The cancellation of the INF Treaty will have a significant impact on defense and security policies in Europe. Last year’s demise of the treaty will lead to a massive loss of predictability and military transparency. It will almost certainly trigger ultimately a new arms race in Europe. Nevertheless, few European leaders have chosen to contest U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to renounce the treaty in response to Russia’s refusal to withdraw prohibited systems. However, there have also noticeably been no appeals from Western European politicians for the U.S. to go ahead and match the Russian deployments of intermediate-range missiles, in order to maintain deterrence and show transatlantic solidarity. One possible explanation for the lack of enthusiasm or an outraged reaction on behalf of Western European leaders might be that they may not view today’s Russia as posing the same threat as the Soviet Union of the 1970s and 1980s. In the mind of most Western Europeans, the Cold War is history. Surely the Poles and Baltic states, but also Romania, Bulgaria, and even the Scandinavian countries may have a different perspective.
The gloomy truth is that West European apparent indifference to the end of the INF Treaty is neither based on confidence nor a professional assessment of security policy in Europe, but on a deep-seated reluctance to accept that military issues are back on the agenda across Europe. Granted, for Europe, the issue of missiles is no longer as central as it was thirty or forty years ago when NATO and the Warsaw Pact faced each other on a line dividing all of Europe. But the end of the INF Treaty is by no means without consequences for Europe. Most of all, Western European leaders seem to lack a complete understanding of what a post-INF Europe could look like. This stems in large part from the INF discussion in Europe being held on the wrong premise. The German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, for example, warned last year of a new arms race, stating that he believed that European security will not be improved by deploying nuclear-armed, medium-range missiles. Western Europe appears to be solely concerned that the nuclear element is coming back to the forefront of European security. The media, politicians and populations in countries like Germany, France or Italy, connect this nuclear element with something that goes back to the Cold War, something dangerous and fearful that had been eliminated from the European reality decades ago. The chance that this danger could come back is of course paired with emotion and met with opposition. Pictures of the European protests of the 1970s and 80s come to mind, when thousands protested against U.S. missiles being stationed in Europe. However, by mistakenly classifying the INF debate as a nuclear debate, the Europeans are narrowing the discussion and missing the main point. We are no longer in the 1980s, but it seems as if the general understanding in Western Europe regarding missile capabilities and the strategic employment of missiles is stuck in that time. While the disposal of a treaty that also admittedly limited the development of nuclear weapons may be unnerving, it must be understood what post-INF Europe will really look like, in order to be prepared. The nuclear issue itself is no longer at the heart of the debate – conventional attack and defense capabilities are front and center (even if some of these missiles are dual-capable). This should in no way discount the potential dangers that could arise for Europe. Conventional long-range missiles were not relevant at the time of the implementation of the INF Treaty because, before precision guidance, it took a nuclear warhead to guarantee an effective hit on a target thousands of kilometers away. But now conventional long and medium-range missiles have become increasingly central to a new era of warfare. Reduced costs and substantial improvements in the accuracy of conventional missiles of all ranges have made them very attractive. Low-flying cruise missiles are very difficult for ground radars to detect, and despite their relatively slow speed of travel, the defense against them proves challenging. Ballistic missiles, by contrast, move at high velocity and can potentially hit targets with minimal warning. The new arms race that is expected in Europe will certainly not unfold according to the classic Cold War model. It will not, for the most part, involve Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons systems in Europe. In addition, the numbers of these missiles are unlikely to run into thousands or even hundreds. Nevertheless, this new round of proliferation will be no less dangerous or intense.
Without the INF Treaty, there are no limitations to new land-based missile systems. The U.S. Department of Defense has already tested a ground-launched version of the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile last year. This new cruise missile has a range of around 1,000 kilometers and could be deployed by early 2021. The U.S. has thus validated Russia’s claim that the United States did not necessarily adhere to the INF Treaty to the letter either. Russia denounced previous U.S. missile tests as violations and accused the U.S. of stationing launchers as part of the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense facilities in Europe, capable of firing intermediate-range missiles. Russia insisted on the dual-use capability of Mk 41 (Aegis Ashore) anti-missile launch facilities in Romania and Poland. The Obama administration on the other hand had always claimed that they were purely defensive and could only be utilized for launching SM-3 interceptors to defend against missile attacks. The logic of the Russians in this matter was that the Mk 41 launchers on the Aegis ships were used to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles as well; therefore, they also have this capability as part of the land-based Aegis Ashore system. The U.S. always denied this and argued that this would require a massive modification of the software and wiring, and was also not possible because it would require a change in the bilateral stationing agreement with Poland and Romania. However, that this capability apparently does exist as demonstrated, with the latest test, has gone unnoticed in the mainstream European media.
The U.S. also tested new surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, one of which – the replacement for the Army Tactical Missile System, with a planned range of 700 km – could be deployed as early as 2023. Another one – a ballistic missile with a much longer range (3,000-4,000 km) – will not be ready for deployment until 2025. Other types of missiles are currently in the planning stage. With China and Russia investing heavily into Anti-Access/Area Denial anti-aircraft systems, ground-launched missiles have become an attractive option for the U.S. military, rather than the conventional use of air power.
There is no doubt that Russia has been violating the INF Treaty for some time and the Russian violation is part of a deliberate policy. In 2003, Moscow apparently began to develop a new family of land-based cruise missiles. This development may be interpreted as a result of a combination of several factors: while Moscow might have officially strongly condemned the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty, in reality it never cared much for the treaty itself. The growing strength of China’s armed forces, including its vast arsenal of land-based medium and intermediate-range missiles (95% of which would be in violation of INF, had China been a signatory), has Moscow concerned they could be at a disadvantage. In its defense planning, Russia needs to consider how to potentially handle a Chinese military threat if it ever materializes. Additionally, its southern flank, with Iran as a major missile producer, is also a growing potential concern to Russia. This explains why Moscow, as early as 2007-2008 raised the possibility of a joint withdrawal from the INF with the United States. In addition, there may also be domestic reasons. Vladimir Putin is allowing its traditional defense industry to maintain significance in Russia. This is part of a calculated policy of preserving the Russian industrial complex, recapitalizing the Russian military, and being able to develop long-range dual-capacity strike capabilities. These include surface-to-surface missiles, in line with Russian traditional military preference, as well as for cost reasons. It is also, in a sense, a retribution on behalf of the Russian military establishment against the policies of Gorbachev, who withdrew Soviet SS-20 missiles from Europe and negotiated the INF. These policies are viewed as weakness toward the West. They resulted in the demise of the Soviet Union, the loss of Russian power, and the strengthening of the West at the cost of Russian security, in the eyes of many within Russia.
The dispute over Russian compliance with the INF Treaty had intensified since 2014, especially after the United States officially alleged a Russian violation. Informed by the Obama administration about the issue since 2013, a year before making public its formal assessment of the violation (U.S. Congress had been informed as early as 2011), Europeans were initially unconvinced. American allegations increased since 2017, when Russia began deploying a ground-launched cruise missile, the 9M729, capable of traveling within the treaty’s prohibited 500-5,500 kilometer missile range. U.S. intelligence agencies have assessed that the Russian military deployed four battalions of 9M729 missiles (including one test battalion). The missiles can be nuclear-capable, but according to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, they are most likely conventionally armed. Eventually in 2019, European doubts were dispelled and several European intelligence agencies independently validated the American judgment with a high degree of probability. Russia initially denied the existence of a new missile, but then finally admitted it, arguing that the new missile was in conformity with the INF Treaty. In January 2019, it presented its arguments in detail to the international press, claiming that the missile has a range of only 480 kilometers.
Moscow could have politically capitalized on the U.S. position of unilaterally cancelling the treaty, proclaiming it would prefer to remain bound by the INF Treaty. Vladimir Putin actually suggested this possibility in December 2018. But Russia eventually acted differently: while publicly blaming the United States, it followed the exact U.S. position by announcing it was suspending its obligations as well. This while stating at the same time that it will not deploy missiles of that range if the U.S. refrains from doing so. But further deployments of 9M729s are likely to follow, since Russia claims that these missiles actually do not violate the ranges laid out in the INF Treaty. In addition, Moscow could develop a new version of the SS-26 Iskander surface-to-surface missile (whose maximum range is currently estimated at 500km) and transform it into an intermediate-range category missile. Without the constraints of the INF Treaty, the development and deployment of multiple types of missiles (including hypersonic missiles) to address objectives and threats in the 500-5,500 kilometer range is now possible with less geographical constraints.
The issue of the INF Treaty must be viewed in a global perspective, with missile proliferation, quantitative growth, and increased sophistication of Asian and Middle Eastern arsenals largely explaining the current situation. The 1987 strategic solution at the implementation of the INF Treaty became a strategic problem from Moscow’s and Washington’s perspectives. That there is no longer an INF Treaty in practice is the product of a new reality and a new context. This development is just as much about Russia’s increasing military power as it is about the American perception of many Cold War arms control treaties being outdated and being viewed as “shackles” that are unfavorable for the United States. But above all, this development is due to the new strategic landscape in Asia.
Even before Donald Trump became president, the Pentagon regarded the restrictions due to INF responsible for the imbalances between Chinese and North Korean missiles and U.S. systems in the region. For quite some time, the INF Treaty was a constraint preventing the United States from acquiring appropriate defenses necessary for a changing context in Asia. Within America, many political ideologues have long advocated for the United States to free itself from INF restrictions, regardless of Russia’s compliance or acceptance. The announcement of the cancellation of the INF Treaty also revealed the fundamentally ideological nature of a decision consistent with the disdain of international treaties perceived as constricting the United States by a large part of the American conservative camp. Consequently, like the ABM Treaty in 2002, when the Bush Administration decided to field the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, the INF Treaty appeared to be a constraint preventing America from acquiring the necessary means to adapt to the changing context and a new security environment.
Right now, Asia, not Europe, appears to be the primary geopolitical emphasis of post-INF missile development in the United States. In this regard, it is also not surprising that China was outspokenly supportive of the United States and Russia saving the INF Treaty, while at the same time categorically ruling out its own participation, in order to maintain its own strategic advantage. However, in Asia, aside from the U.S. territory of Guam and other small U.S. Pacific island territories thousands of miles from the Chinese coast, deployment of American ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles is extremely limited by geography. The United States instead relies on air- and sea-based platforms for long-range power projection in Asia. American basing options for post-INF missiles in Asian countries also appear very limited, geographically as well as politically. However, the day after the formal U.S. withdrawal from the INF treaty, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said that he was in favor of deploying conventional ground-launched, intermediate-range missiles in Asia sooner rather than later.
Europe, on the other hand, with its landmass adjacent to the Russia, seems predestined for the stationing of U.S. land-based missile systems in the long run. The question remains, however, where in Europe should these missiles be deployed. The Trump administration has not yet held talks with any European governments, at least not publicly, on hosting new missiles. Another consideration is the terms on which Washington may be willing to support and carry out a missile deployment to Europe. The United States certainly will want its own troops in Europe to be equipped with the new missile systems, but will there also be an option or a push to sell or lease systems to interested European governments? The Pentagon, in any case, is already attempting to calm the potential debate and any resulting anxieties by constantly emphasizing that none of the planned missiles are nuclear systems.
How open Europeans would be to U.S. intermediate-range missile deployments will vary significantly from country to country. Some NATO countries, such as Poland and the Baltic states, which are already within reach of Russia’s shorter-range missiles, like the SS-26 Iskander, are viewing the development of Russian intermediate-range missiles as an opportunity to attract a more robust and permanent U.S. military presence in their countries. Other countries, such as Germany and France, however, will be cautious of escalating the intermediate-range arms race and will have to internally deal with populations that will be opposed to missiles in their territories. During the 1980s, U.S. missile deployments caused major protests in Western Europe. This means for Russia in return, that if it wants to exploit Western European skepticism and opposition, it must strike a delicate balance between expanding its own intermediate-range missile deployments with maintaining its current outward propaganda advantage. In the Eastern European NATO countries, the situation and sentiment are entirely different, especially in Poland. Due to its history and proximity to Russia, Poland has been wary about Russia’s intentions and has advocated for a resolute, sometimes even provocative policy toward Russia. According to some Polish defense analysts, Russia has already gained a considerable military advantage, because it has medium-range missiles in Europe while NATO does not. But this Russian advantage could be easily curtailed with American missiles in Europe. In their view, the end of the INF treaty is an opportunity for Eastern Europe. It could lead to a stronger alliance between the United States and Eastern European countries. If Western Europe is opposed to the stationing of medium- to intermediate-range missiles from the U.S., Poland and other countries of NATO’s eastern flank may not refuse U.S. missiles on their soil. Some Polish defense planners are even going so far to recommend missiles in Ukraine or Georgia to clearly restrain Russia. They dream of Poland playing a pivotal role in the defense of Europe. For geopolitical reasons, and with American military presence, in their mind, it will become the hub for redistributing security to the whole region by strongly limiting Russia and its ambitions in Central and Eastern Europe. In a similar line of thought, a stronger alliance between the United States and the countries of Eastern Europe would potentially prove far more valuable than a broken, outdated U.S.-Russia treaty would ever be.
Therefore, as Western Europeans may be opposed to any U.S. missile deployments in Europe, the perception in Eastern Europe is quite different. Also, Western European dreams of a common defense and security policy across EU countries are very far from reality. Pro-European voices who claimed that the cancelation of the INF Treaty could be a chance to come up with the creation of a “Euro-deterrent” and European strategic autonomy in a 21st century Europe that will exercise strategic sovereignty will be quickly reminded of the realities in a post-INF Europe. There is no united European position on the defense of Europe. It is telling that the Eastern European countries in the past often turned directly to the U.S. for defense matters and not to the EU or even NATO. Poland and the United States, under President Obama, in 2010 agreed to rotate American Patriot units from Germany to Poland (resulting in Russian threats to move Iskander missiles to the Kaliningrad Oblast) as part of the so-called Patriot to Poland mission. This, for example, was a bilateral agreement between Poland and the United States. There was no NATO involvement. Poland and Romania are already hosting the U.S. Aegis Ashore missile defense systems. Although integrated into a NATO missile defense architecture, make no mistake, these are U.S. systems. The U.S. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar, which functions as the primary sensor for these NATO defense systems is located in Turkey and is operated by U.S. soldiers only. The actual radar and the immediate area where it is located is only accessible to U.S. personnel; no NATO member state has access to it, and this is no different for the sites in Romania or Poland. The operations for the radar in Turkey are coordinated and controlled by U.S. personnel at the U.S. Air Force base in Ramstein, Germany. All the data that the radar provides is collected by U.S. personnel and only then passed on to NATO. Contrary to what many Europeans may want to think, NATO has no direct command or control over any of the U.S. missile defense assets in Europe. The U.S. shares information with NATO and takes NATO into consideration. That is the extent of NATO involvement. All of the assets are American and potential strategic engagements to defend Europe from ballistic missile attacks are controlled and carried out by the U.S. military.
Realistically, the Europeans are only bystanders when it comes to their strategic missile defense. The Europeans were bystanders when the stability of Europe was determined by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1987 with the INF Treaty and the Europeans are bystanders now as well as Russia and the U.S. figure out how a post-INF Europe may look. Today, they remain essentially spectators, even though in 2018, the United States obtained pro forma NATO’s open support for its position. The INF crisis is not a central strategic issue for Europe, also because Europe really has very little strategic say. For Europeans, the consequence and direct impact is political: the INF Treaty symbolizes the end of the Cold War and the start of a new era. The American withdrawal may lead West European populations to view the White House – which, in terms of public relations in Europe, made a big mistake by unanimously cancelling the INF Treaty – and the Kremlin – which now has the higher ground from this point of view – on an equal footing. The consequences for the already strained transatlantic relations are therefore not positive, at least not in Western Europe. Moscow has largely managed to shift the blame for the treaty’s collapse mainly on Washington in the eyes of many Europeans. The abrupt U.S. withdrawal without making much effort to negotiate and discuss the allegations of breaches by both sides has fueled the perception that the U.S. is mainly responsible for the INF’s failure. Therefore, Russia will continue to portray itself as simply reacting to U.S. aggression if it further deploys its own intermediate-range missiles to maintain this perception. Thus, Russia is trying to minimize European irritations at its own missile deployments while at the same time driving a wedge between the United States and its West European allies. Nevertheless, the mysterious explosion at a Russian navy’s testing range last year that had been surrounded by secrecy and increased radiation levels may have drawn some attention to the fact that Russia is also very much engaged in testing and establishment of offensive capabilities and may not be so innocent after all.
One overlooked feature of the INF Treaty in the debate of post-INF Europe is that it was not entirely bilateral anymore after the fall of the USSR. After the USSR ceased to exist, it also covered former Soviet states in whose territories the production or testing of intermediate-range missiles once took place. Among these states is Ukraine, a country with a very strong domestic industrial base for the production of missile systems. Ukraine could now see the collapse of INF as an opportunity to gain some deterrent capability towards Russia with its own ballistic missiles. Kiev has already stated that it reserves the right to now develop its own missiles as necessary. With its economy in dire straits, it may also consider export of such missiles. Potential buyers in Europe would be Poland or the Baltic states, who are eager to bolster their own defenses against Russia.
Another country to consider is Turkey. Turkey too may influence future European missile proliferation. With the launch of its domestically produced Bora ballistic missile in combat against Kurdish assets in northern Iraq, Turkey has joined Syria, Iran, Israel and Russia in making use of ballistic missiles in combat in the region. Turkey is currently in the process of establishing a domestic independent defense industry. The combat use against the Kurds in northern Iraq was just as much a sales pitch, as it was an actual military operation. Turkey has announced its intention to export its missiles and it is working on more advanced ranges and precision. In the past, Turkey had planned to develop a missile with a maximum range of 2,500 kilometers. Further indicating Turkey’s intention to earn offensive missile capabilities was the construction of the first Turkish satellite launching center to bolster the country’s satellite programs. It could be suspected that Ankara may be intending to use its launching pad to fire the long-range missiles the government hopes to build in the long term. Turkey justifies its ballistic missile ambitions by pointing to its neighbors Iran and Syria and their missile programs. However, Turkey also views Armenia, which possesses Russian Iskander missiles, as a potential threat. With Greece being within range of Turkish ballistic missiles, the prospect of an Aegean arms race, if Greece feels compelled to acquire new weapons against its traditional rival Turkey, is not inconceivable either.
The disappearance of the INF Treaty marks the end of the post-Cold War strategic relationships. The nuclear issue itself will not be the actual topic of the debate, but rather the conventional attack and defense capabilities, something that is gravely misunderstood in Western Europe. The end of the INF Treaty reveals many things: the evolution of the international context with China’s rise to power, the disinterest of Russia and the United States in Cold War arms control treaties, the deterioration of relations between Russia and the United States, the division between Western and Eastern Europe, and the powerlessness of Europe in international military matters.
Who Needs A Proxy War In The Caucasus?
All proxy wars are, by definition, delusional. Usually, two client-states wage a war, one against another, while, actually, their war advances interests of some other states, commonly their sponsor-states. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is not a simple proxy war: its proxiness and delusional character exponentially grow as the conflict unfolds on the ground.
For, it is conceived as a war that was supposed to draw two major regional powers, Russia and Turkey, into a mutual conflict, on the assumptions that Russia is going to act as Armenia’s sponsor-state, ready to enter the war on the side of its presumed proxy, and that Turkey is going to act as Azerbaijan’s sponsor-state, ready to enter the war on the side of its presumed proxy. Yet, as the conflict unfolds, it becomes transparent that these assumptions were deeply wrong and that the proxiness and delusional character of this very war are skyrocketing beyond the absurd.
Turkish rapprochement with Russia, which is a logical consequence of Turkey’s geopolitical reversal caused by its failure to become a candidate for membership in the European Union after so many years of begging, has not remained unnoticed by relevant circles in the West. While the United States has tried to persuade the Turks to remain its most reliable ally and refrain from turning towards Turkey’s natural geopolitical environment, that is, towards other Eurasian powers, France’s foreign policy, with a British support, has chosen a different strategy.
Assuming that the close encounters between Russia’s and Turkey’s troops on the soil of Syria and Libya were an expression of a true potential for their mutual conflict, rather than a careful choreography conceived by these two powers to deceive their potential adversaries in the Euro-Atlantic bloc, France and Britain have created a strategy to draw Russia and Turkey into a mutual conflict through their presumed proxies, Armenia and Azerbaijan. For this purpose, they used the traditional bonds between France and Armenia, based on the presence of the numerous Armenian diaspora in France. Due to these historical bonds, it was not difficult for France to persuade the Armenian leadership to fall into a trap of a new war with Azerbaijan, as France’s (and Britain’s)de facto proxy. However, the basic assumption was that in the further development Russia will automatically take Armenia’s side, as it once did, in the times of Boris Yeltsin. In other words, Armenia was pushed into the war by France (and Britain), so as to make it seem as if Russia did it, in order to eventually draw Russia into a conflict with Turkey, which was assumed to be on the side of Azerbaijan in case of Armenian attack. A cunning plan, isn’t it? Yet, these assumptions, as well as the strategy derived from them, have proved to be a farcical failure.
For, Putin’s Russia is not Yeltsin’s Russia. Yeltsin allowed himself to be drawn into a geopolitical game constructed for Russia’s ultimate destruction, the game of creation of ethnically exclusive territories, like Nagorno-Karabakh, or South Ossetia, to be followed by their secession from the states to which they originally belonged and annexation by the states with which they shared common ethnic identity. In other words, this game was a game of endless ethnic cleansing and creation of ethnically exclusive territories, which would eventually destroy not only Russia with its numerous ethnic minorities, but also the entire zone of Eurasia with its numberless ethnic groups. This was a recipe for the ultimate destruction of the entire Eurasian space, carefully planned in the inner circles of the Anglo-American foreign policy establishment, and recklessly adopted by Yeltsin and many other post-Soviet politicians. However, Putin is not Yeltsin, and he did understand the destructive potential of the concept of ethnically exclusive territories when applied to the post-Soviet space: if every ethnic group were to claim its own exclusive territory, and then unification with its ethnic kin in other states, there would be no more territorially compact states in Eurasia, including Russia itself.
A similar pattern was previously applied to the Soviet Union, when its republics were stimulated to claim independence on the basis of ethnic identity and presumed right to self-determination. This process ended up with the total dissolution of the Soviet Union. Of course, full application of this pattern generates a process of endless dissolutions: for, all ethnic minorities within these newly-proclaimed states may well claim secession from these states, since the underlying assumption, adopted by many local ethnonationalist leaders, is that these ethnic groups’ survival is possible only within their own ethnically exclusive statelets. To put it briefly, it is a pattern of geopolitical fission, with the consequences similar to those of nuclear fission. Among other destructive processes triggered in the post-Soviet space, this pattern also led to the Armenian invasion of Azerbaijan’s territory and creation of the ethnically exclusive territory of Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenian ethnic minority in Azerbaijan, with the ultimate goal of its secession from Azerbaijan and annexation by Armenia.
The same pattern was also promoted in the Balkans, again by Britain and France, in their initiatives for ethnic partition of Bosnia in the 1990s and annexation of its territories by Serbia and Croatia, and recently, for exchange of ethnic territories between Serbia and Kosovo. The concept of ethnically exclusive territories as the only safe environment for survival of ethnic groups, therefore, is not the invention of some ‘wild tribes’ in the Balkans or the Caucasus. It is a premeditated strategy for permanent destabilization of any geopolitical zone, wherever applied. Its authorship needs to be finally attributed to those who are always present in their application – the British and French foreign policy establishments. Yet, this time, in the case of the second Armenian-Azeri war, this hook has not been swallowed by its main targets, Russia and Turkey.
Having been aware of the fact that the Armenian attack on Azerbaijan was generated by some other players, who were not even too careful to hide its role in it (such as President Macron of France), and that the very concept of ethnically exclusive territories has served as a tool for permanent destabilization of both Russia and the rest of Eurasia, Russian foreign policy reacted in a way that was precisely the opposite from the reaction of Yeltsin’s foreign policy in the case of the first Armenian-Azeri war. Instead of automatically taking Armenia’s side and further promoting the concept of ethnically exclusive territories, as designed by the Anglo-French axis, Russia took a neutral position and thereby has practically given a green light to Azerbaijan to regain control over Nagorno-Karabakh and restore its full sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this way, the very concept of ethnically exclusive territories has been delegitimised, not only in the Caucasus, but also in the entire post-Soviet space. Yet, it remains to be delegitimised in the Balkans.
Russia has probably made such a radical geopolitical turnover in tacit agreement with Turkey, so as to be safe about its outcome and the foreseeable consequences. Their rapprochement has thus been elevated to a level of potential strategic alliance. At the same time, Turkey has strengthened its credibility in the post-Soviet space and the rest of Eurasia, but not in the conflictual mode against Russia. This improvement of Turkey’s international standing has been based on its principled defence of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, that is, principled respect for international law, not on an aggressive implementation of a pan-Turkic programme that would eventually include all Turkic peoples, including Azeris, into some imagined Greater Turkey. The same applies to Russia and its abandonment of presupposed pan-Orthodox sentiments in the case of Armenia, although these have yet to be abandoned in the Balkans, in the case of Russia’s flirting with the Greater Serbian programme of ethnically exclusive territories.
In any case, both Russia and Turkey have thus made an important step out of the straitjacket tailored for them when the concept of ethnically exclusive territories was inserted into Eurasian geopolitical space. In that way, they have also created a geopolitical framework for Armenia and Azerbaijan to make a step out of their proxy roles, in which they were given a task to inscribe their respective ethnically exclusive territories. In other words, what has been generated is a geopolitical potential for peace between these two countries and their reconstitution along civic-inclusive, instead of ethnic-exclusive, lines.
Analysing INF Treaty: US withdrawal and its implications towards Asian Allies
United States of America and Soviet Union signed a treaty of “Intermediate Range Nuclear Force” during 1987 (also known as Cold War era). The basic purpose of this treaty was to prevent further destruction in the world, but US has engaged the complete world into an arms race. Both the super powers were enthusiastic to abide by the rules of this treaty but, later on US suspected Russia for violating the rules. This research paper is basically to analyze the position of US in the continent Asia whether it will be able to suppress China, as China is the emerging threat towards its hegemony. This research paper is supported by the “offensive realism theory” which was provided by John Mearsheimer. According to this theory, when any state develops strong in any region of strategic importance, different powers intervenes to suppress it in order to maintain their own dominancy.
The main reason behind America withdrawal from “INF treaty” was to construct missiles of that much longer ranges which can counter China and creation of those missiles was actually banned under that treaty. According to the research US actually wanted to suppress China by highlighting the Russia’s non-Compliance as a pretext. Furthermore, due to lack of policies and strategies in Asia-Pacific region US was actually unable to contain China and other Asiatic states for deploying missiles within their territories. The data has been collected from primary and secondary sources and analytical methodology has been applied. Primary data composed of interviews of political parties and American government on News Channels, talk shows and official websites whereas secondary data collected from journals articles, newspapers and reports of “SIPRI”.
Ronald Reagan representing United States and Michael Gaurbachev representing Soviet Union signed “Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF)” Treaty in year 1987. Under this treaty both states were obliged to eliminate all missiles having range of between 500 to 5500 Kms.Russia at that time was having SS 20 Missiles which was capable of destroying whole Europe with its range, the basic purpose of US behind initiating this treaty was to dismantle such types of missiles of Russia. Under this treaty, a total of 2692 missiles (US 846 and Soviet Union 1846) were destroyed and hence it is known as the most successful treaty of the Cold War Era.
US blamed Soviet Union of violating the rule of “INF treaty” under which both of the states were not allowed to construct missiles having range more than 500 KMs, these allegations formed the cause of weakening of this treaty. Russia countered those allegations by giving a statement that those 9M729 missiles have a range of 480 KMs which does not exceed the range mentioned in the treaty. Obama Administration made the first allegation on Soviet Union but never provided any evidence in their complete tenure. Donald Trump elected as US President after Obama in 2016, and suspended the treaty on 2nd Feb 2019 providing time of Six months to Soviet Union to comply on this treaty otherwise US will withdraw from this treaty then by using Russian Violation of treaty as a pretext, US officially announced its withdrawal from the treaty on 2nd August 2019. The basic purpose of America to withdraw from this treaty was to contain China emerging as a super power as China was not the part of this treaty.
US hegemony is greatly threatened by rapid emergence of China as a super power. US has always used its powers against the states which threatened its position in the world as one could see US fought against Germany in World War I, as Germany was gaining a dominant position in Europe and similarly, during world war II America overpowered Japan and Soviet Union during the Cold War era. As currently, there is no state in Europe which can threaten US so it shifted its focus towards Asia to gain dominancy. The emergence of China is the real threat to US hegemony therefore US aims to hold INF treaty in Asia-Pacific region to be centric.US is facing a lot of criticism due to few steps it has taken in recent times which has not only affected the mutual trust of the states but has also put security of Europe at stake. They are facing the criticism of increasing the risk of military conflict in the world.
US is desirous to develop a level playing field which includes the construction of all kinds of weapons i.e. Air, Naval, and ground-based intermediate missiles. There is a risk of enhancement in Arms race in the world due to withdrawal of America from INF. Much work has been done on “INF treaty” about its history and importance but this paper will analyze the United States interest and its policies in Asia after withdrawing INF treaty.
- To examine United States reasons behind withdrawing from INF treaty
- To examine the United States policies in countering China
US hegemony was threatened due to emergence of China as a super power in Asia therefore it withdrew from the INF Treaty
Was Russian noncompliance the only reason for United States to withdraw itself from INF treaty?
Will US be able to contain China in Asia?
Primary and secondary data is primarily used to support Hypothesis and analytical methodology has been applied. Data has been taken from “Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)”, “China Global Television Network (CGTN)” and from Arms control and Disarmament websites. News articles, journals articles,news clipping, documentaries, research papers and magazines have been addressed in this research.
Not many books are available on the topic. Had to take help from newspaper clippings, opinion articles, talk shows or panel discussions, YouTube documentaries and news channels. Post 9/11 period has been taken to address the INF treaty.
Theoretical Framework and Discussions:
Realism is the most noticeable theory of International Politics. This theory sees the world with the logical and realistic point of view. It accomplishes the two significant idea of global relations; “Security” and power or force”. For each country “security” is the prime interest and to satisfy this interest, power is a primary source. Power and security can be called as the two sides of same coin. The state removes its insecurity from the persuasion of power which creates insecurity for another states Two speculations have been taken for the justification of hypothesis Classical Realism and Neorealism and it is further subdivided into two positions: “Offensive and Defensive realism”. Basically, Classical realism focus on Human nature and linked power with it that Human is greedy and selfish because of this war happened but in order to analyze Neo realism it is more appropriate in this contemporary world they discuss that International system is anarchic and this structure determines the behavior of states due to which states pursue power. In addition to this, two factorstalk about power but in different perspective. Offensive realism theory proposed by John Mearsheimer’s deals with maximization of power rather than security and seek towards hegemony than equality.Whereas Defensive realism theorists believe that state must seek power enough for its security rather than accumulating excessive power.
However, in order to apply this theory United States is focusing on offensive realism because hegemon state will use all its power to prevent the rise of competitor in order to stay dominant. Now US did not bother about the security of European states and withdrew INF treaty that has arisen the factor of arm race in the world. So, there is no central authority that can take authentic decisions due to which states create its own self-help system to ensure its own survival.
Russian noncompliance was a reason for United States behind termination of “INF treaty” but it was not a fact Trump was more worried about China missiles because it was not a part of this treaty and it was successfully developing numbers of missiles whose ranges are more than “INF” limits. Whereas, United States was prohibited under this treaty and was not allowed to test or deploy ground-based missile because of this US capability was becoming under threatened by the China. On the other hand, Russia was in favor of this treaty because Russia position is different now as compared to 1980’s era. Soviet Union was split in 1991 and the states that were under Soviet Union associated themselves with “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)” thus United States have an advantage to deploy its missiles here and target Russia in a minute. For example, Estonia is near to Russia and it can target Russia in a second. So, Russia does not want termination of this treaty so that US do not deploy its missiles here because in response Russia is unable to reach territory of United States.
Russia made a draft resolution for the preservation of the INF treaty and submitted to the 74th meeting of General Assembly but it was rejected by the “United Nation Disarmament committee” because it comes under Security Council. Russia tried its best to preserve its treaty but unable to achieve success because US already made its mind since 2018 and US security advisor John Bolton told Russian President Putin that Trump has already made his mind to withdraw from this treaty in Moscow. In addition to this, director of the “Center for Security Cooperation in the Chinese ministry of national defense” without supporting any states Zhou Bo has mentioned in an interview on “world insight China Global Television network” that if there was any problem related to Russian missiles then it was the duty of US to investigate it. Though, Russia showed positive gesture as they invited US for the inspection of missiles but America denied to visit. In addition to this, United States denied this inspection because they were working on missiles if they accept this invitation then US has also reveal its information regarding missiles because Russia was also accusing that US is working on missiles formation i.e. Aegis shore and US is making planning to deploy these missiles in Poland.Continuous debate along with counteraccusation game was going on. Russia statements regarding development of US missiles are showing authentic observations because US tested intermediate missiles just after seventeen days of withdrawal from INF. It means that US was working on these missiles for many years.
There were two reports regarding China Ballistic missiles. In 2013 first report was published by “National Air and space Intelligence Centre” that China consumes utmost diverse ballistic missiles.Moreover, second report was published by Pentagon in 2018 that China is improving its missiles. In prior to this, United States seek hegemony in Asia continent and want to counter China by deploying its missiles in Asian allies’ states and announced that they will deploy missiles “sooner rather than later”. Moreover, United States trying to form new treaty in which China must also become a part of it but China denied to join any treaty that make its capability limited. As China is becoming a continental power and intermediate missiles are its backbone so adherence to any treaty would create a huge asymmetry and might cause an unbalanced power between strategic rivals then it would be difficult to compete them.
United States has again opted the policy of “Containment” against China as it made it against Soviet Union in Cold war. However, question arises that will US be able to contain China in Asia? In order to analyze China and Soviet Union, China is far superior than Soviet Union financially and strategically. US made progress in containing Soviet Union since it was inside frail, however in case of China it would be troublesome on the grounds because China’s procurement power is bigger than United States and has fabricated strong military in South China Sea. China has opted winning heart mind scheme in its surrounding areas by building economic corridor, though United States consistently relied on hard power and consistently centered around military innovation. Rivalry among US and China is consistently there, in light of the fact that both are following nationalism and need to secure own national interest so collaboration would be difficult among them and it is very hard to contain China for United States.
US and Asian Allies:
As China is emerging and creating a military threat to United States. So, United States pull out INF treaty so that it makes itself free from the limitations and make a missile of those ranges that are banned under this treaty only to contain China. Three perspective could be made on US withdrawal: First intermediate missiles are inexpensive for US than air and naval assets, it will be good to deter China and more survivable than air and sea-based missiles. However, US did not consult with its Asian Allies before withdrawing the treaty that will these states allow US to deploy its missiles on their territory. For US it would be one of the difficult tasks to attain because it is digging itself into one of the most complicated process i.e. long process of negotiation will take place between US and its Asian allies.
Japan and South Korea are the two allies of US in Asia. In order to analyze both states want good relations with China. The Government of Japan opposed the US decision regarding a withdrawal from INF treaty. Likewise, it will not allow US to deploy its missile on their territory. Moreover, Japan is bound with their customs and has to take consent from the local governors and administration. Japan does not want another challenge from its neighbor country along from their public because US military are deployed in Japan through “Status of force agreement (SOFA)” and they are operating there without respecting Japan domestic laws and Japan took decision to revise SOFA agreement in 2018. So, public opinion is also playing role in Japan decision making and majority of people are not in the support of deployment of missiles in their territory along with unable to face other repercussions from its neighboring state China.
South Korea and United States relations are becoming weaker after 2016. In 2016 US deployed “Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD)” in South Korea to counter North Korea missiles. In result China retaliated and made sanction on economic and diplomatic efforts that costed South Korea approximately seven billion dollars. In addition to this, if South Korea again deploy US missiles then it would face repercussions and its relation with China will affect. Furthermore, in order to analyze the leadership of Korea, they did not want now any sanctions from China and trying to make peaceful Korean peninsula.
Guam is there where US can deploy its missiles but it is very small island about thirty miles long and ten miles wide. China is far from Guam approximately 3,000 km and currently US is lacking this range of missiles to target China.
Australia is left with only the option but it will also cost US expensively because to target China US require Intercontinental ballistic missiles instead of intermediate missiles because from this region China is 5500 km far away and currently US is bound with the New strategic reduction arm treaty that does not allow US to develop these ranges missiles. Again, US did not consult with Australia regarding deployment of missiles. Australia is also not willing to deploy US missiles as its Prime minister also expressed this statement in an interview.
So, United States always make its policies or agreements with the states but whenever it feels the threat related to their dominancy it withdraws itself from agreements unilaterally. Either it is related to climate agreement or arms control agreement. US always look towards its interest if it is fulfilling then it will follow it otherwise it will withdraw itself from the treaty. As offensive realism theory explain that international system is anarchic not in means of chaos but lack of central political authority is there that leads states towards self-help system to ensure its survival. And this is the perspective that US is continuously using offensive behavior and tried it best to use all its power to prevent the rise of competitor and thus it withdraws from INF only to increase its power so that it would be able to contain China.
On the other hand, United States has undermined the trust of states. Before taking this step, US must know that many states are having missiles technology there is no monopoly over it. Now every state will make more missiles to ensure its survival and thus give emergence to new arm race in the world.
US took verdict on withdrawal from INF arrangement rapidly because of absence of legitimate arranging or approaches in regards to containing China. First no vital strategies were made with Asian Allies particularly Japan and South Korea. These two states are bound to their administration order for deploying intermediate missiles in their region. Public perceptions or recognition and assessment are additionally impacting in their administration arrangements. Research explored that authority of Asian states needs great relations with China rather than United States because China is economically more strengthened then US and it is near to them and cannot take any risk against China so that in future, they face more difficulties. Furthermore, absence of clear strategy with respect to containing China will give no achievement in future as US secretary of states has referenced that it will send its missiles sooner in Asia however it is time taking procedure and will take a very long time to execute. In addition to this, if Russia was violating the rules of INF treaty, at that point why confirmations or evidences were not exposed by US government? United States always back out from the treatise whenever their security becomes threatened. Currently, US is only left with one treaty named as “New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty” that was also signed amid US and Soviet Union during cold war. It is expected that US could withdraw from this last cold war treaty in 2021 as President Trump already indicate this factor in his speech as well. Thus, US will free itself from all the restrictions and chances of arm race will be increased among the states either developing or developed states.
Russian noncompliance was just a pretext for United States of America. Its main reason was to contain China and want to make INF treaty Asia-Pacific centric but it would be difficult for the United States after agreement termination, because for deployment of missiles, it needs Asian allies’ states to offer its launch sites for missiles within range of China. It is clear that which country will provide its territory along with future repercussions from China. In this contemporary world, China has opted winning heart mind strategy in its region whereas United States always believed on hard power and always focused on military technology to achieve its hegemony and this concept is becoming blur in modern world. Competition between US and China always there because both are following nationalism and want to protect their own national interest so cooperation would be difficult amid them and it is quite difficult to contain China for United States in South Asia region.
 “US. Department of State: Treaty Between the United States of America And the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on The Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)”, 2009-2017
Lori Esposito Murray, “What the INF Treaty’s Collapse Means for Nuclear Proliferation”, Council on Foreign Relations, August, 1, 2019
 Alexander Lanoska, “The INF Treaty: Pulling Out in Time”, Air University, no.13 (Summer 2019): 53-54
Glenn H. Snyder, “World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay”, The MIT Press 27,no.1 (summer 2002)
Andrey Baklitskiy, “What the end of the INF treaty means for China”, Carnegie Moscow Center, December 2, 2019
Ivan Tselichtchev, “If Trump blows up US-Russia nuclear treaty, China will pick up the pieces”, South China Morning Post, 10 November 2018
Julian Borger, “European diplomats mount last-ditch effort to stop US scrapping INF treaty”, The Guardian, 18 November 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/18/inf-treaty-european-diplomats-us-russia
 Alexander Lanoska, “The INF Treaty: Pulling Out in Time”, Air University, no.13 (Summer 2019): 56
 Alex ward, “The US just withdrew from an important nuclear arms treaty with Russia. Don’t panic — yet”, VOX, August 2, 2019, https://www.vox.com/world/2019/8/2/20750158/inf-treaty-trump-russia-withdraw
Shannon Bugos, “US completes INF treaty Withdrawal”, Arms control Association, September,2019
Will Saetern, “US cold war containment strategy against China may not end the Soviet way. Instead, it could explode into armed conflict”, South China Morning Post, September 17,2018
 Pranay Vaddi, “Leaving the INF Treaty Won’t Help Trump Counter China”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 31, 2019
 “Australia won’t host U.S. missiles, prime minister says”, August,5,2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-usa-missiles/australia-wont-host-us-missiles-prime-minister-says-idUSKCN1UV0IB
 Malik Qasim Mustafa, “US withdrawal from the INF treaty: Implications for global strategic stability”, Institute of strategic studies Islamabad, ed. Najam Rafique (ISSI, 2018)
UN salutes new Libya ceasefire agreement
Warring parties in Libya on Friday agreed an historic ceasefire, which was hailed by the head of the UN Support Mission in the country (UNSMIL), who led the mediation, as a courageous act that can help secure a “a better, safer, and more peaceful future for all the Libyan people”.
“I would like to salute you, because what you have accomplished here takes a great deal of courage”, said UNSMIL chief, and Acting Special Representative, Stephanie Williams, at a press conference in Geneva. “You have gathered for the sake of Libya, for the sake of your people, to take concrete steps to end their suffering.”
The country has been roiled by division and conflict, since the overthrow of former dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, in 2011. Supporters of the UN-recognized Government in Tripoli have been under siege for months, following an offensive by forces of the rival administration of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Commander Khalifa Haftar.
UN-led mediation by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, representing the two sides, yielded Friday’s agreement, that Ms. Williams said could help secure “a better, safer, and more peaceful future for all the Libyan people.
“I salute your sense of responsibility and your commitment to preserving Libya’s unity and reasserting its sovereignty”, she said of the accord.
Hopes of ‘lasting ceasefire’
She said the two sides had come together first and foremost, as Libyans, together: “The road was long and difficult at times, but your patriotism has been your guide all the time, and you have succeeded in concluding an agreement for a successful and lasting ceasefire.”
I hope that this agreement will contribute to ending the suffering of the Libyan people and enabling the displaced, both outside and inside the country, to return to their homes and live in peace and security.”
The UNSMIL head said the agreement “represents an important distinguishing mark for Libya and the Libyan people. I very much hope that future generations of Libyans will celebrate today’s agreement, as it represents that decisive and courageous first step towards a comprehensive settlement of the Libyan crisis that followed.”
Work lies ahead
Ms. Williams said there was “much work ahead in the coming days and weeks to implement the commitments contained in this agreement” adding that it was important to continue focused negotiations, “as quickly as possible in order to alleviate the many hardships that this conflict has caused to the Libyan people.”
She said she knew that the Libyan people “can count on you” and added that “the United Nations is with you and the people of Libya. We will do our utmost to ensure that the international community lends its full and unwavering support to you.”
Secretary-General hails ‘fundamental step toward peace and stability’
The UN Secretary-General António Guterres welcomed the ceasefire, telling journalists in New York on Friday that represented “a fundamental step toward peace and stability in Libya.”
“I congratulate the parties for putting the interest of their nation ahead of their differences…Too many people have suffered for too long. Too many men, women and children have died as a result of the conflict”, said the UN chief.
The agreement was negotiated within the framework of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission with talks facilitated by the UN on the basis of Security Council resolution 2510 and 2542.
It is the result of four rounds of negotiations held since February of this year, Mr. Guterres reminded.
“I call on the international community to support Libyans in implementing the ceasefire and in bringing an end to the conflict. This includes ensuring the full and unconditional respect for the Security Council arms embargo.
“And I urge the Libyan parties to maintain the current momentum and show the same determination in reaching a political solution to the conflict, resolving economic issues and addressing the humanitarian situation.”
The UN chief said UNSMIL was making preparations to resume the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum – which stalled when fighting escalated last year – adding that it will be preceded by a series of meetings and consultations that would facilitate “the resumption of inclusive, intra-Libyan political talks – Libyan-led and Libyan owned.”
“There is no military solution for the conflict in Libya. This ceasefire agreement is a critical step. There is much hard work ahead”, he warned.
Momentum for global ceasefire builds
“With the inspiration of the Libyan agreement, now is the time to mobilize all efforts to support the mediations taking place to end the conflicts in Yemen, Afghanistan and in Armenia and Azerbaijan – where active hostilities are causing immense suffering for civilians”, he said.
“There is no military solution for any of these conflicts. The solution must be political.”
October 27th: The Tyranny Continues in Kashmir
October 27 marks the beginning of Indian Occupation of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. It is forever scarred...
Going Digital is Necessary for Small Businesses to Survive
APEC member economies must work together to promote and encourage the transition of the region’s micro, small and medium enterprises...
Nord Stream 2: Who Benefits From the Navalny Affair?
On October 7, the French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and his German counterpart Heiko Maas issued a joint statement...
Recession and Automation Changes Our Future of Work, But There are Jobs Coming
The Future of Jobs 2020 report has found that COVID-19 has caused the labour market to change faster than expected....
Financial Bubbles in the Coronavirus Era
There is reason to believe that the coronavirus will not be going anywhere soon. What is more, IMF experts warn...
Rachel Lyons: Shaping the future of humanity in space
Rachel Lyons is the executive director at Space for Humanity. Space for Humanity is a non profit organisation in the...
Socially Responsible, Low-Carbon Capitalism Can Ensure ‘Job-Full’ Recovery From COVID-19
COVID-19 has caused a jobs crisis but, if we are to recover from the pandemic, two more fundamental crises need...
Russia3 days ago
United States, Russia or China: The Struggle for Global Superpower
Development2 days ago
Global collaboration is key to recovery and achieving the SDGs
Health & Wellness3 days ago
‘Very tough’ months ahead in COVID battle- WHO
International Law3 days ago
UN at 75: The Necessity of Having a Stronger & More Effective United Nations
Defense2 days ago
Analysing INF Treaty: US withdrawal and its implications towards Asian Allies
Health & Wellness3 days ago
Healthcare Ratings of the World’s Countries
Southeast Asia2 days ago
Lessons from Cambodia and the way ahead- quest for peace and reconciliation
Southeast Asia1 day ago
US Secretary of State Pompeo set to boost Indonesian religious reform efforts