Connect with us

South Asia

India-Iran Relations and the U.S. Factor

Published

on

Authors: Muneeb Yousuf and Tariq Ahmad Lone*

In the wake of changing regional dynamics, India-Iran relations have occupied greater significance. The relations between India and Iran can be traced back to 1950 when both signed a Treaty of Friendship and Perpetual Peace. However, Iran’s joining of Baghdad pact in 1954 and the Cold War politics separated New Delhi and Tehran in converging their relations until 1990s. The Islamic revolution that swept through Iran in 1979, followed by hostage of U.S. diplomats, Iran-Iraq War and Tehran’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas among others increasingly led to a range of political and economic sanctions, thereby isolating Iran at the global level.

After the end of the Cold War which led to the breakdown of erstwhile Soviet Union a ‘new world order’ began to shape. The end of the Cold-War drastically transformed the bi-polarity of World Politics which had ensued for nearly four decades, setting the ground for a ‘new order’ that initially looked unipolar in character but with passage of time facilitated the rise of new global powers like China–– a multipolar one. After the end of the Cold War, Liberalization, Globalization and Privatization got momentum. India’s internal economic pressures and taking cue from the changing world, India also opened its economy. That does not signify that the new world only ushered benefits and opportunities, also new challenges that were exceedingly new to the modern states.

In the 1990s the interests of both India and Iran converged around energy, Central Asia and security mostly around Pakistan-Afghanistan region. The relations began to shape up in the early 1990s and India and Iran’s relations finally began its strides in post-2002 after both entered into a defense cooperation agreement. Those relations continued with fluctuations in between due to the recurrent hostile relations between the U.S. and Iran. Tehran’s strategic aim for developing nuclear weapons has come under strong criticism from the Trump regime leading to greater sanctions. Iran is also seen as a major regional threat by many Gulf neighbors including Israel. The larger political and economic sanctions that the Trump regime has imposed on Iran, has led pressure on New Delhi to curb diplomatic ties with Iran. While pressures from India’s allies hinder the cultivation of greater relations with Tehran, New Delhi has never completely curtailed engagement with the former.  As it could be argued that New Delhi is treading a fine path despite Tehran’s strong and persistent criticism from Washington. New Delhi’s policy of not parting ways with Tehran is guided in the rationale of geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic interests in the region for which Iran is an indispensable player.

Iran: The connecting Link for India’s Extended Neighborhood

Iran is not only geo-economically important for India per se but also places a connecting link between India and its extended neighborhood-gulf region and Central Asia. Iran’s Chabahar port is vital for India’s geopolitical interests not only in West Asia but also in Afghanistan and Central Asia that is part of India’s extended neighborhood. The importance of the port has significantly increased due to China’s bid to increase its influence in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood through “Belt Road Initiative” and “cheque book” diplomacy and investment on ports like Gwadar. Keeping in view the significance of Chabahar port, New Delhi has invested huge money on the Chabahar port. In December 2018,in a concrete step towards India’s role in Chabahar Port expansion, India Ports Global Limited company opened its office in Chabahar and took over operations at the Shaheed Beheshti port at the Iranian city. The port will provide seal and connectivity to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

India and Iran have committed for the “prosperity through greater connectivity.” Moreover, the focus of the bilateral relations between Tehran and New Delhi is on bilateral cooperation in the fields of energy, trade, connectivity and promotion of people to people contacts. India and Iran along with Afghanistan have trilateral agreement on the development of Chabahar port. The trilateral agreement is motivated to promote connectivity and economic development of the region particularly Afghanistan. Iran has a critical role in India’s emergence as a great power. It is not crucial for securing India’s economic interests but also crucial to increase India’s influence in its extended neighbourhood in westwards which include gulf region and Central Asia. Iran is critical for India’s access to Central Asia and Afghanistan and can help in mitigating China’s growing influence among India’s neighbors.  In an endeavor to consolidate India’s presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia, Tehran plays a pivotal role.

Geo-economic Significance of Iran for India

Iran’s economy is considered as an economy with a large hydrocarbon sector. Iran’s has abundant energy resources with significant oil and natural gas reserves which are second in the world after Russia. India and Iran’s economic ties accelerated following the opening of India’s economy in the early 1990s. However, due to US sanctions on Iran in 2014, the trade has decreased dramatically to the lowest. As per the Exim Bank India Report, India’s imports from Iran are dominated by crude oil, accounting for 85.9 per cent of India’s total imports from Iran. In 2014, India was the second-largest market for Iran’s exports of crude oil…India has steadily cut imports from Iran as the sanctions from the US and other Western countries blocked payment channels and crippled shipping routes.India’s economic interests in Iran are mainly attached to energy and connectivity to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

The bilateral trade between India and Iran during 2017-18 was US Dollars 13.76 billion. The trade was in 2016-17 US dollars 12.89 billion. Bilateral trade has increased by 6.8% as compared to 2016-17. Indian exports increased by 11.4% and were US dollars 2.7 billion. The imports from Iran also increased by 5.8% and reached to US dollars 11.11 billion. As per Ministry of External Affairs Annual report 2019-20, the bilateral trade between the two reached to US dollars 17.3 billion as compared to US dollars 13.76 billion in 2017-18. This shows an increase of 23.8%. Moreover, Indian exports increased by 32.3% and accounted for US dollars 3.5 billion. Imports from Iran also increased by 21.8% and amounted to US dollars 13.5 billion.  India is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. There is a tremendous increase in the demand for energy in India. Energy is also vital input across all the sectors of the economy. India’s high growth in gross domestic product (GDP) results in a climb in the output of goods and services. As a result, the requirement of energy needs in the country is ever increasing. The energy consumption in India is fourth biggest after China, United States of America and Russia. India’s contribution is more than any other country to the estimated rise in worldwide energy demand. In 2040 demographic expansion makes India the world’s most populous state. As per the Global Investment & Business Center report 2015, “Oil demand increases by more than in any other country, approaching 10 million barrels per day (Mb/d) by 2040. India steps up its deployment of renewables, led by solar power, for which India becomes the world’s second-largest market. Three-quarters of Indian energy demand is met by fossil fuels, a share that has been rising as households gradually move away from the traditional use of solid biomass for cooking…India was the world’s third-largest importer of crude oil in 2014 but is also a major exporter of oil products.”

As per the India’s energy outlook report 2015, natural gas consumption triples to 175 cm (although, at 8% in 2040, it still plays a relatively limited role in the overall energy mix)…This mainstay of the rural energy economy is the primary cooking fuel for some 840 million people in India today; its use in traditional stoves is a major cause of indoor air pollution and premature death. Its gradual (albeit not complete) displacement by alternative fuels in our projections to 2040 is achieved thanks to rising incomes and supportive policies; these include one of the world’s largest cash transfer programs, which subsidizes the purchase of LPG cylinders via payments to individual bank accounts, rather than via an intervention affecting end-user prices…India’s urbanization is a key driver of energy trends: an additional 315 million people are expected to live in India’s cities by 2040. This transition has wide ranging effects on energy use, accelerating the switch to modern fuels, the rise in the appliance and vehicle ownership and pushing up demand for construction materials.

The challenge for India will be to set up long term supplies at reasonable prices as anchor gas customers-fertilizer and power industries- may not be able to pay market determined prices.Iran, the repository of huge gas reserves, can ensure increasing India’s LPG demand. To meet the growing demand for energy and sustain the growth rate of economy India needs to plan the sources of the energy supply. Iran is one of the countries that can meet India’s increasing demand for energy resources like crude oil and natural gas. Iran is not only in proximity with India, but India has geopolitical and geostrategic significance for India.

Geopolitical and Geostrategic Significance of Iran for India

India and China are emerging simultaneously as great powers. Consequently, their interests are conflicting at various levels in their immediate neighborhood and Indian Ocean region- strategically and geopolitically vital to global powers. Both want their influence in Iran and around the region. Both pursue the connectivity projects to gain a strong foothold in the immediate and extended neighborhood. China is focusing on the revival of the ancient silk route through its belt road initiative. India, on the other hand, is pursuing connectivity projects like Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). These efforts are motivated to connect Central Asia and Afghanistan. Both these regions are gaining significance since the 1991 development in the international order. The changing world order has led to the emergence of important geographical locations and Central Asia is one among them, that emerged after the collapse of the erstwhile Soviet Union 1991. On the other hand, Afghanistan, geo-strategically very vital, became the important country particularly after the 9/11 attacks in the USA. The region was the part of the “Great Game” between Russia and British empires in the 19th century. The region came into limelight again after the conspicuous withdrawal of the USA from Afghanistan. As it is expected to emerge as a power vacuum in Afghanistan for which already significant movements have begun on the part of great powers like China, Russia, Pakistan. India is more concerned about the post-US withdrawal from Afghanistan due to the larger national security attached to the region. India lacks direct connectivity with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Therefore, Iran becomes vital for India to secure its interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Moreover, to reduce Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan, combat extremist groups and contain strategic encirclement by China, Iran can play a vital role. Despite India has all these vital interests attached to Iran, external pressures and internal challenges have constrained India’s relations with Tehran. New Delhi faces a challenge of chasing a side with USA or Iran in times of bitter hostility between the two.

Iran-India cooperation is critical for their mutual interests in a transitional world. However, their relations are sometimes shadowed by the Indo-US proximity. US-India proximity is motivated primarily to protect US interests in India and India’s neighbourhood.  The conspicuous USA withdrawal from Afghanistan after the Doha Deal between USA and Afghanistan Taliban, there is an apprehension of Civil war and instability in Afghanistan. The US wants India’s presence in Kabul to fight terrorism and to strengthen the civilian government. However, this is not possible without the proper access of India to Afghanistan. India has access to Afghanistan via Pakistan and Iran. The hostile relations with Pakistan will not allow it to reach Pakistan. But Iran is critical in India’s presence and influence in Afghanistan. That is why the USA waive sanctions on India’s investment on Chabahar. Moreover, waiver was obtained from the US which enabled the continued imports of Iranian oil and separate mechanisms were evolved for payments and marine insurance.”

India seems reluctant to work with Iran after the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal. India not only stopped purchasing Iranian oil in May 2019 but also reduced budget on the investment on Chabahar. Soltaninejad, Assistant professor in, the University of Tehran argues that “Tehran is convinced that India cannot be the partner it needs to counter US sanctions”. India owes its rising power status, in part, to its increasingly close relationship with the United States. No matter how valuable Iran is for India, New Delhi would not endanger its relations with Washington for the sake of preserving its friendship with Tehran. Soltaninejad further argued that “although Iranians are well aware that Beijing would not sacrifice its relations with the United States for its partnership with Iran, they still believe that China will support Iran more strongly than India”. China’s continuing trade with Iran and the purchase of Iranian oil is proof of that. From an Iranian perspective, China’s rise is quite different from that of India’s. India’s economic and military development contributes more to preserving the pro-US international status quo, while China’s rise is seen to come at the cost of the United States’ global position and points towards a balanced global power distribution. However, Iran is well aware of the risks of its proximity to China and does not want to be over-dependent on China.

Conclusion

Ever since Donald Trump has come to power in Washington, the so-called liberal international order has witnessed divergence from the key path. Some analysts have better called it a ‘fuzzy order’. As the New Delhi strives to increase its political influence in its immediate neighborhood and also shape up ‘the emerging regional structures’, it becomes essential for New Delhi to tread a fine path. A multilateral approach in its foreign policy will remain key for New Delhi’s road to major power. India has been caught in a quagmire of balancing the relations between both Washington and Tehran and it cannot afford to embrace one at the cost of others. And here, balancing its relations both with Washington and Tehran with due care for its interests will determine India’s political trajectory. In the level of analysis framework, good relations with Tehran will not only enfeeble Pakistan’s greater strategic depth in Afghanistan but will also provide leverage to New Delhi in deciding the things in Kabul–– a push for a say in the emerging regional situation. On the other hand, a good relationship with Washington will provide good incentives and a vital push for New Delhi to be an important player of the current order. The end of the “Cold War” has certainly ushered a new political order where states need to engage multilaterally and realizing this situation, New Delhi is sending the political message to both Washington and Tehran of cultivating better relations with both despite a greater tension between the two.

*Tariq Ahmad Lone is a Doctoral Candidate at Academy of International Studies, New Delhi.

Muneeb Yousuf is a Doctoral Candidate at Academy of International Studies, New Delhi. He tweets at @MuneebYousuf6

South Asia

Opposing Hindutava: US conference raises troubling questions

Published

on

Controversy over a recent ‘Dismantling Global Hindutava’ conference that targeted a politically charged expression of Hindu nationalism raises questions that go far beyond the anti-Muslim discriminatory policies of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government and ruling party.

The conference and responses to it highlight a debilitating deterioration in the past two decades, especially since 9/11, of the standards of civility and etiquette that jeopardize civil, intelligent, and constructive debate and allow expressions of racist, Islamophobic and anti-Semitic attitudes to become mainstream.

Organizers of the conference that was co-sponsored by 53 American universities, including Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, Columbia, Berkeley, University of Chicago, University of Pennsylvania and Rutgers, insisted that they distinguish between Hinduism and Hindutava, Mr. Modi’s notion of Hindu nationalism that enables discrimination against and attacks on India’s 200 million Muslims.

The distinction failed to impress critics who accused the organizers of Hinduphobia. Some critics charged that the framing of the conference demonstrated a pervasiveness of groupthink in academia and an unwillingness to tackle similar phenomena in other major religions, particularly Islam.

The campaign against the conference appeared to have been organized predominantly by organizations in the United States with links to militant right-wing Hindu nationalist groups in India, including some with a history of violence. The conference’s most militant critics threatened violence against conference speakers and their families, prompting some participants to withdraw from the event.

Opponents of political Islam noted that Western academia has not organized a similar conference about the politicization of the faith even though powerful states like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have lobbied Western capitals against the Muslim Brotherhood and its Turkish and Qatari supporters with notable successes in France, Austria, Belgium and Britain.

Academia was likely to have been hesitant to tackle political Islam because Islamophobia is far more prevalent than Hinduphobia.

Moreover, perceptions of political Islam, are far more complex and convoluted. Islam is frequently conflated with political expressions and interpretations of the faith run a gamut from supremacist and conservative to more liberal and tolerant. They also lump together groups that adhere and respect the election process and ones that advocate violent jihad.

Scholars and analysts declared an end to political Islam’s heyday with the military coup in Egypt in 2013 that toppled Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brother, who was elected president in Egypt’s first and only free and fair poll. Political Islam’s alleged swansong loomed even larger with this year’s setbacks for two of the most moderate Islamist political parties in Tunisia and Morocco as well as hints that Turkey may restrict activities of Islamists operating in exile from Istanbul.

A more fundamental criticism of the framing of the Hindutava conference is its failure to put Hindutava in a broader context.

That context involves the undermining of the social cohesion of societies made up of collections of diverse ethnic and religious communities since Osama bin Laden’s 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington.

The attacks fueled the rise of ultra-nationalism and politicized expressions of religious ultra-conservatism not only in the Hindu world but also in the worlds of other major religions.

These include politicized ultra-conservative Islam, politicized Evangelism and Buddhist nationalism. Right-wing religious nationalism in Israel, unlike Islamism and politicized Evangelism, is shaped by ultra-nationalism rather than religious ultra-conservatism.

The worlds of religious ultra-nationalism and politicized expressions of religious ultra-conservatism are often mutually reinforcing.

Scholar Cynthia Miller-Idriss’s assessment of the impact of Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks on the United States is equally true for India or Europe.

“In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the rise of violent jihadism reshaped American politics in ways that created fertile ground for right-wing extremism. The attacks were a gift to peddlers of xenophobia, white supremacism, and Christian nationalism: as dark-skinned Muslim foreigners bent on murdering Americans, Al-Qaeda terrorists and their ilk seemed to have stepped out of a far-right fever dream,” Ms. Miller-Idriss said.

“Almost overnight, the United States and European countries abounded with precisely the fears that the far-right had been trying to stoke for decades,” she added.

The comparison of politically charged militant nationalist and ultra-conservative expressions of diverse religions takes on added significance in a world that has seen the emergence of civilizationalist leaders.

Scholar Sumantra Bose attributes the rise of religious nationalism in non-Western states like Turkey and India to the fact that they never adopted the Western principle of separation of state and church.

Instead, they based their secularism on the principle of state intervention and regulation of the religious sphere. As a result, the rejection of secularism in Turkey and India fits a global trend that conflates a dominant religious identity with national identity.

Sarah Kamali, the author of a recently published book that compares militant white nationalists to militant Islamists in the United States, notes similar patterns while drawing parallels between far-right xenophobes and militant Islamists.

Militant Islamists’ “sense of victimhood […] is similar to that of their White nationalist counterparts in that [it] is constructed and exploited to justify their violence… Both mutually – and exclusively – target America for the purpose of claiming the nation as theirs and theirs alone, either as a White ethno-state or as part of a global caliphate,” Ms. Kamali writes.

Similarly, the Taliban defeat of a superpower energized militant Islamists, as well as proponents of Hindutava, with Islamophobic narratives spun by Mr. Modi’s followers gaining new fodder with the assertion that India was being encircled by Muslim states hosting religious extremists.

Modi is essentially helping the recruitment of…jihadist groups by taking such a hard, repressive line against the Islamic community in India, who are now being forced to see themselves being repressed,” said Douglas London, the CIA’s counter-terrorism chief for South and South-West Asia until 2019.

Continue Reading

South Asia

Panjshir – the last stronghold of democracy in Afghanistan

Published

on

The Taliban’s rapid advance in Afghanistan has briefly stalled only in the face of strong resistance mounted by the people of the country’s recalcitrant mountainous province of Panjshir. Whoever controls the region’s passes controls the routes leading to China and Tajikistan, but to seize this mountain valley and, most importantly, to keep it permanently under control has always been a problem for all invaders. Eager to let the international community see for the first time in 40 years a united Afghanistan as a sign of their final victory, the radical Islamists were prepared to make any sacrifices, including filling the approaches to the Panjshir Valley up with dead bodies. Moreover, the Taliban’s longtime ally Pakistan, which, regardless of its status of an ally of the United States, has provided them with direct military support. In fact, Islamabad admitted its less than successful role when it proposed signing a truce to find and take out the bodies of its special Ops forces who had died during the attack on the valley. However, drones flown by Pakistani operators, professional commandos (possibly once trained by the Americans), air support and other pleasant gifts from the allies eventually bore fruit letting the Taliban be photographed in front of the mausoleum of Ahmad Shah Massoud Sr., the famous “Lion of Panjshir,” who controlled the valley from 1996 to 2001. The Islamists also took control of the province’s central city of Bazarak.

Having deprived the province much of its Internet access, the radicals, who control most of the Afghan territory, found it easier to wage an information war. Their claims of victories were now more difficult to contest, even though information about their retreat did reach the outside world. Reflective of the heavy losses suffered for the first time by the Taliban and their allies – the Haqqani Network and other remnants of al-Qaeda, as well as by the regular Pakistani army is the brief truce arranged by Islamabad. Looks like the mountain passes leading to Panjshir were literally filled up with corpses…

As for Massoud Jr., the young lion of Panjshir, and his supporters, they retreated to the mountains. In fact, they had nowhere to fall back to. The problem of Afghanistan is its ethnic diversity. Thus, the country is home to 23 percent of ethnic Tajiks, most of whom live in the Panjshir Valley. However, the Taliban rely mainly on the Pashtuns, who account for over 50 percent of the country’s population. As for the new masters of Afghanistan, they are ready to carry out ethnic cleansings and even commit outright genocide in order to bring the valley into submission. To make this happen they are going to resettle there their fellow Pashtun tribesmen. Local men aged between 12 and 50 are already being taken away and, according to the National Resistance Front, no one has seen them again. However, due to the information blockade, the Taliban will not hesitate to refute such facts. One thing is clear: Massoud’s Tajik fighters and the government troops that joined them are fighting for their lives, and there will be no honorable surrender!

The main question now is whether the young lion of Panjshir will receive the same support as his father once did, or will find himself without ammunition and food. After all, the Taliban leaders have reached certain agreements with the United States. Suffice it to mention the numerous remarks made, among others, by President Biden himself about the Taliban now being different from what they were 20 years ago.

But no, the Taliban`s remain the same – they have only hired new PR people. Meanwhile, hating to admit their defeat, Brussels and Washington will have to engage in a dialogue with those who are responsible for the tragedy of September 11, 2001, and for the numerous terrorist attacks in Europe. The Taliban are pretending to make minor cosmetic concessions. Minor indeed, since they are still depriving women of the opportunity to work and study, destroying higher and secondary education and brutally clamping down on people who simply do not want to live according to religious norms.

The United States is actually helping the “new-look” Taliban. Their potential opponents, including the famous Marshal Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek, left the country under various guarantees, and Washington is trying to keep them from any further participation in the conflict. Democratic politicians naively believe that by creating an Islamic state and ending the protracted civil war in Afghanistan the Taliban will ensure stability in the region and will not move any further. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan do not think so and are strengthening their borders and preparing to protect their Afghan compatriots, because they know full well that the Taliban`s are not a national political party; they are a radical Islamist ideology.

It knows no borders and spreads like a cancerous tumor, destroying all pockets of Western culture. It can only be stopped by force. However, the two decades of US military presence in Afghanistan showed that Washington, which quickly took control of the country in 2001, simply had no strategy to keep it. The Afghans were given nothing that would appear to them more attractive than the ideas of radical Islam. As a result, the few Afghans who embrace European values are fleeing the country, and those who, like Massoud Jr., decided to fight for their freedom, now risk being left to face their enemy all by themselves.

Continue Reading

South Asia

Misjudgements in India’s Afghan policy

Published

on

India’s Afghan policy has always been obsessed with the desire to deny Pakistan the “strategic depth” that Pakistan, according to India’s perception, yearns. If India had a pragmatic policy, it would not have found itself whimpering and whining like a rueful baby over spilt milk.

India supported the invasion of Afghanistan by both the former Soviet Union and the USA, both losers. President Trump mocked Modi for having built a library for the Afghan people. Trump expected India to contribute foot soldiers, and by corollary, body packs to the Afghan crisis. India played all the tricks up its sleeves to convince the USA to make India a party to the US-Taliban talks. But the USA ditched not only Modi but also Ashraf Ghani to sign the Doha peace deal with the Taliban.

India’s external affairs minister still calls the Taliban government “a dispensation”. Interestingly, the USA has reluctantly accepted that the Taliban government is a de facto government.

Humanitarian crisis

The United Nations’ Development Programme has portrayed a bleak situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is faced with multifarious challenges. These include prolonged drought and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, upheaval caused by the current political transition: frozen foreign reserves, and rising poverty.

About 47 per cent of its people live below the dollar-a-day poverty line. If the poverty line is pushed to $2 a day, 90 per cent of Afghans would be poor. About 55 per cent of Afghans are illiterate.

Ninety seven percent of the population is at risk of sinking below the poverty line, As such, Afghanistan teeters on the brink of universal poverty. Half of the population is already in need of humanitarian support. The UNDP has proposed to access the most vulnerable nine million people by focusing on essential services, local livelihoods, basic income and small infrastructure.

Currently, the gross national product of Afghanistan is around $190 billion, just a little more than the $160 billion economy of Dhaka city. The country’s legal exports of goods and services every year account for $1 billion. It imports$6 billion worth of goods and services every year.

About 80 per cent of world production of opium comes from Afghanistan. Every year, Afghanistan produces nearly 10,000 tons of opium and the revenue generated from it amounts to $7 billion approximately. About 87 per cent of the income of opium producing farmers comes exclusively from this single product. The illicit opium export by Afghanistan is worth $2 billion every year. The role of opium is significant.

About 80 per cent of public expenditure in this country is funded by grants. Since 2002, the World Bank has provided Afghanistan with a total of $5.3 billion as development and emergency relief assistance. The IMF earmarked for Afghanistan $400 million in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) for combating the Covid-19 pandemic in the country.

The United States has frozen about $10 billion worth of Afghan assets held at various banks in Afghanistan. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has withdrawn the $400 million worth of SDRs allocated earlier to Afghanistan for addressing the Covid-19 crisis. The World Bank has not said anything as of yet, but it may also put restrictions on its funding to Afghanistan.

India’s lip service to Afghanistan

India provided around $3 billion in aid to fallen U.S.-backed Afghan government.  It trained the Afghan army and police. But now it is not willing to pay or pledge a penny to the Taliban government. Look at the following Times of India report:

“India did not pledge any money to the Taliban ruled Afghanistan probably for the first time in 20 years. That it has not done so as Jaishanker declared … (At UN, India offers support to Afghanistan but does not pledge money. The Times of India September 14, 2021).The Hindu, September 11, 2021

India’s tirade against Afghanistan

Indian policymakers and experts say they see no guarantees that Afghanistan won’t become a haven for militants. “Afghanistan may be poised to become a bottomless hole for all shades of radical, extremist and jihadi outfits somewhat similar to Iraq and Syria, only closer to India,” said Gautam Mukhopadhaya, who was India’s ambassador in Kabul between 2010 to 2013.  He added that the Taliban victory could have an “inspirational effect” not only for Kashmir’s rebels but wherever religiously-driven groups operate in the broader region… Lt. Gen Deependra Singh Hooda, former military commander for northern India between 2014-2016, said militant groups based across the border in Pakistan would “certainly try and push men” into Kashmir, following the Taliban victory in Afghanistan  (With Taliban’s rise, India sees renewed threat in Kashmir, Star Tribune September 14, 2021). “Meanwhile, Rajnath Singh conveyed to Australian Defence Minister Peter Dutton that the rise of the Taliban raises serious security concerns for India and the region. U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has appealed for an injection of cash into Afghanistan to avoid an economic meltdown that would spark a “catastrophic” situation for the Afghan people and be a “gift for terrorist groups.”). Afghan economic meltdown would be ‘gift for terrorists,’ says U.N. chief” (The Hindu, September 11, 2021)

 India’s former envoy to Kabul, Ambassador Gautam Mukhopadhyay is skeptical of the conciliatory statements by the taliban government. He advises: “We should welcome recent statements by Stanekzai and Anas Haqqani that suggest some independence from the ISI. But we should also ask some hard questions and judge them by their actions and words, and not let down our guard, both with regard to our multiple security concerns such as whether they can protect us from the Ias and ISI, sever ties with other terror groups, especially those supported by the ISI against India, deny Pakistan strategic depth, and preserve and build on our historic P2P and trade ties; and a genuinely inclusive govt in Afghanistan that accommodates the majority of Afghans who want the rights and freedoms enshrined in the 2004 Afghan Constitution or at least acceptable to the Afghan people.” (Taliban move to form govt, Naya Afghanistan brings new challenge for India, September 2, 2021).

Concluding remarks

India wants a “central role’ to be given to the UN in Afghanistan. India’s mumbo jumbo implies that Afghanistan should be made a UN protectorate. Indian media is never tired of calling the Afghan government a bunch of terrorists. They have even launched video games about it.

India needs to rethink how it can mend fences with Afghanistan that it regards a hothouse of terrorists.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Economy31 mins ago

A New Strategy for Ukraine

Authors: Anna Bjerde and Novoye Vremia Four years ago, the World Bank prepared a multi-year strategy to support Ukraine’s development...

Diplomacy3 hours ago

International Relations Amid the Pandemic

We could rest assured that COVID-19 will be defeated, sooner rather than later. The excessive angst and fear we currently...

Environment5 hours ago

‘Tipping point’ for climate action: Time’s running out to avoid catastrophic heating

The temporary reduction in carbon emissions caused by global COVID-19 lockdowns did not slow the relentless advance of climate change....

Finance7 hours ago

Dubai Chamber Continues Bolstering Economic Ties Between UAE And Africa

United Arab Emirates has launched its 6th edition of Global Business Forum Africa (GBF Africa) that aims at scaling-up and...

International Law9 hours ago

The rise & rise of populist demagogues in democratic nations

The term dictators & demagogues are used interchangeably in various contexts but there’s a difference, the former rules over a...

Defense11 hours ago

A Glimpse at China’s Nuclear Build-Up

The People’s Republic of China is now the second largest military spender after the United States, and the country has...

Development13 hours ago

Better Targeting of Social Protection Programs can Significantly Reduce Poverty in Bangladesh

Social Protection Programs remain central to Bangladesh’s sustainable development policy and are progressively benefitting the poorer households. By improving targeting...

Trending