Defense

Not-so-Nuclear War

Published

3 years ago

March 17, 2020

On February 4, 2020, the U.S. Department of Defense officially announced the first combat patrol mission of a nuclear-powered submarine carrying low-yield nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. Some details were reported several days before that: the platform was USS Tennessee, which had went on combat patrol in the Atlantic in late 2019.

The low-yield combat payload in question represent the all-new W76-2 thermonuclear warhead for the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). It is a derivative of the standard “light” W76-1 warhead, with the original secondary stage removed. As a result, the original yield of 100 kt has been reduced to between 5 and 7 kt.

According to official explanations, up to and including those contained in the new nuclear doctrine [1], the United States intends to use the weapon to give additional stability and flexibility to its regional (not strategic!) nuclear deterrence. The idea is that the number of such missiles will be limited, because they are intended for fairly specific purposes.

The U.S. military had long sought permission for low-yield nuclear weapons from the White House, arguing that the president was only limited to high-yield weapons as a last resort and that “interim” response options would come handy in certain scenarios. These were eventually termed “tailored” nuclear scenarios in the new doctrine.

These statements become more specific when looked at through the prism of expert chatter, stories run by specialized publications and private statements. Such as: What if the Russians attack an Eastern European country and, quite inevitably, receive a devastating response from NATO, but then they cunningly use their tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) to raise the stakes? How would the free world respond to that?

Their requests are quite simple and clear. The only question here is, why use a strategic SLBM in a purely tactical mission?

Something is Lacking

The U.S. has two types of nuclear weapons in its arsenals that would perfectly fit the purpose in terms of their yield. There are AGM-86B (ALCM) long-range air-launched cruise missiles, the backbone of the strategic triad’s air component. These are tipped with W80-1 warheads with dialable yield from 5 to 150 kt. There are also B61-family tactical nuclear gravity bombs that come in four different variants, some of them with 300 t and 1.5 kt yield in TNT equivalent.

Why another low-yield warhead?

The problem is not in the warhead itself, but in the delivery method. Russia, and the USSR before it, have historically been inferior to NATO in terms of airpower. For this reason, Russia has always relied on air defence (and electronic warfare) and is perhaps still the best when it comes to building reliable multi-layered air defence. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to penetrate a single air-launched nuclear weapon through that detection and multiple engagements system. The ALCM has been around for a long time, it is a well-known missile. Its more advanced derivative, the AGM-129, was decommissioned because it proved to be inferior. The combat aircraft with B61 were similarly ill-suited for such a hostile environment [2]. Starting a nuclear mission and stupidly losing the delivery vehicle to a Pantsyr or an S-400 would have been a much harder blow than refraining from participation in the escalating conflict.

Single nuclear strikes (as opposed to the massive use of nuclear force) on the theatre become a challenge. Theoretically, at some point, the United States will have nuclear systems that would be up to the task due to their stealth capabilities (LRSO cruise missiles, F-35 combat aircraft plus B61-12 guided bombs) or short flight time combined with the ability to break through air or missile defence (land, sea or air-launched hypersonic boost-glide systems). However, the problem articulated by the United States has to be addressed right now.

This leads to a palliative solution that implies removing the secondary stage from the W76-1 and using the resulting mini-Trident as a guaranteed delivery vehicle. Strange as it may seem, high accuracy is not required here. Not only will the strike be directed against a “soft” target (tactical formations, emplaced positions, or above-ground structures), but it does not even have to hit that target since it is the very fact of the use of nuclear force that matters during the early stages of escalation and not the actual damage.

It may seem clear, but how real is this image of “deterring” Russia? Is it even possible to have such a conflict as the one described in the American strategic papers?

On Reading and Comprehension Skills

Descriptions of a possible conflict along the lines of “Russia suddenly invaded the Baltic states, pre-emptively used its TNW to confuse NATO and force the alliance into a retreat” do not even merit earnest critical consideration. It is quite sad that such ideas are widespread among western political scientists and security experts [3]. However, even an expert with the greatest bias against Russia is likely to acknowledge that no matter what one thinks of Russian dignitaries, no matter what malicious intents one ascribes to them, believing these people to be infantile or irrational is a crucial research fallacy. Over the last couple of decades, the Russian elites have demonstrated a reserved, mistrustful and utterly rational (to the point of cynicism) approach to foreign and domestic policies, an approach that is utterly incompatible with the reckless idea of “let’s occupy the Baltic states, detonate a bomb and threaten a total nuclear war, because we’re bound to lose any other way.”

But what is this idea based on? It is based on Russia’s actual nuclear strategy, the general understanding of which is almost completely the opposite to its intended meaning. Russia has constructed a defence plan against a stronger enemy on the basis of the concept of the limited use of nuclear weapons in special cases.

The logic of “de-escalating” a military conflict by raising the stakes in the form of limited (including demonstrative) use of nuclear weapons has been repeatedly expounded both in general terms and in military details. Asymmetric scenarios are no exception. In such cases, a country responds to a massive attack of conventional forces with a first (limited) nuclear strike. Since, following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the lengthy socioeconomic crisis of the 1990s, Russia had significantly fewer conventional weapons than NATO, it was a rational strategic deterrence plan that implied balancing out conventional weapons with nuclear forces [4].

This was duly reflected in strategic planning documents. The foundation for such planning was laid back in 1993, when Russia officially disengaged itself from the 1982 Soviet obligation not to deliver the first nuclear strike, even though this use of nuclear weapons still applied to a global war only [5]. Subsequently, Russia developed a full-fledged military doctrine in 2000 that allowed the use of nuclear weapons “in situations that were critical for the national security of the Russian Federation,” including “in response to a large-scale aggression using conventional weapons.”

In 2010, the new version of the military doctrine showed the direction of Russia’s military development. The wording became more specific: now nuclear weapons could only be used in a conflict that “threatened the very existence of the state.” The current 2014 doctrine retains this strict wording and additionally bolsters it by introducing the notion of “strategic non-nuclear deterrence” that had previously been absent.

Let us note that this latter step was taken at the peak of the military and political crisis between Russia and the West, in the second half of 2014. If Russia had indeed relied on the irrationally incommensurate nuclear deterrence of the West and, in accordance with the classical “madman theory,” had wished to convince the West of this, there would have been no obstacles in the way of Russia enshrining such deterrence officially. Instead, Russia demonstratively enacted a “doctrinal détente.”

They Offered War and Nobody Came

Taken together, these developments reflected Russia’s efforts to rebuild and modernize its armed forces setting a course for raising the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and for gradually filling up all those potential rungs on the escalation ladder that previously had to be “secured” using nuclear means with non-nuclear precision-guided weapons.

A number of motives driving this evolution can be identified. First, it is a flexible and comprehensive approach to deterrence that was not entirely typical for the USSR in the last years of its existence [6]. Second, there is a clear unwillingness to endow nuclear weapons with any significance greater than that inevitably required by the military strategic balance. Third, the logic of this development directly contradicts the very idea of “nuclear coercion” in regional conflicts with NATO. To coin a phrase, Russia has been gradually “clearing the mines” from a dangerous destabilizing situation that had emerged on the continent following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and significant curtailing of the potential of Russia’s armed forces. The temporary lowering of the threshold for using nuclear weapons reflected precisely the transitory nature of the current factors.

Thus, at the moment, we can presume that Russia cannot simply deliver a first nuclear strike when things start going wrong in a military conflict with a near-peer adversary. The circumstances have to be more severe than this, in which is clearly and presently suffering a large-scale military defeat that threatens a national disaster. Regardless of who started it.

Let us, however, go back to “mini-Tridents” and see what their place in this scenario is. Everything appears to be just the same, but there is one flaw that cannot be eliminated. Such weapons systems will hardly be an effective deterrent if Russia has been cornered so badly that it used nuclear weapons to de-escalate a catastrophically developing conflict with NATO (and it does not matter whether we are talking about the very fact of their existence, as the United States sometimes claims, or about the outcome of a retaliatory strike). The problem of an impending defeat has not been eliminated and, consequently, neither was the stimulus for the further use of nuclear weapons. In this case, the initiating state will simply move to the next rung of the escalation ladder, delivering a multiple strike on the battle ground or selecting a more valuable and sensitive target for a single strike (for instance, within the continental United States). Psychologically, this transition will be much easier (not to say more thoughtless) than the decision to deliver an initial strike.

The crucial thing is that this is precisely the scenario where the apparent military and technical advantages of the “mini-Trident” we mentioned above will lose their importance. Facing an imminent large-scale military defeat, Russia’s integrated air and missile defence system will have been largely “dismantled” through the intensive and successful use of NATO’s precision-guided weapons, and resistance to air and missile strikes will have taken on fragmented nature. In such circumstances, a “mini-Trident” is excessive as a delivery vehicle for a single strike. These tasks can be handled by usual means, such as cruise missiles or combat aircraft. Moreover, “mini-Tridents” will even be harmful in such a situation: an SLBM launched and detected by the early warning systems (which would be left intact in such a conflict), may be misconstrued by Russia given the acute stage of the crisis and thus prompt a launch-on-warning [7]. NATO most certainly does not need this, since it would actually be winning such a war “on points.”

The W76-2 low-yield nuclear warhead:

-is officially aimed against the non-existent scenario of Russia using nuclear weapons in an act of provocation in the unrealistic event of a Russia—NATO conflict;

-is unable to deter Russia’s first use of nuclear weapons in an actual crisis situation as prescribed by its nuclear doctrine;

-harbours an additional destabilizing potential.

What is the point of this warhead then?

“I Don’t Know Who Needed it or What They Needed it For”

Note that in our story, the outlandish strategy of “escalate to de-escalate” has become intertwined with the notion of escalation control, or the idea that a conflict (including a nuclear conflict) can be proactively managed by keeping it low-intensity. This is not surprising at all because the two concepts are the same thing. Consequently, we have to go much further back in time, to the turn of the 1950s–1960s in the United States, to find the roots of this phenomenon. The single, yet crucial remark here is that escalation control is a scholastic and convoluted theory, an exercise for minds with a propensity for abstract thinking. Meanwhile, “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, as it is described today, is, in terms of both political motivation and means of implementation, a highly oversimplified form of the concept.

The United States is a pioneer in terms of introducing plans for limited use of nuclear weapons in practice. If we recall the entire history of the its “counterforce”— the 1974 Schlesinger Doctrine, Carter’s 1980 PD–59 plan and other contrivances of the heights of the Cold War, we will find it very hard to pretend that “mini-Tridents” appeared as an emergency response to Russia’s particularly malicious nuclear doctrine of the last few years. Back in 1962, Robert McNamara said that the United States could look for a way to stop a war on favourable terms, using its own forces as a bargaining chip, threatening further attacks. He further noted that, in any case, the highly secured large reserves of fire power could convince the enemy to abstain from attacking U.S cities and could stop the war [8].

We should not view these things as tales of a long gone bipolar past. A current 2019 American paper on planning nuclear operations states that, “Employment of nuclear weapons can radically alter or accelerate the course of a campaign. A nuclear weapon could be brought into the campaign as a result of perceived failure in a conventional campaign, potential loss of control or regime, or to escalate the conflict to sue for peace on more-favorable terms [9].”

It is sometimes hard not to think that the current nuclear strategy of the United States is subject to a kind of “projective” logic, something that should be familiar to practicing psychologists and means projecting one’s own aspirations and associations onto another person. In this ironic sense, mini-Tridents are very convenient as a nuclear weapons for “limited-scale” operations long since embraced by the U.S. military doctrine. Whether or not they are holding Russia back from an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, or if Russia is somehow self-deterring, is beyond the point. What is important is the very fact that such a potential exists, as arms control experts put it, capabilities are always more important than intentions.

One feature of Trident II SLBM is its depressed trajectory, which makes it possible to use the missile where very short flight time and a relatively low apogee are needed. Thus, at a striking distance of 1900 km, the missile will reach the target in six to seven minutes, never going higher than 150 km, and it will cover a distance of 3000 km in nine to ten minutes with a maximum height of 185 km [10]. Taking into account the changes in precision, it is generally accepted that these SLBM possess significant counter-force capabilities, which puts them beyond the classical role of “city killers” in retaliation strikes that is usually assigned to sea-launched missiles.

This means that the choice of the delivery vehicle was not accidental, although it was influenced by the desire to save time and money. The platform is indeed resilient against air and missile defence, allows for very short flight time and is convenient for discriminate nuclear strikes with low “collateral damage.” Besides, with this payload, it does not pose any counterforce threat for the strategic nuclear force of a potential enemy (the same accuracy with 15–20 times less yield) and planning officers could therefore erroneously perceive it as a relatively “stabilizing” kind of weapon. It is not such a weapon, due to a reduced nuclear use threshold and functional ambiguity of delivery vehicle.

Yet, the danger of low-yield nuclear warheads being deployed is not so much in the lowering of the nuclear threshold as such. First of all, it is about the continuation of a much more encompassing dual process, which erodes two categories: the clear differences between nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons on the one hand, and between strategic and tactical weapons on the other. Mini-Tridents bear the prints of both, especially if you recall how much effort was spent only 10–15 years ago to equip them with non-nuclear precision-guided warheads (nothing came of it, but lightening, or in this case, the shell, most certainly did strike the same place twice).

The result of the changes taking place in the respective nuclear doctrines of the United States and Russia can hardly be considered positive. The United States (if freed from the burden of having to explain its actions) directly raised the question of “usable” nuclear weapons, that is, a battlefield capability, and not an instrument of strategic deterrence. Thus, the image of conflicts of the future implies a limited use of nuclear weapons, including, possibly, against non-nuclear states—the United States has already tried to include such provisions in its 2018 nuclear doctrine. Subjectivity is also important here. Donald Trump is a man of exceptional sincerity and consistency. Look at his campaign promises and compare them with actions in the White House. But even during the election campaign, Trump noted that he does not understand the meaning of weapons that cannot be used.

Given all the severe restrictions we emphasized above, Russia continues to think of itself as of a besieged fortress that is about to fall. This leads, among other things, to the desire to make its nuclear doctrine as opaque as possible, implementing a strategy of “deterrence through uncertainty,” the traditional refuge of the weakest side (take China, for example, which has been adhering to this approach for 50 years). Another national habit, namely making non-strategic strike systems dual-capable (which is both cheap and convenient, and, again, in certain scenarios increases the constraining uncertainty) creates further problems in this area.

Both attitudes do the same job, albeit from different sides and in different ways. They both blur the “red lines” of the first use of nuclear weapons. In the case of the United States, this line descends lower to the area of “clashes,” due to the development of delivery vehicles and the appearance of the illusion that such an employment can be controlled, is limited and implies supposedly low “collateral damage.” It feels like a nuclear strike, but not really. In the case of Russia, the intentional management of nuclear uncertainty lays down destabilizing factors for possible military and political crises, complicating their course and simplifying the transition (including erroneous) from the non-nuclear section of the escalation ladder to the nuclear one.

This might sound like a paradox, but both superpowers are escalating the strategic nuclear risks by solving situational problems caused by the lack of political trust. One problem deals with the imaginary lack of low-intensity deterrence against Russia’s aggressive behaviour, while the other continues to safeguard the risks of a no-less-imaginary NATO intrusion amid the continuing weakening of conventional forces.

All the conditions for a self-fulfilling prophecy are met.

[1] Nuclear Posture Review 2018. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018, pp. 54–55.

[2] Davis P. K. et al. Exploring the Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States. Santa-Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019, pp. 52–53.

[3] See, for instance: Kroenig M. A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes. Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018; Luik J., Jermalavičius T. A Plausible Scenario of Nuclear War in Europe, and How to Deter It: A Perspective from Estonia. // Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 2017. Vol. 73. No 4, pp. 233–239; Schneider M. B. Escalate to De-Escalate. // Proceedings. 2017. Vol. 143/2/1,368 (Feb. 2017), pp. 26–29.

[4] Note that this is essentially “mirroring” the situations of the 1960s–1970s, when NATO relied on America’s forward-based nuclear weapons in Europe to balance out NATO and Warsaw Pact’s conventional weapons.

[5] Principal provisions of Russia’s Military Doctrine. Presidential Executive Order 1833 of November 2, 1993.

[6] Studies by several western experts based on contacts with members of the Soviet military and political leadership indicate that, despite having done the relevant theoretical work, the USSR only planned on the concentrated use of nuclear weapons (both on the battle ground and against the enemy’s strategic targets behind the front lines). See, for instance: Hines J. G., Mishulovich E., Shull J. F. Soviet Strategic Intentions 1965–1985. Vol. I: An Analytical Comparison of U.S–Soviet Assessments During the Cold War; Vol. II: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence. McLean, VA: BDM Corporation, 1995.

[7] It is not very likely, but still probable, and this is precisely the strategic “black swan” that leads to the situation collapsing without any chance of recovery. Concerning the real influence highly unlikely events with a highly significant effect have on nuclear deterrence, see: Yarynich V. E. C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation. Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 2003.

[8] McNamara R. S. Speech before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, 17 Feb. 1962. Cited after: Ball D. Deja vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration. Santa-Monica, CA: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1974.

[9] Joint Publication 3–72, Nuclear Operations, 11 Jun. 2019, pp. V–3.

[10] Gronlund L., Wright D. Depressed Trajectory SLBMs: А Technical Evaluation and Arms Control Possibilities. // Science and Global Security. 1992. Vol. 3. No. 1. pp. 100–160.

Related Topics:Defense Nuclear Power Russia USA

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Defense

From Strategic depth to Strategic Threat

Published

3 days ago

May 25, 2023

Muhammad Imad Abbas

On 30th December, in broad daylight, the hub of Peshawar and administrative center was targeted by the militants with the explosion of a deadly bomb, leaving behind 59 dead. the attack was claimed by the TTP Mohmand faction, whose leadership is allegedly residing in Afghanistan.

The issue of Afghanistan has occupied a consequential part of the strategic culture of Pakistan. Following the partition, with the specter of Pashtun Nationalism looming large on the horizon, policymakers in Pakistan opted for a policy of Islamic Nationalism, which became a cornerstone of strategic thinking during the era of General Zia-ul-Haq in the wake of the Afghan Jihad War in 1979.

Islamic nationalism was seen as only the means through which Pashtun Nationalism could be confronted and subdued.

With the adoption of this policy, swiftly and generously, aid from US, UAE and KSA began to inundate the territory of Pakistan, carrying each their national interests with it.

Within a short period, thousands of new madrassas were established, cultivating youngsters by inculcating the concept of Jihadism.

This formation of an alliance with the US in the Afghan Jihad war was driven by two factors; first, to subdue the dominant Pashtun Nationalism with Islamic Nationalism, and second, to establish an Islamabad-friendly regime in Afghanistan so that any terrorist group could not use Afghan territory while keeping New Delhi at bay, by not letting her establish any foothills in Afghanistan.

Fast forward to 2023, the facts on the group are now telling a different story. Islamabad’s once “strategic depth” is now becoming a distant dream as Pakistan is now confronted by insurmountable problems from all sides

According to the data collected by the Pak Institute of Peace Studies, Islamabad, in the past two years, Pakistan has encountered 100 terrorist attacks, and yet, the recent surge of terrorist activities shows no signs of cooling down in the formidable future. This is clearly evident from the news coming from the casualties on the daily basis of the security forces of Pakistan, mostly on the border areas, and the havoc it caused to the infrastructure. Officially, it is estimated that in the last six months, around 350 military personnel have lost their lives, while the outlawed group has claimed even more than that. These occurrences elucidate the failure of the Pakistani state to effectively persuade the Taliban regime not to let the Afghan territory be used against Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty.

Now, who is to be blamed, if not our flawed policies, and the masters of shortsightedness. Lately, upon leaving his office, the ex-COAS scapegoated Imran Khan who initiated the dialogue with the outlawed group, TTP. While Imran Khan, on the other hand, said that the army was on board when the negotiation decision with the TTP was taken. These inconspicuous but powerful statements clearly reveal the uncertainty of our policymakers while dealing with a sensitive topic. Besides that, it also shows how the wizards of policy making and governance are not on the same page while dealing with the Afghanistan issue.

Recently, a document was released by the National Counter Terrorism Authority and presented to the senate committee where discoveries pertaining to the ceasefire between the government of Pakistan and TTP were made. According to the report, the truce initiated by the PTI-led government last year had utterly emboldened the TTP.

With careful planning and shrewd utilization of resources, they were able to revive themselves both logistically and materially. Once the truce between the two parties was over, yet again, a surge in violent attacks was documented.

Beside the challenge of TTP, the Afghan Taliban shows no signs of a positive stance for the Durand line issue. In an interview, the information minister, Zabiullah Mujahid, said, “The issue of the Durand line is still an unresolved one, while the construction of fencing itself creates rifts between a nation spread across both sides of the border. It amounts to dividing a nation”.

Another prominent concern is the time to time border shelling. On Dec 11, 2022, the Taliban forces heavily shelled a town on the outstrips of the Pakistani border leaving behind seven civilian casualties. A few days later, on Dec 15, another exchange of fire took place, claiming one more life. Although, not much heed has been given to such reports, it seems the genie is out of the bottle now.

Last but not least, the Taliban had even scapegoated Pakistan through which the US drone was flown that killed the top Al Qaeda leader, Ayman Al Zawahiri.

The cherry on top happens to be the readiness of the new system to exhibit the disposition of candour in their interactions with India. The Taliban defense minister, Mullah Yahoob, has expressed his desire for the training of Afghan troops by Pakistan’s arch-rival India. If this goes according to the plan, the dependent policy of Afghanistan on Pakistan will diminish and create new challenges for Pakistan. India, by using Afghan soil, can embolden and logistically support the liberation movements in Balochistan and Sindh, thus exacerbating the already precarious situation.

It’s high time to call a spade a spade!

Our Policymakers must accept that the old strategic depth policy inside Afghanistan has begun to fail. Taliban 2.0 are entirely in contrast to its 1.0 version in terms of statecraft. They are more pluralistic in their policies, and economically, they are far more independent compared to the 90s. This time, they want to cut deals directly with the regional states. It may appear unilateral, but rather it’s a mutually desired engagement as other states have expressed interests in establishing relations with Afghanistan while considering them a new and inevitable reality.

Meanwhile, China is feathering its own nest, and is more concerned about the East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). She does not want Afghanistan to be used as a pawn by an insurgent group in the great game against China.

Considering these dynamic global realities, Pakistan must abrogate its old policy towards Afghanistan and focus on a unanimous policy towards Afghanistan. For the success of a cohesive and effective anti-terrorism strategy it is contingent for policymakers to align their viewpoints against the new resurgent groups. And last but not the least , a collective action by the military, politicians and society is necessary.

Defense

Deciphering Quad’s expanding agenda in the Indo-Pacific

Published

5 days ago

May 24, 2023

Bejoy Sebastian

Image source: twitter @POTUS

Here, I try to throw light on Quad’s expanding regional agenda and where it is headed to.

The third in-person Quad summit took place in Japan’s Hiroshima, the rendezvous of this year’s G7 summit. Following each annual summit, regional observers eagerly look forward to big announcements from the four-nation grouping, via its joint statements. The Hiroshima statement mentions, “Harnessing our collective strengths and resources, we are supporting the region’s development, stability, and prosperity through the Quad’s positive, practical agenda. Our work is guided by regional countries’ priorities and responds to the region’s needs.”

Every Quad summit since 2021 had seen new initiatives or collaborative ventures being announced that are further carried ahead in the subsequent years. At the same time, Quad has also supported the leadership role of regional institutions of the broader Indo-Pacific region such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The grouping also welcomed the Indo-Pacific vision statements of these organisations and also of extra-regional countries and organisations like the European Union (EU).

An oft-repeated sentence in all Quad joint statements is “the promotion of free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific with respect for a rules-based order and international law”, which hints that the grouping has a “balancing character” against coercive behaviour by any regional power. However, the tangible areas of cooperation of the grouping had kept hard security at bay, until recently.

Even though the Quad is not a collective security alliance, the meeting of military chiefs of the four Quad nations in California, United States, earlier this month, in a clear indication of enhanced security cooperation with apparently China in mind. Moreover, they have participated in the Malabar naval exercise four times – in 2007, 2020, 2021 and 2022. Later this year, Australia will host the 2023 edition of Malabar naval exercise. Meanwhile, Quad’s Maritime Security Working Group held its first meeting in Washington earlier this year.

Hiroshima 2023

The Hiroshima joint statement further goes on to mention, “We seek a region where no country dominates and no country is dominated – one where all countries are free from coercion, and can exercise their agency to determine their futures. Our four countries are united by this shared vision.” However, this vision has its limitations as long as Quad exists short of an alliance. At the same time, the grouping has charted for itself a wide-ranging area of mutual cooperation.

A new ‘Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience’ was launched in Hiroshima, recognising the urgent need to support quality undersea cable networks in the Indo-Pacific. The leaders, via the joint statement, also announced a ‘Clean Energy Supply Chains’ initiative and its allied set of principles for accelerating the region’s clean energy transition along with a fellowship scheme to boost infrastructure expertise across the region.

The Quad has agreed on a set of principles to augment cybersecurity in the Indo-Pacific along with a new Space Working Group to explore avenues to deliver Earth Observation data and other space-related applications to assist nations across the region to strengthen climate early warning systems and better manage the impacts of extreme weather events. The existing Vaccine Partnership has been elevated to a broader Health Security Partnership.

In a first in the Pacific, the Quad has agreed to join hands with the island nation of Palau to establish Open Radio Access Networks (Open RAN), with the aim of expanding and modernising telecommunications networks in the crucial subregion. A private sector-led Quad Investors Network (QUIN) is also launched to facilitate investments in strategic technologies such as clean energy, semiconductors, critical minerals, and quantum computing.

The first Quad summit

Two years ago, the White House became the venue for the first in-person Quad leaders’ summit. In fact, there was one more summit-level meeting that year, in March, but in virtual mode. The joint statement following the March 2021 virtual summit was titled “Spirit of the Quad”. It saw the initiation of three key working groups – on vaccine distribution, on climate change, and on critical & emerging technologies – the earliest areas of cooperation since the grouping was elevated to the apex level.

Other than the initiation of the aforementioned working groups, the leaders also pledged “to respond to the economic and health impacts of Covid-19 and address shared challenges in the cyber space, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment and HADR…” Moreover, the March 2021 summit specifically took cognizance of issues such as the role of international law in the maritime domain, challenges to rules-based order in the East and South China Seas, de-nuclearization of North Korea and the need for restoring democracy in junta-ruling Myanmar.

In September 2021, in their first in-person deliberations, Quad leaders extensively looked into how vaccine distribution progressed since their first virtual meeting six months ago and what more can be done in this regard by making use of each other’s comparative advantages and strengths. The leaders also launched the ‘Quad Principles on Technology Design, Development, Governance, and Use’ to guide responsible innovation, a fellowship scheme for science and technology students from Quad nations, and has enhanced partnership in the fields of infrastructure, cybersecurity, outer space and humanitarian support to Afghanistan.

Tokyo 2022

March 2022 saw an emergency virtual meeting by Quad leaders in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. Two months later, in May, they met in person in Tokyo and called for demonstrating that Quad is “a force for good, committed to bringing tangible benefits to the region”. In this regard, they launched a new partnership for maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific (IPMDA) to work with regional partners in combating illegal fishing and responding to disasters by making use of information fusion centres in the Indo-Pacific sub-regions of the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands and by providing near-real-time, integrated and cost-effective data to maritime agencies in these sub-regions.

Tokyo also saw the announcement of a new HADR partnership to further strengthen collaboration in effectively responding to disasters in the region. A new working group on counterterrorism was announced during the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting in March 2023 in New Delhi, India. The next summit was scheduled to be held in Sydney, Australia. But the U.S. President’s inability to attend the summit led to its cancellation and instead the four leaders met in Hiroshima on the sidelines of the G7 summit. Japan, thus, got to host two Quad summits in a row. In 2024, it will be India’s turn to host the leaders’ summit.

All Quad countries, along with several other regional countries, chose to participate in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) launched in Tokyo, just ahead of the 2022 Quad summit. This gives Washington an expanded economic footprint in the region at a time when Chinese economic engagement with regional actors is increasing steadily and progressively. 2022 also saw the launch of the ‘Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package’ (Q-CHAMP) and the ‘Quad Clean Hydrogen Partnership’.

A partnership that predates its name itself

In fact, cooperation among the United States, India, Australia and Japan predates the idea of the Quad itself. Nearly two decades ago, when the Boxing Day tsunami of 2004 wreaked havoc in the Indian Ocean, the four nations came together to coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations by forming a ‘Tsunami Core Group’ and acted as first responders to the looming humanitarian crisis and their collective effort continued till mid-January 2005 before handing over the mission to the United Nations.

So, even before the idea of Quad as such took shape, the four-nation grouping had its first item in its agenda – HADR. The phrase “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” (QSD), predecessor of the present-day Quad, and the maritime construct of “Indo-Pacific” made its entry into the politico-diplomatic lexicon only three years later, led by the persuasive leadership of former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe. The first QSD was held in May 2007 on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila, only to get disbanded the following year due to Australia’s withdrawal and differences on what the grouping’s aims and objectives should be in the years ahead.

Australia backed off primarily due to the diplomatic pressure and the prospect of a promising economic relationship with a rising China. Together with unfavourable regime changes in Canberra and Tokyo in the end of 2007, the Quad remained in a dormant state for about a decade from 2008 to 2017. The fact that China successfully managed to persuade Australia to come out of the Quad just a year after its formation says a lot about Beijing’s negative perceptions of the grouping, or to be precise the perception of it as a U.S.-led attempt to build an “Asian NATO” to contain its rise.

The grouping was given a new life in 2017 when the Donald Trump Administration in the United States (January 2017 to January 2021) took a special interest in reviving it by initiating a working group for ‘consultations on issues of common interest in the Indo-Pacific region’. From November 2017 to March 2021, senior officials from the four Quad nations met seven times and the foreign ministers met thrice, one each in 2019, 2020, and 2021 respectively.

The grouping was finally upgraded to the summit-level in 2021 and then it was followed by in-person summits in 2021, 2022 and 2023, while the foreign ministers continue to meet annually as a precursor to the summits. Today, there is a greater convergence of interests between the Quad partners, which is unlikely to shrink any time soon. The disruptive nature of China’s rise has been a constant factor that has influenced, and is influencing, agenda-setting within the grouping, particularly as a “balance of power” mechanism.

Today, the broad range of areas where the Quad countries cooperate on, as mentioned earlier, happen to be arenas of wider strategic competition with Beijing, even though they don’t wish to acknowledge it explicitly. Taking into account the current trajectory of conflictual nature of geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific, these areas of cooperation and arenas of competition are poised to expand further and further with time. However, what needs to be seen in the years to come is the extent to which Quad dares to tread when it comes to the realm of hard security outside of a formal alliance.

Defense

The Tale of Two Neighbors: India and Pakistan at the SCO Summit

Published

2 weeks ago

May 16, 2023

Asad Ullah

Pakistan and India are bitter neighbors who do not get along very well. Since 1947 they have fought three wars over a disputed region called Kashmir; in the same vein, they accuse each other of supporting terrorism and violating human rights. Moreover, Pakistan and India have sophisticated nukes, making their rivalry even more dangerous.

Unlike Kashmir, the issue of terrorism has had a profound impact on their bilateral relationship. India has since long accused Pakistan of supporting terrorist groups that operate on its soil and carry out attacks on its territory. Similarly, Pakistan has accused India of fueling terrorism on its territory. The most prominent example was the 2008 Mumbai attacks, in which unknown gunmen carried out a series of coordinated attacks in Mumbai, killing more or less 166 people. Surprisingly, the Indian government blamed Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for supporting the attack, while Pakistan denied it.

The two countries also disagree on sharing the waters of the Indus River, which flows through both countries. Moreover, the political and diplomatic tension has further complicated the relationship, with incidents such as the 2019 Pulwama attack, air skirmishes and the subsequent military escalation exacerbating existing tension. Despite efforts to improve ties and resolve issues through different channels, bilateral relations remain strained.

Nevertheless, Pakistan and India sometimes have to sit together and negotiate, like the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. However, before the summit, it appeared to be an eminent development after a decade of strained relations between the two countries. The SCO previously paved the way for India and Pakistan to facilitate dialogue. Despite the periodic attempt to advance dialogue and peace talks between India and Pakistan, their relationship remained fraught with suspicion and loathing.

This year the SCO meeting was held in Goa, India. Unfortunately, the summit was not a friendly affair for India and Pakistan; the two foreign ministers, Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari of Pakistan and Subrahmanyam Jaishankar of India, took veiled swipes at each other in separate conferences.

However, it is imperative to note that the SCO is a stage that is foundationally against the “Three Evils,” namely, extremism, separatism, and terrorism; the member states can use this forum to set together and discuss the issue and create a common ground to these evils. Nonetheless, the forum does not allow member states to blame or accuse each other directly for supporting these evils. Despite this, the Indian foreign minister Jaishankar deliberately beleaguered Bilawal and accused Pakistan of harboring terrorist organizations inside the country. He further describes Pakistan’s position on Kashmir as effectually backing radicalism: “Victims of terrorism do not sit together with perpetrators of terrorism to discuss terrorism, he said” He even blames Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, a “promoter” and spokesperson for terrorism, and it was a ruthless dismissal at the end of the most prestigious visit between two countries in over a decade.

He also said, “Pakistan is depleting faster even its Forex reserve,” which he refers to Islamabad’s economic situation.

In a forum like the SCO, delegates must respect each other’s views and engage in constructive dialogue. Therefore, it is not appropriate for the SCO members to accuse each other directly in the SCO summit, as it would violate the spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding that the SCO stands for. Instead, the SCO members should seek to resolve their differences through peaceful means and constructive dialogue and avoid actions that could undermine the stability and development of the region. Meanwhile, listening is essential for an effective dialogue, and the parties involved must pay attention to each other’s perspectives and try to reach a common understanding of the situation and the challenges they face. Instead of resorting to aggressive or discordant strategies that can damage the relationship and hinder the resolution of the problem, parties should cooperate and work together to find a reciprocally useful solution.

Such summits should not result in any negative outcomes, as they would not only undermine the rules and regulations of the forum but also influence the behavior and attitude of the delegates and the people of the participating countries.

Case in point, the one outcome Pakistanis have learned from the recent SCO summit is that India is a terror-sponsoring country with horrific activities in its mind and no sign of respect for foreign leaders, and they are hard to negotiate with; in the same vein, Imran Khan, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan also expressed his displeasure over the way Indian Foreign Minister treated Pakistani Foreign Minister at the SCO summit, Khan accused Jaishankar of being a bad host and lacking etiquette and culture. Meanwhile, Indians, on the other hand, appreciated Jaishankar’s words as an act of revenge. It is evident that India has used the issue of terrorism for political gain, often at the expense of bilateral relations. This has led to counterterrorism efforts becoming entangled with broader political and strategic interests, making it more difficult to develop a comprehensive approach to the issues.

In the interim, working together to address terrorism and promote regional stability, the SCO members must trust each other and should not confront each other. The two ministers did not meet bilaterally, and there was no sign of reconciliation in their last-longer strained relations.

However, if there are no outcomes with a sign of trust in each other among the member states, then what was the point of attending the summit? Or it means that India and Pakistan have their reason to be part of the bloc? It is worth noting that India is also a sole member of QUAD, and one of the main objectives of the QUAD is to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, India also sees China as a strategic rival and a security threat, especially after the border clashes in 2020. Nevertheless, India’s participation in the Quad has been seen as a way to counterbalance China, while its participation in the SCO has been perceived as a strategy to isolate Pakistan and portray it as a state sponsor of terrorism in the international arena. Nevertheless, it conveys that India’s participation in both organizations reflects a dual-game self-centered strategy.

I do not intend to accuse India of engaging in international organizations but to reveal the inconsistency of its foreign policy. India should not advance its interests at the cost of others. Meanwhile, blaming Pakistan for terrorism or calling Pakistan a terrorist country is not a solution to their ever-lasting rivalry, but such attitudes can only cite hate among the citizens, further escalating bilateral rivalry. Pakistan has long extended its hand for negotiation, and the recently proposed Kartarpur Peace Corridor was another way to improve relations between countries. However, India’s choice to scuffle the special status of the undecided region of Kashmir in 2019 undermined the atmosphere for holding talks between India and Pakistan.

Lastly, to bring peace and stability to the region, both countries should foster trust and cooperation and refrain from accusing each other in international forums. South Asia has immense potential for development and cooperation, but the entrenched conflict between India and Pakistan hampers every step toward progress.