Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Beijing have converted their relationship from being Cold War rivals to become realistic partners with a common goal of pushing back at a Western-dominated international system. Their relationship is strategic and opportunist but noticeable by progressively well-matched economic, political, and security interests. Sharing a geopolitical worldview of multipolarity, they mutually have firm desires to contain Western power and seek to accelerate what they see as the weakening of the United States. With a collective desire to shift the focus of global power from the Euro-Atlantic space to the East, they aim to redraft at least some of the rules of global governance, signifying that their partnership is becoming progressively strategic. Yet the Chinese-Russian relationship is complex, with lasting uncertainty on both sides which is the common phenomenon in world politics. Despite the grand drives for cooperation uttered by the two countries’ leaders, attaining applicable results often escapes them, predominantly in the Russian Far East and the Arctic, where understanding the overabundance of trade, investment, and infrastructure deals announced since 2014 has been challenging. Regardless of the difficulties faced by both countries the level of engagement in these stages has tested Russia’s and China’s abilities to manage their differences and interpret the rhetoric of corporation into solid gains.
Russia China Bilateral Ties
China Russia relations, also known as Sino-Russian relations and this refers to international relations between the people’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Diplomatic relations between China and Russia dramatically improved after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation in 1991. American scholar Joseph Nye argues: With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that de facto US-China alliance ended, and a China-Russia rapprochement began. In 1992, the two countries declared that they were pursuing a “constructive partnership”; in 1996, they progressed toward a “strategic partnership”; and in 2001, they signed a treaty of “friendship and cooperation.
All through at the end of the Cold War, few would have foreseen a full-bodied Russian-Chinese relationship in the twenty-first century, the two countries have had a long, complex, and touchy history dating back to the 1800s when Russia’s eastward expansion across Siberia and the Russian Far East led to China conceding over 1.5 million square kilometers of territory to imperial Russia. Shocked by war and uprising in the twentieth century, both countries became brief allies after the Communist Party takeover in Beijing in 1949, as Moscow dispatched technical aid, financial assistance, and political advisers to China. At the time, Moscow was firmly the leader of the global socialist movement and saw itself as by far the stronger partner in the Sino-Soviet relationship. However, the two countries divided ideologically during the Nikita Khrushchev era, becoming Cold War opponents by the 1960s with a highly armed and disputed border that pushed4,380 kilometers. A series of border clashes in 1969 left scores of mostly Chinese soldiers dead.
Russia and China on a multilateral basis
On a multilateral basis, China and Russia began harmonizing their positions in the United Nations (UN) and other international bodies in the 1990s. In 1997, for example, they presented to the United Nations General Assembly a “Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New World Order,” and the was an early signal of their shared antipathy of Western dominance in the international system and their desire to rebuild it to their benefit. They both promote the United Nations as a key pillar of the international system, because of the authority and influence that their status as permanent Security Council members provides. They similarly have worked together in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the East Asia Summit, G20 group of prominent economies, and the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to support their interests. In 2003, they both pushed back at the UN against the Iraq war, and they criticized (although neither vetoed) the West’s military intervention in Libya. Today, both frequently highlight the instability that Muammar Qaddafi’s overthrow brought to the region.
Conversely, since then, Moscow and Beijing have worked together to challenge principles of the U.S. led international system to which they share an aversion. They have collaborated to protect fellow authoritarian states from human rights criticisms and outside efforts to change their political trajectories. They branded Western democracy promotion as an example of destructive, unhelpful, and intolerable interference by strong powers in the internal affairs of sovereign states. They also look to each other for models for ensuring regime stability and domestic governance. Beijing, for example, has passed legislation similar to Russia to limit the activities of non-governmental organizations and limit their ability to accept foreign funding. Moscow similarly is trying to join aspects of China’s internet firewall to gain greater control over information flows on the Russian-language internet. Moscow’s new laws banning virtual private networks (VPNs) appear to be following the Chinese model of fastening down on VPNs and other internet proxy services that allow users access to websites that are restricted by the state. They likewise have collaborated in numerous international settings to increase the power of states over the internet, challenging the free flow and access of information, and seek to reduce the power of the West over decisions concerning global governance. However the Russian Chinese political, economic, and international ties Developments have led Beijing and Moscow to promote their “strategic partnership,” claims that have only strengthened since Putin’s “pivot to Asia” in 2013 and Russia’s break with the West after the Ukraine crisis the following year. Both countries see the other as a useful counterbalance to U.S. influence. Besides, with its traditional sources of capital now restricted due to sanctions, Russia sees China as a provider of funds to support its struggling economy. China, meanwhile, benefits from Moscow’s efforts to prevent Western military and economic power internationally, conceding leadership to Russia in opposing Western policies abroad, while benefiting by receiving minimal blame. Yet when Russia and China have come together in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic, their interests and realities on the ground have tested their ability to manage differences and sustain this strategic alignment.
Central Asia race
Central Asia is witnessing a key rebalancing of power with Russia declining and China emerging as one of the region’s most influential players. China’s rise in Central Asia is due to its wide-ranging vision for regional connectivity, an appetite for Central Asian energy resources, and generous reserves, which it distributes to Central Asia through commercial investments, loans, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and several other entities. Unlike the West, China makes no demands for political reform from Central Asian governments. Unlike Russia, Beijing does not use political pressure to keep the region in its general orientation. The lack of an obvious political agenda other than regional stability, which Beijing believes can be guaranteed through economic development, makes China particularly attractive to local governments.
Although China’s presence is mounting across all of post-Soviet Eurasia, its increasing geopolitical and geo-economics influence is most outstanding in Central Asia, which is where China has learned how to manage Russian concerns over its growing regional influence. Through the BRI predictable to increase Chinese influence throughout Eurasia, including Russia, sustaining positive dynamics with Moscow in Central Asia will remain one of the most important tests of Chinese political and economic diplomacy; so far, Beijing appears up to that test. China is smart in managing Russia because Beijing engages with Central Asia primarily on economic issues; it has made no explicit push into political or military concerns. While Beijing’s soft power is growing in Central Asia, it still cannot compete with Russia’s media presence in the region or the fact that Russian universities, particularly those in Siberia, remain more widespread than Chinese ones, although the number of Central Asian students studying in Chinese universities often with heavy earnings from the Chinese government is on the rise. From 2005 to 2015, the number of Kazakhs studying in China increased from 781 to 13,198, while the Chinese government now offers twenty-three academic scholarships to Kyrgyz citizens wishing to study at Chinese higher education institutions.
in conclusion ,Russia and China have become increasingly close partners on the global scene, motivated to work together both to pushback at what they consider the United States’ pursuit of repression and to change a Western-dominated international system that they observe as disadvantageous to them. They have resented Western efforts to promote human rights and good governance, seeing the West’s push to create more open political or economic systems as part of a comprehensive and corresponding attempt by the United States and Europe to promote regime change for geopolitical advantage. These collective views have pushed the strengthening of their bilateral relations, efforts that have only enhanced since the start of the Ukraine conflict in 2014. The utmost hazard to Western interests from the increasing strategic partnership between Russia and China does not come from any of any country in the region. But it instead emanates from the two countries’ common efforts to adjust the international system to their advantage. Furthermore, in this regard, Washington should support economic cooperation. On the other hand, the degree to which the Sino-Russian alliance may become anti-American and anti-Western in the future depends on how deeply the two Eurasian powers feel that the United States threatens their interests. While it values friendly relations with both countries.
A Post-Crisis Kazakhstan: Economic and Social Transformation
Preconditions for protests
The deepening gap between what can be seen as economic successes and the low quality of life that a majority of the population has to endure, coupled with a super-concentration of national wealth in the hands of the elite and a resource-based economy that depends on large international companies and the situation on the world market, seem to have become the principal social and economic preconditions for the powerful protests that gripped Kazakhstan in January 2022.
Following a major transformative crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan banked on developing production and exports of mineral resources, reviving its economy and achieving impressive successes—a trend assisted by a wealth of mineral resources, plenty of foreign investment, and a favorable situation on the global market. Still, average wages and income in Kazakhstan are significantly lagging behind countries of Eastern Europe or Russia, which follow a similar development trajectory. Apart from low wages and income, high unemployment (about 5%) and self-employment (in the 3rd quarter of 2021, Kazakhstan had 2.13 million self-employed persons) stand in the way of securing sustainable economic growth. The income of a large chunk of the population lasts them no more than from payday to payday, which means they are forced to take out loans, thus increasing the population’s debt burden.
Kazakhstan’s uneven socioeconomic development is particularly manifested if broken down by region. Unemployment remains highest in the south of Kazakhstan, in Almaty and Shymkent, as well as in the region of Turkistan. More than half of the self-employed are also concentrated in the south. Besides, Kazakhstan is faced with a rather urgent housing problem. Over 2.5 million people, or 14% of the entire population, need better housing—at year-end 2020, per capita housing was only 22.6 square meters. Again, broken down by region, the situation is the worst in the densely populated south. For instance, per capita housing is 17 square meters in the Jambyl Region, 18.7 square meters in the Turkistan Region, 20.2 square meters in the Amlaty Region, and 20 square meters in Almaty. Additionally, over 40% of those who dwell in Kazakhstan’s large cities are renters. The pandemic of COVID-19 has exacerbated the situation for many Kazakhstanis. Loss of employment, illness and death of their relatives, growing prices for goods and services have all served to aggravate the already difficult socioeconomic situation. For instance, rental prices in Almaty grew by 30% in 2020–2021.
Civil activity’s three factors: NGOs, blood ties, and extremists
The January protests in Kazakhstan manifested an extensive geographic reach while developing at a breakneck pace. During a couple of days—literally—rallies and riots spread over 10 regions, with some of the regional authorities losing control of the situation. The post-Soviet period in Kazakhstan saw a number of network structures emerge, ones that provided the basis for the population’s rapid self-organization during the riots, nationwide.
First, there is a network of non-governmental organizations, which have sprung up in every region over the last 30 years. The government’s data suggests that some 22,000 NGOs were registered in Kazakhstan as of 2020; of them, 16,000 were quite active, involving hundreds of thousands of people in their activities.
Second, blood ties remain truly strong in Kazakhstan, particularly in the south and in the west, which allows for a rapid rallying of friends and the entire extended family in case such a need arises.
Third, a network of underground Islamist groups has shaped up in Kazakhstan over the last 10–15 years. Some of them became actively involved in the attacks on law enforcement and authorities.
Besides, Kazakhstan has an extensive network of criminal and semi-criminal organized groups. Almaty and its Region are crime-ridden, with Kazakhstan’s every fourth crime committed there. In total, the south of Kazakhstan—where the heaviest rioting took place—accounts for some 43% of the crimes committed across the country. Almaty and Shymkent, the largest cities in the south, are mired with the highest per capita crime rates.
What is more, Kazakhstan’s south is an area of complicated inter-ethnic relations. Over the last ten years, it saw a few dozens of inter-ethnic conflicts, with some of them turning into major clashes and resulting in casualties. For instance, in 2015, Kazakhs had a conflict with Tajiks in the region of Turkistan; in 2016, a similar situation happened with Meskhetian Turks in the Jambyl Region, while another clash in the Jambyl region unfolded in 2020, this time with the Dungans.
Land reform rallies of April–May 2016 provided an example of a large nation-wide protest. Despite a prohibition from the authorities, about 20,000 people in a dozen Kazakhstani cities took part in the protests, while most of these cities came to be the centers of anti-governmental rallies in January, 2022. Another example can be provided by the rallies in Nur-Sultan and Almaty following the announcement of the 2019 presidential elections’ outcome.
In any case, January 2022 witnessed an attempt to ride the wave of a spontaneous popular protest and use it to achieve political objectives. A whimsical mixture of citizens driven to despair, political activists and radicals, Islamists, criminals, and fringe elements of all stripes provided the right mixture for the “Molotov cocktail” that blew up Almaty and a number of other regional centers in Kazakhstan.
Consequences of the January 2022 events
For Kazakhstan, a transformation of its economic model should become the crucial consequence of the January rioting. Kazakhstan’s post-Soviet economic model rested on several principles. This includes a prioritized concentration on the extractive sector, primarily its oil- and gas-producing industry, where foreign companies play the leading role; a policy aimed at attracting more foreign investment, which used to be truly multi-vector as the U.S., some of the European nations, China, and Russia invested in Kazakhstan; and a large quasi-governmental sector with Nur-Sultan Nazarbayev’s family controlling most valuable of the assets, either directly or indirectly. Despite the declared adherence to a neoliberal course throughout the post-Soviet period, the state remained Kazakhstan’s largest employer.
The first signs of this model failing manifested themselves in the late 2000s. By 2015, Kazakhstan achieved major successes, though: it was the second-largest economy in the post-Soviet space, catching up with Eastern European states in its economic development. The World Bank has it that the GDP by PPP in Kazakhstan (USD 25,877) in 2015 was comparable to the figures for Poland (USD 26,135), higher than in such EU states as Latvia (USD 24,286), Croatia (USD 21,880), Romania (USD 21,403), and Bulgaria (USD 17,512). By the late 2010s, the situation had changed, and Kazakhstan’s pace of development significantly slowed down. According to the World Bank, Kazakhstan’s GDP by PPP in 2020 was USD 26,729, significantly below the figures for Latvia (USD 32,019), Croatia (USD 28,504), and Romania (USD 31,946), and only somewhat higher than those of Bulgaria (USD 24,367). Over the last 15 years, Kazakhstan has passed through two economic crises (in 2007–2008 and in 2014–2015), which resulted in a threefold devaluation of the national currency. At the same time, Kazakhstan is facing price increases, reduced volumes of construction, industrial manufacturing and foreign trade, and a plethora of social issues. The pandemic has delivered another serious blow to the economy.
Today, Kazakhstan is going through an acute crisis of its economic model, whose foundations still include expanding mineral resource exports and developing the consumer sector domestically. Along with many post-Soviet states (Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan) that have large mineral deposits, Kazakhstan in the 2000s, amid explosively growing hydrocarbon prices, built a resource-based economic model that allowed it to achieve impressive success.
However, the resource super-cycle concluding at the global markets, economic crisis in Russia, and China and EU economies slowing down closed the chapter on developing this model. The main objective as of today is developing non-resource exports, privatizing state and quasi-state economic sectors, increasing population’s income, creating market niches at old markets and tapping new markets. During the transformation of the economic model, influence enjoyed by the family of Kazakhstan’s first president on the economy will gradually decrease, while large foreign companies (primarily, Western ones) will retain their standing, and Russian corporations will increase their influence in Kazakhstan.
From our partner RIAC
Great powers rivalry in Central Asia: New strategy, old game
In international politics, interstate rivalry involves conflicting relations between two international rivalries that are nation states. A fundamental feature of rivalry involves the willingness of the states involved to harm their opponents’ prosperity and progress only to deny a gain of the rival state. There is no public good in a rivalry. The only good during a rivalry is to hinder the progress of the rival despite the negative consequences of these efforts on internal progress. (Brandon, 2013)
Rivalry in the international system does not mean a sudden change of the dominant state (hegemon) and does not (always) lead to war. The fact that there were no direct armed conflicts between the USSR / Russia and the US and, more recently, China, indicates that the nations cooperated on time and had common global goals, such as fighting against terrorism, drug trafficking or the COVID-19 pandemic. Obviously, the bilateral relations between these great powers can (should) be improved, but until then, the great power politics seems happening with, the old game, but new strategies in Central Asian region.
In the study of international relations, gaining influence over a given region assumes an asymmetric relation in which a powerful nation is able to exclusively extend its “hard”’ or “soft” power to that region. In a narrower interpretation, the exercise of military or political power, but in a wider context, economic dependence or the tightness of cultural and historical connections combined with institutions and ties of alliance and partnership can also be an essential source of controlling a given region.(Nye Jr, 2004; Armitage and Nye Jr, 2007)
The struggle for supremacy and rivalry in Central Asia
Russia has a huge surface, which for centuries, has ensured its continuity and status of great power, despite an increasingly fragile economy; and like any great power, Russia also has a space considered its own, namely – the former Soviet space and, above all, the territory of Central Asia. From Russia’s perspective, its status as a great power implies rights in its immediate region, a special role in resolving international disputes, cooperation with other great powers and a higher level of autonomy or sovereignty. Medvedev justified Russia’s sphere of influence based on its status as a great power, arguing that: Russia, like other countries in the world, has regions in which it has privileged interests. In these regions, there are countries with which we have traditionally had cordial friendly relations, and historically, special relations. (Clint and Andrew, 2017). In fact, Russia exerts this influence out of pride and prestige, and, as Mearsheimer points out, Washington does not seem to agree with Moscow’s position, but it must understand the logic behind the decision. This is geopolitics: the great powers are always sensitive to potential threats, close to their own territory. (Mearsheimer, 2014)
Central Asia is the highest risk geopolitical region, becoming a place of interest for the great powers, as we have already mentioned: Russia, US, China, but also emerging powers such as India, Turkey, even the European Union. Energy resources are the main advantage of the area, with about 10% of the world’s oil reserves and about 30-40% of global gas reserves. This is not the first time the region has played an important global role as historically it has always been at the intersection of roads, both commercial and as a meeting point for the great civilizations of the world.
It is not a novelty that in Central Asia there are two types of states: the first category of those developed from an economic and military point of view, with the advantage of population and territory: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; the second category is that of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are less developed due to ongoing disputes over natural resources. An extremely interesting and important aspect to note as only Kazakhstan has a direct border with the Russian Federation, it acted during the three decades of independence as a buffer state, thus protecting other states from possible aggression by Russia; on the other hand, this common border also provided Kazakhstan with advantages, such as economic and political ones.
Moreover, being authoritarian regimes, the bilateral relations between all the five republics are far from being good due to several issues like border disputes(particularly between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan neighbors), for example. So, the following question naturally arises:
Why, nonetheless, is Central Asia important?
During the Cold War, Central Asia was characterized as a forgotten region but, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the geopolitics of this area has changed and the role of the Central Asian region in inter-national affairs has increased considerably (Zabortseva, 2012). In the last decades, Central Asia region became a geostrategic and geopolitical area of competition between old and new great powers such as Russia, European Union, United States and China.
Furthermore, these several nations have tried to exploit the power vacuum created after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Unites States, for instance, is increasingly present in the region, whose primary goal is to increase its military presence in Central Asia. Its strategic goals include the neutralization of Central Asia and offsetting the Russian and Chinese influence as well as preventing the region from religious radicalization and decreasing Iran’s influence. Other players in the race for power include Turkey, Iran and India. It is, however, undeniable that Russia and China have the greatest influence over the region and, the political and economic future will be determined by these two powerful nations (Bendarzsevszkij, 2021).
For the Russian Federation, this region is the sphere of traditional influence, and for many Russians, Central Asia is around Russia, hence it shows a special interest in the development of this region. Vladimir Putin tried to reconfirm the influence, but especially the Russian authority in the region, thus reducing the influence of the United States. However, China’s ambitions for the area’s economic potential, but especially the lack of clarity of Russia’s foreign policy in anticipating the region’s future development, make the Russian president’s efforts difficult.
These are not the only causes that prevent Russia from achieving its goals; Moscow’s effort for hegemony in Central Asia is complicated by the desire of some of the region’s leaders to gain special status as secondary leaders under Russian general rule. Indeed, almost all the leaders of the region, no matter how subordinate to Moscow, strive to gain some influence against Russia. One factor that offers, for some regimes, this opportunity, is the oil and gas from the Caspian Sea. The main beneficiaries are Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (Donaldson, Vidya 2014). This desire of local leaders to get out (but not totally) of the sphere of influence of Moscow, is one of a personal nature, because they were not consulted about the dissolution of the USSR; the reason seems somewhat bizarre, but pride in this region is an extremely sensitive issue.
For the achieving their interests Russia is attempting to combine both defense presence and economic suzerainty through selective integration, boosting ties among a core group of states (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) while pursuing a more limited set of aims elsewhere (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) (Mankoff, 2012).
But, despite its ‘return’ to Central Asia in the 2000s, Moscow no longer has a monopolistic hold over the region. The Kremlin has not tried to reintegrate with the Central Asian states politically. Though Moscow wishes to remain Central Asia’s ‘number one’ partner, it no longer imagines that its presence can be exclusive (Emerson and Boonstra, 2010).
On the other hand, western scholars recognize that for the United States, Central Asia is both strategically and commercially important. During President Clinton’s tenure, the first diplomatic, political, and economic ties were established. But after almost 30 years, the United States is perceived as a distant power (in international terms), even if it has invested billions, for example, only in the education of thousands of students in the region.
As a result, for both Russia and the United States, Central Asia is a sphere of strategic influence from a commercial, economic and political point of view. In this competition both states have common interests such as security, economic and energy development, the fight against terrorism and arms and drug trafficking; but, as expected, they also disagree on the promotion of liberal and democratic principles, different definitions of terrorism, and the duration of the existence of US military bases.
The surprise element (?) China
Central Asia has always been important to China’s imagination of and action toward its neighbors and the larger world beyond. As the vast middle section of the ancient Silk Road dating back to the Han Dynasty (207 BCE–220 CE), Central Asia connected and bridged China’s long-distance overland trade with Europe and the Middle East for many centuries (Chen and Fazilov, 2018). As a historical consequence, China was the second country to recognize the independence of the post-Soviet Central Asian states in early January 1992, following the United States. China’s eagerness was mainly attributable to its desire to ensure a stable periphery and maximize its influence with its new and nascent neighbors (Thornton, 2020).
Therefore, with Western powers unable to make sufficiently attractive proposals, given the political and geographical uncertainty of operating in Central Asia, many leaders in the region saw China as a potential alternative to growing Russian influence (Mankoff, 2012: 255). Like Russia, with a common border, China has grown in the trust of regional leaders, thus becoming the most important pole of attractiveness. In addition to economic, energy and trade interests, China will also have its own military bases, somewhere around 2024. This is an interesting fact, because China is Russia’s main economic partner and the most important ally in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Indeed, China does not want the United States to be able to bring its western borders closer. Moreover, Russia appreciates the fact that, so far, China’s expansion into the Central Asian region has been limited to the economic and cultural spheres – those that Moscow believes, either because of its geography or history, can counter them. Moscow has paid very little attention to the possibility of China relying on its soft power in Central Asia to establish security relations or even bases and thus accelerate the decline of Russian influence there. (Goble, 2019) Precisely this strategy of using power soft brought China’s influence, but nevertheless the conclusion and the opinion of specialists is that in the issue of security of the region, the leaders of the Central Asian states feel more secure in the responsibility of Moscow.
Is there an European Union influence in Central Asia?
The European Union must apprehend the security related issues as a geographic and conceptual continuum. From geographic point of view, this is applied from the closest frontier from Balkans up to the Caucasians, all along Central Asia and until the Middle East. From conceptual point of view, it includes issues related to political corruption, criminality, ethnic conflicts, local terrorist attacks within the Union and at the outskirts of the Union, up to the global terrorism. (Pogacian, 2015).
Along these lines, from the European Union point of view, the situation in the Central Asian region is viewed with some concern because it is not a politically and economically homogeneous region. While Turkmenistan remains one of the most authoritarian states in the world, with a terrible human right records, Kyrgyzstan stands out for its more advanced democracy. Moreover, all Central Asian states have multidimensional foreign policies, aiming in particular to balance relations with Russia, China, the EU and the US. Relations with Turkey and Iran are also important.
These efforts to strengthen the EU-Central Asia partnership have resulted in what has become the new EU Strategy for Central Asia – Connectivity in Support of Sustainable Development. An ambitious initiative and approach, in which the EU recognizes the strategic role of the Central Asian region in global efforts to promote connectivity between Europe and Asia and stressing that these efforts should benefit the region, the Council states that it looks forward to intensifying cooperation with Central Asia to promote sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based connectivity.
Despite the geopolitical rivalry between the great powers, the EU should continue to expand educational, cultural and research linkages with the Central Asian stakeholders. These areas of cooperation are most likely to have a long-term impact and they do not risk turning into politically sensitive challenges.
Instead of conclusions – Central Asia where to?
The Americans are not loved, the Russians are not believed, and the growing influence of China scares declaring an international observer of the area. At the same time, it must be said that the political elites in Central Asia seem to benefit the most from the growing interest of the great powers in the region, which is not only determined by energy reserves.
In this context, the recent events in Kazakhstan highly disturbed the delicate regional security context. There are more lessons that have to be learned from this reality:
Firstly, as I mentioned before, the Central Asia countries played the score of balancing within the great powers influence and this is something naturally; but this approach is irritating for the great powers strategies and forecast on the medium and long time period.
Secondly, Russian Federation has a problem to deal with. The events took part on its area of influence and affected that so called belt of security and Kremlin doesn’t want and need a new context like in the case of the former Eastern Europe.
Thirdly, it is very interesting that NATO and not US are the first to support the interest of the citizens both in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Nevertheless, NATO means US interests in the sphere of security issues, for majority of Russian political experts, but dealing with NATO instead is something new and Moscow has to adapt its strategy to regional realities and perceptions.
From our partner RIAC
- Donaldson H. Robert, Nadkarni Vidya, The foreign policy of Russia. Changing systems, enduring interests, fifth edition, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2014, 215
- Emerson, M. and Boonstra, J., 2010, Into Eurasia monitoring the EU’s Central Asia strategy. Brussels: Centre for European policy studies (CEPS)
- Goble, Paul, China Will Have Military Bases in Central Asia Within Five Years, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/04/09/china_will_have_military_bases_in_central_asia_within_five_years_114317.html
- Keohane, R.,The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in the International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977. Boulder: CO: Westveiw Press, 1980
- Kortunov, Andrey, How to stop NATO, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/how-to-stop-nato/
- Mankoff Jeffrey, Russian Foreign Policy. The return of great power politics, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2012, 255
- Mankoff, Jeffrey, The United States and Central Asia after 2014, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C, 2012, 1-31
- Mearsheimer, J. John, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault. The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin, Foreign Affairs, Septemer/October 2014, available https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault
- NYE, Joseph. S., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2004
- Pogacian, Adrian, European Union’s uncertain future. The state of Romanian – Russian relations and the importance of a bilateral dialogue, paper presented at the RAPN Congress, Moscow, 2015
- Reach Clint, Radin Andrew, Russian views of the international order, RAND Report 2017, 17
- Thornton, S., 2021. China in Central Asia: Is China winning the “new great game”?. Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/china-in-central-asia-is-china-winning-the-new-great-game accessed 14 February 2021
- Valeriano, Brandon, Becoming rivals : the process of interstate rivalry development, Taylor&Francis, 2013, 5
- Zabortseva, Yelena Nikolayevna, From the“forgotten region”to the“great game”region: On thedevelopment of geopolitics in Central Asia, in Journal of Eurasian Studies, no. 3, 2012, 168-176
Post-Protest Kazakhstan Faces Three Major Crises
Kazakhstan suffered greatly from the biggest protest since its independence. As I recently returned to Almaty, I saw that everyday life is heading back to normal, and the reconstruction seems lightning speed. Yet, the scar is still apparent. The bank and convenience store from which I live upstairs were burned and under full reconstruction, and the city hall has been entirely covered to go through repairs and rebuild.
On the midnight of 19th of January, the curfew in Almaty is officially over. The end of the curfew also marks the end of the state of emergency triggered by the protest starting January 2. It was a genuinely reassuring sound to hear cars running on the street at midnight again.
Yes, the government has taken swift measures to address political and economic dissatisfaction. However, the political situation in Kazakhstan is very much similar to the reconstruction of Almaty. While it seems normal on the surface and the reconstruction is at a flying speed, the scar, and the uncertainty remain.
To me, the Nur-Sultan government still has to immediately address the three crises exposed during the protest, including power distribution, policy for the future, and inequality and corruption. The country is far from quiet down, and the future is still vague for the people on the steppe.
First, the Kazakh political system is still in shock from the protest. The Kazakh elites are going through a significant political shuffling as President Tokayev targets Nazarbayev and his political influence. As President Nazarbayev called to support the measures taken by President Tokayev, it seems like some political agreement has been made. Nazarbayev has stated that President Tokayev assumes the total power as the president, and Tokayev will assume the presidency of Nur Otan, the ruling party. However, the speech was not live on national TV, as it was a pre-recorded video on Nazarbayev’s Telegram channel. There is no clear indication to prove that Nazarbayev is still in the capital as he claimed to be, and the whereabouts of Nazarbayev remains a question.
As President Tokayev also subtly criticized Nazarbayev and his group in a speech on January 11, the internal political struggle also targets the group surrounding Nazarbayev. Some of Nazarbayev’s political alliances and family members have left their positions or even been arrested. Massimov, the security chief and a known political ally of Nazarbayev, is currently under arrest for treason. Nazarbayev’s nephew, the deputy security chief, left the position on January 17. Nazarbayev’s children and sons-in-law have either left their jobs or sold their shares in key Kazakh companies. Nazarbayev and his family’s political and economic power seems to be vanishing quickly.
The struggle goes outside of Nur-Sultan. As the protester chanted slogans against Nazarbayev, the removal of Nazarbayev’s influence in Kazakh society has also begun. There is a petition to change Nur-Sultan back to Astana, gaining momentum in support. Meanwhile, some other societal leaders in Kazakhstan suggest changing the street names from Nazarbayev to “Republic” or other names that promote national unity. These all point towards the cult of personality surrounding the first president, removing Nazarbayev’s influence in Kazakh society and politics.
The second crisis comes from the uncertainty of Kazakhstan’s policy. The ongoing struggle among the elites also brings instability to the whole nation, especially from a policy perspective. Even though the new Smaiylov cabinet kept 11 out of 12 ministers, the potential shock and the change for Kazkahs politics may still be drastic. The position of these ministers is not secured either. On January 19, President Tokayev introduced the new defense minister while he fired the previous defense minister due to the lack of leadership. This change indicates that the president may take further actions towards the cabinet ministers, further impacting the Kazakh policies.
Meanwhile, the foreign policy also becomes uncertain after the protest. The Kazakh government met with the foreign ambassadors on January 13 to brief them on the situation in Kazakhstan and assure them that the Kazakh government will remain “committed to its fundamental principles.” However, the intricate term “fundamental principles” could also suggest shifts in these policies’ implications and execution. Also, as outside powers, especially Russians, are deeply involved in Kazakhstan’s turmoil, it is uncertain how Kazakhstan will maintain its current foreign policy.
Third, the long-lasting wealth inequality still needs immediate attention and quick action. Kazakhstan suffers greatly from income and wealth inequality, with the wealthiest 10% controlling more than half the wealth while Kazakhstan’s average salary is less than $600. People are already on their limits as the value of tenge dropping, pandemic, stalemate wage growth, and nonstop rising prices. Also, corruption still plagues the system, further widening the wealth inequality, as the top Kazakh elites still manage critical economic sectors and gain significant benefits from them.
To address the massive inequality issues, the government has introduced a new national wealth fund and reformed the existing ones to provide better support to the Kazakh people. Meanwhile, the government introduced a new tax law to raise the tax rate for the mining company and the wealthiest citizens. However, how effective are these new methods and policies still needs observation. It seems like these methods are only remaining on the surface. The increasing tax and new wealth fund do not fundamentally change the wealth distribution system and do not address the core issues.
To further complicate the issue, Kazakhstan is still facing the threat of the ongoing pandemic. While Kazakhstan manages to control the coronavirus in the latter half of 2021, the new wave of the pandemic is hitting the country hard. There are more than 15,000 cases reported in a day, and it is harder to contain the virus than ever before with a relatively low vaccination rate. The pandemic may further hinder the ability of Kazakhstan to deliver the necessary methods to address the three crises exposed by the protest.
On the Kazakh flag, there is a soaring steppe eagle. While the Kazakh economy has flown high like the soaring eagle since its independence, the protest exposed all the challenges and issues the development has brought. While the country rebuilds itself quickly, the Kazakh government still needs to face the political and economic difficulties ignited by the protest.
A Post-Crisis Kazakhstan: Economic and Social Transformation
Preconditions for protests The deepening gap between what can be seen as economic successes and the low quality of life...
Is War Inevitable?
Over the past days and weeks, media outlets have been proliferating all kinds of apocalyptic predictions and scenarios on the...
Potash War: Double edged sword for Lithuania and Belarus
As per the recent proclamation made by the Lithuanian government, the Belarusian potash will get banned across the country from...
King Mohammed VI of Morocco launches Pan-African Giant Vaccine Production Plant
Morocco is getting ready to produce its own vaccines. In Benslimane, King Mohammed VI kicked off on Thursday 27th of...
Environment contaminated with highly toxic substances, risking the health of nearby communities
New research published today by Zero Waste Europe (ZWE) about incinerators in three countries – Spain, Czechia, and Lithuania –...
Shaking Things Up: A Feminist Pakistani Foreign Policy
Almost eight years ago, under Foreign Minister Margot Wallstrom in 2014, Sweden created its first of a kind feminist foreign...
Indonesia’s contribution in renewables through Rare Earth Metals
The increasing of technological advances, the needs of each country are increasing. The discovery of innovations, the production of goods...
Middle East4 days ago
Embarking on Libya’s Noble Foray Into the Future
East Asia4 days ago
“Post-Communism Era”, “Post-Democracy Era”, in the face of “authoritarian liberalism”
Southeast Asia4 days ago
Spreading Indonesia’s Nation Branding Through “Kopi Kenangan”
East Asia4 days ago
The role of China in fighting of fascism and racism
East Asia4 days ago
The American politicization of the Beijing Winter Olympics, and the “post-truth era” theory
Middle East3 days ago
Ukraine crisis could produce an unexpected winner: Iran
Economy3 days ago
2022: Rise of Economic Power of Small Medium Businesses across the World
Eastern Europe2 days ago
Ukraine Lies About 2022 Russian Attack to Hide Dying Economy