As we have all realized, since the COVID-19 epidemics broke out the number of regulations enacted – especially by the Italian Presidency of the Council of Ministers – has literally sky-rocketed.
The starting date of the sequence of regulations is certain. It is, in fact, January 31, 2020 with the declaration of the state of emergency connected to the onset of diseases resulting from transmissible viral agents, pursuant to Article 7, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph c) of Legislative Decree No. 1 of 2018 (Civil Protection Code).
The Prime Minister’s Decrees, the many Guidelines, Directives and Ministerial Orders, as well as the many Orders of the Head of the Civil Protection Department and, finally, the many Regional and even Municipal Orders have added to the Emergency Ordinances and the many – probably too many – decree-laws to be quickly converted into laws after the Parliament’s vote, pursuant to the Constitution.
There has never been an exception to the eternal rule – mathematical, at first, and then legal – according to which the greater the number and complexity of rules, the greater the indecision and misunderstanding inherent in their implementation.
Even in such a severe and complex situation, the messy regulatory system created with the Emergency Ordinances and Decrees for the COVID-19 infection is, therefore, a source of ambiguity, indecisiveness and potential conflict between State apparata and Local Administrations.
This is the reason why, even in the State administration, the old maxim of medieval logic, simplex sigillum veri, should apply.
Hence which is the final criterion for solving the inevitable regulatory ambiguity? The criterion is Politics, seen as Alexander’s Sword cutting the Gordian Knot immediately.
This is, in fact, the real function of democratic representation, in a highly-regulated context, as is the case in every modern Western country.
Parliament is always the decision-maker, together with the Government and the Presidency of the Republic, responsible for both budget items and the hierarchy of rules, which should be as simple as possible, as already taught us by Beccaria.
Reverting – after this example – to the issue of Italy’s current Budget Law, what is it, in fact?
As is well-known, the Budget Law is the legislative instrument, provided for by Article 81 of the Constitution, which lays down how the Government – with a preliminary accounting document – communicates to Parliament the public expenditure and revenue forecast for the following year, pursuant to the laws in force.
At first, it should be noted that much of the expenditure is bound to be fully hypothetical – as happens also in private budgets – and cannot be completely organized by means of a single old or new rule. Finally, some budget items depend on cash flows and expenses which can never be fully predictable in the budget.
Again pursuant to Article 81 of the Constitution, unlike what currently happens for the Stability Law, the law for adopting the State Budget cannot introduce new taxes and new expenses.
The structure of the State Budget, namely the network of fixed items, must be only that one.
The reason is obvious but, given this asymmetry, it is difficult to put together the Budget Law and the Stability Law in a reasonable way.
It should be recalled that the Stability Law, also known as Finance Act or Budget Package, is the ordinary law proposed by the Government, which regulates the economic policy of the State (and also of civil society) for three years.
Well, but in three years, as they say in French, chosir son temps, c’est l’épargner.
In three years everything is done and everything can be destroyed or change, especially with the kind of international economy we are dealing with now.
The Stability Law has been so called, almost officially, since 2009 mainly as a result of the introduction of “fiscal federalism”, implemented with the constitutional reform of 2001, which requires that the activity of the “central” State is coordinated with the local one, which has autonomous and different assets – albeit not always – from the “central” State finance.
I believe that the famous “federalism” has been a long-standing illusion from which the sooner we wake up the better.
The distribution of revenue among the Regions – increasingly eager for money, especially after the reckless “Reform of Title V” of the Constitution, invented by the leftist governments in the belief they could take votes away from the Northern League Party – has been detrimental. It has made the Local Authorities increasingly powerful, and therefore large and very expensive, with an efficiency that, except for the Northern regions, which would have been efficient anyway, has plummeted throughout the rest of Italy.
Again as a result of the Treaty of Maastricht – a city previously unknown except for the French siege of 1673, in which D’Artagnan stood out – the Stability Law must comply with the requirements of economic and financial convergence between the EU countries, but also with the criteria regarding the rules of coordination between the local, regional and State levels of public finance of the various EU-27 Member States. Sicily will coordinate with the economy of Finland, all based on cellulose and mobile phones, while Piedmont, with its precious white truffles, will coordinate with the Tayloristic and low-cost factories of the Czech Republic.
Beyond a certain level, the economies are incomparable with one another and there is no single currency that can put them in communication.
If anything, we would need public accounting like the one that is implemented – even at European level – with the Power Purchasing Parity criteria.
For the first time, in the 2009 Stability Law, an additional instrument was added on welfare – which currently, in the European bureaucratic jargon, also means “Health” – in which there are regularly also rules on labour, social security and competitiveness, which have little to do with Welfare and is drafted according to a deadline of missions, multi-year programs and functions, which is very hard, if not impossible, to monetize.
Furthermore, pursuant to Law No. 234/2012, the Stability Law has also provided that, as from 2016, the Stability Law shall be a Consolidated Act together with the Budget Law.
This is anomalous, considering that the latter can regulate and create new taxes and duties, while the former cannot.
However, the Reform of the State Budget, implemented with Law No. 163/2016 adopted on July 28, 2016, was definitively approved with over 80% of votes in Parliament.
The Stability/Budget Law must be submitted by the Government to Parliament every year by October 15 and Parliament must adopt or amend it otherwise by December 31 of the same year. It is too short a lapse of time. Beyond the initial deadline, Article 81, paragraph 2, of the Constitution provides for the subsequent deadline of April 30 – a term which, however, shall be authorized by law.
The Stability Law shall mandatorily include: a) the net balance to be financed; b) the balance of the recourse to market instruments, i.e. the final amount of money in the annual or three-year cycle for which to resort to loans (and this is certainly a vulnus, because the speculative markets know in advance the amount that can be financed); c) the amount of the special budget funds – and this is another vulnus, since all the other countries know how much the Services, the Special Operations, the Off The Record actions, etc. will cost; d) the maximum amount for renewing the public employment contracts – another vulnus, because this allows to calculate the industrial policy and, therefore, the possible effects of the labour cost on public and private markets, with obvious advantages for the E.U. competitors; e) the appropriations for refinancing the capital expenditure already provided for by the laws in force, and hence also the three-year stop of subsequent capital expenditure; f) the long-term expenditure forecasts.
This is another vulnus since this allows to infer the sum available to a State for any E.U. military or foreign policy program, or for any other strategically important program.
Not to mention the reserves for mergers and acquisitions of strategically important companies within the European Union, or even outside it, but permitted by the other European partners.
A “mutualization” of the public budget which creates many dangers, but corresponds to the mental level of many E.U. accountants.
This structure of the Stability Law leads to a situation in which only two choices are possible. Either the so-called austerity policy, when it comes to restoring possible balance to public funds (but this is always decided by others). We may think that a cyclical austerity policy must also be able to spend more on certain budget items, but much less on the others, while here the amount that counts is only the final one, which automatically determines the market behaviour. The only thing that markets have in mind, like conscripts, is the purchase of our public debt instruments at the best price and with the best interest rate, often carrying out trading operations, as also happens to certain States that profit from the difference – often completely rhetorical – between their debt instruments and ours.
Or there is also the possibility of expansionary spending, which resorts always and only to deficit public spending – i.e. by issuing more public debt instruments – which can be “Keynesian” if it regards investment, but simply expansionary if rents, annuities and current expenses are privileged, in addition to investment.
Sometimes even this may be necessary.
The British economist, however, maintained that public spending applies above all to new investment, while for the “old markets” – as he called them – the self-equilibrium of private enterprises is also good.
The childish idea underlying this conceptual duality is that you can be either “big spenders” (especially if “you come from the South”) or “strict” (especially if you are self-controlled and you come from the North), but this is just a vaudeville skit, not a serious economic policy idea.
Thinking – as many people within the EU institutions believe – that “family” rigour has an impact on the State budget is a “paralogism” – just to use an ancient philosophy concept.
The equivalence between households and States – a concept often reiterated by unexperienced economists – would be fine only if households could issue face value money, which could be spent immediately according to their needs. These needs, however, would be linked to the credibility of their private “money”.
People believe in these fairy tales, especially within the European Commission.
However, the European constraints of any Stability Law are the following: 1) a 3% ratio between the actual and the forecast public deficit and the national GDP – a fully specious and abstruse ratio, even in a phase of restrictive policies; 2) 60% of the ratio between public debt and GDP, another bizarre figure, which may also regard non-Keynesian policies when – for example – a “mature” sector has to be restructured or investment must be made in new and promising areas; 3) the average inflation rate, which cannot exceed by over 1.5 percentage points the one of the three best performing Member States in the sector during the previous three years. Are EU experts aware that there is also ‘imported inflation’?
This happens when the prices of goods and services purchased abroad rise – although this formula is already quite wrong.
Inflation is imported when the costs of imported products increase and obviously countries like Italy, which are processing economies, are also great importers. God knows – in these economic phases – how import-related inflation (just think of oil products) is important for the European economies.
Furthermore, the EU has no strategic, military, geoeconomic and financial ability to change the oil and gas producers’ treatment towards it. The same holds true for the other particularly important raw materials.
Let us now focus on constraint 4): compliance with the long-term Nominal Interest Rate, which must not exceed by over 2 percentage points the one of the best performing Member States in terms of price stability.
This is the Taylor Rule. As the U.S. Treasury Secretary Taylor said in 1993, it is an equation in which the interest rate is a dependent variable, while inflation and national income are regressors.
The rule is the following: ii = i*+α(πi- π*) +βγ+εi
The long-term inflationary target is π. It is the inflation rate that will prevail in the long term. Taylor here assumed that the long-term inflation rate should be 2%, as often happens in the United States, but the current interest rate is π that, only for the USA is a GDP deflator. If we were all just stockbrokers, it might also be true.
But there are costs that are included in the GDP and are neither predictable nor changeable from outside.
The actual nominal interest rate in the equation is γ. The rest is easily calculable.
Hence what does the Taylor Rule mean? When inflation starts reawakening the rates are expected to rise.
This is not at all implicit in the Maastricht rules, which also stem from these formulas.
As the Taylor Rule also shows, the increase in interest rates reflects a decrease in the supply of real monetary rates.
Not necessarily so because there may be many balances available, but with a less “attractive” monetary composition.
Again according to Taylor, investment is inversely correlated with interest rates, but this holds true for the economies that live on loans, not for many of our entrepreneurs who use – almost exclusively – “own resources” or bank loans to secure own resources.
Because of this pseudo-mathematical sequence of events, if investment decreases, the national income and also unemployment increase – which is here the only cure for inflation. But where did these guys study?
Another theory resulting from the Taylor Rule is that when the economic activity slows down, the medium-term interest rate must fall.
This has never happened, not even in the recent U.S. history. Just think of the 2006-2008 crisis.
It is also strange – and I say so from a purely analytical viewpoint – that the purpose of economic theory is only to reduce inflation, considering that – as already pointed out above – it does not depend solely on the excess of public spending, of the availability of low-cost capital (which, instead, is considered in the Taylor Rule) and the use of “moderate” budgets, according to the theories of the ignorant economists à la page.
Let us revert, however, to the procedure of the Italian Stability Law.
According to the procedure known as European Semester, the EU Member States must submit their budgets to the European Commission and the European Council by the end of April, which ipso facto limits our legislation, which also provides for a budgetary role until December 31 of the same current year.
For the time being, the penalties envisaged for some delays can be reduced, at most, to the single penalty equal to 0.2% of GDP for the year under consideration.
The principles of the State budget and the related Stability Law are again the traditional ones established by Law 468/1978, including specification, whereby all budget items must be defined analytically so as to avoid ambiguities in their intended use; truthfulness, whereby no revenue overestimations or expenditure underestimations are allowed and, finally, publicity, whereby the budget must be made known with the most suitable means.
There is also the issue arising from the adoption of Law No. 1/2012, which amended Article 81 of the Constitution, thus enshrining the principle of “balanced budget” in the Constitution.
It is a laughing matter: since the invention of the double-entry accounting by Frà Luca Pacioli – Leonardo da Vinci’s friend and sometimes drinking companion – all budgets “break even” by definition.
Otherwise they are not budgets.
In fact, the term “break even” is never used in the rule. The more cryptic term “balanced budget” is used. We all know that, in physics, the balance can also be unstable.
As already noted above, it is an unintended funny rule.
What could we do if the Vesuvius erupted – an event which may be sure in the future, but unpredictable? Would we issue debt instruments, but for ten years at least, so as not to disturb or offend the E.U. accountants and their search for a liquid monetary base for an improbable and incorrectly calculated immediate fiscal liquidity to support debt instruments?
Hence are millions of homeless people to be left in the city of Naples, possibly in the Vomero and Pietanella neighbourhoods, or in the Sanseverino Chapel, waiting for these accountants to decide to study economics and political economy on the right handbooks?
This is a rule that should not only be deleted, but should also be mocked by some famous comedian, better if with some knowledge of political economy.
In addition to the “balanced budget” requirement, as from January 1, 2014, Law 243/2012 provided for the establishment of the “Parliamentary Budget Office”, with the task of carrying out “analyses, verifications, checks and evaluations” – thus replacing the role of politicians who should be the sole ones responsible for distributing the resources available and the forecast ones among the most suitable budget items.
Moreover, in the summer of 2016, Legislative Decrees No. 90 and 93, as well as Law 164, were enacted, which amended Law 243 in relation to the Local Authorities’ balanced budgets.
Another mistake, albeit a partial one: Local Authorities live on a complex mechanism – on which we need not to elaborate here – of remittances and transfers from the Central State and of sums partially withheld by these Authorities, which are then recalculated by the Central State, again in a too complex way that need not be explained here in great detail.
In this case, how can we repay the local administrations’ colossal debt? Just think that the European Court has already condemned us for these matters. If the current legislation remains in force, there is no way out.
In short, the “European cure” on the State Budget has worsened its ambiguities. It has depoliticized the selection of budget items, thus often moving it away from voters’ and citizens’ real needs. It has not allowed a modern solution to the Local Authorities’ financial crisis. It has also devised the funny mechanism of the “balanced budget”, which literally means that there is no longer a provisional budget (hence how can the real items be calculated?). Finally, it forces us into a debt cycle that is both excessive and, at times, burdensome, but always uncontrollable.
A New Horizon for Kazakhstan’s Economy
On September 1, President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev delivered an address that outlined the nation’s priority areas for development. Primarily focusing on Kazakhstan’s economic trajectory, the President’s remarks have a significant impact on the activities and initiatives of public authorities, including quasi-public sector companies like Samruk-Kazyna, a sovereign wealth fund of Kazakhstan, which owns several major companies in the country.
Rethinking Tariff Policy
President Tokayev emphasized the necessity of reforming the tariff policy and introducing adequate market tariffs for entities subject to natural monopolies. This marks an important shift from the existing approach, which has reached its limits. Adopting a cost-plus principle for tariffs will enable us to discontinue subsidies to the economy. This, in turn, will facilitate timely preventive maintenance, thereby reducing the risk of industrial disasters. This policy overhaul will ensure break-even in the areas of activity, bolster the investment attractiveness of our companies and a number of industries, and ultimately lead to increased dividends and social payments. We have already been collaborating with the Government to systematically increase tariffs, taking into account the 10-12% inflation corridor set by regulators to ensure social stability.
Focusing on Exploration
Tau-Ken Samruk, our national mining company, is currently engaged in exploration projects with leading international companies like RioTinto, Fortescue Metals Group, and others. With Kazgeology joining the structure of Tau-Ken Samruk this year, the number of exploration projects has increased from 15 to 45, expanding the exploration area from 1887.7 km² to 13,609 km². Notably, we are focusing on copper, gold, lead, and zinc, as well as rare metals like tungsten, molybdenum, and yttrium. Joint ventures registered in Kazakhstan will own the extraction rights to these minerals if confirmed. Geological exploration work will be carried out not only by Tau-Ken Samruk, but also by the world’s largest uranium producer Kazatomprom, national oil and gas companies KazMunayGaz and QazaqGaz in their areas of activity.
Energy Goals for the Next Five Years
The President has set a goal to commission 14 GW of new energy capacity over the next five years. This includes the Samruk-Kazyna projects aimed at restoring the first unit of Ekibastuz GRES-1, a coal-fired thermal power station, expanding GRES-2, and constructing GRES-3. These initiatives focus on traditional coal energy.
In addition, the Fund’s portfolio features gas generation projects, the largest of which involve the reconstruction of Almaty CHPP-2 and CHPP-3, as well as the construction of a combined cycle power plant in the Turkestan region.
Special emphasis is being placed on the development of renewable energy sources, particularly hydroelectric power plants. Plans include constructing wind farms with a capacity of up to 5 GW in collaboration with foreign partners such as Total Eren, Acwa Power, Power China, Masdar, and China Power International Holding. The projects also encompass the construction of counter-regulators for Kapshagai HPP and Shulba HPP.
According to forecasted data, a capacity increase of approximately 9 GW is expected by the end of 2028.
Transport and Logistics
Strategic upgrades are in progress to improve our existing transport infrastructure and eliminate bottlenecks. Several significant infrastructure projects are currently underway, including the construction of second lines on the Dostyk–Moiynty section, and the development of new railway lines: Bakhty–Ayagoz, Darbaza–Maktaaral, as well as a bypass line around Almaty.
Alongside the widespread modernization of railway infrastructure across the country, the North–South transport corridor stands out as a promising focus area. Plans are in place to upgrade railway sections leading to the Bolashak station, which is located at the border with Turkmenistan.
Simultaneously, initiatives to boost terminal capacity are in the works both within Kazakhstan and abroad. Noteworthy projects include establishing a container hub in Aktau, constructing a terminal at Xi’an port in China, and creating a dry port at Bakhty station, among others. Kuryk port is receiving special focus; the construction of its ferry complex is nearly complete, and activity along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route is ramping up.
The expected economic impact of these initiatives is substantial, with freight traffic projected to increase by an estimated 50 million tons annually. These efforts aim to transform Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, Kazakhstan’s national railway company, into a comprehensive transport and logistics enterprise.
Top of Form
Economic development on horizon
Kazakhstan is at a historically significant crossroads. The President’s address underlines a multitude of opportunities that we are keen to seize. For decades, Samruk-Kazyna has collaborated with international entities, and we firmly believe that collective business efforts are the most effective approach for the 21st century.
To attract major long-term investors, stability and clear profit plans are essential. In line with the President’s recommendations, we are refining our tax policy to make it more investor-friendly, among other initiatives. These comprehensive efforts not only offer us a robust toolkit for economic development but are already yielding tangible results. I have immense faith in Kazakhstan’s economic potential and am confident that the global business community will recognize and appreciate the favorable conditions being nurtured in our nation.
The High Percentage of Informal Employment in Indonesia: Causes and Implications
In most developing countries, the informal economy accounts for a large portion of the national economy and it often has a negative connotation because of inferior working conditions, low-productivity firms, and disrespect for the rule of law. The firms and workers as well as their output and production activities that are unregistered and do not pay taxes account for a significant and growing share of total economic activity. In Indonesia, BPS-Statistics Indonesia (BPS-Statistic Indonesia, 2022) records that the informal sector reaches 59.31% with more informal economy workers in rural areas. It captures three provinces including Papua (84,11%), West Sulawesi (77,25%), and West Nusa Tenggara (75,36%), with the highest percentage. The informal sector – where most MSMEs operate – employs more than 61 percent of Indonesia’s total workforce (The World Bank, 2010). From a government or formal perspective, the large participation in the informal sector becomes an issue that must be resolved because restricts the government’s ability to provide support for public goods and services (tax issue) and hinders economic growth.
In addition, policy-makers assume that their status (as companies and informal workers) would put them at a disadvantage relative to formal firms because they may not be able to legally obtain credit from formal financial sources, access government programs or facilities, or export products. The fact that is not surprising anymore is, even though actors in the informal sector know those losses mentioned by the government, most of them remain in their position. This phenomenon is interesting to examine because it has a lot to do with economic growth, social welfare, human capital, institutional issue, to development in various sectors. Therefore, this paper will analyze why the percentage of informal employment remains high in Indonesia despite many efforts by institutions and state agencies.
The Informal Sector: Exclusion & Exit Theory
Informal employment is a phenomenon in which firms and workers are unregistered with social security administrations, meaning their work activity and income are outside the tax control of the state and of the legal provisions in labor matters – most of them are small firms. Some literature analyzes the reasons firms or workers choose to remain in the informal sector on the one hand and the reasons other companies register their firms (and workers) and pay taxes. Perry et al. (2007) highlight informality through two lenses, exclusion & rational exit. The exclusion theory argues that the informal sector exists because workers could not find jobs in the formal sector, more precisely they are excluded from critical state benefits or modern economic circuits. Those exclusions include segmentation in the labor market, burdensome entry regulations that prohibit small firms shift to formality and growth, and informality as a defensive measure toward excessive tax and regulatory burdens. Therefore, the rational exit theory states that the net benefits of joining the formal sector are negative. Firms and workers choose to engage with formal institutions based on cost-benefit analysis, depending on their assessment of the net benefits associated with formality and the state’s enforcement effort and capability. This view suggests that high informality results from a massive choice to leave formal institutions by firms and individuals. It implies societal demand on the quality of the state’s service provision and enforcement capability.
They also argue that formality increases rapidly with firm size and productivity. So, formality can be seen as an input in the production process that is not really needed by small firms. However, most micro firms remain too small to benefit sufficiently from formality to overcome their various costs (a survey of informal Mexican micro firms). Other reasons are the high costs and time required to register or the high costs of operating as a registered business. In their research, the degree of formality increases as the firm grows larger and their demand for formalization increases, as does the probability of detection by authorities. Firms choosing to register do have better performance or, the firms that started operations being registered exhibit higher levels (on average) of labor productivity than their equivalent unregistered peers (survey in Latin America). However, there is evidence that, in some cases, informality reflects defensive evasion of possibly excessive regulation. In short, firms not only consider the cost and benefit of formality but their environment that does not demonstrate demand for its expected benefits also influences their decision. For the last, even if the government reduced registration costs, it would not lead to formalization. In other cases, such as unskilled workers – with lower formal wages, they may find that paying social protection and expected returns from a formal job do not exceed their consumption or greater flexibility and income they can get as informal workers. Especially when they have social protection alternatives from private or noncontributory programs (Perry et al., 2007). However, informality is a multidimensional phenomenon in which exclusion and exit mechanisms depend on each country based on its institutions, historical background, and legal frameworks.
The analyses highlight the characteristics of informal workers, their motivations, and their preference for the benefits and non-monetary characteristics of jobs such as flexibility, autonomy, stability, and mobility. Most of these informal workers seem to choose their jobs according to their individual needs, particularly their desire for flexibility and autonomy, and their abilities (comparative advantage). Either independent workers (firm owner and self-employment) or informal salaried workers are related to the exclusion and exit model. Most independent workers choose their jobs voluntarily, exit the formal social protection system, and underline the non-monetary of self-employment. In contrast, most informal salaried workers are excluded from more desirable jobs, either as formal workers or self-employed. They also choose not to contribute to social security and health insurance plans (exit) mainly because of low incomes and their employer’s decision not to offer benefits. Based on Perry’s research in Latin America, most of the self-employed do not appear to be excluded from the formal sector but they choose to exit (rationally, cost-benefit) of formality. They considered their minimal human capital, access to other assets, and low aggregate productivity in the economy. Informal employment then becomes a better option than suitable jobs in formal ones.
The dualism of the Informal Sector
Furthermore, Rizki, Suryadarma, & Suryahadi (2020) used dual economic theory in their research on informal workers in Indonesia in the 1996-2014 period. The dual economy theory argues that the informal and formal sectors co-exist, and are fundamentally different. They produce different products, with different labor, capital, and technological inputs that automatically have different productivity levels, and also pay different levels of wages and serve different consumers. This theory assumes that changes in registration costs will have no impact on the size of the informal sector in the dual economy model. Only economic growth could solve this issue because it will reduce the size of the informal sector while encouraging the formation and expansion of formal firms (Rafael La Porta & Andrei Shleifer, 2014).
Based on Rizki et al. research, Indonesia with its large informal sector in which 57 percent of the 125 million working population are informal workers (50% in the non-agriculture sectors since 2000), the transition from informal to formal jobs is very gradual and can be rapidly overturned by an economic crisis. Although, indeed, between 1996 and 2014, they found evidence that the informal sector seemed to shrink along with economic growth, however, it took a very long time. The results from the first job trend examination show individuals whose first job was as a low-tier informal (LTI) worker, almost half remained in that position through the next 8 to 19 years, and another 45 percent became low-tier formal (LTF) workers for at least one year. Their findings emphasize that the dual economy is divided between low-tier and high-tier employment, rather than informal and formal employment. Even if they shift, they are still at a low-level of employment. However, they have a relatively good chance of switching to LTF work because of the earnings premium that LTI could gain is large and statistically significant (42%). Hence, the research recommends, instead of creating policies that try to encourage low-level informal sector workers to become high-tier informal sector workers – as most policymakers in developing countries desire, the government should be advised to create jobs, even if low-tier ones, that LTI can apply for.
Another research from William, Horodnic, & Windebank (2017) on the dual informal labor market with a case study in the European Union. They see the informal economy both as the ‘exclusion’ and ‘out’, and as internal dualism of it. The evaluation was carried out on a dual informal labor market composed of an exit-driven ‘upper tier’ and exclusion-driven ‘lower tier’ of informal workers. Their analysis resulted in the finding that 24% of participants did so for pure exclusion reasons, 45% for pure exit reasons, and 31% for a mixture of both exclusion and exit rationales. So, it is not purely for exit or exclusion rationales, instead, there is an internal dualism of the informal sector, with some involved in the informal sector being exit, others exclusion, and yet others driven by a mixture of both motives. However, the weight given to exit and exclusion is not uniform across the European Union. Exclusion is more common in Southern Europe and East-Central Europe but less in Nordic nations and Western Europe. Based on their analysis, the exclusion-driven ‘lower tier’ was identified as more likely to be populated by the unemployed and those living in East-Central Europe, and the exit-driven ‘upper tier’ by those with fewer financial difficulties and who live in the Nordic countries. In sum, the informal sector is not purely a necessity-driven realm for excluded populations or purely a result of a desire to exit a burdensome and over-regulated formal sector, it is a mixture of both exclusion and exit rationales.
In addition to examining the phenomenon of the high percentage of informal employment in developing countries through the perspective of economic literature, the author will also look at it from an institutional perspective. Williams & Harodnic (2015), through the lens of institutional theory, reveal that there is a strong relationship between tax morale and participation in the informal economy. The lower the level of tax morale, the higher the level of participation in the informal economy. They mention that not only formal institutions (codified laws & regulations) – government morality – define institutional strength (non-compliance; enforcement) but also informal institutions (societal morality) such as norms, values, and principles. So, in the case of the informal economy, they argue that there is an asymmetry between government morality and societal morality, thereby resulting in a large percentage of the informal economy. The finding (case: the UK population) is people who participate in the informal economy have significantly lower tax morale than those in formal ones.
Indonesia’s Informal Employment
Based on the literature reviews and theories above, the author observes that in the Indonesian case, the exclusion theory is not really relevant (directly) as a reason for the high percentage of the informal sector, especially since the period 2018-after the pandemic COVID-19 until now. During that period, the government amended and passed regulations that ease and facilitate access for MSMEs and workers to enter the formal economy. For instance, the central government has also reduced registration fees (Directorate General of Intellectual Property, Trademark) and business taxes (1% to 0.5%) (Directorate General of Taxes) which have been implemented since 2018, but participation in the informal economy is still large. There are still many informal economy actors who are reluctant to transform into the formal sector. They still assume that the procedure for formalizing (registration) their business is too complicated – and expensive, although the government has reduced and simplified registration. Even the registration of the Taxpayer Identification Number (Nomor Pokok Wajib Pajak/NPWP) – as a requirement for access to capital loans at the Bank, paying taxes, and reporting the Annual Tax Return (Surat Pemberitahuan Tahunan/SPT) can be done at the tax office or through the online site at pajak.go.id which incidentally makes it easier for the community (theoretically). On the other hand, the formation of the Job Creation Law No. 11/2020 (widely known as the “Omnibus Law”) should also support informal workers and MSMEs to shift, but this is not the case.
The high informal sector in Indonesia is more relevant viewed through a rational exit lens in which MSMEs (and workers) choose to be informal because the costs of formality are greater than its benefits. They assume that formalizing their enterprises (mostly small one) are costly and not worth the benefits they get. They have to pay business taxes (Article 2 (5) Law No. 36/2008 on Income Tax; Government Regulation (PP) No. 23/2018 on Income Tax) and have to deal with regulations related to employment (the Job Creation Law No. 11/2020), product certification, and they have to pay business taxes (Article 2 (5) Law No. 36/2008 on Income Tax; Government Regulation (PP) No. 23/2018 on Income Tax) and have to deal with regulations related to employment (the Job Creation Law No. 11/2020) and product certification, and procedures they find complicated and time-consuming to perform. Most of the MSMEs in Indonesia are small – and mostly run by the lower middle class. Lower middle-class informal actors prefer to remain in the informal sector because they enjoy benefits such as not having to pay taxes – but enjoy tax advantages, wage rates that are not limited by labor regulations, not spending time with registration and administration processes that they consider complicated, and other advantages of not following the rules.
So, the author sees this as more of a human capital and societal morality issue. Small businesses and workers in the informal sector are constrained to meet standards in the formal sector due to their low capacities, such as inadequate skills, low education, and lack of knowledge about technology-digitization, which indeed affects their mentality and performance (productivity, efficiency, marketing, management). This fact is in line with the dual economy theory of informality. Furthermore, from an institutional perspective, the informal sector is a matter of enforcement and societal resistance which requires changing the values and beliefs of the population by trying to harmonize regulations and soft policies, so that trust, self-regulation, and high commitment can grow. Hence, in its implementation, the government must have clear indicators for MSME development. MSME development programs must be synergized so that they do not run separately in each ministry/institution. It is necessary to map and differentiate in handling problems based on the size of MSMEs, worker skills, and class so that empowerment is carried out on target. In conclusion, besides the significance of the institution, meaningful enforcement effort and capacity from above and societal cooperation from below, are very important indicators to create a strong institution. Lack of enforcement capacity relative to societal resistance becomes one of the causes of the high percentage of the Indonesian informal economy. It is also important to pay attention to increasing skills in line with the needs of the labor market. It seems that what is important is no longer whether they become informal (which always has a negative connotation) or formal (good one), but how to empower those at the middle and lower levels so that their capacity and morale support economic growth and prosperity economically and socially.
CBDC vs Cryptocurrency: The Future of Global Financial Order
In the rapidly evolving digital era, the global financial landscape is undergoing profound transformation. At the heart of the debate on the future of digital currency, two concepts dominate the discussion: Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) and cryptocurrency. While both offer distinct visions for the future of global finance, there are strong indications that CBDCs hold greater potential to be adopted as a global standard.
A study by the Atlantic Council, a US-based think tank, reveals that 130 countries, representing 98% of the global economy, are currently exploring digital versions of their currencies. Nearly half of these are in advanced stages of development, testing, or launch. All G20 nations, except Argentina, are in these advanced stages. Eleven countries, including some in the Caribbean and Nigeria, have launched their CBDCs. Meanwhile, China has tested its CBDC with 260 million people across 200 different scenarios. However, despite the global push for CBDCs, countries like Nigeria have seen disappointing adoption, while Senegal and Ecuador have halted their developments. Here are some fundamental reasons why CBDCs hold more promise than Cryptocurrencies in setting global financial standards:
1. Authority and Regulation
One of the primary advantages of CBDCs is the oversight and regulation by central banks. With a central authority controlling its circulation and use, CBDCs offer a higher level of trust and security for users and other stakeholders. CBDCs, supervised by central banks, are deemed safer due to a centralized authority ensuring consistent policy and regulation application. The ability to track and monitor transactions to prevent illegal activities, value stability, advanced security infrastructure, legal protection, and monetary control by central banks enhance user trust and security. Moreover, with central bank backing, CBDCs have backup and recovery mechanisms ensuring the digital currency’s integrity and availability.
2. Stability and Sustainability
Cryptocurrencies often face high price volatility, hindering their acceptance as a stable medium of exchange. In contrast, CBDCs, backed by central banks, are expected to offer more consistent value stability. Cryptocurrency price volatility is often driven by speculation, low liquidity, news and regulatory responses, and market immaturity. The nascent crypto market, dominated by retail investors, tends to move based on emotions like fear or greed rather than fundamental analysis. On the other hand, CBDCs, regulated by central banks, are designed for stability, expected to provide more consistent value stability than decentralized cryptocurrencies.
3. Financial System Integration
CBDCs, issued and overseen by central banks, offer easier integration into existing financial infrastructure. With full backing from central banks and existing legal and regulatory frameworks, CBDCs can seamlessly integrate into traditional banking and financial systems, facilitating cross-border transactions and exchanges with traditional currencies. For instance, Swift, a financial messaging service provider, is focusing on CBDC interoperability. They’ve initiated beta testing with several central banks and over 30 financial institutions to ensure new digital currencies operate smoothly alongside current fiat currencies. This aim seeks to address potential global fragmentation in CBDC development.
In contrast, cryptocurrencies, with their decentralized nature, might face challenges integrating with existing financial infrastructure due to the absence of a central authority and regulatory challenges, as well as acceptance by financial institutions.
4. Global Acceptance
As an official currency issued by central banks, CBDCs have the potential for widespread acceptance among nations, becoming an integral part of the global financial order. CBDCs, being official currencies issued by central banks, enjoy the trust and credibility of a nation’s monetary authority, facilitating their acceptance among the public. For instance, China’s Digital Yuan, backed by the People’s Bank of China, has seen extensive domestic acceptance. Moreover, CBDCs are designed to integrate with existing payment systems, as seen with the Sand Dollar project in the Bahamas that enables transactions via smartphones. On an international level, CBDCs can facilitate cross-border monetary cooperation, with countries like ASEAN members considering the interoperability of their CBDCs to ease trade and investment.
5. Transparency and Accountability
The ability to track CBDC transactions provides governments with an effective tool to enhance financial oversight and tax compliance. The transparency offered by CBDCs facilitates the identification of potentially unreported transactions and the detection of suspicious transaction patterns related to money laundering or terrorist financing. Additionally, with real-time monitoring, governments can promptly detect and respond to illegal activities, such as fraud, ensuring the integrity and security of their financial systems remain intact.
6. Promoting Financial Inclusion
CBDCs can play a pivotal role in promoting financial inclusion, providing access to financial services for those previously marginalized from traditional banking systems. CBDCs hold immense potential to boost financial inclusion, especially for those marginalized from traditional banking systems. With easy access via mobile devices and low transaction costs, CBDCs make financial services more accessible, especially in rural or remote areas.
Furthermore, the ease of account opening and cross-border transactions at more efficient costs supports migrant workers and those previously challenged by conventional banking services. For example, the Sand Dollar project in the Bahamas has showcased how CBDCs can expand access to financial services across the islands, allowing residents on remote islands to transact using just a mobile phone. Such initiatives demonstrate how CBDCs can be a crucial tool in promoting financial inclusion globally.
7. Monetary Policy Control
With CBDCs, central banks have an additional tool to implement monetary policy, allowing for more timely and effective interventions in the face of economic crises. CBDCs grant central banks enhanced capabilities to implement monetary policies. With better liquidity control and the ability to apply negative interest rates, central banks can respond more quickly and accurately to economic condition shifts.
Moreover, CBDCs allow for faster monetary policy transmission, such as direct stimulus provision to public accounts, and provide access to real-time transaction data. This capability is crucial as it allows for quicker responses to potential crises, maintaining economic and price stability. Additionally, swift and accurate actions from central banks in crisis situations can boost public trust in financial institutions and the government. Thus, CBDCs can be a vital tool in a central bank’s monetary policy toolkit, reinforcing their role in safeguarding a nation’s economic well-being.
While cryptocurrencies offer benefits like decentralization and privacy, the lack of consistent regulation and high volatility make them less ideal as a global financial standard. On the other hand, CBDCs, with the backing and regulation of central banks, promise a new era in a more stable, transparent, and inclusive global financial landscape.
In the context of modern diplomacy, the acceptance of CBDCs as a global standard can facilitate cross-border economic cooperation, strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships, and advance sustainable development agendas. As a step towards a more integrated and harmonious future, CBDCs might be the key to transforming the global financial order.
Defense4 days ago
Three Sahelian Interim Military Leaders Sign Security Pact
South Asia4 days ago
The G20, the Global South and India
Americas4 days ago
China and Venezuela Deepening Cooperation
Eastern Europe3 days ago
The agreement was reached to stop the Azerbaijan’s Anti-TerrorOperation in Karabakh: quo vadis?
World News4 days ago
Biden’s Hanoi trip was overshadowed by revelations of Vietnam’s secret Russian arms deal
Finance3 days ago
World Trade Report 2023: “re-globalization” amid early signs of fragmentation
World News4 days ago
Sharp deterioration of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh
Arts & Culture4 days ago
UNESCO supports removal of Ugandan tombs from endangered list