is primarily to blame for the appearance of COVID-19? Which country and which system have been most effective in combatting the virus? Who has demonstrated the most compassion and empathy? Who has shown a willingness to selflessly help their foreign partners and even their strategic adversaries in the battle against the pandemic?

Common sense would suggest that it might be better to postpone any discussion of these and other similar issues until the global community has the spread of the virus under control. One way or another, victory over the coronavirus will be something that the global community can share. Let the epidemiologists, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, economists and other experts argue about strategy and the offensive and defensive tactics that needed to be adopted on various fronts. But no! There has been no ceasefire in the “battle of narratives.” Nor is there likely to be one. What is more, one gets the distinct impression that more energy is being put into this battle than into the fight against the coronavirus itself.

But this is hardly surprising. Because right now, literally in front of our very eyes, national and transnational mythologemes of the fight against coronavirus are being created – mythologemes that may end up being just as important as those about World War II or the Cold War. Like the numerous narratives of the past, the narrative that is being created today does not have to reflect the true situation. In fact, it could be entirely false. What is most important here is that the elites are able to convince their own societies of the truth of their version, so that the narrative will be accepted, supported and passed on to future generations. And then its significance as an integral part of national identity and an instrument of political mobilization will be difficult to overestimate.

Whose Narrative is Most Convincing?

Sooner or later, every country that has been affected by the coronavirus pandemic will have developed its own narrative about the fight against COVID-19. There will be heroes, villains, noble feats and tragic mistakes. But the truly era-defining war of “coronavirus narratives” is currently unfolding between China and the West, headed by the United States. The side that can convince the world that its strategy for overcoming the coronavirus is the most effective will at the same time stake its claim to global leadership in the post-corona world. And the side that gives off the impression that it is helpless in the face of the pandemic or has been slow to react to it will automatically be relegated to the position of outsider – a country that will not be able to cope with the challenges awaiting us as we move deeper into the 21st century.

Right now, the West as a whole, and the United States in particular, have been forced to fight a number of difficult defensive battles in the war of “coronavirus narratives.” The public is constantly reminded that COVID-19 did not originate just anywhere, but in China, and hinting at the possibility that the virus was artificially created couldn’t hurt, right? Then there is the argument that Beijing actively misled the international community about the origin of COVID-19 and silenced the doctors who discovered it. And we can blame the Chinese leadership for its massive human rights violations at the peak of the disease in Wuhan, for trying to bribe WHO officials and for various other wrongdoings.

But, as the Russian saying goes, “the winners are not judged.” The statistics are on China’s side, not the United States’. As of April 22, 2020, China had registered a total of 88,423 coronavirus cases and 4632 deaths, compared to 790,480 cases in the United States and 42,214 deaths. China is the most populous country in the world, yet only eighth in terms of the number of infected, far behind the United States and several other Western countries (Spain, Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom). As a side note, it is worth mentioning that the spread of coronavirus in the West has forced many to abandon the previously held propagandist theory that the course of the pandemic in Iran was indisputable proof of the complete failure of the country’s illiberal system to deal with the epidemiological crisis. Today Iran, just like China, compares favourably with most leading countries in the West in terms of both the number of infected and the number of deaths.

The discouraging statistics for the West make it difficult to build a reliable defence against the Chinese “coronavirus narrative.” But the West, particularly the United States, desperately needs an alternative narrative. And now more so than ever, as the outlines of a post-corona bipolar world are coming into sight. Observing this epic battle of narratives from the outside (as Russia does not really have a dog in the fight at this point), we can see that the West is building three lines of defence.

China Can Never Be Trusted!

The first line of defence is to try and discredit China’s official coronavirus numbers. The West has always been sceptical about China’s statistics on just about anything, but now this traditional mistrust has turned into outright rejection. Many point to “indirect data” (for example, the sharp decrease in the number of mobile network subscribers in the country) as proof that the number of infected was not in the tens of thousands, but rather in the millions. It thus follows that the number of deaths is also an order of magnitude (or even two) higher than official reports suggest. Moreover, certain voices insist that China is on the verge of a secondary outbreak (which may happen as early as this autumn), and if this is the case, then we may have been a little hasty in praising the effectiveness of China’s strategy in fighting COVID-19.

How strong is this line of defence? The design looks flimsy and unreliable. Naturally, Beijing manipulated the statistics from time to time and the accuracy and completeness of official data on the pandemic are probably questionable. But surely only the most hardened Sinophobe would entertain the notion that the actual numbers of infected and dead are several times higher than the officially reported figures. The reality is that it is impossible to hide the real numbers in today’s transparent and interconnected world – even in a totalitarian and completely closed country like North Korea, not to mention China, which is deeply integrated into the global economic and political system. Attempts to destroy the Chinese narrative by reference to Xi Jinping’s statistical gymnastics can be likened to Lord Cardigan’s hopeless Charge of the Light Brigade on the fortified positions of Russian troops during the Crimean War.

It’s All Trump’s Fault!

The second line of defence is a classic example of ad hominem fallacy. That is, in this case, reducing all of the West’s problems in the fight against coronavirus to the subjective miscalculations of individual statesmen and politicians. The primary culprit is, of course, President of the United States Donald Trump, although fingers are certainly being pointed at European leaders too, from British Prime Minister Boris Johnson to his Spanish opposite number Pedro Sánchez. The basic premise is that western healthcare, just like the western socio-political system, is far more effective “in principle” than that of China. Unfortunately for the West, however, the countless managerial missteps of certain individuals and the inconsistencies brought about by the belief in their own infallibility have cancelled out any objective advantages that the West may have had over China. People in the West caught a “bad break” when, at a crucial moment in history, their leaders turned out to be wholly incapable of meeting the challenge before them.

There are gaping holes in the second line of defence as well. It is difficult to find a convincing argument that would explain why such different leaders (in terms of their political views, professional experience, management style and even age) have done about as poorly as each other in their response to the coronavirus in the United States, Spain, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom. Let us not forget that the population of these countries is several times lower than that of China, yet the number of infected exceeds the Chinese figures significantly. If the Western political system continues to put incompetent and inadequate in positions of power, then perhaps the problem is not the people themselves, but the system as such!

Back to the Roots!

The third line of defence is the willingness to acknowledge the serious systemic imperfections of modern capitalism without touching upon the fundamental principles of political liberalism. In this case, it is not so much Donald Trump and Boris Johnson who are to blame, but rather Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. The argument here is that many Western countries made the fatal mistake in the late 1970s and early 1980s of privatizing numerous industries and stimulating economic inequality. What is more, the state started to reject its traditional social obligations. Not only did this result in the degradation of national healthcare systems, but it also led to increased social and political polarization and a general distrust of state institutions and of other people. This all came to a head when a real test in the form of the coronavirus appeared. For example, in the United States, not only did the Republicans and Democrats not rally together in the fight against the pandemic, but they also turned COVID-19 into another reason to step up interparty hostilities.

The conclusion can thus be made that, in order to successfully fight the pandemic and overcome the various other challenges that await humanity, the West needs to return to the historical fork in the road, as it were, where the wrong choice was made. The proponents of this argument point to the relatively successful strategy of the Scandinavian countries in fighting the coronavirus, where social interaction remains high, the state never abandoned its social obligations and the government, opposition, trade unions and employer associations have come together to fight the pandemic.

There is, of course, a logic to this approach. However, the first thing that we should point out here is that the success of the Scandinavian countries in fighting coronavirus has been mixed thus far. As of April 23, 2020, Finland had 3868 registered cases, with 98 deaths (2.5 per cent), compared to 14,777 and 1580 (10.5 per cent), respectively, in Sweden. This can hardly be seen as an unequivocal success for the Prime Minister of Sweden, Stefan Löfven. Secondly, some doubt if the Scandinavian models of the social state can be interpreted as a consistent implementation of “true capitalism at all.”

What if the Defence Falls?

As we can see, holding these lines of defence requires huge resources and casualties from the West. At the first line of defence, the question simply comes down to increasing the effectiveness of propaganda and counterpropaganda and enhancing the West’s intelligence and analytical potential in the name of winning the information war against Beijing. At the second line of defence, at least some of today’s leaders, as well as members of their inner circles, will need to go. And holding the third line of defence will take more than simply removing individual figures from the political scene, no matter how influential they may be. Substantial reforms of the political and socio-economic models of leading Western nations are what is needed here, with all the costs that this will entail for the current elites.

Let us say that there is enough determination and political will in the West to make these sacrifices. Will this be enough to guarantee victory over China in the “battle of narratives”? And what if the third line of defence is breached? Such a breach would represent a direct or indirect acknowledgement that the relative failures of the West and the relative successes of China in the fight against coronavirus are not down to Beijing manipulating the statistics, the inferiority of certain leaders in the West or the departure of leading Western countries from the traditional foundations of the capitalist system.

The failure of the third line of defence would demonstrate that the failures of the West are rooted in the very principles of political liberalism, which is losing all credibility in front of our very eyes through its inability to respond in an effective manner to the challenges of the 21st century. And we are not talking about losing a battle here (even a major one) – we are talking about losing the war.

The Return of Convergence Theory?

iberal political systems assume a degree of external and internal openness. As a rule, liberalism promotes the idea of the free movement of goods, services and people around the world. While people in China saw the closing of the country’s borders as a natural measure for preventing the spread of the coronavirus, similar steps in Western countries were met with fierce criticism from the political opposition. And this is understandable, as a person in a liberal society is first and foremost a “citizen of the world,” rather than a citizen in an authoritarian society. Inside one’s own country, the former enjoys more professional, social and geographical mobility than the latter and has a much wider network of social and professional contacts. This is precisely why a liberal society is, by definition, a more fertile environment for spreading COVID-19.

Liberal societies are far more resistant to attempts by the state to interfere in the private lives of their citizens, be it monitoring smartphones to identify people with whom an infected individual may have had contact or restricting the movement of the population. It is more difficult to place limits on household consumption in liberal societies, even when such restrictions are necessary to prevent panic buying, artificial scarcity and price gouging. Similarly, the liberal economic model is not as effective as the authoritarian model when it comes to mobilizing productive resources in times of war, natural disasters and other difficult times.

None of this necessarily means that authoritarianism will always triumph over liberalism. Even the most effective forms of authoritarianism (as displayed by the Chinese model) have their obvious flaws and imperfections. But if China scores a resounding victory in the battle of “coronavirus narratives,” then much will surely change in terms of what we consider the most desirable future for humankind.

After all, COVID-19 is not the last pandemic that the world will have to face. And let us not forget about climate change, the increasingly frequent natural disasters, possible resource shortages and other emergency situations which, unfortunately, are becoming part of the “new normality.” People across the world want to be free. Freedom is still valued highly. But what if we put the question rather coldly: Would you prefer to survive in an authoritarian Wuhan or die in a free New York?

In the middle of the last century, several prominent thinkers, including Pitirim Sorokin and John Galbraith put forward the idea of converging two opposing socio-economic systems. The so-called convergence theory gained popularity in the 1960s–1970s, even though it was heavily criticized in both the East and the West. The implosion of the world socialist system at the end of the 20th century meant that everyone simply forgot about it, condemning it to the scrapheap of human errors. Perhaps now is the time to revisit the idea from a 21st-century perspective?

From our partner RIAC

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East Asia

The complex puzzle of Canberra-Beijing ties, as diplomacy takes a back seat

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Australia and China seems to be engaged in a repulsive tariff war targeting each other’s goods. Canberra is struggling to manage its complex economic relationship with Beijing even as it finds itself in the strategically opposite camp. How did things turn out this way? Here, I analyse.

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There was a time when Australia under the Mandarin-speaking Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who was in office from 2007 to 2013, had the highest level of warmth in relations with China.

The Labour premier saw a promising prospect of economic partnership with a rising China at that point of time, but gravely under-estimated the geopolitical threat that would be soon posed by Beijing, a mistake later governments would realise and is still striving to rectify.

Quad pullout and comeback

Rudd even pulled Australia out of the four-nation Quad grouping in 2008, a year after it was conceived by former Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, in a move to appease Beijing with which Canberra’s economic partnership was progressively moving upwards. But, nine years later, Malcolm Turnbull’s premiership brought Canberra back to the Quad as regional and global security dynamics witnessed a paradigm shift.

Strategic shift

A decade later since Rudd took office, despite closer economic ties with Beijing, Canberra pushed for a closer alliance with the United States since 2017, the year Quad Security Dialogue was revived during the ASEAN and Related Summits in Manila.

It was a result of changes in security assessments by Canberra with regard to new threats and challenges from an increasingly assertive Beijing in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

The rift between Australia and China further widened, earlier this year, when the Australian government supported an inquiry into the origins of the novel coronavirus, annoying China where it originated. Australian politicians also became increasingly divided on hawkish and dovish lines.

Huawei and ZTE ban

Tides were turned in 2018 when Australia became the first country in the world to ban Chinese telecom giants Huawei and ZTE from 5G trials and rollout, citing security concerns, as these companies ‘allegedly’ had links to the Chinese ruling establishment which they deny.

Beijing also reciprocated with tit-for-tat measures from time to time. The latest in line of such measures was the imposition of temporary anti-dumping tariffs up to 212.1 per cent on Australian wine imports with effect from November 28, this year.

Ongoing tariff tensions

2020 saw a foray of imposition of tariffs and reciprocal duties from both sides right from the beginning of the pandemic. Attempted mergers and acquisitions by Chinese companies involving companies in Australia were also blocked by Canberra citing security reasons.

Adding oil to the fire, anti-dumping investigations were initiated by both sides against each other, for using its findings as rationale for imposing more tariffs on different sets of goods such as aluminum, steel, paper, coal, copper, sugar, log timber, and barley.

ChAFTA

What will be the fate of the 2015-signed China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA)?

The worsening ties might take a toll on ChAFTA as it readies for a five-year review next month, notwithstanding the other broad-based trade pacts in which both countries are participants such as the recently-signed, 15-nation Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

ChAFTA took about a decade to complete and led to zero tariffs on many goods, but RCEP is still in its infancy.The main issue is not whether a review of ChAFTA is possible, but how to prevent the looming prospect of Canberra and Beijing retreating from the current commitments directly or indirectly that would effectively reduce the pact into a state of coma.

As ChAFTA goes for review in December, the most likely outcome could be both countries agreeing to maintain the deal’s status quo. If any of the parties wishes to terminate the pact, there is a six-month notice period after which they can leave, with or without a review.

Still economic partners, but political rivals

Today, China has positioned itself as Australia’s largest trading partner. Moreover, Australia strongly benefits from its close proximity to the vast markets of China and Japan which together represent over 40% of all Australian exports, in which a little over 32% amounting to $89.2 billion, are exclusively to China, as data from 2019 show. Despite this, Canberra and Beijing remain at odds politically.

Exercise Malabar 2020 and beyond

One of the striking questions in the strategic circles of all Quad partner countries is, will Australia continue to take part in the annual Exercise Malabar in the coming years, annoying Beijing further?

While Japan is a strategic partner in the Quad, ties with China are moving on an adversarial path, particularly worsening since Canberra took part in the annual Exercise Malabar in the Indian Ocean this month, after a gap of 13 years since it left the mega naval war games.

The exercise by the four Quad partners of India, United States, Japan, and Australia is apparently a warning to Beijing’s naval ambitions in the waters of the Indo-Pacific.

Supply Chain Resilience Initiative

In fact, all the Quad partners and other democracies in the Indo-Pacific wish to decouple itself from over trade dependency on China. But, domestic economic realities prove otherwise. With a raging pandemic and the unravelling US-China cold war threatening supply chains, Japan has recently put forward an idea – the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative or SCRI.

It is a trilateral approach to trade, with India, Australia, and Japan as the key-partners aimed at diversifying its supply risk across a group of supplying nations instead of being disproportionately dependent on just one, apparently keeping China in mind.

Despite all these measures, the prospect of closing of huge Chinese markets for Australian exports, owing to a disproportionately high level of tariffs is haunting domestic producers in Australia that could potentially make Australian wine largely unmarketable and non-feasible in Chinese markets.

Ineffective diplomatic efforts

Current Australian PM Scott Morrison has been trying to bridge gaps in a reconciliatory tone by stating that his government’s actions are wrongly seen and interpreted by some only through the lens of the strategic competition between China and the US. But, Beijing doesn’t seem satisfied, as evident in the decision to impose the recent set of disproportionate tariffs on wine.

Loss of businesses for Australian domestic producers is already hurting the Australian economy badly as goods remain stalled at ports. But, the behemoth of Chinese economy appears to be largely resilient to adverse impacts, compared to the Australian economy.

Way ahead

Australia’s producers and farmers are largely unhappy and unsatisfied with the way Canberra is dealing with Beijing as it directly threatens their livelihoods.

As things turn out worse, Canberra will have to strategise newer options to effectively balance geostrategic and economic considerations with regard to Beijing, possibly through the diplomatic route, in a way to immediately diffuse the prevalent confrontational approach to come out of this diplomatic impasse.

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Is China on the brink of a food crisis?

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It is not a secret that the current COVID-19 pandemic has been affecting people all around the globe. The virus touched almost all spheres of regular life – i.e. it resulted in temporary or permanent closure of businesses, a rise in the unemployment rate, inability to physically spend time with family and friends. Such drastic changes in times of uncertainty significantly impacted the well-being of the world population. Moreover, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) warned about the emerging food shortages worldwide. According to FAO statistics, global food prices have been on the rise for four consequent months, hitting their maximum in September 2020. China – the place where the virus originated – is one of the states that have been seriously affected by the disruptions, including production and distribution of food.

In his speech on August, 11 Chinese leader Xi Jinping did not admit any food shortages. However, he promoted food security through the campaign “operation empty plate,” thereby encouraging people to stop wasting food. It is interesting to note that Mao Zedong introduced a similar food campaign before the 1959 Great Chinese Famine. Meanwhile, there has undoubtedly been a significant increase in food prices in China. Many experts claim that China is on the brink of a food crisis that has been manifested as a result of lockdowns, infected livestock, and poor weather conditions. It is difficult to give any predictions or estimations about the future food situation in China because the country does not share enough of its data with the rest of the world, yet it is possible to answer the question why the state faces food difficulties.

Average food prices increase

The National Bureau of Statistics of China reported that, on average, food prices have increased by 11.2% compared to 2019. The price level of vegetables increased by 6.4% in one month; egg prices soared by 11.3% within the same period. Pork prices grew the most, by 52.6% compared to the last year’s statistics. Why is it important?

Firstly, many workers and their families who faced loss or decrease of income or remittances became food insecure. That, in turn, has had social repercussions for the overall level of crime, health concerns among adults and infants, high death rate, different demographic and economic challenges. Furthermore, international trade will also suffer: due to the lack of labor force Chinese imports in foreign countries will seemingly increase in price.

Secondly, China, along with other countries, was in a period of recession earlier this year. Food insecurity will cause difficulties in coming out of this financial downturn.

The impact of lockdowns on food supply chains

One of the main factors contributing to the declining agricultural productivity and spiking food prices in China is the restrictions on personal mobility and transportation of goods. In January Chinese authorities adopted measures to limit mobility within the country; they imposed “city lockdowns, traffic control, and closed management of villages and communities.” Such restrictions impacted food supply chains. For the production part many workers experienced difficulties getting to work that created a shortage of physical labor. That is why some crops were not picked, others were not even planted. As a result, the supply of agricultural goods decreased. On the other hand, at the beginning of the year, the demand for them also fell as restaurants and bars were closed. Thereby, many crops went to waste, while farmers did not make enough profit to purchase the seeds and fertilizers for the next season. It is a problem because businesses continue to open up, raising the demand and prices on crops. Immobility also impacted the distribution of seeds and fertilizers to the farms that disrupted the plantation season. Furthermore, the distribution of agricultural goods to grocery stores became difficult. Particular inconveniences associated with the restrictions on mobility all added up to the spike of prices on crops.

African Swine fever outbreak

Another factor impacting the emerging food crisis in China is the failure to rebuild last year’s loss of pigs due to the infection. Chinese porcine farms were hit by the African swine fever outbreak that infected and killed a large number of pigs (40% of total Chinese pigs’ population), decreasing the supply but increasing the prices on pork in 2019. According to China’s National Bureau of Statistics, pork prices were 52.6% higher in August this year than the year before, while corn prices – the main porcine fodder – increased by 20% compared to last year. Chinese farmers failed to improve the situation in 2020 due to severe flooding. The increased amount of precipitation caused considerable losses of corn and thus the inability to feed pigs. China began to import crops from abroad – particularly, corn from the US. As the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) stated, China had been importing 195,000 more tonnes of American corn than the year before.

Shuttered diplomatic relations between China and Western states

Some experts claim that Chinese diplomatic relations with such Western countries as Australia, the US and Canada shattered due to the fire of four ballistic missiles on the Indian border on August, 26. These states are China’s major food exporters. If their diplomatic relations with Beijing worsen, then the trade has a high chance of being negatively affected as well. In other words, Chinese imports of crops have the risk of becoming more expensive, meaning that the prices of pork and other goods might rise even more.

Severe flooding and drought

Finally, worsened weather conditions – some parts of China experienced drought, others were hit by flooding – led to a decrease in crops and a significant increase in food prices. Southern, Central and Eastern China underwent a period of heavy rain and the worst flooding in the last hundred years. Excessively high water levels in major Chinese rivers, including the Yangtze River, resulted in the evacuation of 15 million people in July 2020. Moreover, the flooding destroyed 13 million acres of agricultural land, which is estimated to cost at least $29 billion of economic damage. In the meantime Northern (Xinjiang province) and Southwest (Yunnan province) China have gone through a period of severe drought. In April 2020 nearly 1.5 million people in Yunnan province were caught in an emergency situation: shortages of drinking water, damage of hundreds of hectares of crops and livestock. Consequently, the supply of many agricultural goods and pork decreased, which spiked the prices on these goods.

Chinese long-term prospects toward food security

To conclude, immobility, African swine flu, worsened weather and security conditions led to the growing food shortages and increasing food prices in China. This being said, the Chinese government has been working on that problem. It has taken special measures to ensure sufficience of agricultural goods by investing in various disaster relief funds for different crops, particularly rice and wheat. For example, Chinese authorities allocated 1.4 billion yuan to save the agricultural harvest in Hubei province. Due to the substantial loss of agricultural products, China has also increased its imports. General Administration of Customs reported that China’s grain imports rose by 22.7% in July 2020 compared to the previous year. Meanwhile, the Chinese leader took a gentle approach to solve this problem. He did not announce the issues related to the insufficient number of crops; instead, he adopted a program for encouraging people to be more frugal with their eating habits. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences followed the same path as it denied anticipation of a food crisis in the short-term perspective, yet warned about possible food shortfalls by 2025 if no agricultural reforms take place. As of now, China is not on the break of a food crisis; however, its shuttered prospects for long-term food sustainability are subject to dangerous repercussions.

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China and Mongolia: A Comprehensive and Never-Ending Strategic Partnership

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Mongolia is an exceptional country when it comes to Eurasian geopolitics, linking China with Russia, two great countries in terms of military and economic capabilities, geographical area and population. In June 2016, the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC) was announced in order to consolidate friendly relations and promote economic exchanges for the success of the Belt and Road Initiative. Many reports indicate the great position of Mongolia on the Chinese economic map as a pillar of the modern Chinese initiative. Mongolia is a major economic partner of China, and the Chinese administration aspires to forge permanent relations of cooperation and coordination with Mongolia by virtue of its common geography and strategic location, in order to open up through it to Russia and other Mongolia is a key economic partner of China, and the Chinese administration aspires to forge permanent relations of cooperation and coordination with Mongolia by virtue of its common geography and strategic location, in order to open up through it to Russia and other international partners.

Mongolia is rich in natural resources, for example the mining industry provided up to 30% of GDP and almost 90% of exports, but its economy is not as developed compared to China. Some economic reports indicate the great economic benefit to Mongolia from the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor. Mongolia is expected to witness unparalleled economic growth in terms of international economic cooperation, which will positively affect the national economy. The Mongolian economy depends heavily on China’s investment; data of the two largest ports in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in northern China indicates enormous economic benefits. In the chart below, the continued economic progress achieved in Inner Mongolia is shown. In addition, rail trade increased by 16 percent year-on-year to 11.2 million tons in 2017. In the same year, 570 trips were made on the China-Europe railways passing through Ernhot (a county-level city of the XilinGol League, in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, located in the Gobi Desert along the Sino-Mongolian border, across from the Mongolian town of Zamyn-Üüd).

The Belt and Road Initiative aims for mutual profit, cooperation and peaceful communication. China shares an ancient cultural history with Mongolia, long common borders, and economic cooperation that has never stopped. The strategic geographic location of Mongolia makes it a priority for China on the new Silk Road, in addition to the richness of natural resources and livestock that China needs.

The Mongolians are a horse-loving people, a country known for its large number of horses. Mongols without horses are like birds without wings. Despite globalization and the great economic progress in the neighbor (China), as well as the cold weather and difficult geography, the Mongolians did not abandon their traditions and the Mongolian way of life still exists today. In Mongolia there are herders of horses, camels and cattle to benefit from milk, meat, wool, etc. During the pandemic in China, for example, President Battulga set up what is known as “Sheep Diplomacy” where Mongolian President donated 30,000 sheep to China. This initiative indicates the Mongolians’ positive intentions towards the Chinese and the desire to open up more. In this context, I would like to point out that China is a big importer of meat and the Chinese demand for meat is constantly increasing, as shown in the chart below. Here is a great opportunity for Mongolia to increase its exports of meat to the Chinese market.

The reading of Mongolian history indicates that this country has passed through periods of prosperity. Mongolia may be a good example of power and rule, as its borders extended to many countries during the rule of Genghis Khan (1162-1227), the man whom the Mongolians consider their historical leader and has turned into a hero and a national symbol. The Mongolians did not abandon their land despite the cold weather and difficult geography, indicating that they are a deeply rooted people with land. Mongolia, with its vast territories and few people, has turned into a meeting place for Russia and China, and a strategic center for Chinese economic expansion. Therefore, it is impossible for the Chinese administration to abandon the partnership with Mongolia.

The Mongolian economy is heavily dependent on livestock, and the number of pastures has increased significantly since the Soviet era because of the transfer of ownership to the people. However, the government is still not able to provide all services to citizens “the government has failed to promote education and health care and veterinary care in pastoral communities, so there is no longer any incentive to stay in rural areas” said Sarol Khuadu, an official at the Institute for Environmental Research in the Mongolian capital. The policy, which no longer places much emphasis on the countryside, has led to the transfer of large numbers of citizens to the capital and to engage in the world of money and business.

Unfortunately, the Mongolian government is not working seriously to support citizens in remote areas. The conditions of life are not good and the loans granted are high interest, in addition to the weather that adversely affects their businesses. In order to help the poor and rural people, in cooperation with national governments, humanitarian, development and scientific partners, FAO has developed an early warning approach by monitoring risk information systems and turning warnings into proactive actions. International organizations contribute to permanent humanitarian and social assistance in Mongolia.

Mongolia’s strategic policy through the “Mongolia Steppe Road Program 蒙古国“草原之路” is largely in line with the belt and road initiative, which is a road connecting Mongolia, China and Russia. Consequently, Mongolia, a country that mainly depends on the agricultural sector, will be a center for economic communication between China and Russia, and thus will witness a great economic development. The Steppe Road Program aims to boost Mongolia’s economic standing and create an advanced network of infrastructure for communication with China and Russia and build an oil and gas pipeline. In 2014, during his historic visit, Chinese President Xi Jinping raised the level of relations between the two countries to “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Relations”. Since then, bilateral cooperation has begun to move faster.

China has never abandoned Mongolia; it is a country of advanced strategic location as a bridge between Asia and Europe, in addition to the important agricultural sector in Mongolia which benefits China greatly, not to forget to mention the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor which has become an important part of the belt and road initiative and a key component of Sino-Russian cooperation.

The relationship between China and Mongolia today is an ideal example of the bilateral relationship between two neighboring countries. Cultural, economic, political and tourism communication is in continuous progress between the Chinese and Mongolians, and the Belt and Road Initiative will push this communication forward. The Chinese aspire to increase free trade areas and economic connectivity through a developed infrastructure network.

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The Commission today adopted its annual EU Climate Action Progress Report, covering the EU’s progress in cutting greenhouse gas emissions...

Human Rights13 hours ago

Global Experts To Convene Online To Discuss Values In A Post-Covid World

Leading Islamic scholars and experts from around the world, representing government and civil society will convene online to attend the...

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