The world did not expect such a shock and readjustment in 2020. COVID-19 has put countries to the test and has heightened and exacerbated pre-existing tensions in international politics. It is highly unlikely that a new world order will emerge as a result of this pandemic; there will be, however a series of important geopolitical, economic and political shifts that may shape the world for the next decade.
Democracy, the current world order, and the prevailing stability rest upon cooperation among countries, multilateral agreements, supranational organisations and not upon isolationism. The current health crisis is magnifying a pre-existing fear culture in the West. Fear has been the main drive in this pandemic. When societies are confronted with a world that is increasingly less stable, more complex, less predictable and more dangerous, people will seek reassurance, stability and protection at all costs, even if this mean turning their support to less democratic regimes and turning into isolationism.
Let’s take the European Union (EU) as an example, under the current circumstances, EU member states see their survival in self-isolation and closure of borders, both contrary to the principles of the EU. The economic crisis that is looming the world post-COVID-19 will demand coordination and cooperation among countries. It is expected that the economic crisis that will be consequence of the current pandemic will be the worse since the 1920s. Such crisis will not affect the world symmetrically, and the South is the most likely to bear the brunt. Centrism of the state could again be brought back to the forefront of the political and security agendas. This could potentially bring up and strengthen a wider wave of populist leaders and a wider and deeper division between the richer and the poorer.
While the rise of populism in Europe and western democracies can be explained by a serious frustration with liberalism and the way it has shaped societies; in places like Latin America, for example, the rise of populist leaders was due to the association of liberalism with privileges for the upper class.
The culture of fear fits perfectly with the populist rhetoric, and there even has been an extra bolt on that may prove beneficial for inward looking policies: fear of infections and germs. The fear of foreigners in xenophobic societies has always been closely related to the fear of infections. Politics also turn more conservative and reactionary where society is scared of the risk of massive infection. There has been a serious outbreak of racist attacks since the start of the pandemic, and it is very likely that such a trend will outlive the lockdown and the disease itself. If we go back in history, there has always been the need to make a virus or a disease foreign: from the middle ages with the bubonic plague to Nazi Germany and its association of Jews with infections.
This xenophobia has also led to people considering foreigners as a burden who are straining the already stretched national health services that should be allocated to only nationals of a given country. Stoking paranoia and blaming foreigners is usually a combo that works. One just has too look at how efficient that formula was in the 2016 US election.
Austerity measures have also helped the surge of populist trends , especially in Europe. It has become evident for some European countries that severe cuts and austerity over the past decade have led to depleted health care systems, Italy is one example of such view, and potentially should Italy become massively disillusioned and Eurosceptic it could pose a more serious challenge for the survival of the organisation than Brexit did. The United Kingdom always had remained as distant member not joining the Schengen are or the single currency. Italy is at the heart of Europe unlike the UK.
Therefore, it is very likely that countries advocating for a less open world and a more populist, state-centrist and nationalistic approach could see their arguments vindicated with the pandemic. The world may not really change substantially at the end of this health crisis, it might however find that it is increasingly difficult to solve existing problems in a prevailing environment of less credibility and solidarity.
The pandemic has also resulted in important geopolitical considerations: China has been jostling for global and regional influence with Russia, the US and Europe. This crisis may serve the country well to strengthen its soft power by positioning in the world as the largest producer of medical supplies. The US inadvertently is contributing to this by the relative American absence of the world stage and the shocking response to the virus domestically. The US has practically disappeared from world affairs, reinforcing the opinion that America is retreating into an isolationist position that resembles the US followed the post-World War I.
The second important geopolitical move that has taken place under the current pandemic crisis is the accession of North Macedonia as a full NATO member last 27th of March. Soon after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Russia lost most of its influence over Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. NATO and the EU soon started to turn its eyes and woo former members of the Warsaw Pact. Enlargement of both organisations has not stopped since then.
North Macedonia’s accession to NATO means the loss of Russian strategic position in the Mediterranean, and Serbia, the last of Russia’s ally in the Balkans, is now completely encircled. It is very probable NATO will not try to fasten the accession of Ukraine and Georgia and the EU that of Moldova completing with this the isolation of Russia on its European side.
So, although it is highly unlikely the current pandemic will herald the start of a new world order, it is very likely that current national and international responses to it might be key to the shaping of international politics for years to come.