Germany’s conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will hold an extraordinary congress on April 25 to elect its new chairperson, who is almost certain to lead the party to next year’s federal elections to culminate in the election of the country’s new Chancellor in lieu of Angela Merkel, who has already confirmed that she will not be running again. Meanwhile, judging by the current alignment of political forces in Germany, the CDU remains the main candidate for victory, although not as indisputable as it was a year ago.
The CDU’s decision to look for a new face at the helm was prompted by the resignation of Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, whose handling of last year’s elections in eastern state of Thuringia resulted in an acute political crisis alienating the Christian Democrats’ partners in the ruling coalition (CSU and Social Democrats), and many within the CDU itself.
In October 2019, the Left party landed a historic victory in elections to the regional assembly (Landtag) in Thuringia, scoring 31 percent of votes. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) came in second with 23.4 percent, leaving the CDU in third place with just 21.8 percent. The Social Democrats (SPD), the pro-environment Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) garnered five percent, but in the February 5 vote in the Landtag for the head of the regional government, the FDP’s candidate Thomas Kemmerich surged ahead of his main rival, the Left party’s hopeful Bodo Ramelow thanks to the support that the candidate from the FDP and the CDU had received from the AfD as a result of an earlier agreement.
The outcome of the Thuringia vote sent shockwaves through political Germany because up until then the ruling coalition had banned any party-level cooperation with the extreme right. The SPD leadership accused its coalition partners of violating ethical and inter-party standards, and Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said that the local branch of the CDU violated the party’s requirements. At a February 6 press conference while on a visit to South Africa, Angela Merkel said that it was “unforgivable” that a state premier had been elected expressly because of the support of the far-right AfD, and accused the Thuringia CDU of abandoning the “values and beliefs” of the party.
Resignations followed shortly after, with Thomas Kemmerich saying he would step down on February 8, and already on February 10, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer informed the CDU leadership of her decision to stand down as party leader. The crisis around the elections in Thuringia reportedly came as a shock for Angela Merkel, since Kramp-Karrenbauer was her protégé and was supposed to ensure a seamless power transit within the CDU after Merkel herself resigns in 2021 and after she earlier left the post of CDU leader in October 2018. As for Kramp-Karrenbauer, she did not enjoy the unconditionally support within the CDU. During the CDU congress in December 2018, she was elected its new leader, getting 517 votes, narrowly beating her principal rival, the ex-leader of the Christian Democrats’ parliamentary faction, Friedrich Merz, who trailed closely behind with 482 votes.
Friedrich Merz, who is widely viewed as one of the three (and so far the likeliest) contenders for victory in the 2020 Christian Democratic Union leadership election set to take place during the party’s upcoming extraordinary congress on April 25. Even though he has recently stayed out of big-time politics focusing on his business interests, Merz still enjoys significant support among the CDU. As to his political views and priorities, they are pretty vague and even contradictory, including when it comes to Russia. On the one hand, he supports President Vladimir Putin’s idea of a single economic space between the European Union and Russia stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, and wants Germany and the EU to “play ball” with Moscow, arguing that without Russia in Europe there can be no long-term stability, and that in the 21st century “there should be more and more points of contact” between partners.
On the other hand, Merz is fully supportive of NATO’s policy of “containing Moscow,” and criticizes Russia’s policy in the Middle East, considering it just one of the “warring sides” in the Syrian conflict. Overall, he believes that “right now Russia is making life very difficult for us.”
Even more critical of Russia is another candidate – a CDU foreign policy expert and the head of the Bundestag foreign relations committee, Norbert Röttgen, who is constantly accusing Russia of “war crimes” it is allegedly committing in Syria, and calling for new sanctions against Moscow. Moreover, while considering France as a key foreign policy partner in Europe, Norbert Röttgen does not share President Emmanuel Macron’s desire to mend fences with Moscow. However, he has the least chances of being elected to the head of the CDU.
The most pragmatic attitude towards Russia in the upcoming elections of the CDU leader is projected by North Rhine-Westphalia’s state premier, Armin Laschet, who still lags behind Merz in polls. Notably, he is going to the polls in tandem with the young Health Minister Jens Spahn, who enjoys a great deal of popularity within the party. Moreover, while Laschet generally shares Angela Merkel’s main domestic and international priorities, Jens Spahn is critical of her alleged departure from “conservative values.”
While supporting the EU’s sanctions on Russia, Armin Laschet would still like to see them lifted as soon as possible if the Minsk process of ending the crisis in eastern Ukraine “starts developing constructively,” and he is generally holding out for a more active search for a way out of the deadlock in relations between Europe and Russia. Moreover, he takes a fairly constructive view even on the issue of the “annexation” of Crimea, arguing that Germany should be able to “look at everything through the eyes of its partner in a dialogue.” He believes that “Russia is necessary to resolve many international issues,” which makes it imperative to jointly look for mutually acceptable solutions, including when it comes to the conflict in Syria. Armin Laschet is against the “demonization” of Russia in German political and public circles and the media, dismissing this criticism as “one-sided,” and the overall picture of the Syrian conflict being projected in Germany as “too superficial.”
Meanwhile, clearly disappointed by the entire background of this whole issue, Angela Merkel herself is trying to stay away from the election of her new successor.
“I won’t interfere in the issue of who will lead the CDU in the future or who will be the candidate for chancellor,” Merkel told a recent news conference. She emphasized that her experience tells her that predecessors should not interfere in such processes, although she does not refuse to “talk” with candidates. Earlier, Bloomberg reported, citing German sources, that Angela Merkel had been too quick (even before the scandal in Thuringia) to “doubt” that her previously tipped successor as CDU leader and candidate for chancellor, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, would be up to the job, and therefore, she will take a more cautious position during the current campaign by distancing himself from the pre-election debate.
The ongoing crisis and divisions within the CDU come against the backcloth of even more dramatic collisions in the ranks of its partner in the “Grand Coalition” – the Social Democrats (SPD), whose electoral rating is down to 13 percent – the worst in Germany’s entire post-war history. This may prove fatal for the SPD’s chances of staying in power if, according to the party’s former leader, Sigmar Gabriel, early elections to the Bundestag are held.
According to the US-based publication Project Syndicate, “the crisis in the CDU comes on the heels of the SPD’s own implosion.”
“The SPD will likely be replaced by the resurgent Greens, who have enjoyed a remarkable rally in the polls since the May 2019 European Parliament elections. Over the last year, the duo at the party’s helm – Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck – have increasingly been mooted as potential future leaders of Germany. Habeck currently is the country’s second most popular politician, just behind Merkel. If the CDU’s current crisis persists and the party fails to win the largest share of the vote in the next general election, then the coveted right to nominate the chancellor will most likely fall to the Greens,” Project Syndicate writes.
“A green-black coalition government in which the CDU was the junior partner would be a political first in Germany, and highly unpalatable for the party,” CNBC reporter Carolin Roth warns.
“With both of Germany’s ruling parties now in turmoil, a quick resolution to the CDU’s leadership crisis is essential. Prolonged paralysis could be highly damaging for both Germany and Europe,” she concludes.
In view of the above, new internal contradictions within the European Union itself look very much likely now that it is losing one of the key drivers of European integration. This, in turn, may prompt European leaders to take an attentive and constructive view of the need to restore interaction with Russia, all the more so if such a signal comes from the new CDU leader. From our partner International Affairs
After initially keeping a low profile during the acute military-political confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine, the European Union suddenly surprised the world in the latter half of June with more important decisions than the approval of yet another package of sanctions against Moscow. First, the land transit problem between the Russian mainland and Kaliningrad dramatically worsened as part of the EU economic war on Russia. Second, at a June 23 summit, the leaders of the EU countries agreed to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. Although neither is likely to have significant or truly dangerous consequences for the time being, these actions provide an excellent opportunity to reflect the nature of the EU, its role in Europe’s development and prospects.
This is of particular interest because European integration has become one of the most mythologised topics in international affairs. This is no surprise – the relatively stable and long-term cooperation of such a large group of states is highly unusual for international politics. But it inevitably gives rise to a number of hypotheses about the emergence of this phenomenon and its peculiarities.
In a sense, this association is indeed a marvel against the background of our entire historical experience, which is marked by competition and fierce rivalry between states.
This is why attempts to explain how it was at all possible inevitably engendered new myths and illusions that were designed to separate the phenomenon from the discussion about it.
The first, most enduring myth rests on the assumption that the EU is a peaceful project that, by its very nature, cannot be used for aggressive action beyond its borders. In effect, this is a simple extrapolation of the rules and norms of interstate relations to their relations with the outside world. Indeed, European integration did emerge at a time when a military solution to disputes between its members did not appear possible.
But the sequence is all important – the founding countries were already incapable of fighting each other before they created an association with additional opportunities for developing relations in the framework of law and institutions.
When the first institutions of European integration emerged, West European countries were still reeling from the greatest military cataclysm in history. Moreover, two of them – Germany and Italy – were not actually in charge of their domestic and foreign policy. Both countries were under full or partial foreign occupation and therefore could not even physically consider a military option one of the tools of their foreign policy as regards their neighbours. Formally one of the victorious countries in WWII, France was also dependent on the United States, which was the only country that could guarantee France’s sovereignty against the looming threat of being swallowed from the east by the victorious USSR.
Subsequently, European integration did not do anything to spread peace even among its members. The United States successfully resolved these issues inside the Western community. In the second half of the 20th century it could effectively discipline the elites of the countries under its military domination.
The only real opportunity for achieving peace between historical opponents in the framework of integration would be Turkey’s accession to the EU, which already counts its traditional foe, Greece, as a member. However, the EU has neither the ability nor appetite to make this happen, and the Republic of Turkey is now further from joining the EU than during any time since the start of their relations in 1961. Another example that some European officials also like to mention is containing the allegedly irrepressible territorial conflict between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania. However, the main deterrent here is NATO or, more precisely, US influence in Eastern Europe, which is vital to the existence of the alliance.
There is even less justification to claim that European integration was intended to improve relations with third countries via cooperation. In general, immediately after the creation of the communities, one of the main goals of their foreign policy was to restore the positions of their members in Third World countries that had just rid themselves of colonial dependence. The EEC’s first trade agreement was signed with a group of former French colonies in West Africa and was aimed at preserving the economic positions of the former parent state in this region.
Subsequently, the member countries charged their institutions in Brussels with other important tasks: oppose the USSR in the economic arena; contain the development of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries; coordinate formal and informal sanctions against the USSR and its allies; and ultimately undermine the CMEA’s integrity by signing separate trade agreements with its inpidual members. This is exactly why the EEC persistently opposed the signing of a general agreement with the CMEA or the USSR despite their urging until the latter half of the 1980s when the impending collapse of the Eastern bloc had become a likely prospect.
There are no grounds at all to call the EU a “peaceful project” after the end of the Cold War. In fact, the recent collision over Kaliningrad transit was one of the consequences of the EU’s activities in that historical period. After the collapse of the Soviet sphere of influence and breakup of the USSR, the West European countries began to rather aggressively establish control over Eastern Europe, while never considering the interests of Russia, their biggest partner in the East. Now nobody even conceals the fact that the EU expanded to the detriment of Russian interests, not to mention the policy the EU adopted after 2003 as regards the states that emerged along the perimeter of Russia in the western part of the former USSR. The ultimatum contained in “the EU’s peaceful project” for Ukraine in 2013 was one of the most important factors in triggering the Ukrainian crisis.
The second important myth is linked with the EU’s expansion to include new members. For a rather long time, there was a dominant view that any increase in the number of member countries was the result of a rational calculation based on an objective assessment of the ability of this or that country to meet a certain “gold standard.” But his was not the case. With the exception of the accession of Denmark and the United Kingdom to the European communities in 1973, all other waves of expansion were not based on the economic readiness of candidate members. This applies to Greece that joined the EU in 1981 and even more so, to Spain and Portugal, which became its members in 1986. It is possible to say with some reservations that the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland to the EU in 1995 was not accompanied by any big differences in the level of socioeconomic development.
However, the following large expansion to Eastern Europe, as well as to Cyprus and Malta was a strictly political project. The preservation of economic harmony within the EU was out of the question. Therefore, it is possible to regard the granting of candidate status to Ukraine, which may not even exist in five or seven years, and Moldova, Europe’s poorest country, as the logical continuation of the road on which the West European countries embarked 40 years ago when they invited economically backward Greece to join their ranks.
Overall, we are seeing that European integration has always been aimed at resource extraction from new territories and consolidation of US influence in Europe. Brexit and Britain’s decades-long special position in the integration structure was possible owing to its much stronger bilateral relationship with the United States.
Finally, the third myth of European integration, which is widespread in Russia, concerns its legal and institutional character. Indeed, in several decades the EU has established a ramified system of its own legal standards and institutions, which creates a powerful illusion of resolving vital issues by the force of law, not by the law of force. However, we should not forget that all decisions in the EU are based on the relative power (demographic and economic) of the inpidual member countries. In this sense, the biggest countries have free rein to implement what they considered politically expedient. In other words, there can be no standards or rules in the EU that do not accommodate the interests of such countries as Germany and France first and foremost. This has become particularly clear in the past 15 years when most decisions were made directly through intergovernmental bargaining while the job of EU institutions was merely to process them legally.
To sum up, it is possible to say that the current circumstances are allowing us to see much clearer the real nature of the phenomenon to the west of our borders. Even if economic and political relations with the EU countries are restricted in the next few years, a better understanding of how their association develops will allow us to more accurately assess its historical prospects. For quite a long time, Russia, like many other countries, had no opportunity to see Europe for what it is. However, in the new historical era we will not have to recycle old myths and long-standing illusions that we often created ourselves.
From our partner RIAC
European Union Could Share its Solid Economic Benefits with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia
European Union has, at least by territory and population, expanded as the European Council overwhelmingly decided to grant Moldova and Ukraine, with the possibility of Georgia, candidates’ status to join the bloc. Current, the European Union consists of 27 members and has an estimated total population of about 447 million. Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, all former Soviet republics, will together add approximately 50.8 million to the current population of the European Union.
As former Soviet republics, the three attained their political independence and within the international laws, must be considered with respect based on the principles of their territorial integrity and national sovereignty. While the granting them their new status after official requests from them, it has indeed sparked debates especially in the Russian Federation.
European Union leaders have formally agreed to grant candidate status to Ukraine, as well as Moldova, although the two former Soviet republics face a long path before joining the bloc. Ukraine applied to join the bloc just days after the Russian invasion on 24 February, and the process from application to candidacy has gone through at record speed.
Undoubtedly the new status has opened wide, most possibly, better doors and a platform to spring up with economic development through integration into European Union. President of the European Council, Charles Michel, noted: “it is a historic moment, today marks a crucial step on your path towards the European Union. Our future is together.”
The official congratulated the leaders of Ukraine and Moldova. Regarding Georgia, the European Council “decided to recognize the European perspective of Georgia and is ready to grant candidate status once the outstanding priorities are addressed,” Michel said. “Congratulations to the Georgian people,” he said. “A historic moment in EU-Georgia relations: Georgia’s future lies within the EU.”
The European Commission on June 17 recommended that the summit grant a candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. It is a “symbol of hope” to support the Ukrainians while the country had a long way to go before actual accession. A few days later, Speaker of Moldova Parliament, Igor Grosu, announced that Moldova ready to join new sanctions, mostly in finance and banking, against Russia.
“We will show solidarity with the EU, as our status and European aspirations oblige us. Of course, we will join [any new sanctions] meant to stop the military operation. We are seeking to contribute to this goal by any diplomatic means,” Grosu said following a decision by the EU.
Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicu Popescu earlier said the East European nation could not fully join anti-Russian sanctions due to its weak economy. European Union candidate status now provides Moldova with access to world’s most developed market. It offers similar new economic opportunities to bothe Ukraine and Georgia.
In one of her warm-hearted illuminating speeches at a media briefing, President Maia Sandu emphasized: “Candidate country status gives us a clear direction of our development, support on this path, and most importantly, hope. We are a small and vulnerable country, which would feel more secure when it becomes part of the European family, in which we could count on support from all members and institutions. Belonging to the EU also means access to the richest and the most developed market in the world.”
Moldova, however, expects more support from the European Union to improve the wellbeing of its people and provide preconditions for developing the business environment. “The situation will not change overnight after candidate status has been granted, as a lot of hard work is still ahead,” Sandu said, attributing the current hardships in Moldova to the conflict in Ukraine that began late February.
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky hailed the news as “a unique and historic moment”, adding “Ukraine’s future is within the EU” while the French President Emmanuel Macron said that the decision by EU leaders sent a “very strong signal” to Russia that Europeans support Ukraine’s pro-Western aspirations.
At least, they have joined the ‘European family’ that offers practical warmth for sustainable development. Ukraine has already signed an agreement with the European Union on joining its LIFE Program, an international funding instrument for the environment and climate action, whose budget on environment protection projects for 2021-2027 amounts to €5.43 billion, Ukrainian media reported with reference to the Environment Protection and Natural Resources Ministry.
Ukrainian Environment Protection Minister Ruslan Strilets and European Commissioner for Environment, Oceans, and Fisheries Virginijus Sinkevicius signed the agreement.The ministry has over 15 concrete proposals to be transformed into relevant projects to be presented for consideration under LIFE Program.
“Ukraine has received great support and colossal capabilities from the European Union for restoring not only the environment but also live nature in Ukraine. This is something for which there has always been a lack of funding. LIFE is a powerful financial tool of the participating countries. This means great confidence in Ukraine,” Strilets said. “This should help us develop more new projects which local businesses could be engaged with. Therefore, we’ve made a very important step today.”
In the near future Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia have the possibility to access the benefits from the Global Gateway, a new European strategy directed at boosting smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors and to strengthen health, education and research systems across the world.
It is in line with the commitment of the G-7 leaders from June 2021 to launch a values-driven, high-standard and transparent infrastructure partnership to meet global infrastructure development needs. The Global Gateway is also fully aligned with the UN’s Agenda 2030 and its Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the Paris Agreement.
In addition, late June the he Group of Seven economic powers – the U.S., Germany, France, the U.K., Italy, Canada and Japan – made some progress in bringing their counterparts from their five guest countries closer to Western views on sanctions against Russia. The G-7 is committing themselves to support the new members especially Ukraine.
Ahead of his trip, Biden authorized another US$450 million in weaponry to be sent to Ukraine, bringing the total U.S. commitment to US$6.1 billion since the start of the war. Offering a concrete template, the G-7 combined are aiming to invest US$600 billion in public and private capital for infrastructure projects over the next five years, with US$200 billion of that total coming from the United States.
According to European lawmakers interviewed by local Russian media Izvestia, this step has broad support from the EU. Meanwhile, Russia views the move ambiguously. On the one hand, it sees EU membership as tantamount to striving for NATO, on the other hand, European integration is a purely economic issue and does not raise any concerns.
“We’ll see, we’ll analyze the consequences,” former Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin told Izvestia. “The context is important; it is not as harmless as it might have seemed three years ago. Decisions are being made amid a sanctions offensive and against everything Russian,” he added.
That being said, the European Union noted that obtaining candidate status is only the first step towards membership. Engin Eroglu, a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the European Parliament, in an interview with Izvestia said that the process of gaining membership to the EU does not mean automatic entry, but it means that the country has started pro-European processes and reforms, which are partially financed by Brussels.
The granting of candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova has angered other countries that have been striving to join the European Union for several years now. For example, the European Commission has so far denied this status to Georgia, the newspaper writes.
“Tbilisi, to put it mildly, was not happy about the refusal, but this will not be a reason for any deterioration in relations between the European Union and Georgia,” Head of the Department of Integration Studies at Moscow State University of International Relations (MGIMO) Nikolay Kaveshnikov told Izvestia.
Russia consistently expresses fierce opposition to this European membership over the past several years. President Vladimir Putin had declared Ukraine to be part of Moscow’s sphere and insisted he was acting due to attempts to bring the country into NATO, the Western alliance that comes with security guarantees.
Granting Ukraine and Moldova candidate status to join the European Union looks like nothing more than a scam by the West, according to Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova. “Scam is such a wonderful word, seeing that the numerous decisions taken by the West are more like combination of a destructive, provocative nature, rather than well-thought-out steps,” the diplomat said, speaking to the Sputnik Radio.
“I think that’s certainly their case,” she added, “Given these maneuvers, these zigzags that we now are witnessing from the West with regards to Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia, it is no longer necessary to prove anything in terms of market conditions. There is a direct link between economics and politics. And this is exactly what they have always stood against.” She described the actions by the European Union as infringement of Russia’s territorial integrity, and as encroachment on former Soviet space and territory.
On the distinctive opposite side, Russia sees no risks for itself in the fact that Ukraine and Moldova have been granted EU candidate status, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at a press conference following talks with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov on June 24 in Baku.
“Our position has always been that the European Union is not a political bloc, unlike NATO. The development of its relations with any countries that wish to do so does not create any threats and risks for us,” Lavrov said in reply to a media question. “Of course, we will realistically consider the European Union’s behavior and monitor the real steps it takes and how the candidate countries act: whether they comply with these requirements or still try to show their independence.”
These new European Union members have some strategic significance. Moldova is a landlocked country in Eastern Europe. It shares borders with Romania to the west and Ukraine to the north. Ukraine, with a coastline along the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov to the south and southeast, respectively could be used for economic benefits by the European Union.
EU-Australia Relations: Strategic Security Cooperation
Over the last decade, security cooperation between Australia and the EU has grown. Increasing security and defence cooperation with governments outside the EU is something that the EU has looked into. Third-country participation in the “Common Security and Defence Policy” CSDP civilian and military crisis management missions and operations, as well as the exchange of sensitive information, are all examples of this.
Australia participates in CSDP missions and exchanges classified information with the EU. This emphasis on ties with other countries is a key aspect of EU Global Strategy, which asks its allies to assist promote the rule-based global order. “External partnerships” must be restructured and the EU must “engage with key partners, likeminded countries, and regional groupings” in order to share this responsibility.
Australia stated that it would work with “like-minded” friends like the European Union to address global concerns. The EU’s security mandate relies heavily on crisis management. For the EU to be seen and effective in managing crises, it must be able to draw in non-EU countries and establish links with them. Third-country participation in CSDP missions and the signing of Framework Participation Agreements on crisis management show how actors outside the EU regard the EU as a crisis management actor and validate the EU’s crisis management function.
The EU’s external measures to safeguard freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and human rights must have this external validation if they are to gain “credibility and normative significance.” To “strengthen its own ability to bear responsibility and share the cost with security and defence partners,” the EU needs the support of third countries. European Union “strategic autonomy” refers to the EU’s ability to act and collaborate with international and regional partners but also working independently when necessary, according to the EU’s Security and Defence Implementation Plan, published in November 2016. EU credibility is bolstered as a result.
Ad hoc agreements, which took a long time to draft, are now the preferred method of enabling participation, instead of the time-consuming ad hoc agreements that were previously used. Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop announced the beginning of FPA negotiations with EU counterparts, Catherine Ashton, saying that “North Africa & Middle East have highlighted the value in Australia & EU cooperating closely to react to international crises” at the time of the announcement.
The EU and Australia, according to the FPA, share a common understanding of the threats they face and the objectives they should focus on. Australian participation in two CSDP missions has been made possible by this convergence. Some argue whether or not the European Union and Australia see each other as strategic or priority partners in the fight against global and interconnected security threats, as well as whether or not their geographical domains of interests and aims align.
In two CSDP missions, Australia’s involvement has been capped (and duration as with EUCAP Nestor). CSDP military operations are not permitted. EU crisis management will take a new step forward with participation by Australia in a CSDP military mission. The EU CSDP’s military efforts have primarily focused on developing military capabilities or deploying naval forces. As long as EU member states are unwilling to engage in large-scale military operations, this pattern will continue.
A naval operation in the Strait of Hormuz has been proposed recently by the EU as a means of protecting freedom of navigation and calming tensions between Iran and the United States. We could see Australia participating in an EU military operation as this occurs. As seen by its August 2019 decision to join the US-led mission in the Strait of Hormuz, Australia has a strategic interest in maintaining marine flow.
The EU-Australia security partnership is strengthened because to FPA. European Union and Australian cooperation will have a solid foundation thanks to the FPA, which recognizes common interests in international peace and security. Both EUCAP Nestor and EUAM Iraq have involved Australia in crisis management, but more effort is required. Both parties must agree that Australia will be invited to more than just these two missions. The EU’s CSDP missions are strengthened by its partners, who help the EU to be a responsible global actor. However, it also makes it necessary for Australia and the EU to work together more closely to identify common interests on a variety of issues.
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