Defense

To Sequestrate, or Not to Sequestrate: The Impact of Covid-19 on Military Budgets

Published

3 years ago

April 12, 2020

Ilya Kramnik

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic combined with the resulting economic crisis is already affecting behaviors of most countries in the world, including leading military powers. Thus, the adjustment of state expenditures, such as military budgets, is almost unavoidable in this situation. At the same time, a number of countries will inevitably try to support their technology leaders, as a rule, major weapons and equipment manufacturers included. This article attempts to forecast possible reactions of the planet’s military leaders with a focus on their priorities in the event of a deepening crisis.

In case of positive developments (i.e. limited damages and the rapid economic recovery), military programs on all sides stay practically intact and more attention is given to the automation of some processes and further “depopulation” of the military sphere.

An interim option suggests that the global restoration will last a few years and only the United States can avoid serious revisions by taking advantage of its position as the issuer of the world currency; however, some plans will likely be revised in favor of more effective employment and development of the national industry.

A negative scenario involves a serious collapse, including a number of global financial corporations becoming bankrupt. Behaviors of the military leaders and countries of the Second or Third Echelon will differ dramatically: the latter will practically stop the procurement of new equipment and in some cases be forced to make substantial reductions in the armed forces; the former will consider the military industry, first of all, in the context of saving their own economies, which implies significant changes in priorities, the preservation of serial productions of equipment, albeit in reduced production volumes, and the slow-down of expensive and promising R&D, which in early stages mainly generates costs.

The USA: More Money for Each and Every One!

The U.S. behavior in financing military programs will generally be determined by its macroeconomic policy, which so far has been within the expected range: the Federal Reserve has already announced extensive new measures to support the economy, including the explicitly stated program of supporting a generous lending to businesses. US President Donald Trump, in turn, decides against the nation-wide quarantine in order to ensure the functioning of economy, though, a final decision on this issue is yet to be made.

Given statements made and the memorandum issued by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord on the need to maintain the production of armaments and military equipment, it can be assumed that the United States, at least in the nearest future, intends not to reduce its military production programs.

Nevertheless, the memorandum outlines some priorities and the following areas were identified in this capacity: aerospace; mechanical and software engineers; manufacturing/production workers; IT support; security staff; intelligence support; aircraft and weapons systems mechanics and maintainers; suppliers of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals; and critical transportation.

Based on these priorities, it can be concluded that, most likely, all programs on upgrading the U.S. Air Force as well as space programs will be preserved. In addition, existing contracts concluded for the production of military equipment for other types of armed forces will be executed in order to provide support for production enterprises. At the same time, it is possible that some R&D expenses will be reduced in early stages of the cycle as they require substantial funds and not give a large number of jobs and man-hours in the short term.

This approach cannot be called new. A support for the economy through government spending, including the military one, was characteristic of the American leadership in the midst of the Great Depression in the early 1930s. The economic crisis did not obstruct financing of the construction of almost two dozen cruisers, four aircraft carriers, and a large number of ships of other classes for the U.S. Navy during this period; at the same time, the polit-military situation at that moment did not necessitate strengthened procurement; however, a few projects in initial stages of development were put on hold, which subsequently led to a shortage of modern equipment in the U.S. Army and military aviation in the first period of World War II.

The key difference with the current situation is the transition of priorities from the fleet to the Air Force and the space group. The fleet can still get its share in the form of increasing the production volume of existing types of ships and vessels. Previously announced plans to increase the number of U.S. Navy ships of main classification types to 355 are likely to remain in the category of intentions, especially taking into account the probable early disposal of various obsolete assets and the ability to order new ones to replace them.

Russia: Revising Priorities

Given the general economic environment, the situation for Russia is different: the ruble is not a world currency or a universal medium of exchange, which limits possibilities of supporting the national economy by emission methods, the way the United States is trying to do. A fall in budget revenues, due both to the collapse of oil prices and the reduction in tax revenues because of the economic downturn aggravated by the current pandemic, will inevitably require a revision of the state armament program priorities, even if nominal costs do not change.

Taking into account the traditional prioritization of the Russian military development in the post-Soviet period, objects of the defense spending sequestration are totally clear. Most likely programs for the Navy, which is already at the bottom of the military priorities pyramid, will be reviewed, including the development of new projects of capital ships (the new generation of aircraft carriers and Leader-class destroyers) and the reduction in infrastructure renovation costs in several districts, such as the Arctic. The program of modernization of ships and submarines built in 1980–1990s is also at risk, given the previous tendency to exceed funding figures and shift work timeframes. In face of quarantine measures, plans to construct new ships within the framework of the state defense order for 2020 are sure to be tilted.

Land forces are also among the likeliest victims. The high cost of finalizing and launching a series of new models of armored vehicles on promising Armata, Kurganets, and Boomerang platforms has already forced lifting the large-scale production of these vehicles, and they again become the first in line for budget cuts in the current situation. At the same time, artillery weapon modernization programs will most probably be unaffected, given the growing role of long-range artillery systems equipped with the guided ammunition and the target designation from unmanned aerial vehicles, among other things.

The nuclear deterrence and aerospace forces remain as priorities for the Russian military construction, but a revision of expenditures is inevitable here too. In the area of strategic nuclear forces, projects for the revival of railway-based ICBM most likely will be canceled. They are currently represented by Barguzin ICBM, the need and serial prospects of which have repeatedly arose doubts. Developing the Burevestnik nuclear-armed cruise missile with a nuclear propulsion system will be certainly postponed (if not completely canceled). At the same time, serial productions of ballistic missiles Yars and Bulava, as well as Sarmat, all of which are in late stages of development, will continue per program.

As of procurement for the aerospace forces, the first to suffer will be early-stage developments: promising Long-Range Aviation and Transport Aviation branches (PAK DA, PAK TA). A reduction of funding is also possible for a number of other projects, such as the upgrade of Su-30 fighter aircrafts and Su-34 bomber/strike aircrafts, the development of a promising medium military transport aircraft, the new product family of Marine Corps helicopters, etc. At the same time, the military department and the industry leadership will probably strive to maintain the serial production of modern aircrafts, so the termination of the procurement of aircrafts under construction is implausible.

With respect to air defense and missile defense technologies, the S-500 missile system, encountering high expectations as a promising air defense/missile defense weapon in the theater of operations, will certainly go into serial production. A shift to the right is also possible for the large-scale delivery of S-350, a non-critical element in the Russian air defense system production line, as its range of operations is covered by other systems from above and from below.

Space vehicles will inevitably preserve, and possibly improve, their positions in the priority list, given the vital role of space reconnaissance, navigation, and communications in ensuring the country’s defense capabilities, as well as prospects for the deployment of anti-satellite weapons by leading global actors. In this regard, the development of electronic technologies for space military equipment almost unavoidably becomes a top priority, the procurement of imported equipment being even more complicated than ever before.

To the detriment of traditional weapon systems, the share of spending for unmanned vehicles, especially battlefield UAVs, will significantly increase on account of capabilities they have demonstrated in local conflicts, particularly in Syria. The availability of workable reconnaissance-strike systems, including reconnaissance-strike UAVs, space-based systems, long-range artilleries, and the aviation with high-precision weapons, can drastically reduce the number of traditional weapons systems needed to solve most tasks on the battlefield.

Europe: At Whose Expense?

Military budgets of European countries are very difficult to compare, primarily because expenditures of Germany, the top 5 world economy, for instance, and Estonia, one of the world’s smallest economies, are formed on the basis of completely different priorities. European countries in the Second or Third Echelon have already begun to reduce military spending during the ongoing crisis, for example, the Czech Republic envisages postponing the purchase of military equipment worth CZK 2.9 billion (about USD 120 million). Defense budget corrections are expected in other NATO countries as well. At the same time, Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg encouraged the member states not just to maintain but even increase their military spending.

Potential effects of the current crisis on the stability and prospects of the NATO Alliance as a whole is a separate topic worthy of reflection, but within the framework of this article a primary focus will be given to expected behaviors of European countries and leaders of the Alliance, whose military spending can be a tool to save their own and the pan-European economy.

From this point of view, one should await a reduction in expenditures for exercises, as not creating additional jobs their costs only bring losses in a crisis situation. The ongoing pandemic has already led to such a reduction by forcing to cancel scheduled series of NATO exercises, and given economic prospects, no one is expecting large-scale exercises the following year.

NATO leaders will also have to solve the complicated issue of supporting their arms and military equipment manufacturers, that is technology leaders of the European industry, and this pie will need to be cut for several eaters at once. The simplest case is Great Britain, which stopped being a EU member this year, as the support of BAE Systems is its, and partly the U.S.’s, national task; however, within the continental Europe the competition among manufacturers for a share in military spending and anti-crisis packages will sharply increase.

A substantial part of the military budgets will certainly be redirected to sustain Airbus. Provided the expected many-fold reduction in Airbus deliveries, the fall of the company, which was very likely to happen, will leave Europe without its own civilian aircraft manufacturer. The rescue of Airbus will require, among other things, the participation of Great Britain, whose industry is equally interested in maintaining the existence of a pan-European manufacturer of civilian aircrafts.

What is anticipated for combat aircrafts is, first, braking the work process on existing European perspective fighters (French-German FCAS, British-Italian Tempest) and second, a possible revision of current procurement plans by a number of countries, especially with regard to the U.S. 5th Generation F-35 fighter, shifting the timeline to the right: Europe’s participation in this program is not so extensive and makes no warranties in the period when belts must be tightened.

The work on the promising Franco-German tank project KANT, which has been underway since 2015, will be postponed as well. The project involves the creation of a single main battle tank for the armies of the two countries. At this stage, the project requires further investment, but hardly creates production orders or jobs, unlike serial armored vehicles.

Still, this is a longer-term prospect; for now the epidemic is slowing down the ongoing working process. Fincantieri (Italy) and Navantia (Spain) shipbuilding groups, for example, have already reduced their activities. Considering serious damages that the epidemic has already caused to both countries, especially in terms of declining tourism revenues in GDP, it can be assumed that further activities of the defense industries in Italy and Spain will be revised based on their states of the economy in the post-epidemic period. French shipbuilders, who have not yet stopped productions but have reduced their activities and changed some work protocols, too will have to revise their plans. The priority task for the Naval Groupi is to maintain the combat effectiveness of French nuclear submarines and the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. That said, it is thus far difficult to say what kind of impact the crisis will have on the scheduled test program of Suffren submarine, the newest Barracuda class attack submarine.

Nonetheless, according to Petr Topychkanov, Senior Researcher at SIPRI, there is no reason to expect big changes: “The current crisis is another reason for NATO to urge its members to integrate more and increase military capabilities and expenditures. In addition to the traditional threat in the form of the eastern neighbor, whose name was mentioned in connection with the information policy allegedly pursued to spread disinformation and panic over COVID-19, there are now new threats like the virus itself, and the Alliance members were not quite ready for it (but who was ready?). While European countries are only approaching the peak of the epidemic, it is difficult to predict its long-term effect on military spending and the development of the defense industry. So far, we have not heard about the serious need to reduce military spending in favor of restoring the socio-economic sphere. The absence of such rhetoric, together with signals from NATO, suggest that the Alliance members will try to maintain or even increase military spending. Because of the crisis, they will have to adjust priorities, revise schedules, but these changes are unlikely to lead to a long-term decline in military expenditure or the withdrawal of large companies from the arms market”.

A Scenario Check

Any forecast should describe a future scenario that can later be checked for compliance with real events, further assessing the given forecast. The above outlined provisions can briefly be summarized as follows:

An interim option suggests that the global restoration will last a few years and only the United States can avoid serious revisions by taking advantage of its position as the issuer of the world currency. Some plans, tough, will likely be revised in favor of more effective employment and development of the national industry;

From our partner RIAC

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Defense

Indian Conventional and Strategic Arms Buildup: Implications for Pakistan

Published

6 days ago

March 18, 2023

Nadir Ali

South Asia’s regional dynamic is both flamboyant and intricate. Various empires have formed, prospered, and perished over the millennia, as innumerable conflicts and struggles for control of resources spread over the globe. However, 2021 was a year of fierce weapons competition between South Asia’s nuclear neighbors, India and Pakistan, who carried out 26 missile tests. India launched 16 ballistic and cruise missiles while Pakistan tested 10 missiles with nearly identical capabilities.

As a response to the perceived inability of the Indian Armed Forces (IAF) to adequately respond to the Pakistani insurgencies, and after the failure of the Indian forces to quickly react and mobilize their forces in 2001, the Indian Army and the defense policymakers realized the lack of modernized and consistent army doctrine. This resulted in the announcement by the Indian Army in 2004 of a new limited war doctrine known as the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD).

Importance of Air Base

The importance of air superiority can be witnessed by looking at the six days of the Arab-Israeli War, in which the Israeli forces pre-empted an attack from the bases of Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, and struck the air force before the fight even began. The outcome of the war was determined during its first hours. By destroying the opposing air fleet, Israeli forces gained air superiority, and thus the Arab forces were helpless in their efforts, which eventually resulted in a humiliating defeat for the Arabs.

Indian Air-Bases: A Strategic Threat

In the contemporary era, military forces are going for weapon systems that require absolutely no time at all when it comes to striking a target. In that regard, the air force comes first for the obvious reason that its threshold is low as compared to a ballistic missile strike. Indian force deployment and employment are very close to Pakistan’s borders, from Siachen to the Rann of Kutch. In India’s most recent attack on Balakot, which took place in 2019, the air force was utilized. This clearly shows the Indian resolve to use the air force in any future blatant aggression like the one in February 2019.

The Indian air force deployment is tailor-made for Pakistan. If one analyzes the airbases/airstrips positioning and range from the Pakistani-Indo international border, the Line of Control (LOC), and the working boundary, it is quite obvious that the positioning shows the aggressive posture of the Indian Air Force. When deployed at those bases, the aircraft are the finest in the Indian military, both in terms of their quality and serviceability. When it comes to the up-gradation of the base’s facilities, this is the top priority list that is visible to everyone. In May 2021, the bases in Pakistan got priority.

The bases are positioned in such a strategy to cover every city in Pakistan, as it has no strategic depth. Pakistan’s major cities, like Karachi, Lahore, Multan, Faisalabad, Hyderabad, Bahawalpur, Rahim Yar Khan, Sialkot, and even the capital, Islamabad, are within the Indian Air Force’s reach. The same goes for the areas in Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan.

Future Threat Scenario

Now the question arises what will happen in the future in light of past historical data? The answer to this is both simple and complex. It is simple in the context that the IAF will target Pakistan with its pre-defined strategy of naked aggression against peaceful neighbors, while the Indian Army is following a pro-active offense posture; the complex part is where, when, and how.

The IAF will utilize the war scenario created by the Indian government and Indian media after a staged terrorist attack on a civilian or military target, for which they will put full blame on the Pakistani state and security apparatus. They will try to raise the temperature to the point where the Indian civil establishment shows the world community that now enough is enough and our people are demanding a counter-strike. At that time, the Indian establishment will use its media to put blame on Pakistan and create a war-like scenario while raising tensions.

In light of that, the IAF, under the orders of the Indian government, along with the Indian army, will start attacking the Pakistani bases in the early moments of the war because if the IAF does not target PAF bases, then there will be grave consequences for the Indian army, and the Pakistani army also has additional fire support bases. The above-mentioned rationale will be the main cause of the IAF attacking the PAF infrastructure, thus undermining the national security of Pakistan. The Indian army, with the IAF, will aspire to rapid, shallow penetration of Pakistani territory, without crossing the nuclear threshold of Pakistan. The Indian military will go for a quick and short battle that will surprise Pakistan because that is the only possible strategy in their minds when talking about limited war scenarios or showing off war.

Conclusion

The IAF is a major threat to the national security of Pakistan in the wake of its alignment with the Indian military’s CSD. The operational exercises conducted in the past and the recent strikes at Balakot exhibit the growing role of the IAF in the Indian military offensive strategy against Pakistan. Vast parts of Pakistan are within the combat radius of the IAF’s operational fighters because of Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth.

The IAF will try to use this as an advantage to support the pro-active and offensive strategy of the Indian Armed Forces to harm Pakistan, as that would be their prime objective because of their hegemonic designs. In order to protect itself from India’s flagrant military aggression, Pakistan should take some protective measures.

Recommendations

In the wake of the growing IAF threat, the PAF and Pakistani government should take the following measures on an urgent basis:

Build some new airstrips along the border with India, to balance the threat by not allowing an IAF advantage in any sector. Moreover, the building of airstrips requires less money; thus this step will not put a strain on Pakistan’s economy;
Buy more advanced surveillance radars to detect early IAF movement.
Purchase advanced surface-to-air missiles to create a defensive barrier;
Go for indigenizing the modern, state-of-the-art 5^th generation fighter aircraft, as buying from foreign suppliers is very expensive.
Ask the international community to put pressure on both sides to sign confidence-building measures that will lead to peace and stability.

Defense

The audacious AUKUS submarine deal and Asia’s changing security landscape

Published

6 days ago

March 18, 2023

Bejoy Sebastian

image source: twitter @POTUS

In this exhaustive analysis, I try to spell out the impact and potential consequences of the recently-brokered submarine deal between the U.S., the U.K., and Australia on Asia’s changing security landscape.

***

All advanced navies of the world possess lethal submarines, powered by either diesel-electric or nuclear propulsion. These underwater warships are the most potent asset at the disposal of a naval force for maritime power projection, sea denial and sea control. Lying silently under water, they are capable of sinking surface ships, including large aircraft carriers, with torpedoes or ballistic missiles. Ever since WW-II, submarines have made its name as one of the most crucial components of maritime strategy and naval warfare. Australia and the U.K. are two key maritime nations of the world, which happen to be security allies of the United States, a country that owns and operates the largest fleet of nuclear-powered submarines in the world. Being nuclear-powered not necessarily mean being armed with nuclear warheads.

The 2021-formed AUKUS (Australia, U.S., U.K.) “enhanced trilateral security partnership” has taken cooperation between the three Anglophone countries to the next level. U.S. President Joe Biden hosted the prime ministers of the United Kingdom and Australia – PM Rishi Sunak and PM Anthony Albanese – in the Californian port city of San Diego on 13 March 2023, where they jointly announced a detailed four-phased plan to equip Australia (a non-nuclear-weapon state) with “conventionally armed, nuclear-powered” submarines (codenamed SSN) at least by the next decade along with strengthening cooperation in other areas such as critical and emerging technologies.

The plan would cost Canberra’s exchequer up to a whopping A$ 368 bn. (US$ 245 bn.) in total by 2055, according to reports. The detailed plan, spanning a time frame of three decades, was announced after an eighteen-month-long consultation period following the creation of AUKUS in mid-September 2021. Australian PM Anthony Albanese called the deal “the single biggest leap” in Australia’s defence capabilities in the nation’s history. If the plan goes ahead smoothly as planned, Australia will become the seventh country in the world to add nuclear-powered submarines to its navy. As the deal turns out to be a race against time, the biggest challenge is to ensure deterrence capabilities for Australia at the present, as the full benefits of the deal would take years to materialise.

AUKUS leaders believe that the deal would “strengthen deterrence and bolster stability in the Indo-Pacific and beyond for decades to come”, apparently keeping in mind the exponential growth of China’s naval power in the recent past. China has built 12 nuclear-powered submarines in the last two decades, including ballistic missile submarines (codenamed SSBNs) and is continuing its ambitious ship-building spree in all fronts. As per the AUKUS plan, the first phase of the deal is set to begin as early as this year, with U.S. and British SSNs increasing their port visits in Australia along with joint embedded training of naval personnel, which will be followed by a rotational deployment of U.S. and British SSNs in the island continent.

In the remaining two phases of the deal, Washington will deliver a flotilla of three to five advanced Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines to Australia by the early 2030s, upon Congressional approval, and eventually a new “SSN-AUKUS class” of nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) will be developed in the decade that follows, for future commissioning in both British and Australian navies. With the use of nuclear energy involved, the Indo-Pacific region is abuzz with fears and concerns of an escalating arms race, even though AUKUS promises “the highest nuclear non-proliferation standard”.

Current owners of nuclear-powered submarines

As of now, only the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (U.S., Russia, China, U.K., France) and India have active nuclear-powered attack-capable submarines in their naval fleet (see the image below). More than half of the 130 active nuclear-powered submarines in the world are operated by the U.S. Navy (67), followed by Russia (31), China (12), U.K. (10), France (9) and India (1). The rise of China’s offensive military capabilities and its naval power in particular, since the 1990s, is the single largest factor that has convinced Canberra to join hands with Washington and London to bolster its own capabilities, through AUKUS, by making use of “next-generation” British hull design and “cutting-edge” American technology.

Countries with active nuclear powered submarines (via Statista)

The AUKUS deal smartly gets away with a loophole in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which allows for the transfer of fissionable material and nuclear technology from a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) to a non-NWS if it is used for non-explosive military use like naval propulsion. Such a transfer is also exempted from inspections and monitoring by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an organisation that stands for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the promotion of nuclear safety. The IAEA Director General said that he had received “separate communications” on the matter from the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Australia, as well as from the U.K. and the U.S.

Mixed reactions

Of all the countries that have reacted to the highly ambitious AUKUS project, the responses of China and Russia stands out, as they are in direct strategic competition with the de facto leader of AUKUS – the United States. While the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson remarked that the U.S. and its AUKUS allies are “walking further and further down the path of error and danger for their own geopolitical self-interest”, Russian foreign minister commented, “the Anglo-Saxon world, with the creation of structures like AUKUS and with the advancement of NATO military infrastructures into Asia, is making a serious bet on many years of confrontation in Asia”.

While Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong cities Canberra’s bid for “strategic equilibrium” in the region as the underlying factor that led to the AUKUS pact, opinions on the submarine deal, which comes at a humongous cost, are not uniform across Australia’s political spectrum. Former Prime Minister Paul Keating thinks Canberra is compromising on a proper national defence strategy to help maintain U.S. “strategic hegemony” in Asia and has also stated that the submarine deal would be ineffective in the event of a war. Indonesia, Malaysia and New Zealand have also shared their concerns about the risk of nuclear proliferation in the region.

As per the Bangkok Treaty of 1995, Southeast Asia is a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ). Moreover, almost all of the ASEAN member-states have deep economic linkages with China, even though they rely on the U.S. for “security and stability” in Asia. Even though some of them have disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea, like the Philippines and Vietnam, they prefer to avoid unnecessary “provocations” and try to balance their ties with the U.S. and China, amid intensifying regional rivalry between the two big powers. Australian defence and foreign ministries are expected to embark on a diplomatic charm offensive to assuage all concerns of Southeast Asian countries lying in China’s periphery.

Eyeing for balance of power

AUKUS was announced just one year after a Pentagon report claimed that China has built the world’s largest naval fleet in sheer numerical terms, even though the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) relies mostly on smaller classes of ships, while the U.S. naval strength is further multiplied by its allied navies. One of the most-overlooked events of March 2023 was the annual session of China’s ceremonial national legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC), which handed over China’s Presidency to the hyper-nationalistic and revanchist leader Xi Jinping for an unprecedented third time in a row.

The newly-appointed Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang, formerly China’s Ambassador to the United States, held a press conference on the sidelines of the NPC, during which he made a significant remark that throws light on the deteriorating state of U.S.-China relations. He accused the U.S. of harbouring a “Cold War mentality” and said, “… the United States claims that it seeks to out-compete China but does not seek conflict. Yet in reality, it’s so-called competition means to contain and suppress China in all respects and get the two countries locked in a zero-sum game … If the United States does not hit the brake but continues to speed down the wrong path, no amount of guardrails can prevent derailing, and there will surely be conflict and confrontation … Containment and suppression will not make America great, and it will not stop the rejuvenation of China …”

Washington’s shooting of a suspected Chinese “spy balloon” that flew over American airspace earlier this year is the latest example of this downward spiral in U.S.-China ties. The Indo-Pacific, as a geostrategic concept and a broader maritime region, came into being as China began to flex its military muscles throughout its immediate and extended neighbourhood, where U.S. and its allies have a robust military presence.

Being part of the U.S.-led alliance system, including the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing network and the recent AUKUS pact, Canberra has become a lynchpin of Washington’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy to counter growing Chinese assertiveness and stated offensive intentions vis-à-vis Taiwan, the South and East China Seas, and also the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. Australia is also due to the host the third in-person Quad leaders’ summit later this year.

As the “threat perception” of China in the West continues to rise day by day, the extent to which an AUKUS-centered deterrence is possible in Asia remains to be seen in the years to come.

Defense

Anti-Satellite Weapons: Risks and Regulations

Published

1 week ago

March 15, 2023

Sameer Ali Khan

Today, outer space is characterised as an increasingly congested, contested, and competitive domain. This is because of an unprecedented increase in satellites and actors operating them. 13 countries now possess the capability to launch satellites compared to only two in the late 50s. In 1959, there were only two man-made objects in outer space but as of 30^th April, 2022, Union of Concerned Scientists’ database included 5,465 active satellites. The number stood at 3,372 on 31 December 2020 – indicating an increase of 62%.

The growing dependence over space-based assets for day-to-day activities, like communication, navigation, and weather forecasts etc. indicates that the numbers are likely to grow exponentially. The environment that these satellites face is not benign by any standard. The biggest threat emerges in the form of space debris which are any human-made objects in orbit around the Earth that no longer serve any useful purpose. 60 years of human activities in outer space have generated over 29,000 human-made objects of larger than 10cm, while even a 1cm object can collide with a satellite to cause damage comparable to a hand grenade. While some of the debris generation is inevitable, Destructive Anti Satellite Weapons (DA-ASATs) testing has been a leading source of debris creation – something that can be prevented.

DA-ASATs, part of the counterspace capabilities which help a state in establishing space superiority while denying the same to its adversary, are essentially missiles which either directly hit a satellite in outer space or destroy it through proximity detonations. Use of this capability generates debris in outer space and threatens sustainable utilisation of outer space for peaceful endeavours. Other non-kinetic counterspace capabilities include physical non-kinetic capabilities like lasers and High Power Microwaves (HPMs) that damage on board circuitry of satellites, electronic counterspace capabilities which affect the satellites’ communications channels and cyber capabilities which target the data.

In November 2022, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a non-binding resolution banning testing of DA-ASATs. The resolution was supported by an overwhelming majority of 154 states. The resolution was tabled by the United States (US) that had already announced a unilateral moratorium on such testing in April of that year. While the earliest demonstrations of such a capability date back to early Cold War, only four states have demonstrated this capability so far – the US, Russia, China, and India. While Russia and China voted against the resolution, India abstained from voting but expressed its preference for a legally binding treaty over self-declared moratoriums. Russia and China, on the other hand, objected to the resolution’s shortcomings over development of such a capability and lack of disarmament when it comes to states that already possess this capability. The two have also pointed out how the issue of non-kinetic ASATs was left out.

While the effort to mitigate debris-generation through banning the testing of DA-ASATs is praiseworthy, leaving out the continued possession, production, and development of DA-ASATs and more advanced non-kinetic capabilities is worrisome. In a way, the emerging trend of unilateral moratoriums and UNGA resolution is akin to establishing DA-ASAT ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ as was the case of nuclear non-proliferation regime. A taboo on testing of these technologies is likely to emerge, making it difficult for other states to enter this club. Such an outcome would be desirable if the intent was to avoid an arms race in outer space and move towards disarmament of existing capabilities. However, that does not seem to be the case.

France, for instance, joined the US in announcing a moratorium on testing of DA-ASATs – in a way surrendering its option to demonstrate this capability. However, in 2019, French Defence Minister had publicised a French plan to develop anti-satellite laser weapons stating that, ‘If our [French] satellites are threatened, we intend to blind those of our adversaries.’ Lasers and other non-kinetic means present a different set of challenges for space security. Possession of such capabilities is difficult to verify, it is difficult to establish attribution once such weapons have been employed, and their non-destructive nature lowers the threshold of use. In case of electronic and counterspace capabilities, the barriers to entry are lower and the risks of proliferation are higher. If other states with significant stakes in outer space emulate the French approach, it is only going to increase the likelihood of warfighting in outer space.

The emerging taboo on non-testing of DA-ASATs is not shared by three of the four states which have demonstrated this capability so far. Notwithstanding the American divergences with Russia and China, there is merit in the position that the latter have taken. The next step, therefore, needs to be disarmament of existing DA-ASAT capabilities and a ban on their development. Alongside, the issue of non-kinetic counterspace capabilities also needs to be addressed. Without a comprehensive approach towards space security and addressing the concerns of all stakeholders, there is no way to ensure that contestation in outer space will not escalate to undesirable levels.