Russian-Chinese technical-military cooperation in the 1990s started when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) initiated large-scale rearmament based on Russian technologies. About 80% of Russian armaments were targeted at the Chinese market. At the same time, to create a more solid basis for bilateral technical-military relations, Russia and China found deeper opportunities for industrial integration and carried out long-term projects in the area of military development. Russia’s defense-related exports of military services to China subsequently grew in record numbers throughout the early 2000s.Yevgeny Primakov in 1996 had already suggested the concept of cooperation between Russia, India, and China (RIC) – countries that belong to a group of states that already had their economies in transition, occupied similar positions in the international political and economic structure and had similar approaches for shaping the political and economic order after the Cold War.
Two decades after Primakov’s position, during President Putin’s June 2016 visit to China, the two countries adopted a Joint Declaration on Strengthening Global Strategic Stability. The document is not only a new step in the development of Russia-China relations, but it is also the contribution of Russia and China to the formation of a modern concept of strategic stability in International Relations. Sovereignty, security, and development reflects the main national interests common to both countries. Mostly, characterized by connections in the military sector in addition to political and economic operations. As the Asian Bank, APEC, and BRICS, for example, show how Moscow and Beijing have gone further and created closer ties in recent years, the creation of the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, signed in 2001, gave Russia and China even greater connectivity in business and interregional cooperation.
The partnership initiative between the two countries is an important systemic driver, not just beneficial for joint Russia-China cooperation, including high-tech engineering, energy, transportation, machinery and equipment projects, both in the immediate and long term. Structures of expert dialogues already exist in Russia-China relations to facilitate the projects, such as the Russia-China Business Council (2019), Sino-Russian Committee for Friendship, Peace and Development (2006).A substantial problem developing within Russia-China cooperation, however, is the extreme technological nationalism endemic to the military and industrial circles of the two countries. Both parties, but especially China, see the importation of military goods and services as a security threat and potential national dilemma. Despite this barrier, both still aim to expand their cooperation and make progress towards more complex diplomatic cooperation forms, such as the extensive carrying out of long-term joint projects with emerging military technologies.
The Russian economy has experienced negative consequences due to the sharp fall in global oil prices, the fall in the value of the ruble, and the reduced rate of GDP growth in recent years. Russian companies plan to attract Chinese financing, including the selling of shares in relevant industries. Given the slump in the domestic economy and Western sanctions added on top, Russian companies are limited in their ability to attract loan capital in both Russia and the West, while Chinese companies are ready to offer commercially viable and politically stable terms for economic cooperation.
Russia and China must seek solid institutional guarantees for their continued development in economic cooperation, eliminating trade and investment barriers that limit their cooperation. Potential cooperation in power generation, infrastructure, transport, and agriculture is immense. China has received the status of a major offshore trading center for its currency, the Yuan, allowing it to increase the liquidity of Chinese currency, which gives the Chinese economy considerable scope and leverage internationally.
The agreement to establish the “Intergovernmental Commission for Cooperation and Development of the Russian Far East and the Baikal and Northeast China Region” was also discussed in 2016[1], where the government of the Russian Federation approved a set of measures to establish and improve infrastructure facilities of the Primorye-1 and Primorye-2 international transport passages. These connect the northeastern provinces of China with ports in southern Russia. The expectation is that they will transport 45 million tons of grain and container shipments by 2030.
Striving to preserve full sovereignty in decision-making, Russia supports the policy of One China, recognizing Taiwan as part of the country, and takes a similar position on Tibet. Russia also insists that third party participation in any South China Sea dispute is unacceptable. In a similar fashion, China supports Russia in the war against Chechnya and has also condemned the sanctions imposed on Russia over Crimea.
Russia, having most of its coastline in the Arctic Circle, defines its interests in official strategic documents like the “Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security until 2020”.Climate change and, consequently, the Arctic meltdown are also of Chinese interest, as they are likely to impact agricultural production and Asian rainy seasons. Its interests in the Arctic can be reduced to two categories: short-term and long-term. The first show that Beijing is interested in activities such as scientific research, resource exploration, navigation, and security. But it also looks to the future, analyzing climate change and its potential consequences to the region which can massively affect the entire global community.
China also sees the Arctic as a means of increasing influence in
the region. China is the first Asian state showing interest and making efforts
to become a full member of the Arctic Council[2], which
it accomplished in 2010. Since 2011, China, the world’s largest exporter, has
shown interest in expanding and developing this alternative Arctic route as
more favorable to some of its more traditional Southern maritime routes. Three
new navigation routes appear in the Arctic region with the melting of the ice: the
Northwest passage (west of Greenland and North of Canada),the Northeast passage
(North of the Russian Federation), and passage through the North Pole. There is
also China’s strong desire to link the Arctic to its Belt and Road initiative,
encouraging joint efforts to build the new “Polar Silk Road” or
“blue economic gateway” that would link China to Europe across the
Arctic Ocean. Although Beijing promoted the project as a mutual economic development
initiative, it is widely seen as an attempt by China to build a huge
multinational zone of economic and political influence that has Beijing at its nucleus.
This way, as China says: the Arctic is an international issue. But an
international issue that should have Chinese, and perhaps Russian, management.
[1]RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 2016. The 2016 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. <http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248> (in Russian)
[2]Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States.
