Connect with us

East Asia

The Chinese view of the world

Themistoklis Z. Zanidis

Published

on

Today’s international system of states is characterized by the strategic competition between US and China, which are consider to be the most significant powers in terms of hard and soft power. Western analysts try to interpret the Chinese presence which threatens the status quo of the East Asia-Pacific region. This paper is a brief introduction to the Chinese worldview as it’s important to comprehend the Chinese high strategy.

It is a fact that the majority of the western analyses based on the theory of political realism consider the behavior of the People’s Republic of China (China) at a global level as actions of a predetermined plan by the elite of the Communist Party for the take-over of the global hegemony (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013). However, in order to properly interpret the Chinese policy and its pursuits, the complex situation within the country should be scrutinized. Indeed, the various state organizations like ministries, agencies, services compete for influence growth on the shaping of the country’s foreign policy, since they often have conflicting interests (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013). It is also a certainty that within the country a confrontation between  state policies and enterprise objectives is escalating, a case that makes promotion of  policies of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CPC’s) leadership difficult (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013). Consequently, the scholars’ view of China as an undivided international actor with a plan of peaceful rise, as claimed by the CPC’s leadership, is problematic, because each Chinese activity abroad may not be at all connected to the official governmental policy (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013).

Already since the beginning of the 20th century the non-European countries were forced by Western Powers to westernize their societies. In the Chinese case its obligatory opening to the West took place painfully after its defeat by Great Britain in the Opium War (1839-1842) (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013). The radically opposed social organization of China, which embodied in a cultural planet the lifestyle of Chinese people that was compatible with the principles of Confucianism, had to yield to the totally strange Western model for the sake of its modernization. The Chinese culture, as well as other cultures of the Far East, reached maturity too early, but it was trapped in a very strict framework that offered cohesion. Simultaneously, this had a result to pause its development as well as any modernity (Braudel 2007). In the scheme of culture, the center of the world was the Chinese state while all the rest were considered to be barbaric, since their people did not engage in the Chinese education (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013). The zhongguo “Middle Kingdom” that is referred to China is not related to a specific geographical place between other kingdoms but to the area that China occupies between Sky (Heaven) and  Earth and is indicative of the perception of the Chinese about their country (Allison 2017). An attribute of the Chinese worldview, apart from Confucianism, is both the ancestral and the monarch’s worship that rooted in the time of the empire (Braudel 2007). Confucianism was not strictly a religion but a social and political expression of the country’s superior social caste that survives, with many changes, until today and promotes the maintenance of order and social hierarchy as a lifestyle (Braudel 2007). It is crystal clear that it contributed enormously to the shaping of the Chinese traditional culture that in the current time of globalization fascinates increasingly extensive masses of people, even of Western countries (Nye Jr. 2011). The dissemination of the Chinese culture is achieved also by the students, both the Chinese in the universities of mostly Western countries and the westerns in the Chinese higher education institutes, who are estimated to reach 500,000 in 2020 (Nye Jr. 2011). The trend of the circulation of the Chinese language and culture worldwide is promoted aside the Chinese leadership by funding both China Radio International and the television network Xinhua which broadcast also in English 24/7, as well as the Confucian institutes that are founded in various states (Nye Jr. 2011). Of course, the development of the Chinese soft power is critical but still is significant lower than the respective of the USA and EU (Nye Jr. 2011).

The perspective of Chinese people about the dominance of their country compared to others was also augmented by China’s geographical position which is ideal. Indeed, the country was protected by the sea, the deserts and the mountain ranges of Central Asia at least until the arrival of the Western Powers. The country’s strategic position contributed to the duration of Chinese empire, namely almost 21 centuries (Braudel 2007). The first contact with Westerns was humiliating and ended with the destruction of the Summer Palaces and the downfall of the Chinese emperor Sien Feng (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013). Several decades later, the conflict between China and Japan, a power that was westernized to a large extent, lead to a new destruction. Since then, the country was living humiliated by the Western Powers. During the 1930’s, the communists pursued another way to modernize the state (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013). They basically destroyed the traditional Chinese lifestyle by importing western values and doctrine. The foundations of the contemporary Chinese miracle of the country’s emergence as a global power that can influence World Order in which totally engages, in contrast to its historical past, were established (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013). Modern China was founded by the CPC in 1949 when officially declared the end of the century of humiliation (Braudel 2007). To a great extent the current Chinese leadership is comprised of descendants of the first communists who came to power then (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013). Ultimately the Chinese leadership is a kind of political aristocracy whose primary concern is to stay in power. For this reason Chinese authorities are particularly suspicious towards the western criticism regarding the monopoly of power by the Party and the simultaneous violation of human rights[1] . However, despite the Party’s predominance within the country, its foreign policy is not ideologically charged but is characterized by pragmatism due to the negative impact of the Cultural Revolution both on the society and the Party (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013).

Another equally important factor for understanding the China’s foreign policy is the awareness of the means in which historical reminiscences define the way in which the country apprehends the rest of the world today. The Opium Wars,   the embarrassment by Japan in the War of 1895-1896 as well as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 constitute traumatic experiences for the Chinese people that influence their current worldview (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013). The Western involvement in China led to the mid 19th-mid 20th century of Chinese humiliation. This vision of the past resulted to China’s goal to retrieve its lost honor and pride. Its high strategy does not seek to inflation, on terms of territorial expansion[2], but to acquire the vanished esteem (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013). It does not consider itself as a rising power, as it is considered within the USA, but on the contrary, as a power that returned to the forefront of international affairs after its displacement by the West. Nationalism is an up-and-coming ideology within the country. Nonetheless, it is not absolutely based on the bitter historical recollection that the Chinese people have from the involvement of the Western Powers within their country, but on the contrary, it stems from the CPC as an alternative authority origin in the case that the economy starts to slow down, as it is actually noticed in recent years[3] (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013).

In conclusion, the position of China as a significant power in global affairs, the only one which can seriously challenge the American hegemony, is not seriously doubted by any scholar, in contrast to its potentials. The logic of reasoning this differentiation is traced in the complicated and vulnerable situation within its territory (corruption and social inequality that leads to a dramatic rise of social conflicts) but also in features of the Chinese economy (dependency on exportations’ increase, dominant position of the state in economy, energy dependency, environmental destruction) (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013). Its painful westernization meant the conversion of the multinational empire to an undivided national state. An essential outcome of this change is the installation of nationalism in the Chinese worldview as well as the formulation of broadly Western ideas. However, the latter causes problems both within the country, with the issue being focused on the cohesion of the Chinese society, and abroad with tensions between China and its neighbors (Petropoulos Chouliaras 2013).


[1] The most recent example derives from the riots which took place in Hong Kong

[2] The case of Taiwan is distinctive because the island considers, by the elite of the Chinese Communist Party, to be part of the mainland China. For this reason further independence of Taiwan is Casus Belli for China.

[3]  The halt of the growth, which characterized the Chinese economy for the last four decades, is significant today due to the Covid-19 outbreak which started from Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei province.

International Relations Analyst – Researcher in Training at the Institute of International Relations Themistoklis Z. Zanidis has a B.A. in Cultural Studies from the Hellenic Open University and a MSc in International and European Affairs from University of Piraeus (concentration Strategic Studies). He is Researcher in training at the Institute of International Relations (I.DI.S.) on the field of Strategic Culture of Greece and Turkey. Themistoklis writes articles, both in Greek and English, about international relations and EU affairs in magazines and blogs. You can find his articles in his personal website: https://www.tzanidis.online/

East Asia

Nepal-China Boundary Treaty: An example of peaceful Himalayan frontiers

Birat Anupam

Published

on

image source: Chinese Embassy in Nepal

Chairman Mao: How is everything with Your Excellency? Have all the problems been solved?

King Mahendra: Everything is settled.

Chairman Mao: Fair and reasonable?

King Mahendra: Yes. We all agree.

Chairman Mao: It is good that we agree. There is goodwill on both sides. We hope that will get along well, and you hope we shall get along well too. We do not want to harm you, nor do you want to harm us.

King Mahendra: We fully understand.

Chairman Mao: We are equals; we cannot say one country is superior or inferior to the other.

King Mahendra: We very much appreciate the way of speaking.

This was a snippet of the candid conversation between founding father of People’s Republic of China Mao Zedong and Nepal’s the then king Mahendra on the historic Nepal-China Border Treaty day of 5 October 1961. A book titled ‘MAO ZEDUNG ON DIPLOMACY’ has detailed this conversation. The conversation is mentioned under the topic of ”Talk with Nepal’s king Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva and the queen’ (page 366 and 367) in the book.

This famous diplomatic book of Mao was compiled by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and the Party Literature Research Center under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and was published by Foreign Languages Press Beijing on 1998.

This conversation, from the verbatim records, speaks volumes about the level of trust and the height of friendship between two neighbors Nepal and China.

Nepal-China boundary: An example of speedy settlement

Nepal and China boundary settlement has reached 59 years of its signing ceremony at Beijing. It is an extraordinary example of speedy settlement. Nepal and China formally established diplomatic relationship on 1 August 1955.

Few years later on 21 March 1960, Nepal and China signed Boundary Agreement. Nepal’s first democratically elected Prime Minister Bishweshwar Prashad Koirala signed it during the official China visit. The friendly diplomatic dialogue of Koirala and Mao is also included in the book ”MAO ZEDUNG ON DIPLOMACY’ under the topic of ”The Sino-Nepal Border Must be Peaceful and Friendly Forever.”  

On 5 October 1961, Nepal and China signed Boundary Treaty at Beijing during the state visit of the then king Mahendra. The 1414-kilometer-long border treaty protocol was finally inscribed on 20 January 1963.

The adjustment was made on equal footing by land-swapping with Nepal gaining more land than it gave. According to a working paper presented at ”International Cross-Border Conference on Border Regions in Transition (BRIT)-XII Fukuoka (Japan)-Busan (South Korea) 13-16 November 2012” by Nepal’s former Director General of Survey Department and the author of the book titled ‘Boundary of Nepal’, China had given 302.75 square kilometer more land to Nepal.

The paper says, ”the adjustment was made on the basis of ‘give’ and ‘take’ and the inclusion of some pasture land within Nepalese territory. With this principle, Nepal had given 1,836.25 square kilometer of land to China and Nepal had taken 2,139.00 square kilometer, as it has been added 302.75 square kilometer of Chinese territory into Nepal.”

Nepal-China border settlement is an excellent example of speedy border settlement compared to Nepal’s southern neighbor India. Since the formal diplomatic engagement of 1955, it just took around eight years to ink full-fledged technical border adjustment between Nepal and China.

Tragically, Nepal and India are at odds over the border demarked by 204-year-old Treaty of Sugauli. The recent issue of Lipulekh, Kalapani and Limpiyadhura and new political map of Nepal unanimously approved by lower and upper houses of the federal parliament point to the long-pending friendly border settlements between Nepal and India.

Media myths on China’s encroachment of Nepal’s territory

Nepal and India has not resolved much of their border tensions since long. Lately, there are some media reports, mainly from India, about so-called Chinese ‘encroachment’ of Nepal’s territory. There was report about missed pillar number 11. However, it came out to be untrue with the finding of the pillar.  After field inspection and technical studies, Chief District Officer of Humla district, Chiranjibi Giri, made it clear that the rumored border encroachment from China was not the fact.

Similar incident was reported few weeks ago when Nepal’s leading daily Kantipur claimed China’s encroachment of Nepal’s territory citing unverified Ministry of Agriculture, the ministry that has nothing to do with border issues. However, after formal clarification from Nepal Government, the report was found to be false and the biggest daily of the nation apologized.

There is a section in Nepal that desperately wants to draw parallel between factual Nepal-India border tensions with fictitious Nepal-China border rows. However, so far, this mission has proven wrong at times.

Nepal does not have any serious border tension with China. The only concern Nepal has it about China-India agreement to ‘boost border trade at Quiangla/Lipu-Lekh Pass’ as said in the 28th point of the  joint communiqué issued by visiting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Chinese counterpart Li Keqiang on 15 May 2015.

Nepal has diplomatically protested about this agreement by two countries as Lipulekh falls in Nepali territory not only based on the Treaty of Sugauli of 1816 but also the Nepal-China Boundary Treaty of 5 October 1961. Given China’s generosity and friendliness towards Nepal, it is not a big issue to address. Nepalese citizens are optimistic on China’s support on Nepal’s sovereignty over Lipulekh.

Continue Reading

East Asia

Why doesn’t China take India seriously?

Shalabh Chopra

Published

on

India needs to formulate a long-term strategy on China, lest it be lurching from one crisis to another.

Amid rising anti-China sentiment in the aftermath of the bloody border clash with China, India has announced a slew of measures to curtail Chinese presence in the Indian economy. Building on previously imposed restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) from China, the latest round of regulations constitute banning over 200 Chinese apps and clamping down on Chinese investments in Indian startups. These measures, while drawing applause from Western governments such as the US and helping massage the nationalistic ego, have seemingly failed to irk the Chinese administration as much as India would have intended, let alone compel the PLA to pull back from the disputed areas along the long and undemarcated Indo-China border. In previous instances as well, India’s signalling to China of allying more closely with the United States in response to China’s aggressive posture on the border has failed to yield desirable results. This begs the question: why does not China take India seriously? The answer may lie in India’s China policy which can be described as reactive at best and incoherent at worst.

India’s Policy Conundrum

Although its geopolitical rise has been significant – next only to China, India still finds itself bereft of a world order concept or a guiding foreign policy framework. The lack of which, when it comes to dealing with China, has translated into a foreign policy muddle. Mohan Malik, for instance, points out that there are three schools of thought in India’s policy-making with regards to China – pragmatism, hyperrealism, and appeasement. Pragmatists maintain that India should balance China both internally (increasing its economic and military strength w.r.t. China) and externally (by forging alliances and enhancing interstate cooperation with other powers) while mitigating differences through economic and diplomatic engagement. Hyperrealists decry pragmatists’ optimism that increased trade and economic engagement can win over a territorially unsatiated China and instead argue for an unabashed encirclement strategy towards it with other China-wary powers. Appeasers posit that China is a benign and friendly power, meaning no harm to India and that it should be enthusiastically engaged. In trying to accommodate such plethora of views in dealing with China, successive Indian governments have found themselves muddling through one approach to another.

Current Government and Policy Flip-Flops

Following the Galwan clash, India appears to be hinting at a change of tack as evinced by India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s repeated assertions that realism should shape India’s China policy and that peace and tranquillity on the border cannot be separated from the overall architecture of bilateral ties. India’s slashing of Chinese presence in the Indian economy suggests a move in that direction. China’s rather staid response to India’s manoeuvres stems from a general under appreciation of Indian resolve to follow through on such a policy initiative. China’s belief in Indian irresoluteness is not without basis either. The new dispensation led by Narendra Modi started off by trying to bring the “pragmatic” element more into play in India’s dealings with China. To this end, it resorted to a two-pronged strategy of bolstering strategic ties with other regional partners alarmed by China’s newfound boldness such as Vietnam, Japan, Indonesia, Australia among others and spurred up defense and strategic ties with the US, while simultaneously trying to improve relations with China by enhancing bilateral trade (which was already heavily-tilted in China’s favour). However, relations nosedived with the Doklam standoff in June 2017 which lasted for over three months. Cognizant of its power differential with China, and therefore not keen on antagonizing it any further, India broached the idea of organizing an informal summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and India’s PM Narendra Modi. As the two leaders met in picturesque Wuhan, India had by then made up its mind to drop the “pragmatic” yet somewhat “confrontational” approach and decided in favour of going full throttle with appeasement vis-à-vis China. Following the summit, the Indian government scaled down its contact with the Tibet’s India-based government-in-exile and refused to back Australia’s bid to participate in the annual Malabar exercise. What exactly did India hope to achieve with such tactics is anyone’s guess as China continued to brazenly oppose India’s membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and block India’s efforts to get Pakistan-based terrorist Masood Azhar admitted to the UN Sanctions list – eventually relenting on the latter (courtesy of US pressure) while continuing to hyphenate India’s cause with Pakistan’s in the case of former.

A Long History of Fluctuating China Policy

As a matter of fact, the blame for such a vacillating policy cannot be squarely put at Modi’s doorsteps. Historical precedents abound where previous Indian governments too have struggled to come up with a comprehensive and coherent strategy on China. Notable examples include Jawaharlal Nehru’s flip-flops on China threat which not only cost India loss of territory but also resulted in a personal loss of face for Nehru. Some twenty-five years later, Rajiv Gandhi who showed remarkable courage in standing up to the Chinese challenge in a serious military provocation along the eastern flank of the LAC let go of the chance to articulate India’s long-term strategy vis-à-vis China and instead sought a quick return to normalcy in bilateral ties following his visit to Beijing in 1988. A decade later, AB Vajpayee, after having justified India’s nuclear tests as a response to Chinese nuclear weapons, ended up describing China as a “good neighbour” in his address at the Peking University only a couple of years later. Indeed, India’s foreign policy history is riddled with complacency on the part of successive Indian governments in dealing with its largest neighbour, and a continual cause of strategic concern.

It is clear that unless India does away with policy ad-hocism and sticks with a clear, long-term China policy,it would not be able to effect a change in China’s attitude towards itself. In this regard, Jaishankar’s recoupling of economic and trade ties with the larger border question is a welcome move, but a lot would depend on how determined India is to persevere through the demanding nature of realpolitik.

Notes:

  1. Mohan Malik’s article on three schools of thought on India’s China policy: accessible at: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a591916.pdf

Continue Reading

East Asia

India-China Relations: A Turbulent Future?

Leoni Connah

Published

on

On the 10th May 2020, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a cross-border dispute in Sikkim. After built up tensions, a month later another clash began in The Galwan Valley. By September, shots had been fired for the first time in over 40 years. Such confrontations are the worst India and China have seen in recent years. Although face-offs between the two sides are not uncommon, border disputes do pose a challenge for Indian and Chinese security. Also, their economic relationship could be strained if the two rising giants do not resolve their territorial dispute. Therefore, this article looks at the recent tensions between the two states and considers what this means for the future of their bilateral relationship.

Where did it Begin?

The Sino-Indian war took place in 1962, when Indian and Chinese troops fought over the Himalayan territory of Aksai Chin. Aksai Chin is located between Tibet, Xinjiang and Ladakh and territory was the primary cause of the war, as well as other issues including sporadic violence. China had gradually exerted its influence over Aksai Chin for four years before the war. At the time, India placed its forces along the border, but China’s strategy was to launch a full-blown attack. China’s standpoint was that the territory they were fighting over was deemed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and they should have sovereignty over it. As India’s strategy was one of defence, they were outnumbered and lacked sufficient weaponry. Therefore, they suffered heavy casualties with many of the army killed, wounded, missing and captured. The war lasted until China announced a unilateral ceasefire on 21stNovember 1962.India was left defeated and humiliated as it was never prepared for a war with China. Until 1962, India had always focused on the security threat posed by Pakistan and had the upper hand militarily.

Cross-border Disputes

Since the 1962 war there have occurred numerous infrequent stand-offs between Indian armed forces and Chinese armed forces along the disputed territory. There is a competitive nature between the two states whereby these stand-offs become an opportunity to militarily flex their muscles. Episodes occurred in Northern Ladakh in 2013 and Eastern Ladakh in 2014. In 2017, the situation escalated when China attempted to form a road that would extend its border into India. India opposed this and feared that if the road was built, China would have increased access to the Siliguri Corridor, also known as the ‘chicken’s neck’. This is a highly contentious area for India as they believe it is a strategic asset to them because it connects the North Eastern states to the mainland. The high-altitude stand-off lasted for over a month. In September 2019, another violent clash took place near the Pangong Tso (lake), an area that China has control over two thirds of. The most recent disputes involved pushing, shoving, fists, wooden clubs, and stone throwing. The skirmish in May resulted in 11 injured in total, 4 Indian forces and 7 Chinese forces. It was resolved by local brigadier-level sector commanders who were able to discuss the tensions and come to a resolution. However, the clash in June saw 20 Indian soldiers dead and up to 40 Chinese casualties. In late July, it was believed that troops were withdrawing from the border region. However, this remained incomplete and throughout August and September, Indian troops were continuing to deploy along the LAC. For over 40 years, no bullets were fired in these skirmishes because of the de facto border code that prohibits the use of firearms. However, this changed in September when the first shots were fired. The most recent disputes are believed to have been triggered by a disagreement over the location of Chinese observation towers and tents. It seems, tensions have been building since India’s revocation of Article 370 in 2019 and China’s resistance against India’s infrastructure plans in the borderlands.

A Turbulent Future?

In 2018, PM Modi and President Jinping agreed to maintain peace along the border at the Wuhan summit. India and China’s collective economies make up over 17% of the entire global economy. Also, China is India’s primary trading partner with annual trade worth $92 billion. They have attempted to increase cooperation and build confidence measures by undertaking joint projects including a training program for Afghan diplomats and reviving the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor. However, these efforts are undermined by the pervasive feeling of distrust between the two states and the echoes of Cold War history. Also, the summits and efforts of cooperation have not stopped the outbreaks of violence, nor have they solved any of the underlying issues. Underlying issues that strain the Sino-Indian relationship include nuclear weapons, China’s support for Pakistan, the situation in Tibet and India’s sheltering of the Dalai Lama, the Chinese navy making an appearance in Indian waters and Indian foreign policy. The Covid-19 pandemic has added pressure to Sino-Indian relations as the Indian general public blame China for the outbreak thus causing an anti-China sentiment. Both states have downplayed the recent stand-off’s as short-term and temporary incidents. However, if relations continue to sour over territorial boundaries and the border remains unresolved, this could compromise their economic relationship. To prevent prolonged crisis, China would need to withdraw its aggressive position voluntarily through peaceful negotiations with India. India could attempt a forceful removal of Chinese forces, but that would lead to increased escalation. Further, India should tread with caution as neighbouring countries including Sri Lanka and Nepal are becoming increasingly supportive of China. In other words, unless India and China find a way to trust each other, it is highly likely that they will be pushed to the brink of war once again.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Energy News1 hour ago

Countries Raise the Sails on Offshore Renewables Sector

Offshore renewables, including offshore wind, wave, tidal, ocean thermal, and floating solar PV, will witness substantial growth in capacity over...

Reports3 hours ago

2020 Deloitte-NASCIO Cybersecurity Study Highlights Imperatives for State Governments

Deloitte and The National Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO) released their 2020 Cybersecurity Study, “States at Risk: The...

Americas4 hours ago

U.S. versus China, and U.S. versus Russia

The main ideological conflict in the world used to be between capitalism versus communism. After the end of the Soviet...

Defense5 hours ago

Could a maritime chain hub between US-Japan-Viet Nam-India to tackle China?

The rise of China in the last few years has been a cause of concern and as China grew economically,...

Africa7 hours ago

‘We want justice for these girls’: The Kenyan helpline for victims of gender violence

Around four million girls worldwide suffer female genital mutilation every year. Although it is forbidden in Kenya, COVID-19 has led...

Health & Wellness9 hours ago

COVID-19: ‘Little or no’ benefit from trials of anti-virals

Latest results from a UN-coordinated international trial on four COVID-19 therapeutic drugs, indicate that they have “little or no” positive impact on preventing deaths in patients...

Human Rights10 hours ago

Cindy Sirinya Bishop new UN Women Regional Goodwill Ambassador for Asia Pacific

Thai celebrity and rights activist Cindy Sirinya Bishop is working to stop violence and other abuses against women as the newly...

Trending